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POWER, CIVILIZATION AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSCIENCE[1]

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After the first world war, Paul Valéry spoke for the entire generation when he observed that Western civilization had learned that it was mortal, and that "a civilization is as fragile as a life."[2] Thoughtful people discussed Oswald Spengler's work, began to criticize the idea of progress, revived cyclical theories of cultural decline, and were deeply stirred by the idea that Western civilization was in a state of decay. Since that time there has been no end to jeremiads and diagnoses judging that the crisis of our time is caused by the loss of spiritual convictions, the eclipse of transcendental values, the decline of morality, or the breakdown of traditional belief systems.[3]

Frequently, the writings in this genre have offered not sound diagnoses but merely truisms and dolorous representations of symptoms; nevertheless, concealed in them lurks a psychological truth. The breakdown in morality and traditional beliefs, stimulated by rapid social change, mass society and secularization, has helped to devitalize the psychological bearer of conscience and morality: the superego. Historically, the cultivation of the superego had propagated civilized men and a system of internal controls. Now the deterioration of the superego has brought crisis for political power and regression for civilization.

Through a union of political theory with history, psychoanalytic psychology and social science, an analysis of the crisis illuminates political realities and opens new perspectives for the political scientist. In this paper I suggest an approach that explains puzzling relationships and brings together phenomena that have been separate only in appearance. On the one hand, the approach commits itself to the rigorous examination of behavior and the search for causal relationships. On the other hand, understanding the significance of familiar concepts such as authority and obligation, and recognizing that in the political community men act as moral agents, the approach maintains its connection with traditional political theory.

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[1] This paper is based on my essay in the forthcoming volume edited by Maurice Stein, Arthur Vidich and David M. White, *Identity and Anxiety: Survival of the Person in Mass Society*, to be published by The Free Press early in 1960.

[2] Paul Valéry, "Le crise de l'esprit," *The Athenaeum* (London), 1919, pp. 182–84.

[3] The most cogent sociological analysis is the now classic work by Karl Mannheim, *Diagnosis of our Time* (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1943).

I. THE DETERIORATED SUPEREGO

The conditions of mass society have weakened the foundations of political community and have crippled the normal mechanisms of political power. An authentic system of political power blends many forms of social control, rational and irrational, but within the domain of power subordinates are tied to their leaders in a moral and material community—whether the leaders be despots, oligarchs, or democratic representatives—and their obedience to direction is largely voluntary. In contrast, a politicized mass is held together by irrational bonds and manipulated anxiety, supplemented in some systems by violence and terror.

Violence is not the same as power; indeed, violence may be considered to be the failure of power. Ultimately, power depends on authority and voluntary obedience, which is based on persuasion, and persuasion, in turn, depends on convictions, ideals and respect. Certainly, force may be used in a domain of power to guarantee prescribed actions and to safeguard the limits of permitted behavior; nevertheless, sanctions, penalties, and the fear of punishment are merely braces and not foundations. As Rousseau put it, "the severity of penalties is only a vain resource, invented by little minds in order to substitute terror for that respect which they have no means of obtaining."[4] Historically, force has played an important but limited part in the construction of political communities. James Bryce observed:

> As it is the historian who best understands how much Force has done to build up States, so he most fully sees that Force is only one among many factors, and not the most important, in creating, moulding, expanding and knitting together political communities.[5]

A system of political power is an order in which the action of subordinates, directed by leaders, is dependable and predictable, and in such a system the use of force is limited to specific cases that are, literally, out of order. Charles Merriam explained:

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[4] "A Discourse on Political Economy," trans. G. D. H. Cole, in *The Social Contract and Discourses* (Everyman's Library; New York: Dutton, 1950), p. 295.

[5] *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* (New York: Oxford, 1901), p. 471.

In most communities the use of force is relatively uncommon in proportion to the number of regulations, and the success of the organization is not measured by the amount of violence in specific cases, but by the extent to which violence is avoided and other substitutes discovered. The monopoly of force, which is so often declared to be the chief characteristic of the political association, is not meant for daily use, but as a last resort when all other measures of persuasion and conciliation have failed.[6]

What distinguishes political power from crude types of coercion is that it provides a pattern of control more efficient and more desirable than force. As Merriam observed,

> The functional situation out of which the political arises is not the demand for force as such, but the need for some form of equilibrium, adjustment, *modus vivendi* between the various groups and individuals of the community, as a substitute indeed for force in many cases.[7]

Sometimes political power succeeds in creating a social tie that did not previously exist,[8] but usually its function is to regulate, direct, coordinate and control existing social relationships. It acts as the control of controls—in the oldest sense of the word, as the "governor" of society. To function properly, political power depends on certain social and psychological conditions. The governing class, first of all, must be able to satisfy material needs of the subordinates.[9] The capacity to satisfy needs through the control of the key institutions is a major source of power because it permits governors to manipulate satisfactions and privations, and to dispense rewards and penalties. However, as a recent book on political economy has pointed out:

> Not all the rewards and deprivations to which a person responds are external. The source of many rewards and deprivations is internal, in the sense that these rewards and deprivations are inflicted by the self on the self. . . . Such internalized rewards and deprivations constitute the individual's conscience (or superego). Because these rewards and deprivations are internalized, once they are built into the individual they are not easily manipulated.[10]

External controls, therefore, are only part of a power system, for unless they are to survey every action, governors must rely on a system of internal controls: the restraints of conscience and morality.

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[6] Charles E. Merriam, *Political Power* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950), p. 21.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] See *The Sociology of George Simmel,* trans. Kurt Wolff (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950), p. 192.

[9] In a comprehensive work that is little known today, a conservative writer of last century claimed that all political forms may be derived from the collective patterns in which minorities manage to satisfy mass needs. See Karl Ludwig von Haller, *Restauration der Staats-Wissenschaft,* 6 Bde (2te Aufl.; Winterthur: Steinerischen Buchhandlung, 1820–34). Haller's perspective is important, but he was reluctant to recognize the other side—that political superiors also *need* the services of their subordinates.

[10] R. A. Dahl and C. E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Harper, 1953), pp. 113–14.

In the literature of the psychoanalytic movement, the hidden motions and dynamics of the superego, the psychological carrier of conscience and morality, are revealed. A psychoanalytic writer explains:

> Conscience is a *scientific* newcomer. The popular connotation is of course age-old; it refers exclusively to a set of conscious, conventional and necessary precepts of right and wrong, specific for specific societies. *Unconscious* conscience, *the hidden but real master of the personality,* is, on the other hand, almost entirely unknown. The language does not even possess a word for it; Freud supplied the lack with the introduction of the term "superego."[11]

Psychoanalysis is no substitute for social science, but, employed judiciously, it amplifies the perception and comprehension of political events. As Harold Lasswell has pointed out, "the social scientists have received an ultramicroscope from Freud's original work that adds unprecedented depth to the observational tools available for the study of human interactions."[12]

Freud himself declared that "psychoanalysis has never claimed to provide a complete theory of human mentality as a whole, but only expected that what it offered should be applied to supplement and correct the knowledge acquired by other means." The limited but significant perspective of psychoanalytic psychology cannot tell us much about history, economics or social organization, which are subject to laws of their own, but it can take us inside history and society, so to speak, and, by providing a theory of motivation, show us the psychic forces that move concrete living individuals to action, and explain what that action means to different types of character under varied conditions of stress.

Civil obedience is conditioned and regulated by the superego. It can make men obey when it is against their interest to obey, and it can make men disobey when it is in their interest to remain obedient. Just as obedience has an inner dimension, civil disobedience depends on subjective conditions. To examine a political event such as a revolution, for example, one must be aware of two levels of motivation. On one level, a revolution is the product of abuses imposed by factors of a social and economic nature. But to understand the intensity of revolutionary violence, one must take into account the other level and recognize in the subterranean caverns of the soul the Oedipal source of the passion to destroy the father figures who are the representatives and standard bearers of the institutions under attack.[13]

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[11] Edmund Bergler, *The Superego: Unconscious Conscience* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1952), p. vii; italics in the original.

[12] Harold D. Lasswell, "Impact of Psychoanalytic Thinking on the Social Sciences," in L. D. White (ed.), *The State of the Social Sciences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 89.

Thus there is an inside and an outside to every power relation. The distribution of power in society depends on a number of "external" conditions—the factors of history, economics, military action, status systems, and so on—but there are also important subjective conditions as well; namely, the ways in which people typically respond to domination and subordination. These patterns of response vary with cultural conditions, but a number of elements within them seem to be invariable, for the responses to domination and subordination are based on prototypes of behavior learned in the family early in life. For this reason, Freud argued that the family is the prototype of social organization and the bridge between individual and social psychology.[14]

In the genesis of the superego, this psychological vehicle of ideals, conscience and morality becomes the successor and internal representative of the parents and other educators, establishing in the mind a system of controls that were formerly enforced externally. This institution, constructed in the ego by the process of introjection and internalization, opposes the other activities of the mind by observation, criticism and prohibition.[15] It "may bring fresh needs to the fore, but its chief function remains the limitation of satisfactions."[16] Its chief weapon in controlling the personality is the feeling of guilt, an internalized form of the pain or discomfort of punishment.

In the taboos and restrictions established to ward off guilt, Freud and other psychoanalytic writers have argued, one finds the beginnings of social organization, moral restriction and religion. They supposed that the action of the superego was responsible for the whole spiritual aspiration of man and his impressive system of cultural institutions. Identified in the superego they found all forms of inhibition: God, morality, and every idea that restrains men from satisfying their instinctual demands.[17] Although tyrannical superegos produced neuroses, the superego itself made civilization possible, since the latter depended on the renunciation of instinct. The superego was the tragic burden of civilized man.

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[13] *Cf.* Marie Coleman, "Integrative Approach to Individual and Group Psychology," *Psychoanalytic Review*, Vol. 36 (1949), pp. 389–402.

[14] Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo* (first published in 1913), trans. A. A. Brill, in *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud* (New York: The Modern Library, 1938); *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1949).

[15] Ernest Jones, "The Genesis of the Superego," *Papers on Psychoanalysis* (5th ed.; London: Buillière, Tindall and Cox, 1948), pp. 145–52.

[16] Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1949), p. 19.

[17] Freud, *Totem and Taboo, op. cit.*; *The Future of an Illusion*, trans. W. D. Robson-Scott (New York: Doubleday, 1957); *Civilization and its Discontents*, trans. Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth, 1930); *Moses and Monotheism*, trans. Katherine Jones (New York: Knopf, 1939).

The forms of imagery and idea through which the superego "speaks" to the personality depend on the cultural matrix, for the superego is also a transmitter of culture. As Freud put it, the superego "represents more than anything the cultural past. . . . In the emergence of the superego we have before us, as it were, an example of the way in which the present is changed into the past. . . . "[18] In some cultures, superego commands come from the powerful and omniscient spirits of departed ancestors, who speak to the individual and come to his aid in time of need.[19] In Western society, I would argue, superego controls tend to take a more abstract form. Though the superego emerges originally from the prohibitions and commands of the parents, it develops according to laws of its own. After introjecting primordial figures from the external world, the normal superego grows by depersonalization and universalization, creating abstract ideals such as justice, obligation and duty.[20] After creating these internal abstract standards, it projects them into the external world, searching for concrete models to confirm the internal commands.

From the tendency to magnify and universalize, the superego constructs a fantasy of omnipotence from experience with external power and a standard of absolute justice from experience with ethical norms and standards of conduct. The traditional model that incorporates omnipotence and absolute justice is, of course, the idea of God.

The image of God is linked genetically with the child's father, Freud claimed, and authority figures—gods and kings—were "substitutive formations for the father." Clinical evidence suggested:

> that god is in every case modelled after the father and that our personal relation to god is dependent upon our relation to our physical father, fluctuating and changing with him, and that god at bottom is nothing but an exalted father.[21]

The conception of God is a superego model which is not debilitated by the physical and moral weaknesses of the human father. As Freud put it, man, having realized that "his father is a being with strictly limited powers, and by no means endowed with every desirable attribute, therefore looks back to the memory image of the over-rated father of his childhood, exalts it into a deity, and brings it into the present, and into reality."

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[18] *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, pp. 123, 124.

[19] *Cf.* Wulf Sachs, *Black Anger* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947).

[20] *Cf.* Freud, *The Problem of Lay-Analyses*, trans. A. P. Maerker-Branden (New York: Brentano, 1927), p. 125.

[21] *Totem and Taboo*, pp. 919, 922.

Though this description of the psychological origins of the idea of God explains something about the genesis of the superego, it tells us little about the direction the superego takes in its development. Certainly, God replaces the parent as the source of moral authority, and the individual's enjoyment of security and ease of conscience does depend on the internal blessing he receives from fulfilling the demands of morality. Nevertheless, the idea of God takes on characteristics of its own, beyond the concrete imagery of primordial authority, and becomes an ideal of ethical perfection, with the characteristics of omnipotence, absolute virtue and justice. The difficulty of sustaining such an ideal in the modern world is one of the factors leading to the deterioration of the superego and to the crisis in political power.

The processes of secularization have so profoundly weakened traditional convictions that the idea of God has become dim—as a result of social and intellectual transformations in the liberal states and of the campaign against religion in the totalitarian systems. Consequently, God has become less real as a source to confirm superego commands. The contemporary return to religion is by and large not an authentic movement of the superego but a pragmatic attempt of the ego to make up for the lack of superego controls by engineering piety and by establishing religion as an instrument of comfort, mental health, or morality. Such attempts are superficial and are always swept away.

Also sapping the strength of the superego, the realities of political conflict in the present age have tended to destroy the moral authority of leadership. In constitutional states the superego's demand for a balance between power and virtue traditionally has been satisfied by the rule of law. Modern political leaders, especially in the totalitarian systems, may satisfy the superego's search for omnipotence, for the leader has at his disposal weapons and technological power that make him appear all-powerful. Yet, he is infinitely corruptible, and the spectacle of omnipotence conflicts with the demand for virtue and justice.

There is no point in condemning Machiavellism or in lamenting the contrast between moral man and immoral society, for unwelcome realities in political history are just as immune from maledictions as are earthquakes and pestilences. I am merely pointing to social consequences. To function in the realm of power politics, the state cannot act as a moral entity, but to draw political obedience from its citizens it must depend on trust and moral obligation. The contradiction between its *realpolitiker* role and its moralizing role contributes to the incidence of moral anxiety, restlessness, and political rage. Furthermore, the absence of moral paradigms to confirm internal controls has contributed to the deterioration of the superego.

Clinicians tend to consider the superego primarily as an instrument of torture to the distressed personality, and to treat what Freud called "moral anxiety" exclusively as a neurotic symptom.[22] However, critical social events may evoke moral anxiety in comparatively normal superegos. The spectacle of unrestrained power exercised by political leaders may infuse the personality with more than fear—with malaise, anxiety and a sense of restlessness, for the superego seeks a model worthy of obedience and respect. For this reason, throughout political history, tyrants have labored to transform control by force and violence into rule by authority. Moreover, there is no want of examples in which the corruption of leaders has destroyed their moral authority. As Harold Laski observed, "It is the record of all history that no class of men can retain over a period sufficient moral integrity to direct the lives of others. Sooner or later they pervert those lives to their own ends."[23]

The dynamics of leadership in mass society tend to take a special form, especially in the totalitarian states and modern dictatorships. The leader controls by fascination rather than by trust and respect. He appears as a savior endowed with magical qualities, binds to himself a corps of disciplined lieutenants, captures the devotion of the masses, and his power to direct their energies according to his command depends on his skill in manipulating free-floating anxiety. This kind of control requires a permanent reservoir of anxiety, strong libidinal ties—between the leader and his lieutenants, and between the leader and the masses—and strong hatreds of scapegoats and alleged enemies. Seeking support for the regime by ideological flattery of the masses and the manipulation of anxiety, this type of leadership has been named caesarism.[24] It is not a new form of control—the very name proclaims its existence in the Roman Republic; the term has been used to describe the leadership of the Bonapartes in France; and Neumann showed that Cola di Rienzo was a caesaristic proto-fascist leader in fourteenth-century Italy.[25]

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[22] *Cf.* Edmund Bergler, *The Battle of the Conscience* (Washington, D. C.: Washington Institute of Medicine, 1948); *The Superego: Unconscious Conscience, op. cit.*

[23] *A Grammar of Politics* (5th ed.; London: Allen and Unwin, 1948), p. 290.

[24] Franz Neumann, "Anxiety and Politics," in *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State,* ed. Herbert Marcuse (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), p. 278 ff.

[25] Walter Bagehot, "Caesarism after Thirteen Years," *The Economist* (London), 1865, in *The Works of Walter Bagehot,* ed. Forrest Morgan (Hartford, Connecticut: Traveler's Insurance Company, 1891), Vol. 2, p. 440 ff. Franz Neumann, "Anxiety and Politics," *loc. cit.; Behemoth: the Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (New York: Oxford, 1942), pp. 465–67.

Caesaristic leaders have eminent stage presence—Napoleon III, for example, was notable for his theatrical talents—but the acting of a modern totalitarian leader, such as Hitler or Mussolini, is more shamanistic than theatrical. He seeks to capture not mere adulation but absolute devotion, for his purpose is not mere persuasion but the possession of souls. Whereas the actor as an artist is content, like the Pied Piper, to draw his audience away from the real world to the world of his illusion, the totalitarian leader directs his masses to an assault on reality, impelling them to remake the real world in the image of his delusion. Institutionalizing and manipulating anxiety to direct the energies of the mass and to strengthen the identifications within it, he substitutes his own authority for the internal authority of the superego.

Freud distinguished a mass from rational and cooperative groups.[26] A mass regresses to what he called a "primary group" dominated by a leader. "A primary group of this kind is a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal and have consequently identified with one another in their ego."[27] In the mass, individuals are reduced to a more childlike form of behavior, their normal intellectual functions are lowered, and their emotions made more volatile.[28] The individual gives up his superego, Freud said, "and substitutes for it the group ideal as embodied in the leader." The model of leadership in the mass is hypnosis, and, in the case of hypnosis, "no one can doubt that the hypnotist has stepped into the place of the [superego]."[29]

The mass dominated by a leader, therefore, is a regressive form of organization; its regression is threefold: psychological, political and cultural. It is a psychological regression, Freud explained, because the members lose ego-function and suffer a loss of superego controls. Secondly, I would add, it is a political regression.

The question of lower and higher forms of political control, distinguishing between domination and political power, is as old as Aristotle, who argued in the first book of the *Politics* that power originates in the household but evolves into higher forms. The political community is a kind of association different from the household and the model of paternal power does not apply to it. Its origin is patriarchal but its end is rational. The question was also debated extensively in seventeenth-century England during the revolutionary period, when the old political structure had collapsed, both in reality and in imagination, and the new forms were not yet clearly perceived. From the literature of this time (the most creative period for Western political theory) emerged the conviction that a rational polity was a higher and more desirable form than the old model of patriarchal authority. Hobbes incurred the suspicion of the royalist party, despite his congenial political sentiments and his absolutist ideas, precisely because he abandoned the patriarchal theory of power and argued for monarchical absolutism from a rational ground. Hobbes also made clear in the *Leviathan* that he understood the distinction between government by "institution," based on rational consent, and "dominion paternall and despoticall." Locke, in the *First Treatise on Civil Government*, demolished the patriarchal theory of authority, as expressed by Filmer, and, in the *Second Treatise*, explained that political power was rational and based on consent; not patriarchal and founded on mere domination, although, he suggested, the origins of government may be found in the father's control of the family. Moreover, in the next century, Rousseau distinguished between power by nature and force, which was patriarchal; and power by convention and consent, which was political. In the nineteenth century, under the influence of the idea of evolution, political writers accepted the notion that political forms evolve from family groups dominated by an authoritarian patriarch to higher, more free, rational organizations based on consent. H. S. Maine argued that just as the law evolves from status to contract, political life grows from the patriarchal clan to the modern state with its more rational institutions and more room for individual freedom. And in the second decade of the twentieth century, a psychoanalytic writer, after the abortive 1919 revolution in Germany, declared that the old forms of domination were collapsing in Western society, that a community of "brothers" was emerging, and that we could look forward to a "fatherless society."[30] Thus, in the history of thinking about political power, one finds wide agreement on the idea that social control based on a paternal type of domination is a regressive political form.

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[26] *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.* The original German title used the word *Massenpsychologie*, and perhaps "mass psychology" would be a more appropriate translation.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 80. Freud later substituted the term "superego" for "ego ideal." Today, in the vocabulary of psychoanalysis, "ego ideal" refers to only a part of the superego.

[28] *Cf.* Heinz Hartmann, "On Rational and Irrational Action," *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences* (New York: International Universities Press), Vol. 1 (1947), pp. 359–92.

[29] *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 102, 77.

Freud also argued that the mass was a cultural regression, since he considered the history of civilization to be the progressive emancipation of mankind from the tyrannical emotional bonds of the horde. By increased rational control of nature through science (a function of the ego), and by the self-discipline of the superego, mankind was becoming more free, progressively emancipating itself from its origins. The work of civilization, to which psychoanalysis was dedicated, was the Faustian wresting of ground from the Zuyder Zee of the unconscious and the liberation of man from all forms of irrational authority.

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[30] Paul Federn, *Zur Psychologie der Revolution: Die Vaterlose Gesellschaft* (Wien: Anzengruber-Verlag Brüder Suschitzky, 1919), expanded from an article in *Der Österreichische Volkswirt*, 1919.

Freud thought that the religions of mankind must be considered as mass delusions or as wishes and dreams compensating for lack of instinctual gratification, but he also knew that the religious world-view was a hard-won gain for civilization. The main achievement of religion had been the psychic binding of the fear of demons—the conquest of animism.

A distinguished orientalist and historian of culture has observed:

> Animism, with its fears, its irrationality, and its imaginative powers, lies in the subconsciousness of every historic faith, because it is part of the inescapable heritage of mankind, the legacy of those 500,000 years which lie behind the 5,000 years of religious development. It is a prime function of religion to discipline and to control these primitive survivals which haunt the background of our conscious existence. Their impulses, which without religious direction remain subjective and anarchical, are governed and directed in and through religion towards less egocentric ends; and the irrational fears which loom so large in animistic attitudes are transformed into ethical and religious reverence.[31]

By defeating animism and magical thinking, religion raised the spiritual condition of mankind. Now, when the religious world view has lost its grip on men, some elements of the more primitive mentality have sprung back in its place. Demons have reappeared in political form and are used by leaders to their own advantage. Neumann pointed out that the caesaristic leader, who binds men to himself by their anxiety, gives them a view of history that is conspiratorial.[32] I suggest it is the equivalent of a political demonology, attributing social frustrations to concrete malicious wills, increasing the incidence of fear and persecutory anxiety, and it cultivates a mental condition that Freud called animism.

Writers of the ancient world recognized that religion and traditional morality were illusions, held for irrational reasons; still, they knew that these institutions made possible a moral climate that was the necessary condition of a rational political order. Philemon Holland's quaint but lively old translation of Plutarch conveys the force of the latter's conviction that religion "constraineth and holdeth together all humane society, this is the foundation, prop, and stay of all Laws. . . . " Contempt for the masses gives their words a cynical and manipulative ring;[33]

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[31] H. A. R. Gibb, "The Structure of Religious Thought in Islam," *The Muslim World*, Vol. 38 (1948), p. 27.

[32] "Anxiety and Politics," *loc. cit.*

[33] Altheim contends that in Rome the nobles purged *superstitio* from *religio*, but that the other classes did not. See Franz Altheim, *A History of Roman Religion*, trans. Harold Mattingly (London: Methuen, 1938), p. 333 ff.

still, the writers of classical antiquity perceived that the political necessity of religion was greater than its usefulness to the ruling class. Critias, the oligarch, Plato's uncle, suggested in his play, *Sisyphus*, that since legal punishments could reach only open infractions, and were powerless to restrict actions that escaped detection, social control required the idea of all-knowing gods who perceived every deed, word and thought.[34] Polybius, a rationalistic, sceptical Greek and an intimate of the Scipionic circle at Rome, lauded the use of religion for disciplinary purposes, claiming that the masses must be restrained by invisible terrors and tragic fears. He wrote: "I think, not that the ancients acted rashly and at haphazard in introducing among the people notions concerning the gods and beliefs in the terrors of hell, but that the moderns are most rash and foolish in banishing such beliefs."[35] Cicero, himself a member of the college of augurs, clearly indicated that divination was a lost art, and suggested that it may really never have existed, yet he asserted that the mystique of divination was not only an invaluable instrument for the ruling class, but also a necessity for the well-ordered state.[36] He expressed most lucidly and dramatically the classical conviction that political power and the order of law must be reinforced by religious superego controls:

> We talk as if all the miseries of man were comprehended in death, pain of body, sorrow of mind or judicial punishments . . . [but] the divine punishment of the impious is double their legal penalties; for it consists in the pang of conscience while they live, and the reported anguish of the dead; so that their chastisement may become manifest, both to the judgment and the satisfaction of the living.[37]

In addition, Cicero believed that religion performed a civilizing function: " . . . to the advantage of human society, there is nothing better than the mysteries by which we are polished and softened into politeness from the rude austerities of barbarism."[38]

And Livy, conservative historian of the Augustan age, like Hegel seeking to justify established power by a principle of historical development both rational and providential, found the first transformation in the history of Rome to be the movement from a warlike and barbarous society to a sessile, rationally organized, more civilized state. He ascribed this transformation to the work of pious Numa, the legendary second king, who founded anew on the principles of justice, law and custom the kingdom which had been established by arms and violence.[39] The first step in this transformation was to abstain from warfare, for he considered "that a fierce people should be mollified by the disuse of arms" and that they could not be reconciled to principles of justice and morality during time of war. "When he saw that their minds [had] been rendered ferocious by military life," he erected a temple and established religion.[40] Rome was destined, of course, to return to warfare; yet, not as a society of barbarians but as a state. Livy suggested that religious controls were an alternative to the exclusively military organization that Rome was destined to transcend. Numa established religion because:

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[34] *Cf.* Benjamin Farrington, *Head and Hand in Ancient Greece* (London: Watts, 1947). The classical view of religion as a form of thought control has been restated often. In Elizabethan times, Richard Hooker observed that laws "have no farther power than over our outward actions only, whereas unto men's inward cogitations, unto the privy intents and motions of their hearts, religion serveth for a bridle." *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity,* V. ii. 3.

[35] Polybius vi. 56. *Cf.* F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* (London: Oxford, 1957), Vol. 1, p. 741.

[36] Cicero *De Div.; De Leg.* ii.

[37] "The Treatise on the Laws," in *The Political Works of Marcus Tullius Cicero,* 2 vols., trans. Francis Barham (London: Spettigue, 1842), Vol. 2, p. 111.

[38] *De Leg.* ii. 14; trans. Francis Barham, in *The Treatises of Cicero,* ed. C. D. Yonge (London: Bell, 1887), pp. 444–45.

> The removal of all danger from without would induce his subjects to luxuriate in idleness, as they would be no longer restrained by the fear of an enemy or by military discipline. To prevent this, he strove to inculcate in their minds the fear of the gods, regarding this as the most powerful influence which could act upon an uncivilised and, in those ages, a barbarous people.[41]

The Fathers of the Church agreed that an advanced religion was a civilizing force, and Christian writers perennially have conceived one mission of Christianity to be the taming of the barbarians. Christianity helped fashion a coherent order in the Western world: macrocosmically in the social order, microcosmically in the personality of European man. Though it differs in its secular premises, my argument is compatible with that of Christopher Dawson, a distinguished Catholic historian of culture, who writes:

> the importance of these centuries of which I have been writing is not to be found in the external order they created or attempted to create, but in the internal change they brought about in the soul of Western man—a change which can never be entirely undone except by the total negation or destruction of Western man himself.[42]

Ancient and medieval writers knew that religious controls gentled savage behavior and provided a moral climate within which a system of political power could exist. Modern *illuminati*, optimistic liberals and progressives of various kinds, with certain exceptions, have been on the side of secularization, correctly understanding that the traditional pieties were transmitted and held for irrational reasons and worked as restrictions, limiting the individual autonomy that they conceived to be the goal of civilization. Only Burke, Maistre and the writers of the counter-Enlightenment sensed that secularization would destroy the political community, leaving behind political wreckage upon which modern dictatorships have built their empires. Likewise, modern liberals, radicals and other writers on the side of liberation, recognizing that religion was an instrument of the ruling class, supposed that the destruction of that instrument would deprive the governors of an important weapon and would permit the subordinates to upset their oppressors and to establish a rational polity of their own design. These writers were not wise enough to know that religion historically had cultivated a moral order that was a constitutive—not merely regulative—element for political power, and that its destruction would make inevitable certain regressive forms of political domination more harsh than the systems they had condemned.

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[39] Livy 1. 19.

[40] *Ibid.*, trans. D. Spillan (New York: Harper, 1896), Vol. 1, p. 39.

[41] *Ibid.*, trans. W. M. Roberts (Everyman's Library; London: Dent, 1926), Vol. 1, p. 23.

[42] *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1950), p. 274.

Yet I will argue that what Dawson calls "the soul of Western man" has been crippled but not negated, that the superego has been debilitated but not destroyed, and, though caesaristic manipulation and totalitarian controls have rendered it inert, that it still survives underground and promises to endure in a state of watchful suspension.

II. THE ATAVISTIC SUPEREGO

Even though totalitarian states claim to have constructed a "new order" and to have created a "new man," deteriorated superego controls in those regimes remain as stubborn, irreducible, irrational obstacles that mock their pretensions. Religious movements were not stamped out but went underground. Nationalist movements resisted control and have erupted in the Ukraine, Poland and Hungary. Both religious convictions and nationalist sentiments are deeply imbedded in the superego, transmitted by parents to children partly by overt teaching and partly by unconscious gesture and the hidden ways concealed in each family's private world. There is no evidence, except in the cases dramatized for propaganda purposes, that the attempt to establish political superego models rival to the parents and to invade the family by enlisting children in youth groups, encouraging them to spy on their parents, has been successful.

In portions of the superego dominated by religious elements, there is latent opposition to the regime. German Christians not caught up in the

Nazi enthusiasm but still accustomed to passive acquiescence to political authority were not moved to oppose the regime until they conceived of National Socialism as a rival religion. Karl Barth gave a theological explanation of their position:

> National Socialism in the first stage of its power had in fact the character of a political experiment similar to other experiments and . . . the Church in Germany at that time—this is still my conviction today—had the right and the duty to confine herself to giving it, as a political experiment, first of all time and a chance, and therefore to adopting first of all a strictly neutral position.[43]

This kind of neutrality was justified by the conservative Protestant appeal to *Romans xiii*, in which the Apostle Paul enjoins Christians to "be subject unto the higher powers," for "the powers that be are ordained of God." But, Barth continued,

> it must now be said of this political problem so addressed to us that it is definitely not "only" a political problem. . . . National Socialism, according to its own revelation of what it is—a self revelation to which it has devoted all the time and chance till now allowed—is as well without any doubt something quite different from a political experiment. It is, namely, a *religious institution of salvation.* One cannot understand it as a political experiment, if one does not at the same time understand it in this other character, as a religious institution of salvation.[44]

Barth made it clear that a number of German Christians could maintain a position of neutrality in the face of political oppression and moral outrage and that not until National Socialism revealed itself as a rival religion, committing sacrilege and threatening the unity of the Church, did their superegos move them to a position of intransigent opposition.

In the historical role of early Christianity in the Roman Empire, one may perceive the action of the superego behind the fission and reconstruction of the domain of power. Though the early Christians passively obeyed the Roman government in matters defined as indifferent, their religious convictions opposed the moral authority of the Emperor. In effect, the Christian community established a rival domain of power impervious to Roman control. Their ascetic lives rendered them immune to the manipulation of external rewards and privations. Their religion would not compromise with the Roman pantheon—hence they could not be moved by Roman superego appeals. Nor did fear avail, for they were not intimidated by torture and preferred martyrdom to moral subordination. Only after the Emperor and the ruling class became

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[43] Karl Barth, *The Church and the Political Problem of our Day* (New York: Scribner, 1939), p. 31.

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 37, 41; italics in the original.

Christian themselves did the governors move into the Christian domain of power and reestablish themselves on firm superego foundations.

In other cases, when regimes have lost their moral authority but a rival domain of power has not established itself, the regime may be able to get along entirely with external controls, but they are crude and costly. When subjective controls do not work, constant surveillance is necessary, and a political police is required to organize a spy system.

Normally, however, every system has special techniques other than espionage to calculate and control subjective reactions to authority. Each political system, whether it is liberal or authoritarian, has some internal network of alarms designed to reveal subjective disobedience. Ritual actions with little apparent objective meaning function as postural insignia, screening out and isolating intractable superegos. The postures of subordination—the kow-tow, a pinch of incense, salute, form of address, loyalty oath, "attitude," or muscular carriage—are far from guarantees of *positive* loyalty, but when individuals conform—"wear" the insignia—they signal the *absence* of strong superego opposition to the symbols of power. If an individual rejects the ascribed posture and does not wear the insignia, refusing, for example, to take an oath, to attend prescribed meetings, to assume a tone of veneration, or to direct his face and muscles in the mask of cooperation, then he sets off an alarm, which draws official attention and marks him as a case of potential insubordination or superego rebellion.

In totalitarian dictatorships, one of the postural insignia is the mask of enthusiasm. Because silent obedience is an uncertain quality, the citizen body is denied the right of silence. "Nobody can hope to be left alone by claiming political ignorance or lack of political interest."[45] Citizens are expected to voice their animated consent to political decisions and to express what the official transcripts of speeches record as "prolonged applause." Moreover, the familiar response of staged enthusiasm reassures leaders who are uncertain of their moral authority, and, when repeated interminably, forces a mechanical reduction of the moral demands in the superegos of subordinates, even when they have serious reservations about a regime.

When intractable superego remnants cannot be absorbed, destroyed or converted, the only alternative is to keep them in suspension. If individuals find their leaders morally repugnant and if they are free to direct their loyalties, they will seek new leadership and institute a rival domain of power. As Laski put it, "The authority of any group is based, in fact, upon the living and spontaneous trust it can command. If it betrays or stultifies itself it ceases to win the loyalty that is its life."[46] The movement of the superego impelling men to find leadership with moral authority has in the past contributed to the formation of faction and the making of sedition, civil war and revolution. One of the functions of terror in totalitarian regimes is to paralyze potential factions and natural associations that might organize opposition.

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[45] Robert Waelder, "Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Psychological Comments on a Problem of Power," in *Psychoanalysis and Culture* (New York: International Universities Press, 1951), p. 185.

Terror paralyzes the impulse to *act* in opposition and inhibits the free movement of the superego. In regimes that are merely authoritarian, terror may produce indignation and may actually harm the regime, destroying its moral authority. But in a totalitarian state, when terror is applied to manipulated masses, increased terror leads to increased conformity.

Used in this way, terror reinforces regressive tendencies, inhibiting the superego, controlling individual aims, reducing moral autonomy and making the individual ready to cooperate and allow his behavior to be planned according to the aims of the leaders. In concentration camps the psychological regression of prisoners is striking. In a remarkable article, recording his experiences in such a camp, Bettelheim observed that all the pressures of living seemed to force the prisoners back to childhood attitudes and behavior, molding them into more or less willing tools of the camp administration.[47] The superegos of the prisoners functioned in a curious and stunted way. Many prisoners were anxious to accept and identify with the Gestapo and the SS. They walked and talked like camp guards, imitating their mannerisms, and wore shreds of Nazi uniforms. Some of them took the camp administrators as all-powerful images and even tried to defend their actions. They insisted that they must be secretly just and kind—they were so powerful that they must also be just.[48] All their positive emotions were concentrated on a few officers high up in the hierarchy of camp administrators, and they insisted that these officers were hiding behind their rough surfaces sentiments of justice and kindliness. The eagerness of these prisoners to find reasons in fantasy to support their claims was pitiful. In a different context, one may compare the behavior of the intellectuals described in the book by Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind,* who strove under varying conditions to convince themselves of the rightness of their regime.

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[46] H. J. Laski, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

[47] Bruno Bettelheim, "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology,* Vol. 38 (1943), pp. 417–52.

[48] Likewise, Jones discusses cases of individuals who insisted that since Hitler was irresistible, he must also be right. Ernest Jones, "The Psychology of Quislingism," *Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis* (London: Hogarth, 1951), Vol. 1, p. 280.

Many individuals, especially in the new generations reared under totalitarian conditions, apparently have little difficulty in identifying with the regime and making the totalitarian creed the standard of the superego. When commands are consistent with superego ideals, even when they apparently restrict freedom, they are not felt as restrictions. From the stories that have come out of Siberian slave camps, many prisoners who were communists—members of the Party formerly in good standing—did not have their positive feelings about the regime impaired by their imprisonment. They interpreted their deviations as crimes, were taking their punishment, and would return to function very much as before.[49] In these cases the claims of the superego were identified with the claims of the regime. Waelder explains such behavior by the conclusion that:

> Whenever the ideal which a restriction is intended to serve is *internalized* and forms part and parcel of our superego, the restriction does not seem to interfere with our freedom. But if this purpose or ideal is not part of our superego and the pressure is merely external, it is felt as oppressive and, beyond a certain intensity, as tyrannical.[50]

Religious fundamentalists, whose intransigent superegos were dominated by religious elements, have succeeded in enduring the terrors of totalitarian captivity, and they had no difficulty in opposing the regime since it was obviously an instrument of the devil. Persons who have suffered the most are those who concur with some values in the totalitarian creed but reject other parts of it, or are internally divided because they are committed to some values opposed to the regime. They tend to become completely demoralized.

With each new generation the totalitarian regime, through education and indoctrination, attempts to fulfill its boast that it has created a new humanity. The boast would be true if superegos could be shaped entirely by political education, but the superego is obstinate, conservative, and far from being as plastic as leaders would prefer.

It changes very slowly in response to changes in reality. The ideologies of the superego, Freud observed, perpetuate the past—one might call the process moral lag—and yield but slowly to the demands of the present. Shaped in silent ways by the family, unconscious traditions and habits, the superego may be generations behind the new education. It plays a part in life that seems almost independent of external conditions and provokes the patience of officials charged with the construction of a new humanity.

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[49] See Joseph Scholmer, *Vorkuta,* trans. Robert Kee (New York: Holt, 1955).

[50] Robert Waelder, *op. cit.,* p. 195.

Enduring in hidden ways, the superego finds expression even in institutions that seem to contradict its very principles. Two important instances of its underground working in the totalitarian state are the institution of the public purge and the custom of bribery.

Public purges are opportunities for communal catharsis, not unlike the Greek drama. Secret rage against the corruption of leaders and aggressions caused by frustrations imposed by the regime may be deflected against paradigmatic enemies. The trial makes possible a proclamation of group morality and satisfies the superego's need for retribution and justice. Political violators are declared anathema, and their punishment assuages the guilt felt by citizens for hostile thoughts against the regime. This kind of behavior fits Lasswell's observation that:

> The spectacle of any violation of the accredited order arouses the repressed impulses of the spectator to indulge his own antisocial whims. This produces a crisis of conscience within the personalities of those who see and hear of the violation, and the individual is driven to relieve himself of his own discomfort by externalizing his aggression against those in the environment who threaten the inner equilibrium of his own life. To punish and to have punished the performer of a criminal act is to perform a vicarious act of propitiation of one's own conscience.[51]

Similarly, Fenichel points out that the unconscious basis of this demand for justice is the idea: "What I am not permitted to do, no one else should be permitted either."[52]

Moreover, the widespread custom of bribery in totalitarian states, even extending to the concentration camps, where bribery of guards by prisoners was flagrant, performed a psychological function. Bribery is an act of aggression against the powerful person who is bribed. Lasswell argues:

> The ubiquity of bribery in society is due to the fact that it is learned as a by-product of the experience of being a weak child in a world of strong adults. . . . Bribery is one of the most common of all the techniques by which the weak or the preoccupied can deal with the strong or the obstructive. It has the special lure of damaging the authoritative object even as he is being granted tangible advantages, and as such is particularly designed to throw authority into contempt, and to gratify the antisocial impulses of the personality. Keen pleasure

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[51] Harold D. Lasswell, "The Triple-Appeal Principle," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 37 (1932), 537.

[52] Otto Fenichel, *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis* (New York: Norton, 1945), p. 294; *cf.* Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego;* Franz Alexander and Hugo Staub, *The Criminal, the Judge, and the Public* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1931).

> is taken by many bribers in the very act of corrupting those who profess to represent the pomp and circumstance of the conventional order.[53]

Since the subordinates are weak and lack other acceptable means to express aggression, bribery will continue to be an ineradicable part of life in totalitarian regimes.

Superego remnants continue to embarrass militarized mass societies in non-totalitarian states also. The American public was made aware of the problem after the Korean war, when information was released that a large number of soldiers could not bring themselves to fire at the enemy. To cope with this problem, the field of military psychiatry has become the inverse of psychoanalysis, just as the science of bacteriological warfare has developed as the inverse of medical science. Military psychiatry consciously searches for techniques to assist the process of decivilization, to render men pliant under the domination of paternal (in a psychological sense) military leaders, and to loosen their consciences and trigger fingers.

The quality of civil life, of course, is affected directly by the extent to which military organization invades society. Mass societies show a tendency to revert to a military form of social organization and thereby to adopt the social psychology of a specific stage of barbarism—that of the community in arms. In his polemic with Leon Trotsky over the use of terror in the Bolshevik Revolution, Karl Kautsky went so far as to argue that such brutality and savage terrorism would never have been possible had not extended military experience in the nineteenth century halted the natural progress of social evolution and reversed the civilizing and humanizing effect of the eighteenth century, causing European men to revert to barbaric sentiments and impulses.[54]

Despite the cultural wreckage produced by historical and social changes, remnants of deteriorated superegos, and superegos secretly intact, survive underground, even though individuals in the manipulated mass are forced into psychological, political and cultural regression. Freud showed us that man's relation to barbarism is psychological—not solely historical. The mind contains "a survival of all the early stages alongside the final form"; civilized and primitive mental states coexist in every age and in every mind.[55] Freud and the crowd psychologists before him demonstrated that in the mass every civilized man is potentially a savage. Yet, knowing what we do about the obstinate endurance of the superego, it may also be true that mass men are potentially civilized. A restoration or reconstruction will build on foundations that already exist. The future of civilization may depend on whether men will recapitulate their own history and re-enact psychologically what had been accomplished historically.

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[53] "The Triple-Appeal Principle," *loc. cit.*, pp. 537–38.

[54] Karl Kautsky, *Terrorismus und Kommunismus; ein Beitrag zur Naturgeschichte der Revolution* (Berlin: Verlag Neues Vaterland, 1919).

[55] *Civilization and its Discontents*, p. 20; "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death," *Collected Papers* (London: Hogarth, 1953), Vol. 4, p. 301.

Men have endured periods similar to the present, though not so frightening. Bishop Stubbs, in his classic political history of England, examined the civil life of the fourteenth century, deplored its decline in moral power and general social disintegration, and concluded: "yet out of it emerges in spite of all, the truer and brighter day, the season of more general conscious life, higher longings, more forbearing, more sympathetic, purer, riper liberty." One never perceives the forces underground until they have accomplished their work—for good or for ill: "the historian has not yet arisen who can account . . . for the tides in the affairs of men."[56] In this same period of decline that Stubbs wrote about, Bryce agreed: "unseen causes were already at work which after no long interval restored the tone and spirit of England. It has often been so in history, though no generation can foretell how long a period of intellectual or moral depression will endure."[57]

Contrived attempts to bring about moral rejuvenation by spiritual tinkering and programs for character building are inauthentic, repugnant, worse than useless, and really fool no one. We shall have to wait. However, Camus has assured: "All of us, among the ruins, are preparing a renaissance beyond the limits of nihilism. But few of us know it."[58]

Restorations and renewals do not respond to invitations, but come silently, unexpectedly, and often in disguise, as if to deceive the powerful forces that would destroy them on recognition. In their secret wisdom, they take devious routes, ignoring our most desperate yearnings for their immediate advent; but once they are on the way, no one can hold them back.

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[56] William Stubbs, *The Constitutional History of England* (2d ed.; London: Macmillan, 1878), Vol. 2, p. 626.

[57] Bryce, *op. cit.*, p. 498.

[58] Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Knopf, 1956), p. 305.

IDEOLOGY HUNTING: THE CASE OF JAMES HARRINGTON

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It is well known that each age writes history anew to serve its own purposes and that the history of political ideas is no exception to this rule. The precise nature of these changes in perspective, however, bears investigation. For not only can their study help us to understand the past; it may also lead us to a better understanding of our own intellectual situation. In this quest the political theories of the 17th century and particularly of the English Civil War are especially rewarding. It was in those memorable years that all the major issues of modern political theory were first stated, and with the most perfect clarity. As we have come to reject the optimism of the eighteenth century, and the crude positivism of the nineteenth, we tend more and more to return to our origins in search of a new start. This involves a good deal of reinterpretation, as the intensity with which the writings of Hobbes and Locke, for instance, are being reexamined in England and America testify. These philosophical giants have, however, by the force of their ideas been able to limit the scope of interpretive license. A provocative minor writer, such as Harrington, may for this reason be more revealing. The present study is therefore not only an effort to explain more soundly Harrington's own ideas, but also to treat him as an illustration of the mutations that the art of interpreting political ideas has undergone, and, perhaps to make some suggestions about the problems of writing intellectual history in general.

To begin with, Harrington is a 17th century figure of some considerable intrinsic interest.* Not only was he the only avowed Machiavellian of the time but the controversies in which he was engaged, particularly with Hobbes, are of enduring importance as they touch upon the nature of both power and law. Beyond that, is the question how he came to appear to later writers in such a great variety of roles. Why has he served each interpreter so differently?

What is at stake here is the intrusion of ideology upon historical analysis. And ideology must be understood in three distinct senses. First of all, there are simply the political convictions and preoccupations of later thinkers who read them into Harrington. Secondly, there was ideology, not as a mere matter of political preferences, but in its historicist, all-explaining form. Here the metaphors of historical explanation become personified entities, and catch-words like "feudal," "bourgeois" and "revolution," dominate the stage entirely, while individual thinkers and events are used solely to prove the reality and necessity of these abstractions. Few writers have been exploited for this purpose more thoroughly than Harrington. Nor has this been entirely accidental.

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* I should like to acknowledge my debt to Charles Blitzer's unpublished Harvard Ph.D. thesis, "The Political Philosophy of James Harrington," which is to be published in the near future.

As one whose own main concern was with revolutions he was sure to become a center of interest for those ideologists whose thought is both the product of, and a continuous reflection upon, social conflict. It is this circumstance that makes Harrington such an excellent case-study for those who wish to examine the play of ideology upon history. And to the extent that political thinking is now not so exclusively preoccupied with the dynamics of social war, it can define itself by critically reviewing this aspect of the history of political theory. Lastly, there is ideology in the more neutral sense, as a term in sociological discourse. At the level of abstraction at which social wholes are investigated, individuals and their ideas are treated as functions, if not as direct effects, of these wholes. The unique and individual, the level of biography, tends to be ignored, or even to be modified, in order to illuminate the logic of an entire situation. That this is liable to lead to distortion in writings on the history of ideas is obvious; and in this respect, too, Harrington has been a victim. The following pages will, then, deal with two levels of inquiry, one into Harrington directly, and another into Harrington as a problem in the history of the interpretation of political ideas.

I. HARRINGTON IN THE WILDERNESS

Almost every account of Harrington begins with the lament that he is known to the world only as a republican theorist who composed a dreary utopia, and whose one distinction was to have declared that forms of government depend upon the distribution of property. Actually he is no longer quite so obscure a figure. If it was his misfortune to have been sandwiched in between Hobbes and Locke, the damage is being repaired.[1] The resurrection of the man whom Maitland called "the greatest of our Commonwealthmen" is all but complete.[2] And while this belated rise to fame has not always been to his advantage, it has thrown a good deal of light not only on him and his age; it has also done much to illuminate the character of much later political thinking.

Harrington's years in the wilderness were long and real enough. Only in America was he treated with much respect, a fact which, as we shall see, tells us something about the differences between English and American political thinking. But if he influenced Americans and so their institutions, this purely American Harrington was an utter bore. At worst he was made into a grab-bag of republican platitudes; at best, a prophet of written constitutions and an ingenious inventor of electoral devices.[3] In England, his logical successors, the

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[1] For this source of Harrington's troubles see R. Polin, "Economique et Politique au XVIIe Siècle: L'Oceana de James Harrington," *Revue Français de Science Politique*, Vol. 2 (1952), pp. 24–41.

[2] F. W. Maitland, *Collected Papers* (Cambridge, 1911), p. 21.

[3] The most Americanized view of Harrington is that presented in the only book-length study as yet published on him, H. F. Russell Smith, *James Harrington and his Oceana* (Cambridge, 1914). On the strength of this portrait he has been dismissed as inconsequential by both J. W. Gough, "Harrington and Contemporary Thought," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 45 (1930), pp. 395–404, and by A. E. Levett, "James Harrington," *Social and Political Ideas of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. F. J. C. Hearnshaw (New York, 1949), pp. 174–203.

Benthamites, did not look to history, and certainly not to the sad events of the Commonwealth, to support their plans for constitutional and electoral reform. Grote seems to have made some notes on Harrington, but utopias, however practical, did not appeal to the utilitarians. Indeed, so long as English liberalism traced its traditions only to 1688, or rested on utility without benefit of history, there was little point in thinking about Harrington. He is after all not self-sufficient, as Milton and Hobbes are; and anyone who preferred to forget the Civil War was bound to ignore those who are interesting mainly because of the part they played in those tumultuous years. After the Tories had their say on the Great Rebellion, it was politely ignored until the latter part of the 19th century when interest in revolutions revived spectacularly. They are not likely to be forgotten now. Nevertheless, even the few occasions on which Harrington was mentioned earlier are not without interest, if only to show the remarkable changes to which historical reputations are subject.

In his own time Harrington was generally rejected by all except a few personal friends and followers, as either an absurd dreamer or an atheist or both.[4] In the 18th century the second charge was no longer raised. It was not likely to arouse the indignation of that pair of "intelligent Tories," Montesquieu and Hume. Montesquieu dismissed Harrington as a utopian and scolded him for having exaggerated, and consequently false, ideas about liberty.[5] Since Harrington did in fact reject the traditional "liberties" that Montesquieu wanted to revive, this judgment is not surprising. Hume's admiration is rather more puzzling, for he thought of the Civil War as a case of popular madness. And indeed his praise of Harrington was qualified. Only after carefully noting the futility of all "imaginary commonwealths" and the inherent advantages of *any* established government, did he permit himself to indulge in the trivial pastime of following Harrington. Moreover, even though he accepted many of *Oceana's* institutions, he noted that civil liberty was not well protected in it, and that it was impossible to enforce legal limits upon property holding. Harrington had insisted that no conflicts of interest were to exist in his republic, and Hume, even in his airiest speculations could not imagine such a state of affairs. What is even more interesting is that Hume recognized two distinct phases in Harrington's thought. There was the republican dreamer, whom he rather patronizingly enjoyed, and also the theorist who had made property interests the sole basis of government. This Hume rejected, as historically untrue and psychologically unconvincing. Opinions and habits, as all conservative historians know, matter just as much as interest in attaching men to their rulers. Indeed, if property alone were a legitimate basis for power, the Commons alone must rule, a prospect Hume did not favor.[6]

With this, the lines of interpretation were set. Harrington was either a political romancer, or a tough-minded defender of the place of property in government. In practice this meant that radicals, Whigs, and Tories could all ignore him. He does not even turn up in Godwin's history of the Civil War. Occasionally he was named, no more.[7] Only Burke, who was neither quite Tory nor quite Whig, felt at all inclined to deal with him. As a constitution maker Harrington was, of course, all that was most distasteful to Burke. For Burke was not, like Hume, a skeptical and self-confident conservative, who could take such matters lightly. Even before 1789, in presenting his American policy, Burke took pains to show that he was not Harrington, not a dreamer, but the defender of a political tradition.[8] In his more embittered later years, he went farther and compared Harrington to Sieyès, and to those "thorough-bred metaphysicians" whose "hardness of heart" allowed them to indulge in "analytical experiments" with no regard to the consequences.[9] The comparison was apt, since Harrington's scheme was certainly known to Sieyès, whose constitutional draft showed traces of *Oceana.* There were also differences that Burke was in no mood to dwell on. For Harrington, radical republican though he was in his dreams of an equal commonwealth with "no contradiction," was also no 18th century philosopher. Neither the rights of man nor the theory of progress haunt the pages of *Oceana.*[10] That is why even Burke could appreciate some aspects of Harrington's doctrine, for he had seen something that Hume had not known: what happens when property and interest do not play their part in government. He was a bit unfair in saying that this was a condition that "the learned and ingenious" Harrington "could not imagine." In fact, Harrington had no need to *imagine* it, having lived through a military dictatorship; and his entire theory rested on the belief that the rule of force was the only alternative to the rule of interest.[11] A government by violence, and against nature, Harrington called it. What Burke added to this was a sense of the "dreadful energy," the dynamism, of the ideological state.[12] He was not the last to observe it.

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[4] Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 113–121.

[5] *The Spirit of the Laws*, Vol. II, Bk. xxix, s. 19 and Vol. I, Bk. xi, s. 6.

[6] "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" and "Of the First Principles of Government," *Hume: Theory of Politics*, ed. F. W. Watkins (Edinburgh, 1951), pp. 227–230 and 149–152.

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[7] G. P. Gooch in *English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 250–251, lists the rare notices given Harrington. None shows any real interest in him. Thus Coleridge named him among others as a great political writer, but no substitute for the Scriptures. *Stateman's Manual, Works,* Vol. I (New York, 1884), p. 129.

[8] *Works,* Vol. II (Boston, 1884), p. 154.

[9] *Ibid.,* Vol. V, pp. 216–217.

[10] *Oceana,* ed. S. B. Liljegren (Lund, 1924), pp. 135 and 185–186. There is some controversy about the actual importance of Harrington's influence on revolutionary France. That Commonwealth ideas in general were known has been shown, but beyond specific similarities in constitutional devices, which often were not original with Harrington, there is little evidence of a deep or direct intellectual influence. This is well brought out by R. Koebner, "Oceana," *Englische Studien,* 68, 1933–1934, pp. 377–396. See, however, Gooch, *op. cit.,* pp. 312–313; S. B. Liljegren ed. and introd., *A French Draft, Constitution of 1792 Modelled on James Harrington's 'Oceana'* (Lund, 1932), pp. 3–79; D. Trevor, "Some Sources of the Constitutional Theory of the Abbé Sieyès," *Politica,* Vol. 1 (1934–35), pp. 325–342 and 443–469.

[11] *Works,* ed. John Toland (London, 1771), pp. 362, 465, 482, 483, 488. All future references are to this edition, except for *Oceana.*

[12] *Works,* Vol. V, pp. 376–377 and 381.

II. THE DISGUISES OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

For the better part of the nineteenth century we hear no more of Harrington, and very little about the Civil War. It is not true that Marx made historians aware of revolutions; the revolutions accomplished that by themselves. He was not even alone in regarding the Reformation, the Civil War, and the French Revolution as one continuous revolution, rather than separate events. De Maistre and Saint-Simon, before him, and Acton after, for rather different reasons, saw it so too. In England, it was the "Whigs," as is now well known, who restored the English Revolution to respectability. However, they were slow in coming to it. Macaulay, after all, begins with James II, and it was not until Gardiner's monumental work on the "Puritan" revolution, the one in which the whole nation rose in defense of its liberties, that the Civil War was really made sufficiently moral, and unlike the French Revolution, to appeal to the Whigs.[13]

There were of course remnants of the old Tory view. One of them was Isaac Disraeli, who not only defended the Stuarts, but also devoted an essay to Harrington. His picture adds little to Burke's. We have the same old "phantast" who guessed wrong in thinking the Restoration impossible, but who, at least, was a "gentleman" with "no vulgar notions of a levelling democracy."[14] And so, too, it was no Whig, Carlyle, who resuscitated Cromwell. However, as an increasingly conservative liberalism wanted a tradition, as historicism infected it, as it wanted radicalism but not class conflict, so the new Civil War, and Harrington with it, re-emerged.

A Whig Harrington. Not that Harrington inspired any great interest in anyone. Acton did pay some attention to him, and the same conflict between radical impulses and the fear of the radical danger to liberty is reflected here as in the rest of his writings. So Acton preferred Harrington to Cromwell because he had realized the need for a redistribution of property if the Commonwealth was to succeed, while "a timorous conservatism" and "legal scruples" prevented the Protector from going all the way.[15] Again he praised Harrington as one of that "little band of true theorists" in which he included Locke, Rousseau, Jefferson, Hamilton, Mill and Sieyès, the last being especially praised.[16] In short, here all that Burke detested was being glorified. Yet Acton had many harsh things to say about Rousseau and the French revolutionaries when he came to consider the democratic danger. It is, in any case, difficult to guess what "the little band" had in common, except that all contributed to constitutionalism, of which Acton approved. However, the democratic taint that Acton came to recognize in some of the "little band," he never detected in Harrington. Far from it, he attributed to him the glory of having discovered a "separate science of society" based on the notion that "the sphere of religion, morality, economy and knowledge" was "organically distinct from the State."[17]

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[13] R. G. Usher, *The Historical Method of S. R. Gardiner* (St. Louis, 1915), pp. 41–54, 76–94 and 123–143.

[14] *Amenities of Literature* (New York, 1864), Vol. I, pp. 370–389.

[15] *Lectures on Modern History* (London, 1912), pp. 204–205.

[16] *Historical Essays and Studies* (London, 1907), p. 492.

How Acton got this idea, it is hard to imagine. There is not a hint of the liberal antinomy of state and society in Harrington. If government, to be stable, must be adjusted to the "fundamental" distribution of property, there is no suggestion that government cannot, or ought not to, interfere with "society." *Oceana* has an agrarian law; a national, if tolerating, church; and there is a compulsory scheme of education and military service for all citizens. And everyone with £100 per year can vote. That is what "ancient prudence" and Machiavelli had taught Harrington. Yet Acton had no illusions about Plato's, Aristotle's or Machiavelli's liberalism. Perhaps he had not read *Oceana*, but more likely, seeing it only in the light of the Civil War, he could recognize only a chapter in the history of English freedom. Harrington, to become a Whig ancestor, had to be ruthlessly liberalized.

This last guess finds at least some support in the fact that another contemporary of Acton's and Gardiner's completed the de-radicalization of the now completely "Whig" Harrington. Lecky admired Harrington even more than Milton and Jeremy Taylor, because he had defended religious toleration not on grounds of faith, but on a comprehensive demand for civil freedom.[18] So far radicalism was all to the good, but Harrington was a true Englishman too "who had realized that government is an organism, not a mechanism, . . . that it must grow naturally out of the conditions of society and cannot be imposed by theorists."[19] This too was the burden of Maitland's early essay in praise of the distinctively English idea of liberty, in which Harrington is pictured as anything but a utopian. On the contrary he was an "inductive historian" who knew the limits of the possible.[20] One wonders what on earth Montesquieu and Burke had ever found amiss. What had happened to the old constitution maker, who had referred to his labors as "political architecture" and called for "invention" in politics? What indeed had happened to the Commonwealth? Nothing much, except that the Whigs by an heroic act of retrospective idealization had made it Victorian, and above all, English, in the sense of "non-French."[21] However, if the liberals drew Harrington into the 19th century struggle of ideologies, they did not keep him, or the Revolution. Both presently had to be shared with the Marxists. Harrington had in any case never occupied a great place in the liberal Pantheon. After all, it was not he who had written *Areopagitica*. In fact, he did not really quite fit. On the other hand, he turned out to be just what Marxist historians were looking for.

A Dialectical Harrington. That Marxists should concentrate on revolutions is hardly surprising—that *was* politics. And the Civil War as a part of the "bourgeois revolution" was bound to come in for its share of analysis.[22] Harrington, moreover, had more to contribute to the "bourgeois" than to the "Puritan" revolution. Indeed, as historicism turned to economism in general, Marxists were not alone in noticing how remarkably modern it was of him to have discovered "the principle that the economic elements in a State will determine its government."[23] Now this is fair enough: Harrington too prided himself on the discovery of the principle of "the balance," the idea that those who have the greatest share of property must rule. That power follows property was undeniably his belief. However, it was left to Eduard Bernstein to discover that this simple formula made him a precursor of historical materialism. There was of course Harrington's use of the word "superstructure" to describe political institutions to justify this suggestion, but there was more. Harrington, Bernstein felt, had accurately diagnosed the class relationships prevailing in 17th century England. Far from being mistaken about the impossibility of a restored monarchy, he had really foreseen that absolutism was impossible, and that the bourgeoisie must rule, as, in fact, it did after 1688. In short, Harrington had discovered the "bourgeois revolution," not just "the balance."[24] Since Bernstein offered his interpretation there has been a flood of imitative writings on the English Revolution, and in all of them Harrington turns up as a most remarkable fellow, with a stunning resemblance to Marx. He "was the greatest of a group of writers who penetrated behind the political facade." And he was able to do this because in a more limited way he was witnessing the same events that Marx was to face in 1848.[25] Not only is Harrington said to have seen that "political domination was directly and inevitably the function of economic power," he also had a theory of social development, a view of "history as a social process." In short, he was not only an economic determinist, but a dialectical historian. His errors were slight indeed. Only the fact that he was an aristocrat prevented him from being fully class-conscious, from recognizing the proletariat. That too is what led him to believe that the end of the dialectical process had already come, and that a harmonious constitutional order was possible. However, subtract the old constitutional "phantast" and you get an historical materialist.[26] From another point of view, it might be said that what Bernstein's *epigoni* have done is to separate the "real" from the "accidental" Harrington, and to describe him in terms drawn from a new vocabulary. That is exactly what was done to the Revolution as a whole, after all.

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 380.

[18] W. E. H. Lecky, *History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe* (New York, 1866), Vol. II, p. 80.

[19] *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 145–146.

[20] Maitland, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[21] See especially G. M. Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts* (London, 1922), pp. 195–196, for the clearest statement about the unique character of the English Revolution.

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[22] C. Hill, "The English Civil War Interpreted by Marx and Engels," *Science and Society*, Vol. 12 (1948), pp. 130–156; L. Krieger, "Marx and Engels as Historians," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 14 (1953), pp. 381–403.

[23] J. Bonar, *Philosophy and Political Economy* (London, 1922), p. 895; Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–24 and 28.

[24] E. Bernstein, *Sozialismus und Demokratie in der grossen englischen Revolution* (Stuttgart, 1919), pp. 259–267.

[25] M. James, *Social Problems and Policy During the Puritan Revolution* (London, 1930), p. 304, and "Contemporary Materialist Interpretations of Society in the English Revolution," in *The English Revolution*, ed. C. Hill (London, 1949), pp. 83 and 86.

[26] D. W. Petegorsky, *Left-Wing Democracy in the English Civil War* (London, 1940), p. 234; P. Zagorin, *A History of Political Thought in the English Revolution* (London, 1954), pp. 133 and 144–145.

A Marx for the Gentry. One historian of the "bourgeois revolution," however, cannot possibly be so waved aside. For R. H. Tawney has surely done more than anyone else to make that revolution intelligible and he alone has given us a subtle and fascinating portrait of Harrington in the context of his age. He does not doubt that the decline of the nobility and the rise of capitalism were at the root of the Civil War, but at least we are told exactly who was rising and who was falling. According to Tawney's calculations there emerged along with urban capitalists a class of rural ones, the gentry, who by benefitting from Tudor policies and by improving their estates, came to be part of the new bourgeois order that rose to challenge the Establishment.[27]

If this is still the old bourgeois revolution it has at least been ruralized and we have been liberated from 1789, 1848, and 1917. For "Tawney's country" is 17th century England, his evidence is 17th century evidence, and the writers whom he quotes are 17th century writers. Moreover, if the gentry had their Marx it was at least not a 19th century Marx, but Harrington. To be sure, it is not everyone's Harrington. The old constitutional dreamer is quite gone. His specific political proposals are dismissed as trivial, but if he did have too much faith in "the magic of institutions," he was still no "English Sieyès." On the contrary, he was one of the first "to depict their conception of the society of the future as a necessary deduction from the facts of social history." *Oceana* is thus "partly social history, partly a program based on it." What matters is the former. For with Harrington we get for the first time a recognition of "the operation of impersonal, constant, and, it might be, measurable forces" in history. He was, indeed, the first English thinker to find the causes of the political upheaval in antecedent social change. The only fault that Tawney can find in this prodigy is the weakness of all "one key" explanations and the failure to grasp "the dynamic power of religious conviction."[28] It is, of course, the very charge he has for years brought against doctrinaire Marxism. What remains is impressive enough, and it has found many supporters.[29] It is a persuasive picture because due weight is given to Harrington's limitations, his preoccupation with peace and order, and his debts to earlier writers. However, it does not stand up. Poor Harrington simply cannot be made to bear the burdens of a 20th century social historian.

There is much in Harrington to make Tawney's portrait a recognizable likeness. Harrington *did* see the English Revolution as part of a general European upheaval of which the Dutch Revolts, the Fronde, and the Thirty Years War in Germany were parts. He also took this to be the expression of the instability of the "Gothick Ballance" in its death pangs, that is, the end of the feudal system. Nor is there any doubt that he felt that Tudor policy, by repressing the nobility and enriching the "people", had made the war inevitable.[30] In his way he was an economic determinist. There was no question in his mind about the sequence of cause and effect. The distribution of property is "fundamental"; it is the "efficient cause" of the political "superstructure."[31] And if he believed that an even distribution of property could be maintained forever by a republican government, he admitted that it had never been attempted in the past.[32] So far Tawney's Harrington seems perfectly sound. The trouble begins when we ask: what did Harrington mean by property? Why was it "fundamental"? How did he describe the changes preceding the Civil War? What did he mean by the "Gothick Ballance"? And how closely did he really look at his own age?

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[27] "The Rise of the Gentry," *Economic History Review*, Vol. 11 (1941), pp. 6 and 18.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 36–37; "Harrington's Interpretation of His Age," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. 27 (1941), pp. 221, 200, 204.

[29] *E.g.*, C. Blitzer, "Introduction" to *Selections from the Writings of James Harrington* (New York, 1955), pp. xi–xxxix; C. J. Friedrich, *The Age of the Baroque* (New York, 1952), pp. 33–34; C. Hill, "Recent Interpretations of the Civil War," *History* (N.S.) Vol. 41 (1946), pp. 70–71; G. H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York, 1951), pp. 498 and 507.

To begin with, Harrington had no idea whatsoever of what we today call economic life. He never spoke of "rents, sales or profits," only of property. Changes in ownership of property, not economic development, were his sole concern.[33] Now the political consequences of the amounts of property held by either a few or many persons were indeed a matter of "necessity," but it was not "historical necessity," not the logic of an historical situation at all. The necessity that Harrington had in mind was the universal need to eat.[34] From this it follows that anyone who has the means to feed men, controls them. It also means that he has the power to maintain soldiers who depend on him. That is why property is power. For an "Army is a belly" whether it be a royal army, the retinue of a nobleman, or a citizen militia.[35] Moreover, Harrington was convinced that property will always be used to support armed men because no one is secure in his possessions unless they can be defended. The "matter of governments is . . . estate," that is, the defense of possessions.[36] If "industry secures possession," it is not *property* unless others recognize it as such, and respect the claim.[37]

There are two ways of enforcing claims to property, by violence or by due process of law. Now Harrington argued that the latter is possible only when possessions and military power are so evenly divided that no one can hope to encroach successfully upon anyone else. This is the economic basis of the *rule* of law. It will be an *effective* rule, moreover, because, once a common interest exists in maintaining the proprietary status quo, it can be defended by the pooled strength of a citizen militia, fed at the common trough. The alternative is competition for property, the use of private armies, and the enforcement of claims by arms. This is the economic basis of the rule of men. For property is secure possession and only might can accomplish that. If the people own the balance of property they can rule effectively through law based on common interest and common military power. If a monarch or an oligarchy has the balance, they will rule, but there will be no law, for there will be no shared interest and only conflicting claims and armies. All rule is based on the ability to maintain arms; the choice is between private or public armies, competing or harmonized interests, law or violence, war or peace. There are really two very closely linked arguments here. The first deals with, "what is law?", the second with, "when is the *rule* of law possible?" Neither is a question about the economic structure of society as such. That military power should play so large a part in it is not surprising. Harrington had lived through a civil war and had seen the rise of the New Model; nor was Machiavelli his idol in vain.

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[30] *Oceana*, pp. 124–125, 48–50 and 53; *Works*, pp. 365–367.

[31] *Oceana*, pp. 38–39; *Works*, pp. 367, 408 and 465.

[32] *Oceana*, pp. 36, 39, 85–99; *Works*, p. 368.

[33] I am very much indebted to the analysis of J. G. A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law* (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 128–130, and to his letter to *Encounter*, July, 1958.

[34] *Oceana*, p. 14.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[36] *Works*, p. 466.

[37] *Works*, p. 363. The fundamental law in a state is the law that settles what is a man's "own." *Oceana*, p. 185.

III. HARRINGTON'S ARGUMENT

To understand the development of Harrington's argument one must remember both what he was trying to prove, and whom he was trying to refute. Harrington was no relativist. He thought a republic not only a suitable form of government for England in 1656, but the absolutely and eternally best.[38] And he wanted to show that it was not only a possibility but a necessity, because there were no viable alternatives. Of these there were two that had to be demolished, the ancient constitution and Hobbes' *Leviathan*.[39] The latter was for Harrington far more important, not because it was a likely prospect, but because he fully understood its intellectual strength. *Oceana* is essentially a struggle between Machiavellian "ancient prudence" and Hobbes.

Anti-Goths. However, he did not ignore the traditionalists' views either. To them he had to prove that the traditional order could not, and never did, provide either the rule of law or, indeed, any sort of political stability. With Hobbes, Harrington insisted that anarchy was the inevitable result of divided sovereignty. Now the argument of constitutional theorists from Fortescue to the 17th century had been that the legal defense of "one's own," including property, social status or "liberties," and the power to rule the kingdom, were separate. Charles I on the scaffold still defended a form of this old doctrine when he proclaimed that the subjects' "liberty and freedom consists in having government in those laws by which their life and goods may be best their own. . . . It is not their having a share in the government; that is nothing pertaining to them." It was essentially a re-echoing of the Senecan phrase that epitomized the traditional idea of the constitution: "*ad reges enim potestas omnium; ad singulos, proprietas.*"[40] This is what Harrington called the "Gothick ballance" and his whole point was to show that it had never worked because it was inherently unstable. The division of *gubernatio* and *jurisdictio*, the child of "modern prudence," had never produced a rule of law. It was, rather, a perpetual state of civil war. The nobility could not rule without a king, as they were perpetually competing with each other. Since feudalism in Norman England began as a system of military tenures they had always the means to defend and extend "their own" by arms. The king needed the military services of the nobility as they needed his political offices, but as they trenched upon his dominion, so he was a threat to theirs. Neither one could get on with or without the other. Both lived off the people. Happily the Tudor kings by statutes of alienation and by expropriating the clergy had enriched the people and destroyed the nobility. However, by depriving itself of the social and military support of the nobles the monarchy itself became impossible, for it was not a Turkish absolutism in which the king owned the balance of property.[41] In England the people now held the balance and it only remained for Englishmen to face the facts and set up political institutions compatible with this new order.

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[38] Koebner, "Oceana," *loc. cit.*, p. 367.

[39] I suspect that Harrington's description of the Gothic-balance of pre-Norman England was directed at the Levellers' myth of an Anglo-Saxon paradise. *Oceana*, pp. 43–45. I shall not here discuss either the adequacy of Harrington's historical scholarship by the standards of his own time, nor even his basic historical concepts, since these subjects have already been treated exceptionally well in Pocock's *Ancient Constitution*, pp. 124–147.

There is much that is ingenious in this account, but is it good modern social history? There is neither a notion of economics nor of class-conflict in all this. Nor did Harrington ever claim to have said anything new. He merely repeated the accounts given by Bacon, Raleigh, Selden, and Henry Wotton.[42] Not one of them spoke of the "rise of the gentry," but all described the conflict that our textbooks have long spoken of as the end of feudalism and the rise of absolutism. Harrington's only contribution to this history was to see the rise of the people as the consequence of Tudor policy and to explain the origins of the Civil War by that fact. The conflict itself had been one between absolutist legal institutions and a new economic-military balance of power. His originality was in the correlation of feudal history with the Polybian theory of constitutions. Had Tawney not insisted on treating Harrington's constitutional preoccupations as trivial, he would not have so distorted his ideas.

Anti-Hobbes. Against the traditionalists Harrington had to show only what conditions were necessary for the rule of law. He did not have to justify the inseparability of law and property, since their constitutional theory, too, rested on it. To refute Hobbes, however, he had to find a new answer to the question, "what is law?" And it is here that his theory of "interest" really comes to play its part.[43] Harrington's attitude toward Hobbes was extremely complex. He very much admired Hobbes' nonpolitical writings, and even *Leviathan* he knew to be among the best of the modern age. Above all, both men shared an ardent desire, not surprising in a period of revolution, for peace and order at almost any price. Both not only stood apart from the war of religious opinions, but also wanted to find some way out of it. A demonstrable politics, a certain, self-evident set of rules capable of convincing any sane person, seemed the only answer to both.[44] The trouble was that Hobbes had come up with a monarchical, and Harrington with a republican, solution to their common problem. It was impossible for Harrington to use the conventional religious and traditionalist attacks against Hobbes. These applied to him no less than to Hobbes.[45] Nor was it possible simply to assert his republican faith. Demonstrable proof of some sort had to be offered in answer to *Leviathan.* That was the true function of his theory of "interest."

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[40] C. H. McIlwain, *The Development of Political Thought in the West* (New York, 1932), p. 394.

[41] *Oceana*, 15, 30–32, 47–48 and 187; *Works*, 226–228, 248–262, 270, 363–364, 553.

[42] Pocock, *Ancient Constitution*, pp. 128–130 and 143; *Oceana*, 51–52; *Works*, pp. 364–365.

[43] Polin, *loc. cit.*, pp. 27 and 30–31; F. D. Wormuth, *The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism* (New York, 1949), p. 135.

In his direct references to Hobbes, anywhere in his writings, Harrington was often disingenuous, picturing their conflict as one between demonstration "by geometry" and "by nature" or historical example, as between logic and experience.[46] To be sure, Hobbes did argue for sovereignty as a logical necessity and rejected historical arguments as uncertain and merely prudential.[47] However, logic was not his only instrument, and certainly not the one most relevant to Harrington. It was Hobbes' psychology that presented the real obstacle to Harrington's republican rule of law. According to Harrington, Hobbes had simply stopped short the argument about legitimacy, or the valid sources of law, by saying that it was the will of the sovereign. To this Harrington replied that not only was the logic of consent an unhistorical argument, but that will must be supported by power, and arms by fodder, that is, by property. Effective law is made, in short, not just by will, but by the interest that moves this will and gives it substance, and interest is, for Harrington, property interest.

To say that Hobbes had not investigated the nature of power is, however, far from true. With horrified fascination he saw it everywhere. For him, however, it was not a quantity, like Harrington's interest, but a human disposition, an overriding urge. Power drove men in all they did and dominated all their relations. Science gave power, reputation gave power, riches gave power, authority gave power; that is why men desired them.[48] The one thing, however, that Hobbes never did, unlike Machiavelli and Harrington, was to admire or praise power. He hated it as he was obsessed by it. But the acuteness of his insight into the psychology of power relationships *did* make Machiavelli look like a "boy who had newly read his Livy."[49]

Now it has often been noticed that Harrington avoided all talk about human nature. His reputation as a sociologist and realist depends on it. Nevertheless, the absence of moral concern, though unusual in the 17th century, is not in itself any great proof of science. Partly it sprang, of course, from his desire to escape from the ideological deadlock; but he not only wanted to avoid moral and religious issues, he was determined to de-psychologize politics. It was his way of evading Hobbes, without answering him. Hobbes had made sovereignty and law expressions of the needs created by the rage for power. Harrington simply refused to ask himself why men need rules and rulers. He did not offer an alternative to Hobbes, he just described the institutional setting within which sovereignty and law could operate. So where Hobbes had insisted that authority, like all sources of legitimacy, was a form of power, Harrington replied that it was nothing of the sort, it came from "the goods of the mind."[50] To which Hobbes might have answered that the ability to convince people is also power. It would not have mattered; for Harrington has nothing more to say about authority. For, being a mental attribute, it has no place in his theory of legitimacy. Legitimacy is based solely on interest, on the balance of property. Effective law can only be made by those who possess the balance of property and stability depends on law expressing their interests. It follows that the only legitimate government, the only government that *should* rule, is that which must in fact rule—that is, the government of the dominant "interest." An intelligent government will acquire authority, but its legitimacy rests on the interests that it represents.[51] Against Hobbes' psychological account of the origins of law Harrington simply pitted an institutional one. It is an argument which, in rather less subtle form, still rages among political theorists.

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[44] Koebner, "Die Geschichtslehre James Harringtons," *Geist und Gesellschaft* (Breslau, 1927), pp. 17–18.

[45] In fact, Harrington defended Hobbes against the attacks of the divines, *Works*, p. 354.

[46] *Oceana*, pp. 12–13, 50; *Works*, 553, 558–561. Other writers have been only too ready to take his word for it, *e.g.*, Maitland, *op. cit.*, p. 21; Sabine, *op. cit.*, p. 499.

[47] *Leviathan*, ed. Oakeshott (Oxford, 1947), pp. 435–436.

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 50–64.

[49] *Oceana*, p. 30.

Interest and Human Nature. There were other reasons for avoiding psychology. Not only must it not be allowed to interfere with the "interest" theory of law on which the legitimacy and necessity of the republic were based; it must also be kept out of history. The "autonomy of politics" for Harrington meant that once the stable rule of common interest was established, "political architecture" and institutional "invention" could build a perfect and eternal republic.[52] There was no need to worry about convictions, dispositions, and passions. This not only set him apart, as an historian, from Hobbes, but also from Machiavelli. In both cases psychological considerations, which from the republican point of view were unfortunate, had to be eliminated. For if the republic was an historical necessity and could be made to last for all time, it was important that no inconvenient psychological factors be allowed to disturb the clear course of history. Tawney is perfectly right in attributing to Harrington a sense for the "impersonal forces."

The trouble is that this came not from any historical sense, but from its total absence. One need only compare his account of the origins of the Civil War to Hobbes's. To Hobbes it was a war of ideologies. The doctrines of fanatical preachers, the seditious universities, and the fantasies of those who, like Harrington, had derived exaggerated notions about Greek and Roman liberty from their youthful readings of classical authors, these were the causes of the disaster.[53] Hobbes was as sure as any post-Gardiner historian that it was a war of minorities. The people had merely followed prospects of pay and plunder. As for "social factors," Hobbes noted the city merchants' disinclination to pay taxes, and the hopes of improvident gentlemen who were out to make their fortune in war; but these were minor points for him.[54] Ideas and the passions they produced were at the heart of the war. Now Harrington, having friends on both sides, was not, like Hobbes, inclined to deal out praise and blame. It was not the characters of the king or of the rebels that had caused the war, it was the nature of the situation.[55]

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[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 20–21 and 24.

[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 15–17; *Works*, pp. 362, 457 and 477.

[52] *Oceana*, pp. 30–34 and 207.

However, Harrington never gave the barest account of what that situation really was. He never described the interests at work. He is even less sociological than Hobbes, not to speak of Baxter. After repeating his predecessors' accounts of Tudor policy he tells us in one paragraph that the balance of property and power had shifted to the people and the Commons. Elizabeth had been able to charm them into acquiescence. The Stuarts, prompted by false counsellors, had ignored their demands, and, presumably lacking charm, were bound to fall.[56] That is all he knew, that is all he had observed. Yet these were the crucial years during which the gentry is said to have been transformed. But Harrington had no interest in these events as such. He had read of republican institutions; he wanted them in England. His war was a very simple one between the monarchy and the people, a political war of institutions. There is no mention of the social or economic trends of his own age. He tells us nothing of the life of the towns, nor did he notice that the actual trend was toward the consolidation of estates. All that he saw was a repetition of those classical conflicts that Machiavelli had explained to him. However, he did not even follow Machiavelli when it came to psychology. He was not only ready to accept the latter's dictum that good laws make good men, he went further. Men can be bad and the commonwealth can still be perfect, because stability depends on "interests and orders," not on morality.[57] Not for him Machiavelli's cycle of corruption, or the flight of virtue from one place to another. It was not a decline in virtue, but changes in the balance of property, that brought republics down. Luxury was the habit of the nobility, it was their self-interest. When they ruled, so did their ways; but the cause of the change was not moral, it was institutional.[58] Had they protected themselves with a sound agrarian law the republic would have lasted as eternally as *Oceana.*

There is little left of Tawney's objective social historian; of the 17th century

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[53] *Behemoth, English Works* (London, 1840), Vol. VI, pp. 167–218, 362; *Leviathan,* pp. 140–141 and 214.

[54] *Behemoth,* pp. 166–169.

[55] *Oceana,* p. 50. It was not, thus, that his friend Charles I had been *bad,* just helpless. *Works,* p. 367.

[56] *Oceana,* pp. 49–50; *Works,* pp. 364–367, 408 and 467.

[57] *Oceana,* pp. 53–54, 185–186; *Works,* p. 456.

[58] *Oceana,* p. 56; Machiavelli's *Discourses,* Bk. I, chs. 1, 2, 18, 37 and 39; Bk. II, "Introduction"; Bk. III, ch. 1; Pocock, *Ancient Constitution,* pp. 145–147; Koebner, "Geschichtslehre," *loc. cit.,* pp. 13–14 and 19.

Marx nothing remains at all. There is only a very ingenious defender of classical republicanism, an institutional historian who applied a modified version of Polybius to the history of England.

IV. A HARRINGTON FOR THE PRESENT

Since J. H. Hexter has exposed "the storm over the gentry" to the general public, there is no need to go into the details of this academic war here.[59] All that has to be said is that Tawney, Trevor-Roper, and their respective followers, armed with conflicting sets of statistics, are re-fighting the Civil War. Facing the "rising gentry" is now a very different species of gentlemen.[60] Trevor-Roper's gentry are far from prosperous. Stagnant economically, politically disgruntled, they are shopping for ideologies, first Roman Catholicism, then Puritanism, and in their last hour Harrington's republicanism. Since economic success was based not on estate management, but on trade or court favor, and as the latter was a limited source of supply, there was a permanent group of "outs," grumbling and plotting in rural discomfort. Their policies were nothing if not regressive. If they thought at all, it was negatively: away with the court, the common law, the established church, the city, the bureaucracy; away especially with a peaceful foreign policy, so that gentlemen might again enrich themselves by naval piracy as they had under Elizabeth.

The Gentry Fanatic. Of this unattractive group, Trevor-Roper tells us, Cromwell was the incarnation, and Harrington the ideologue—still the Marx of the gentry here, but a very different gentry and a very different Marx. The science of society has been replaced by disastrous prophecy. Instead of giving his clients an accurate view of their prospects Harrington gave them a dream-picture of what they wished to be. Like later ideologists he said "is" where "I hope" should have been. The statement, "the gentry have the land," Trevor-Roper notes, is analogous to Hitler's saying, "England *is* defeated," in 1940. At worst Harrington was an intellectualizing subversive, at best a "coffee-house politician" prating about his anarchic gentry-republic in his dream-parliament, the Rota Club.

It is an immensely persuasive picture. As Hexter says, we've seen these types before, and he mentions the Raubritter and Lord Eldon's entourage. But why stop there? Surely we have seen all this in our own day. As we have emerged from the twin myths of the eternal "right" and "left" and of the creativity of revolutionary movements, we have come to a new view of the nature of fanaticism and the forces that feed it.[61] And who knows more about the most ghoulish manifestations of nihilism than the author of *The Last Days of Hitler*?[62] The fact is that the picture of a group of socially displaced malcontents, animated by a pure wish to destroy the "system," corresponds far more to our own experience than that of a sturdy, solid group of consciously "rising" men, engaging in radical politics so as to assert the claims of their class against an order in which they are, after all, getting on. To which it might, of course, be very justly answered, that we have not been living through the "bourgeois revolution." The impression remains that psychologically Trevor-Roper wins hands down. It has simply become difficult to envision a class-revolution of any kind. The work of nihilistic discontent, on the other hand, is not unfamiliar.

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[59] J. H. Hexter, "Storm over the Gentry," *Encounter*, May, 1958, pp. 22–34.

[60] H. R. Trevor-Roper, "The Gentry, 1540–1640," *Economic History Review Supplement* (1954); "The Country-House Radicals, 1590–1660" and "The Outbreak of the Great Rebellion," *Men and Events* (New York, 1957), pp. 179–188 and 195–205.

[61] See R. Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, tr. by T. Kilmartin (New York, 1957), *passim*, for a discussion both of the obsolescence of these ideas, and the passions which they can stir among café-politicians.

[62] I am happy to see that I am not alone in this suspicion, see M. Beloff, "Another Fallen Idol?", *Encounter*, January, 1959, p. 74.

Harrington on Gentry and People. The question here is, how does his new reputation fit Harrington, whatever the "ups" and "downs" of the gentry may have been? There is only too much in *Oceana* that justifies Trevor-Roper's view. Not only did he share many of the pseudo-policies that Trevor-Roper associates with his miserable gentry, but he *was* in the habit of saying "is" for reasons other than the demands of veracity. For instance, he did not say that the court was a bad thing, for which there was no place in a republic. Describing England in general he said, "men of Country-Lives have been still entrusted with the greatest affairs, and the people have constantly had an aversion from the ways of the Court."[63] No fawning courtiers in England, where only self-respecting country squires rule. That he saw the whole people, as such, rising in the Rebellion, and not specific groups, is itself an ideological symptom, fatal to Tawney's objective observer, but only too compatible with Trevor-Roper's myth-maker. It was in fact his closest friend Neville, not Harrington himself, who said that the "balance is in the gentry"; but to have said "the people" instead was probably worse.[64]

But it is in the structure of government of *Oceana*, and in its policies, that Trevor-Roper's case finds its greatest support. Although it is an active state it has no taxes and no bureaucracy; administration is local, even if the traditional division of England has been replaced by a more symmetrical one.[65] The "owner at his plow" is the genius of this society. The city is to be curbed, since ancient history "proves" that where city-life has had "the stronger influence" in a republic it led to turbulence.[66] The clergy and the lawyers, the natural deceivers of the people, are to be banished from political life. Indeed, one of the advantages of ending primogeniture was that it would end the flow of younger sons into these professions.[67] There was to be a national church, but its doctrines were never explained; it was not Anglican at any rate. Above all there is Harrington's jingoism and imperialism. One would never guess that the historian of the "bourgeois revolution" was a rip-roaring England-firster, whom Froude quite correctly regarded as the prophet of British imperialism.[68] Not only did Harrington repeat Cromwell's cant about a great Protestant war of liberation, but he added the Machiavellian argument that a "commonwealth for encrease" was superior to one for mere "preservation." And as usual he provided plenty of historical "proof" that such a commonwealth was bound to win.[69]

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[63] *Oceana*, p. 10.

[64] Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 75–112. For the friendship between Neville and Harrington see *Aubrey's Lives*, ed. O. L. Dick (Ann Arbor, 1957), pp. 124–127.

[65] *Oceana*, pp. 410–411. I am particularly indebted to Blitzer's thesis for drawing my attention to this.

[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 10 and 169; *Works*, pp. 279–280.

[67] *E.g.*, *Oceana*, pp. 38–39, 118 and 173–174.

It is, however, in his attitude to the people and in his vision of a reconstructed gentry that Harrington most resembles the professional revolutionary. The "course of England" into a commonwealth is "certain" and "natural," but the people if left to themselves will be led by lawyers and clergy right back to monarchy, even though that could not succeed. Far from having the "unshatterable faith in the political virtues of his fellow country-men" that Tawney ascribes to him, he deeply distrusted their political intelligence unless supported by gentry leadership.[70] Only the gentry could provide both the military and the political leadership that England needed. Indeed "history showed" that only gentlemen, like Moses, Solon or Cromwell had ever established a commonwealth.[71] In spite of Machiavelli's advice that a popular republic should begin by killing off its nobility, Harrington insisted that a gentry "not overballancing the people" was "the very life and soul" of a commonwealth.[72]

There is indeed some reason to doubt Harrington's devotion to democracy. An agrarian law could settle the distribution of property forever, but nothing on earth would alter the natural division of men into freemen and servants, such as "live on their own" and such as do not. The latter have no place in political life and are even to be excluded from the army, like the Roman "proletaries," lest freemen be ruled by their servants.[73] A German author has even come up with the fanciful suggestion that this "socialist-aristocratic" order was an unconscious emanation of an "urgermanische Gesittung," an obscure longing for the long-lost organic, Germanic, peasant society led by its God-sent leaders.[74] One need not go to such lengths to see that *Oceana* is a rural gentry-paradise. Even if Harrington piously insisted on a nobility of merit, and not of privilege, he constantly identified the former with the existing gentry or "noblesse" as he put it, explicitly rejecting the division between nobility and gentry.[75] Here indeed is a "pseudo-realistic utopia," a mixture of prophecy, historical speculation, and exhortation that might well appeal to people like Trevor-Roper's rebellious hay-seeds.[76]

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[68] J. A. Froude, *Oceana* (London, 1886), pp. 1–4.

[69] *Oceana*, pp. 11, 33, 133, 185–187 and 194–198; Z. Fink, *The Classical Republicans* (Evanston, 1945), pp. 83–85; C. Firth, *Cromwell and the Rule of the Puritans in England* (Oxford, 1953), pp. 382 and 386; Koebner, "Oceana," *loc. cit.*, pp. 372 and 374.

[70] *Oceana*, pp. 148–149; *Works*, pp. 456, 562–563, 577. Tawney, "Harrington," p. 212.

[71] *Oceana*, pp. 34–35.

[72] *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18, 118–125 and 142; Machiavelli, *Discourses*, Bk. I, ch. 55.

[73] *Oceana*, pp. 176–177; *Works*, pp. 409 and 465.

[74] C. Weishofen, *James Harrington und sein Wunschbild vom Germanischen Staate* (Bonn, 1935), pp. 37, 45 and 70–71.

[75] *Oceana*, pp. 18, 34, 118 and 122.

Nevertheless it is a false picture. Whatever may have been happening to the gentry, Harrington was not their Marx, and not their Lenin—neither a discoverer of the springs of history, nor a maker of ideology. All that Trevor-Roper has done is to turn Tawney's Harrington on his head, along with the "rising-gentry" and the entire "bourgeois revolution." It is a procedure that does little to explain him.

His Relation to Commonwealth Ideology. No one has ever denied that Harrington was a Commonwealthman, and that being eclectic he shared some of the ideas of the Levellers and some of the Independents.[77] A written constitution was not his invention, neither were frequent elections, nor religious toleration nor hostility to the legal caste, to monarchy and to courtiers. The first question is whether Harrington, in fact, provided the Cromwellian gentry with their operative political ideas. The second question is what light, if any, the ideology of the gentry can cast upon the character of Harrington's thought. For Trevor-Roper's Harrington depends not only upon a positive answer to the first question. It also assumes that this function of Harrington's thought, the rôle it played in gentry politics, corresponds exactly to Harrington's intentions. The present argument is that both these propositions are false. The first is a simple mistake in fact, the second a common, but extremely obvious, error in the art of historical interpretation. One need only recall how often Rousseau has been treated as if the Jacobins had *written*, rather than *quoted*, the *Social Contract*, to see, at once, what has happened to Harrington. In both cases the intellectual biography of a man has been distorted in the course of a far more general and complex argument about the "nature" and "causes" of a revolution. If Tawney is, perhaps, mistaken in his view of Harrington's purposes and methods, he at least has given us the portrait of a man, even if a rather impressionistic one. The same can hardly be said of Trevor-Roper's Harrington. What we get here is not a picture of a thinker, but a personification, an artificial assemblage of the various roles that his ideas *may* have played in gentry politics. This montage of their potential functions is then passed off as a genuine picture of Harrington's ideas. There is, of course, nothing objectionable in describing the social functions of ideas, that is, the study of ideology proper. It is an essential aspect of social history. After all, social psychology treats the person as the sum of the "masks" he wears, the totality of the roles he plays in the "orders" of society, whether political, economic, military, kinship or religious.[78] There is no reason why ideas should not be treated in their social context, in terms of the part they play in the activities of groups, especially of groups engaged in a violent conflict.

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[76] Hexter, *loc. cit.*

[77] In the words of an older commentator, he was "to the right of the left and to the left of the right," T. W. Dwight, "James Harrington," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 2 (1887), p. 6.

[78] H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, *Character and Social Structure* (New York, 1953), pp. 14 and 26.

However, just as an individual may be regarded as more than a social type, so there is more to the study of ideas than the identification of ideological processes. In analyzing an individual writer one looks for more than just another social specimen. And when it is said that an author ought to be studied in terms of his social experiences, it is worth remembering that these are specifically *his*, and that his personal situation and intellectual antecedents and concerns are not to be ignored.[79] As a part of social history ideas are impersonal functions of group-life; as the subject of the history of ideas they are the expressions of individual thinkers who communicate directly and personally with their predecessors, contemporaries and us. There is no conflict between these two ways of looking at the past. One asks different questions and one gets different answers. Only the intellectual imperialist, out to conquer the realm of "real" history that lies behind men and events, will confuse them.

It is the habit of personifying events, ages, nations, classes and other groups, indeed history itself, that has led to the depersonalizing of individuals.[80] For it is now these abstract categories that have motives and intentions that must be uncovered and evaluated as one judges the behavior of individuals. Ideas are now rationalizations, deceptions practiced semi-consciously by groups, and the omniscient historian must expose them and grade them as "ideology," "utopia" or "false consciousness," depending on their relation to the true standard—the course of "real" history.[81] This has been the method of neo-Tories no less than of Marxists. According to the latter the "virtue" of the 17th century bourgeoisie was to have been "progressive," that is, in line with the demands of history. Their error was to have thought that they were a "universal" class, realizing general moral and religious values, not just their own aspirations; and this disguise must be pulled aside. Thus too the sin of Trevor-Roper's gentry is not that they were nasty, but that they attempted the impossible by vainly trying to interfere with the set course of England's historical development; and because they could not succeed their ideology was a mere cover for their impotence, "false consciousness." The terms of historical classification now become those of moral obloquy. Puritanism is "really" only the "veil of the bourgeoisie" or the "false consciousness" of the declining gentry. Hobbes's philosophy was "really" only "bourgeois ideology"; Harrington's, that of an array of distempered "mere" gentry. The revolution was "really" caused by the rising classes, or it was "really" caused by declining groups.

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[79] This might as well be called post-Marxism, in contrast to Mr. Pocock's neo-Marxism which limits itself to strictly *social* experiences and situations. Letter to *Encounter*, October, 1958.

[80] Unlike Karl Popper I do not regard the personification of historical categories as analogous to medieval realism. His own medieval nominalism would make the writing of any sort of history impossible. How little he has understood the real problems of historical explanation and especially those created by generalizations on different levels of abstractness can be seen in his claim that the First World War is an "individual thing" just like Alexander the Great. *The Poverty of Historicism* (Boston, 1957), pp. 17–34, 76–83, 143–152.

[81] Krieger, "Marx and Engels," *loc. cit.*; K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (Harvest Books, New York, n.d.), *passim* and pp. 56 and 93–97.

As has been well observed—and by a Marxist too—to describe Puritanism as the ideology of the declining gentry does little to explain the spiritual life of Milton or Vane.[82] To classify it as the rationalization of bourgeois aspirations does no better.[83] Nor does this distributing of identification disks throw much light upon Hobbes and Harrington. The only extenuating circumstance that excuses this rage for revealing the intimate secrets of groups and classes, and of history itself, is the political prudery of the Whigs, which was designed to bring out the worst in anyone. For to have said that the Civil War was "really" about "faith and freedom," not a "social war" but "a war of ideas," was to invite abuse.[84] Whatever else wars may be, they are social events in which organized groups of men fight each other. Nor is slaughter improved when it is "motivated" by convictions and ideas. Ideological wars are no more edifying than other wars. In analyzing wars, or any identifiable social situation, we are, moreover, not looking for "real" causes, the "deep motives." Generalized concepts like "revolutions" or "classes" or "parties" do not have simple motives, open or hidden, that can be used to explain their character or general behavior. They are not individuals, after all. They are abstract concepts that we established so as to bring some order into our accounts of the past.[85] We can dissect them, identify the various strands that go into a chosen situation, and see how these modify and affect each other. Among these objectivized tendencies ideology, or "the symbol sphere," is surely an important one, no less so than the other "orders" of society. If this sort of analysis is the task of the social historian—and anyone who writes anything beyond the purest narrative history is just that—then there is no need to insist on metaphors, and on emotionally charged ones at that. It is indeed regrettable, as Stone has observed, that the Cold War has come to disturb the Civil War.[86] Perhaps it will console him to remember that something of that sort has always occurred when the question of the "real" causes of the Revolution was raised. Nothing less than partisanship could ever have induced so many learned men to ask so futile a question.

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[82] Hill, "Recent Interpretations," *loc. cit.*, p. 74.

[83] Bernstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–7; Hill, "Marx and Engels," *loc. cit.*, pp. 132 and 154; *The English Revolution*, pp. 13 and 17; Petegorsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 22 and 25.

[84] Hexter, *loc. cit.;* see also Firth, *op. cit.*, p. 71, or G. M. Trevelyan, *op. cit.*, pp. 195–196 and 228–231, where it is said, "in motive it was a war not like the French or American of classes or of districts, but of ideas," p. 229.

[85] I am aware that there are plenty of philosophical problems in describing individual behavior in this way too, but I do not think this is relevant to the everyday discourse of historical writing. I am much indebted to P. Gardiner's *The Nature of Historical Explanation* (Oxford, 1952), especially pp. 60–61, 99–112 and 114–127, for these considerations. However, I think that while Gardiner rightly emphasizes the abstractness of words like "revolution" or "class", he treats these as "events" capable of being explained causally. I think that as pure "cover-words" they cannot be treated in this way, especially when one is analyzing social factors. This, however, does not apply to more purely narrative history where the antecedent event simply serves as the cause of subsequent ones, and more limited entities are involved. Of such writing C. V. Wedgwood's *The King's Peace* (London, 1955) is clearly a fine example, even if it tends to be the history only of conspicuous persons and highly articulate speakers.

What Happened to Him. It remains to disentangle Harrington from the fortunes of the gentry and the "real" causes of the Great Rebellion. To begin with, Trevor-Roper accepts Tawney's view that Harrington described the "rise of the gentry," and in a way that was different from the earlier accounts of the decline of the nobility by Bacon, Raleigh, and Selden.[87] This, as we have seen, was not the case. If he appealed to the gentry this was not the reason for his popularity. However, the gentry did not in fact accept Harrington's ideas, and at no time did *Oceana* become the intellectual weapon, the verbal gunpowder, of the Independents. If they and Cromwell were the political leaders of the mere gentry, as Trevor-Roper claims, then Harrington never became their prophet. Even in the mad last year of the Commonwealth, Neville could muster only eight or ten supporters for Harrington's scheme in Parliament. Aubrey gives us one reason for its unpopularity, the overly democratic notion of rotation in office.[88] Burnet tells us of an even deeper reason, Harrington's paganism.[89] Moreover, if Trevor-Roper were not so anxious to destroy Tawney's unreal Harrington, he might well have asked himself who, in fact, did write Cromwell's propaganda, who answered his critics and rationalized his policies? It was not Harrington; it was Milton. The dying gasp of Independent ideology is the *Ready and Easy Way.* Here is the disillusion with "the people," the call for the rule of the best, the best being the last Commonwealthmen. Here too is the religious fervor, the true note of 17th century ideological combat. It is here that the Commonwealth is held up as the will of God, as toleration had earlier been defended as the way to help men to God. As for Cromwell's radical Republican opponents, they talked of rights, consent, the "will of the nation," and "the cause we fought for." Whether the gentry was coming up or going down, these were the terms in which they, and the majority of their contemporaries, talked. It was not Harrington's manner any more than it was Hobbes's. That is why no one cared for them.[90] Cromwell tried to silence Harrington; the judges of Charles II persecuted him. Hobbes was exiled during the Commonwealth and kept quiet under Charles II. Neither produced ideology, the kind of ideas that could have played a part in the actual struggle.

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[86] Letter to *Encounter*, October, 1958.

[87] He makes no complaint against these writers, "Gentry," *loc. cit.*, p. 44.

[88] Aubrey, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

[89] G. Burnet, *History of My Own Time*, ed. O. Airy (Oxford, 1897), Vol. I, p. 120; Cromwell treated *Oceana* as too unimportant and fanciful to matter, then took care to condemn its paganism, Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 75–76, 113–117; Toland, pp. xvi-xvii. See also C. J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Reason of State* (Providence, 1957), pp. 35 and 110.

[90] If it was Hobbes's mistake to forget that "no society can survive without its myth," it was also Harrington's. Presumably that is why John Bowle does not even mention him among Hobbes's critics. *Hobbes and his Critics* (London, 1951), p. 45.

So much for history.

The facts known about Harrington's life can help us to see why he should have been so ineffectual. Tawney has suggested that Harrington may have seen the rise of the gentry in the fortunes of his own family, and Blitzer has shown that, in fact, many Harringtons had been climbing up the social ladder in a fairly spectacular way. Trevor-Roper has shown that some of them were slipping.[91] These circumstances, interesting in themselves, tell us nothing about Harrington. We do not know how much he knew or cared about the progress of his near and distant relations. Nor is their social status all that is relevant to a picture of his background. Many Harringtons had been scholars, travellers, and courtiers of note.[92] There is no reason to suppose that Harrington thought of himself as a "mere" gentleman or that he was under any inner compulsion to provide a pie-in-the-sky opiate for such men. If he aligned himself with any one of his family's traditions, it was that of the urbane, travelled gentleman-scholar. He had friends at court and in Parliament. According to all accounts he was a republican before the Civil War and remained one to the end. He loved Charles I and he admired Cromwell, or at least had illusions about him. But the origin of his views is not in his direct political activities, of which he, in fact, had none. His forum, the Rota, if it was a dream-parliament, was no more so than any debating society; and if it met in a coffee-house, the members were not such as one associates with the political cafés of modern Left-Banks. Tawney is surely right in recalling that several members of the future Royal Academy were to be found there, as well as solid men like Pepys.[93]

Harrington got his notions from his beloved classics, not from any specific social experience. We may as well take Hobbes's word for the impact that the classics had upon the intellectual youth of his age. And Harrington was nothing if not an intellectual. He was precocious as a child and spent his early manhood in study and travel. Far from participating in the Civil War, he at once fled to his study; a true scholar, in short.[94] He had no wish to enter public life, because he preferred his books, and he boasted about the superiority of the intellectual to the man of affairs in season and out. No public figure had ever written a sensible word on politics, only "private gentlemen" could.[95] And before his judges he could think of no better defense than that if Aristotle and Machiavelli had been allowed to write freely under their respective rulers, then he too should be granted that privilege.[96] One can see with whom he identified himself. Socially detached, he cared only for his ideas, and for those of his great predecessors. If he addressed the gentry it was to call them to their duties, not to flatter them, "who understand so little what it is to be Lords of the Earth that they have not been able to keep their lands."[97] If *Oceana* was dedicated to Cromwell, he continued, on the strength of his classical examples, to call for a single, creative, but not ruling, legislator after Cromwell was dead.[98] Olphaus Megaletor, the great legislator of *Oceana*, does not resemble Cromwell, or any other contemporary; he is just a reincarnation of the Moses-Lycurgus-Solon-Romulus figure. As for the dedication, it is a puzzle, comparable to Machiavelli's dedication of *The Prince*.[99] Hobbes was surely right in insisting that realism was not the fruit of classical learning. And we have already seen how little there is to substantiate Harrington's reputation as a close observer of the English constitutional crisis. While he was abroad, for all his talk about the value of travel and historical knowledge for politicians, he was equally inattentive. His picture of Venice bears no resemblance to that republic in the 17th century, but it corresponds exactly to Contarini's popular myth.[100] Harrington was, in short, fatally addicted to his books, especially to Plato's *Laws*, Aristotle's *Politics*, Polybius, and, above all, to Machiavelli. *Oceana* was written to show the superiority of these "masters of ancient prudence" to those of "modern prudence," especially Hobbes and the defenders of the medieval tradition. If *Oceana* resembles Cromwell's *Instrument* and copies his military system, this was due to their common desire for stability. However, both knew perfectly well that their political values were not only different, but basically irreconcilable, as Puritanism and paganism were bound to be.

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[91] M. James, "Contemporary Materialist Interpretations," *loc. cit.*, p. 86; Tawney, "Harrington," p. 203; "The Rise of the Gentry: A Postscript," *Economic History Review*, Vol. 7 (1954–55), p. 96; Blitzer, "Introduction," *loc. cit.*, p. xv; Trevor-Roper, "The Gentry," p. 22.

[92] Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 2–3.

[93] Aubrey, *op. cit.*, p. 125; Blitzer, "Introduction," *loc. cit.*, pp. xxiii–xxiv; Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 101–108; Tawney, "Harrington," p. 205; Toland, *loc. cit.*, pp. xxv–xxvi.

[94] *Ibid.*, p. xiii; Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–11; Koebner, "Oceana," *loc. cit.*, pp. 370–371; "Geschichtslehre," *loc. cit.*, p. 19.

[95] Toland, pp. xi–xiii and xxx; *Works*, pp. 219 and 367.

[96] *Ibid.*, p. xxx.

Harrington's Religious Views. It is possible that the gentry might have turned, as Trevor-Roper says, from Roman Catholicism to Puritanism in their search for a suitable ideology, though it is difficult to believe, since one of the few remaining certainties about the Great Rebellion is that Catholics and Puritans were never on the same side.[101] It is, however, totally improbable that they could at any time have moved from these to a pagan ideology. Nor is there any evidence that they did. They did not, and could not see themselves reflected in Harrington's Machiavellian paradise. And Harrington took to it precisely because he felt that peace and tranquillity depended on de-ideologizing politics, on ending the religious wrangles that raged about him with increasing heat. "Religion was not the thing at first contested, but God brought it to that issue," Cromwell noted.[102] Harrington's main aim was to get God out of politics. If he quoted the Old Testament it was as history. When he spoke of Christianity it was only to show that it was in no way incompatible with

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[97] *Oceana*, p. 177.

[98] *Works*, pp. 470 and 578.

[99] For Machiavelli's own historical unrealism, see F. Chabod, *Machiavelli and the Renaissance* (London, 1958), tr. D. Moore (London, 1958), pp. 20–21, 85–104, 119–120, 137 and 143–147.

[100] Fink, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–55 and 62–67.

[101] Hill, "Recent Interpretations," *loc. cit.*, p. 73.

[102] Firth, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

"ancient prudence." The rule of the Saints was an illegitimate oligarchy, in his eyes. Since they did not represent the balance, their rule was unstable and so unjust, and not at all godly.[103]

He also detested the asceticism of the Puritans. Like most admirers of the ancient republics, he wanted public games and entertainments.[104] As for his beloved Venice, it was not, as Filmer noted, a Christian place.[105] Nor was Harrington opposed only to Laud's church or to the Presbyterians. He was anti-clerical in the Continental manner, and indeed was fond of quoting French and Italian sayings about the political follies of the clergy.[106] Unlike Machiavelli he did not dwell on the political superiority of pagan religions to Christianity.[107] It was the sort of psychological reflection his optimistic mind eschewed. Moreover, the situation was different. Machiavelli saw only two alternatives, the Church or paganism. Harrington was faced with the problem of a multitude of sects. That his answer to it was fantastic is perfectly clear. Only as atypical a man as Harrington could have proposed toleration together with a national church and have suggested that the universities rationally settle all doctrinal disputes. What lies behind this fancy is a complete lack of religious sense. That is why Cromwell and Baxter condemned him. For his justification of this arrangement was that it did not matter what Christians believed as long as there was public order and an organ "representing the public conscience."[108] In this Montesquieu would have quite approved of him, for he too thought it was "necessary to the society that it should have something fixed; and it is religion that has this stability."[109] Thus Harrington, for all his tolerance, insisted on the exclusion of Jews and idolaters from *Oceana*, not because of their personal beliefs, but because they would not mix and become part of the public or share the national conscience. His specific suggestion was to send the Jews to Ireland where their industry would fill an evident gap in the national character of the local population.[110] It is not the content of faith that matters, but only its political and social consequences. Like Machiavelli, Bodin, and Montesquieu, Harrington was a *politique d'abord* man.

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[103] *Oceana*, pp. 55–56; *Works*, pp. 156, 457–458, 469 and 574.

[104] *Oceana*, pp. 158 and 220–221.

[105] *Patriarcha and Other Political Writings*, ed. P. Laslett (Oxford, 1949), pp. 207–208 and 221–222.

[106] *Oceana*, p. 173. Gough, I think, is quite mistaken in treating Harrington as no more "irreligious" than the radical Puritans. The use of religious arguments signifies a no greater degree of religion in him than in Hobbes. The radical Puritan arguments based on rights were *secularized* religious conceptions, whereas Harrington returned to the *pagan* notions of social order and civic liberty. I should therefore agree that Harrington was not a *secular* thinker in that sense, but insist on his utter indifference to religious faith. Gough, *loc. cit.*, pp. 395–404. In contrast, see A. S. P. Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty* (Chicago, 1951), "Introduction," pp. 38 and 82, where this distinction is very clearly drawn.

[107] *Discourses*, Bk. I, chs. 11–12, and Bk. II, ch. 2.

[108] *Oceana*, pp. 38, 55, 69–70, 109–110 and 169–173; *Works*, pp. 420–423, 474–476, 484–485 and 594–596.

[109] *Spirit of the Laws*, Vol. II, Bk. XXVI, s. 2.

[110] *Oceana*, pp. 10–11.

Survivalism. What else could "ancient prudence" have told him? What else could have drawn him to it? All knew stability, peace, order, and civic unity to be the highest of all social and political aims. Liberty, justice, and equality—these were all mere means to that supreme aim.[111] That is what Harrington said he had learned from them, and that is why he admired them so extravagantly. His dependence in every detail on Plato's *Laws* has often been shown.[112] Polybius was his master in the theory of mixed government.[113] In Aristotle, who was already "full of" the balance, he found the same doctrine.[114] If one is to see Harrington in the context of a tradition of political thought, one might well call it the "survivalist" tradition.[115] It includes all those for whom the fifth book of Aristotle's *Politics*, abstracted from all the rest of his thought, serves as the fountain of political wisdom, for whom the preservation of the political order is the first task of politics. Amoral, and a-ideological, it rests on the assumption that government cannot make men good, but that it can keep them from violent action. The strict adherence to the letter of the law is demanded not as just, but as the one means of stopping violence and resentment among the governed; mixed-government, as the way to prevent acts of hostility from rulers. That, in fact, *is* justice. The end of government is at the most civic harmony; at the very least it is to prevent clashes of interest and conviction from becoming violent. Such was the theory of Marsiglio of Padua, of Machiavelli in the *Discourses*, of Spinoza, of Harrington, and in its most sophisticated form, of Montesquieu. It is a philosophy that is sure to appeal to those who have seen enough of civil war and ideological wrangling to last them forever.

V. HARRINGTON AND AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE

After observing the complexity of the attitudes which Harrington has evoked among his English readers, it is with relief that one turns to the simple welcome he received in America. For if Harrington's ideas ever played any part in political life, it was in America. Indeed they came close to being the ideology of the American Whigs, especially Adams and Webster. If his agrarian law, his militarism, his imperialism, and such devices as his Plutarchian legislator clearly had no place in American thinking, the American Harrington did bear a very recognizable resemblance to the original.[116] Certainly it was a more genuine likeness than any we have seen since Hume's essays. For only in America could he be accepted as a whole, as both a social realist and as a constitution-maker. There was no need here to separate these two aspects of his thought and to ignore, disparage, or distort one in order to accept the second. The "interest" theory of legitimacy was no longer incompatible with "political architecture"; rather they supported each other. For constitution writing was now no less respectable than a due regard for the place of property in government. Thus it was possible for Adams to recall that during the Second Continental Congress he had been a second Sieyès, and to quote the very passage in which Burke had identified the latter with Harrington. But Adams was quick to add that even in those palmy days he had never suggested an "unbalanced" constitution.[117] In short, he had been a second Harrington from the first. There was not the slightest chance that he should confuse a 17th century republican with an 18th century revolutionary. On the contrary, Harrington provided him with all the necessary arguments against the latter. At last Harrington had found a niche in the world of politics.

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[111] *E.g.*, *Oceana*, pp. 32, 135–137 and 185–186; *Works*, 218 and 370.

[112] Blitzer in his thesis gives a very convincing point-by-point comparison of the institutions of the *Laws* and *Oceana*.

[113] Fink, *op. cit.*, pp. 3–27 and 54–57.

[114] *Oceana*, p. 17.

[115] I borrow this term from C. J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Reason of State*, pp. 34–54, though I give it a broader meaning than he intended.

[116] On the strength of his remark that it was impossible to keep colonies—that is, to feed soldiers—when the native population owned the balance, everyone from Otis on treated him as a prophet of American liberty, forgetting that *Oceana* was to be a second Roman Empire. See Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 185–200. See Levett, *loc. cit.*, pp. 189–191, for a criticism of this Americanized Harrington.

Harrington and the American Whigs. Harrington's American success is no surprise. The Great Rebellion did not need refighting. Most Americans were born Roundheads. Adams was proud to be unfashionable in England, with his taste for 17th century republican authors. And then *Oceana* was much more like America than England. It was after all a society in which considerable differences in wealth and conviction did not have to lead to violent conflict. It was an agrarian community, the very condition that Adams was happy to observe in America.[118] And it was, as Adams insisted a republic must be, based on popular consent. After all, anyone with £100 a year was entitled to participate in politics.

It has not been proven that, except in the case of Massachusetts where Adams himself introduced Harrington, he exercised a direct influence upon the various state constitutions. Rather it was a matter of drawing on a common stock of 17th century republican ideas which later writers had already developed.[119] In any case, in this respect Harrington was not particularly original. Survivalist constitutionalism in general continued to have a career in America. Where the balancing of interests rather than the morality of consent, and mixed and stable government rather than individual rights were stresssed, as in *The Federalist*, there the direct heirs of Harrington, rather than those of Locke, were at work.[120] Not that even Adams saw any real conflict between these two. The usual thing was to talk of Sidney, Harrington, and Locke in one breath as the three patron saints of republicanism.[121] This could be done quite easily by de-radicalizing both Locke and Harrington. The individualism of Locke was toned down and Harrington's demand for a harmony of interest was overlooked—probably because both had been realized to a sufficient degree not to be real challenges. To Adams the balancing of interests achieved by his bicameralism seemed just like Harrington's. Did not both believe in natural aristocracy?[122] Only Harrington's Senate represented not the *interests* of this aristocracy, but rather the brains of a nation with one common interest. Its function, like that of the great legislator, was "invention," not the defense of local or group interests.[123] Indeed Harrington believed in political leadership, in politics as an art, in a way that was unfamiliar to the Whigs. A due attention to "energy in the executive" did not amount to politics as perpetual contrivance, not to mention again the constitution-creating single legislator, that civilized Machiavellian *Prince*.[124] Mixed government for Harrington was a matter of talent and functional utility, not of balancing powers. *Oceana* was a model of civic solidarity to which no reality, not even America, could aspire.

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[117] *The Selected Writings of John and John Quincy Adams*, ed. A. Koch and W. Peden (New York, 1946), pp. 44–45.

[118] *Ibid.*, p. 52; *Works*, ed. C. F. Adams (Boston, 1850–1856), Vol. IV, pp. 395–360, 521, 551; V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York, 1954), Vol. I, p. 274.

[119] Parrington, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 5; Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 160–185.

[120] For a contemporary restatement, see Wormuth, *op. cit.*, pp. 3–9, 211–215.

[121] Adams, *Selected Writings*, pp. 23, 36 and 208.

Politics as Engineering. Constitutional engineering has been respectable in America. Its academic offshoot today is the study of "comparative" government in which incommensurables are placed side by side in order that the essence of constitutional and political truth may reveal itself.[125] It is the art of writing static history, both ancient and contemporary, in which Harrington and Adams excelled. Harrington juggled his ancient republics around to prove that they alone were capable of achieving stability, and that the failure to adopt agrarian legislation was alone responsible for their eventual decline. Adams followed the same procedure in order to prove to Turgot and Condorcet that mixed government alone was stable, that wherever power had been located in one center the republican order had died.[126] To be sure, for all his agreement with the Machiavellian principle that good laws make good men, Adams spent far more time than Harrington did in contemplating the infirmities of human nature. However, since the old Adam was an historic constant, and only the balance of interest was variable, he could proceed on Harringtonian principles.[127] He openly rejected Montesquieu's relativism as Harrington had denied Machiavelli's.[128] And so Adams and later Webster could congratulate themselves in sober tones upon the fact that in America the aims of *Oceana* had been all but achieved because their ancestors had divided the land equally and their contemporaries or fathers had adopted a sensible constitution.[129]

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[122] Adams, *Works*, Vol. IV, pp. 413–414; Dwight, *loc. cit.*, p. 19; Z. Haraszti, *John Adams and the Prophets of Progress* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), p. 35; Parrington, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 324–325; Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 191–199.

[123] *Oceana*, pp. 59, 61 and 142–149; *Works*, pp. 214, 472 and 490.

[124] I am much indebted to L. Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, 1955), pp. 46–47, for this and most of the ideas presented here.

[125] For a good criticism of current practices in this field, see K. R. Minogue, "The Language of Comparative Politics," *Political Studies*, Vol. VI (1958), pp. 267–270.

[126] The quarrel here was not between those who wanted to treat constitutions as if they were "pudding to be made by a receipt" and those who did not want to make them at all, but between different kinds of cooks, receipts and diners. See C. H. McIlwain, *Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern* (Ithaca, 1958), pp. 1–22 and *passim*.

[127] Haraszti, *op. cit.*, pp. 34, 45–46 and 258; Parrington, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 273, 284, 323, 328.

[128] *Works*, Vol. VI, p. 218.

If this is a watered-down Harrington, he is at least more genuinely himself than Acton's liberal, Lecky's organicist, or Burke's split personality. Both his mechanical materialism and his political fancies were given their due. For the latter were no longer quite so absurd. What was and remains so is the notion that politics is like engineering, an exact technique to be learned from the models of the past—or by "analytical models" built by contemporary political scientists. It is this that makes Oakeshott's caricature of the "political rationalist" so uncomfortably convincing. It is Harrington, far more than the often dour Machiavelli, who is the real prototype of this mentality. "A perfectionist in detail," addicted to the "politics of creation," professing the morality of "the self-made man and the self-made society," for whom politics is always a matter of solving technical "problems."[130] To which it might be said that the politics of "the felt need" do not exclude creation, and that when traditions fail or die, it is better to invent than to lament, provided one does it with a sense for the situation. Harrington lacked the latter utterly. However, when the situation found *him*, he could provide not just a combative ideology, but a reasoned view of the bases of constitutional government. What more than justifies the critics of politics as engineering is the extent to which Harrington and his latter-day equivalents have misunderstood the prudential and historical nature of practical political thinking.

Politics as Science. A mania for regarding Harringtonian "political architecture" as a science begins early. Harrington fancied himself a second Harvey, and Adams compared his "law" of the balance to Newton's physics.[131] Harrington's latest American admirers have gone even beyond that. Now it is not too much to claim that Harrington felt an enthusiasm for science. However, enthusiasm for science is not the same thing as science itself. And Harrington, for all his fervor, showed not the remotest understanding of, or even interest in, the scientific work of his age. For all his admiration for Harvey, he only knew that the latter had discovered the circulation of the blood, "out of nature." Yet Harvey's work had been published twenty-eight years before *Oceana* appeared, and his reputation was so great that by 1656 nearly every literate person had heard of him. In all his travels in Italy and Holland, Harrington seems to have heard of no other great man or work of science. Just as he copied his social history from books, so his "passion" for science did not go beyond an acquaintance with a celebrated name and with a few new-fangled terms from the vocabulary of mechanics.[132]

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[129] Parrington, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 25–26; Vol. II, pp. 296–297; C. Beard, *The Economic Basis of Politics*, ed. W. Beard (New York, 1957), pp. 37–40 and 53, for quotations from Webster in praise of Harrington.

[130] M. Oakeshott, "Rationalism in Politics," *Cambridge Journal*, Vol. I (1947), pp. 83–84, 88–91 and 145–157. See Harrington's *Oceana*, pp. 62 and 207; *Works*, pp. 214–215, 367, 463, 470, 472, 477, 480–482 and 488, for his addiction to the politics of technical invention and "reason of state."

[131] Blitzer, "Introduction," *loc. cit.*, pp. xxvi–xxvii.

However, if his knowledge of the natural sciences of his own age was scant, his resemblance to the 20th century political scientist seems only too evident. His insensitivity to intangibles, and to qualitative considerations, which came out in his argument with Hobbes, find their culmination in his pretensions to "science." However, what was only a part of Harrington's work is now taken for the whole. We are told that he "was trying to reduce political life to a form that would admit of quantitative expression, of measurement on a common scale" and to deal only with "the measurable element among . . . phenomena."[133] That is said to explain his interest in property and electoral devices, where something, presumably pounds and votes, could be counted. In short, Harrington was not just, as his English admirers feel, a modern historian, but an American political scientist. For he was determined "to formulate a comprehensive and coherent science of politics" by applying to politics the techniques that had proven so fruitful in the natural sciences. His passion for detail did not express a lively imagination, but a sense of the concrete and a "desire to avoid oversimplification and abstraction."[134] Since "concrete" in Harrington's case can hardly mean a sense of the possible, it must be identified with the measurable.

Happily there is no reason to suppose that Harrington was trying to "reduce" politics to 20th century academic ideology. What he did was to use Harvey's name to prop up his argument that the "facts" of history proved his law of "the balance" and that a political system built on such a basis must inevitably succeed. He also fancied that his detailed model of a political order was "political anatomy" since he was providing the commonwealth with its bones and arteries. In this he assured himself he was emulating Harvey.[135] What it amounted to was argument by analogy and feeble analogy at that. For it never occurred to Harrington that Harvey had not built the human body nor "invented" the blood stream.[136] Essentially he was no more "scientific" than John of Salisbury in his famous comparison of the levels of the social hierarchy to the members of the human body. Nor was he at all able to distinguish between the laws of history and those of mechanics or between a "demonstration out of nature" and historical examples. Such distinctions would only have undermined his case against Hobbes. However, once the function of Harrington's "institutionalism" is understood, there is nothing to suggest that he was at all inclined to identify the concrete with the measurable. He never speaks of measurement nor did he limit himself to measurable political phenomena any more than had Plato in the *Laws*, in which numbers also play their part—if not exactly a scientific one. And no one has yet suggested that Plato was a precursor of contemporary "behavioral science."

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[132] *E.g., Oceana,* p. 107.

[133] Blitzer, p. xxvii.

[134] *Ibid.,* pp. xxvi–xxviii and xxix.

[135] *Oceana,* pp. 13 and 62; *Works,* pp. 214, 232, 402–403, 463, 470 and 560.

[136] This failure to distinguish between the logic of discovery and technology lies behind most of the current concern for "measurement," "certainty," and "methodology" in the social sciences. Moreover, I agree with those who see in this development the ideological expression of a pervasive concern for security—political, social and intellectual. See *e.g.,* B. Moore, Jr., *Political Power and Social Theory* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 92–94. I have in mind exactly what C. W. Mills calls "abstracted empiricism." *The Sociological Imagination* (New York, 1959), pp. 50–75.

This is not the place to discuss the value of statistical information, of the study of voting behavior, of constructing equilibrium models or of plotting legislative and judicial decisions on graphs. For the present it suffices to note that Harrington contributed nothing but the habit of reasoning by dubious analogy to this form of political thinking. For he did not limit himself to the measurable. If any affinity exists between him and those who reduce politics to mathematics, it is on the level of ideology. In both cases there is an image of a political world so bland and so harmonious that nothing need be said or done but to record and count decisions about indifferent issues, and one that seems so calm and stable that everything appears calculable and predictable. In both cases it is a matter of hope rather than of science.

VI. CONCLUSION

It is as a theory of political history, and especially of constitutional history, that Harrington and the whole survivalist tradition may still play a part in our thinking. And, in fact, with the decline of academic Marxism a return to this older tradition has taken place. Since it never entirely died out in America, it is perhaps not surprising that it was to find one of its earliest restatements here. Whatever may have been the failings of Charles Beard as an historian of the Constitution in general, and of the Whigs in particular, he was, paradoxically, an avowed disciple of their historical theory.[137] And when in later years, thanks to the experience of war and fascism, he revised his economic interpretation of history, he came as close to Harrington as anyone could in the present age. The economic man, he argued, was always in competition with the political and military man, and economic interest could dominate political life only when the latter two were in abeyance.[138] In his view of economics as "interest" and in posing the alternatives of a state based on force or on interest, he showed himself a true Harringtonian. To have underestimated the importance of military force was, in his eyes, the great fault of Marx, and he pointed to Tirpitz's naval policy and to fascism to show the independent dynamic of military and political forces.[139] Nevertheless, he insisted that politics without economics was "astrology," since, to survive, any state must pay due regard to its economic foundations.[140] Since he, like Harrington, had not the slightest understanding of ideological forces, he could not envision a government that might choose to destroy a nation.

[137] Beard, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 36 and 40.
[138] *Ibid.*, pp. 93 and 103–104.
[139] *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 93, 98–99, 103–104, 122–123
[140] *Ibid.*, pp. 99–100.

Many others, having lived through the entire history of Nazism and having had to cope with Soviet politics, too, followed Beard in finding Marxian categories inadequate. Power has been reinstated as an independent factor in history, along with ideology. With this has come a return to the conception of political classes.[141] Once it was really accepted that political power shapes economic life here and now, not vice versa, and the often terrifying consequences of this circumstance were realized, the days of grandiose historical expectations were over.[142] And with a decline in ideological fervor a new appreciation for limited government and the values of peace and order emerged. It is this rebirth of survivalism that justifies this extensive discussion of Harrington, who was one of its most honest defenders.

Harrington cannot solve our "problems" for us; that is not, in any case, the task of political theory, past or present. It has not, moreover, been the aim of this paper to give a systematic account of his ideas. Anyone who wishes to know exactly what Harrington said must read him. It is, indeed, the mere cataloguing of "who said what" that has brought the study of the history of ideas to its present low repute. The purpose, however inadequately achieved, here has been to look at contemporary thinking by examining a part of its inheritance and its ways of dealing with it.

[141] *E.g.*, R. Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," and R. Bendix, "Social Stratification and Political Power" in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, eds., *Class, Status and Power* (Glencoe, 1953), pp. 567–577 and 596–609; J. E. Meisel, *The Myth of the Ruling Class* (Ann Arbor, 1957), pp. 345–381; C. W. Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, 1956), pp. 269–324; F. Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State* (Glencoe, 1957), pp. 3–21 and 233–269. Note particularly the latter's appreciative analysis of Montesquieu, pp. 96–148.

[142] See, *e.g.*, C. A. R. Crosland, *The Future of Socialism* (New York, 1957), both for the recognition of power, status and ideology as social factors, and for the values of an "Americanized" social atmosphere and constitutional government, by a not untypical socialist, pp. 29, 38–41, 71, 97–116 and 169–217, 220–221, 232–237, 245–248.

THE PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND OF INTERNATIONAL LAW*

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The principal aim of this paper is to relate the normative structure of international law to the underlying patterns of political behavior that have characterized the modern state system. The political constraint upon the normative structure of the law is only one of many; there are also economic, social, and ethical constraints, among others. Nonetheless, it provides many insights into the changing substantive content of the law and also illustrates the way in which theory helps to provide an understanding of subject matter.

A systematic study of the structure of the international society has been attempted elsewhere by one of the authors.[1] Two different models of international systems delineated there have particular relevance to the present topic. These are the "balance of power" system, a model of the international politics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the "loose bipolar" system, a model of present-day international politics. The two models, though no doubt less complex than the actual patterns of action, suffice to demonstrate important differences in system structure and behavior that can be related to normative standards.

A model of the international society, like the model of any kind of system, attempts to relate some of the system's variables in some systematic way. In a social system, one may look at the kinds of members, the role functions they perform, the conditions under which they do so, and the conditions necesssary to the system's stability.

I. THE "BALANCE OF POWER" INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Certain striking characteristics of the "balance of power" international system are immediately evident. In the first place, the members of the international society are nation-states, unlike the loose bipolar system, in which there are also blocs, like NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, and universal organizations like the United Nations.

In this system the nation is the focus of solidary sentiments for its citizen-subjects. It is the protector of the values, of the economic prospects, of the health and physical safety of the individual. Within it he *belongs* and outside of it he is an alien. But the nation itself must depend largely upon its own ability to survive. This is not unrestrictedly true for all nation-states as further modifications will demonstrate. Yet it is a central assumption upon which the behavior of important participants in the "balance of power" system depends.

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* This article will also appear as a chapter in the authors' forthcoming book, *The Political Foundations of International Law.*

[1] See Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*, John Wiley and Sons, 1957.

The failure of Spain toward the close of the period of colonial conquests had a devastating effect upon Spain's internal life. The demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire shattered Austrian national life and threatened Austrian viability. The recent decline of Britain and France has an easily traced effect upon their internal societies and upon their ability to protect themselves. On the other hand, the unification of Germany, in the nineteenth century, except for the political misuse of German power, turned Germany into a flourishing and prosperous country. All Americans are aware that whether American destiny was manifest or not the policy of national expansion was essential to the present importance and prosperity of the United States. Today the European Common Market rests upon the belief that only a new supranational organization can bring back past glories. But in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the nation was the essential unit. If one nation did not pursue its possible gains in the international system, another would do so, to the advantage of its own citizens and probably to the detriment of the citizens of the first.

The relationships of nations to one another in such a system must be competitive, suspicious, and primarily instrumental. Considerations of interest and expediency must be paramount. The first rule of conduct for each nation must be to seek security for itself. It will be ready to move from one alliance to another whenever this provides more security.

Since changes in national productivity of an unexpected nature might disturb the "balance," each nation will strive for a margin of security for itself. For this reason nations will enter coalitions, partly to gain prizes of some sort or other, such as territory, resources, shipping facilities, and so forth, and partly to prevent any other nation or combination of them from becoming powerful enough to pose a decisive threat.

Coalitions in a "balance of power" system will tend to become fragile when they become too strong. If too successful, they might eliminate defeated nations and thus threaten the interests of the weaker members of the successful coalition, whose security would then become precarious. Also, weak coalitions might make large offers to a powerful nation that was not aligned with other nations, or even to a member of the opposed coalition, not for gain but to protect themselves against loss. Moreover, different issues might give rise to different alignments. Therefore it is characteristic of the "balance of power" international system that previously uncommitted nations or even members of its own coalition swing into the "balance" against the predominant coalition. So the Russian-British-French entente was consolidated by 1907, and Italy later split off from the Triple Alliance.

Restraint in victory is also a characteristic of the "balance of power" international system, not necessarily for any reasons of altruism, but because restraint protects the interests of the members of the international society. Each strong nation has an interest in maintaining the existence of other strong nations in order to be confident of future allies in case of disagreements or clashes with its present allies. The restoration of France after the defeat of Napoleon was at least partly responsive to this need. Even the support given to German unification and to Italian nationalism had some relationship to this aim.

The "balance of power" system was dependent, among other things, upon the maintenance of a minimum number of large and strong nations. A system of three such would probably have been inherently unstable. It might be possible in a three-nation system for the nation defeated in a war to combine with the weaker of the victorious nations against the stronger victor. But the risks would be great and the opportunities to undo mistakes minimal. Such a system would place a high premium on striking first, on taking advantage of opportunity, on forming combinations, and on betraying allies. In a three-nation system, under conditions of conventional capabilities, turmoil and strife would be the rule; and the number would soon be reduced.

On the other hand, a greater number of large and important nations promise a greater opportunity to counter any individual alliance. Numbers of uncommitted nations would be available to redress the "balance." The opportunity to attract a member from one alliance to another would be relatively great. With a large number of great nations, there is a premium upon delay and moderation. Whereas with three nations, it is better to eliminate the opponents before they can combine against oneself, with a larger number it is better to preserve them so that they can combine with oneself in the future. With a large number of major nations, it is easier to find a coalition to prevent major change. In the First World War, for instance, America and Japan were available to restore the "balance" of Europe. Numbers gave time for thought and time for action and provided the nations needed to carry out the actions.

In such a system, any nation may at some time have an interest in conquering other nations. But there will be more nations—provided there is a minimally large number of them—having a contrary interest in preventing this. It would hardly be surprising therefore to discover in such a system that national "sovereignty" becomes an enforceable norm of the system, for it reflects essential needs of the "balance of power," and is compatible with the organization of domestic politics around the unifying concept of the nation. Each nation is an independent unit, not subject to conquest, amalgamation or other forms of political domination by other nations; each nation preserves for itself maximum flexibility with regard to alignments; each nation is organized territorially on the basis of existing culture groups. Any permanent international organization, or, indeed, any joint institutional arrangements such as we have today would be an unwarranted and undesirable drag on the flexible diplomacy that maintains political stability among the great nations in the "balance of power" system. The members of the system have a joint or cooperative interest in maintaining the system's norms. And, although in one sense each is "free" to violate the norms, each has an interest in protecting the norms from violations by others.

Additional factors tended to support this state of equilibrium. One we have already emphasized was nationalism. The growth of unifying sentiments of loyalty toward the nation gave the nation-state a strength and coherence that other forms of political organization had lacked. The struggle for national independence did not, of course, interfere with the suppression of minorities, as in Hungary, where they existed as isolated islands within a larger geographical area. These minority problems, however, did create a domestic instability which affected the role of such nations internationally, and as a result produced international instability; the recurrence of the Balkan problem is the prime example. But where nationalism was effective domestically it tended to limit expansive international objectives. It is implausible for politicians to preach the values of national independence for themselves without according it to others. Nationalism tends to differentiate beyond the area which it can unify, increasing the difficulties of conquest by force. Hitler's pan-Germanism had no appeal to non-Germans. One may limit national independence of minorities to "civilized" countries; one may accept the suppression of minorities within a nation; one need not refine or stereotype the qualities of the nation-state so far as to insist upon cultural self-determination of a Wilsonian sort. But the existence of national identity as the focal point for sentiments of loyalty at home is bound to legitimize it for others on principle, and in fact to increase the problems of conquest and annexation of all save border areas of mixed cultural content, like the Sudetenland.

Another factor contributing to preserving the "balance of power" system stemmed from the difficulty, increased by the ideology of nationalism, of any attempt by one nation to extend control over another. Consider the situation at the end of the Franco-Prussian War. Suppose that Bismarck had desired to establish German hegemony over France, how successful would he have been? Even apart from direct intervention by other nations on behalf of France, many considerations would have militated against a German attempt at hegemony. Given the state of technology of the period, the answer is, it would have been very difficult for Bismarck. Factories in the remote provinces of France would have been capable of producing weapons quite comparable in fire power to those used in the Prussian Army. Garrisoning major portions of France would have immobilized the Prussian Army in case military problems arose elsewhere in the world and would have placed a great strain upon the Prussian economy. Communication and transportation were not efficient enough to permit the central stationing of an occupation force for use in the provinces whenever disturbances broke out. To occupy a colonial area was one thing; to occupy metropolitan France was distinctly different. An attempt to occupy France permanently would have weakened Prussia relative to other potential enemies, and a seemingly successful conquest would also have stimulated others to enmity as a consequence of fear.

These factors tended to reinforce a social system in which the nation as an independent and "sovereign" entity played a key role. Still another factor gave particular support to a society of formally "equal" and "sovereign" nation-states. The "balance of power" system operated upon the basis of alliances designed to adjust immediate and short-term interests of the major nations. This required a willingness to consider any nation an acceptable role partner under appropriate circumstances.

Some questions handled at the Congress of Vienna become clearer when interpreted in light of this principle. The quick acceptance of France as a full member of the Congress after the defeat of Napoleon is illustrative. (This may be contrasted with the treatment of Germany at Versailles.) But the difficulties over the fate of Napoleon reflected a genuine dilemma of the European statesmen of the time. If the nations had refused to deal with Napoleon, as some statesmen advocated, this would have reflected a degree of interference in the internal affairs of the nation-state inconsistent with the state system of the time. On the other hand, the revolutionary character of the Napoleonic system and Napoleon's refusal to limit his objectives made it virtually impossible to enter into short-term alliances, restricted to short-term interests. He challenged the "neutrality" of alignments and therefore the character of the state system itself. Neutrality of alignment—a marriage of convenience without emotional involvement—is difficult in a revolutionary period when state regimes become unstable and when considerable foreign popular support is available to the revolutionary nation.

Neutrality of alignment was an essential characteristic of the "balance of power" international system; otherwise the process of forming counteralliances would have been impeded and the system would have developed rigidities making for instability. The "feud" between Germany and France after the forced cession of Alsace-Lorraine, for example, was one of the major circumstances leading to the breakdown of the "balance of power" system and the eruption of virtually total war in 1914.

If hostility between nations could impede operation of the principle of neutrality of alignment, control of one nation by another would also frustrate the same principle. Independence of the nation therefore was a prerequisite of this system. And, although any nation might have an individual interest in violating this rule or principle, each nation had an even stronger common interest in supporting it against the encroachments of all other nations. Moreover, the appeal to other nations to prevent an encroachment would characteristically be phrased in terms of the legitimate value of national independence. In short, this was necessarily a guiding norm which the existing political circumstances supported against violation and which almost automatically guaranteed the outraged resentment of the community of nations against any violator. It was therefore a key to the legal code of the international society of the late nineteenth century. Fear of the revolutionary character of democracy, to be sure, coupled perhaps with a desire to maintain the old social order, did lead the Holy Alliance to proclaim a doctrine of collective intervention against democracy. Had the cases of application proved highly exceptional, this limitation might have been maintained. However, in the nineteenth century world, such an effort was inconsistent with more basic needs of the "balance of power" system. And this exception to the rule proved potentially so dangerous that it was abandoned, despite the fact that the collective element of the intervention was designed to minimize its unstabilizing effects.

Non-interference in the internal affairs of another nation characterized the "balance of power" international system. The aims of war must stop short of such interference except when nations were confronted with the kind of dilemma Napoleon posed. Influence upon minor principalities, which often could not be avoided, represented such violations of the code that they were disguised lest the general principle be called into question. Even the troubles within the Ottoman Empire were treated with relative restraint. And British and French interference in Egypt—which was not at the heart of the European world—at least maintained the legal formalities. American dollar diplomacy restricted intervention to certain definite and limited objectives. Even so, it was difficult to accommodate these actions within the norms of the "balance of power" international system and the fiction of the dependent state had to be adopted to square the circle.

At least with respect to the major nations, the facts conformed fairly well with the legal norms. No nation had such predominance that it interfered with the internal life of other nations in any substantial way, whether by design or simply because of the immutable fact of its existence and weight in the international picture. Since most actions which had any influence upon citizens as such were settled within the territorial state by the government of that state, the myth of sovereignty as unlimited and indivisible jurisdiction was a fiction the logical difficulties of which did not affect its practical adequacy in explaining what took place; it was a fiction which each nation had an interest in maintaining and fostering. The absurdity of auto-limitation as an explanation of international law should not obscure the fact that the concept reflected the real needs which the community of nations had in protecting the myth of sovereignty.

Now the doctrine spawned from the basic idea of a sovereign state (however fictional, almost mystical, and useless for analytical or even descriptive purposes) was realistically more applicable to the large states than to smaller ones, for it was the former who made or redressed the "balance of power," whose independence was essential to the maintenance of the minimal number of states necessary to "balance," and whose equality within that system came moderately close to accurate description—not, of course, on a one-to-one basis, but in the ability of each to equalize the "balance." Its extension to a number of smaller states within Europe and Latin America (after the Monroe Doctrine, at least) served essentially the same purpose of preserving the status quo. The recognition of smaller states on terms of formal equality was not, as in the case of the great nations, primarily related to their utility as military allies or even to their direct impact on the political or military capabilities of the important actors. In effect, their "sovereign" status was guaranteed by the major nations, and for two reasons. In a system of flexible alliances it was not possible to agree upon any workable or viable division of smaller European countries; and the difficulty of acquisition by military force was considerable because of the difficulties of assimilating the conquered into different national cultures—it was scarcely worth the effort if others could be persuaded not to do so. Under such circumstances the best common policy usually was to neutralize the smaller states, and extending doctrine applicable to the major nations was well suited to this purpose. Statesmen of minor European nations were quite aware that their independence was the product of a "balance" they could not directly alter, and which it was to their advantage to preserve. They could best avoid domination by any particular nation by insisting upon their rights as "sovereign" entities, while, for their own part, scrupulously adhering to the code. The stalemate among the great nations gave the minor nations considerable freedom of action so long as they invoked standards which were impartial. Their interest in preserving their independence and neutrality coincided with that of the great nations, and so was converted into a force for law and order. In Europe, at least, the "balance" was at all times sufficiently fragile to make minor statesmen "responsible."

Although the "sovereignty" of these smaller states had, as in the case of the great nations, an obvious relation to "nationalism," it had little to do with any universalized principle of "self determination"—at least in Europe—until a much later period. Until Wilsonian idealism coincided with the break-up of the "balance" system, there was no inconsistency acknowledged between the sovereignty and independence of states and the existence of colonies and other forms of "dependent" states. The hegemony of the great nations over much of the world was simply taken for granted and remained undisturbed. Equality of rights and freedom from intervention were necessities only where they affected the political positions of the great nations; principally, therefore, in Europe. Military intervention or even lesser forms of interference in the administration of other states could not be tolerated where they had a direct effect on military capability. In other parts of the world intervention could be tolerated, and might, indeed, be indispensable to the pursuit of other objectives. The great nations had no hesitation in imposing their systems of values, their cultures, and in forwarding the interests of their nationals, in those parts of the world where intervention was tolerable to other great nations. Colonial claims were recognized and conceded on a *status quo* basis; further intervention was tolerated and incorporated into the doctrine of dependent statehood to minimize the potentially unfortunate feedback of intervention as a precedent invalidating the general rule in areas where it was necessary for the general rule against intervention to apply.

Doctrine with regard to the rights and duties of "states" accordingly became a matter of defining what constituted a "state," and here there was no reference to national self-determination as a principle. Inevitably the definition was tautological, for it included as one essential a capacity to enter into relations with other states—a capacity which depended upon its being a "state"—that is, upon its ability to act independently of any of the great nations. A new state came into being only with the acquiescence of the great nations, an acquiescence which might come from agreement among them not to intervene or from a geographical location such that intervention by a single nation would be opposed forcibly by others. An analogous situation occurred with regard to the recognition of new "governments" of old "states" whenever crowned heads fell before popular revolutions. Although the notion of popular sovereignty was anathema to the various governmental elites, and there was a common interest in suppressing radical ideas, intervention constituted an even greater danger. One could support an existing government in various indirect ways, but such assistance had to stop short of measures which would threaten its independence.

Now it is clear that a doctrine authorizing or inhibiting forcible intervention or direct control of the political institutions of another entity—whatever its justification—is a limitation only upon the great nations. All states may be equally governed by the same general rule against intervention, but its bite is only against those who have the capacity to intervene. Similarly the appeal of those intervened against must be to those who have the capacity to protect them. Small states do not intervene against large states, whatever the provocation, and no rule of law is necessary to prevent it. Because the "balance of power" depended upon the large nations—and was the limit upon their independent acts—they occupied a special social position in the family of nations. The position of small nations depended upon how specific applications of policy affected the competitive position of the great nations. The great nations were, so to speak, the informal officeholders in the "balance of power" system. They would intervene, but not be intervened against. Legal norms were those which they promulgated or acquiesced in.

The special position of the great nations in establishing and enforcing international law meant that the law established could not run contrary to their felt interests or—to the extent a pluralistic system permitted—to the capabilities to each. To say this is not to say that the norms established were incompatible with the interests of small nations or, indeed, with the interests of individuals who were not citizens of one of the great nations. Undoubtedly there were advantages to being born an Englishman just as there are advantages to being born of a wealthy family. But the rules which the great nations promulgated at least had the merits of formal generality and equality. Englishmen did not have formal privileges internationally because they were Englishmen, any more than they did domestically because they were rich. True, such rules might have the defect that Anatole France sardonically noted in the law which equally forbids rich and poor alike to sleep in ditches and under railroad bridges. But formal equality, however unequal in fact, is preferable—at least to the small states—to formal inequality. Nor were the great nations, in theory or in fact, altogether outside or above the rules they put forward as binding on all nations. They put forward as rules governing the international community what they regarded as desirable for the world community and what they were willing to abide by themselves—provided others did likewise. Like all law, it was subject to change where conditions changed.

During the nineteenth century the great nations came to share a similar economic philosophy, a similar regard for the individual, similar views as to domestic politics—the principal values of a common civilization, a common legal heritage, a common faith in laissez-faire economics. They were quite willing to impose the essentials of this system on the world at large wherever it touched their interests, or the interests of their nationals. Among themselves there was little need to insist on such standards because each was committed to the belief that these principles served its national interest. There was—despite some notable exceptions—little desire to bring the benefits of European civilization to the non-European world; administration was the white man's burden. But the great European nations did desire to make the non-European world a safe place for Europeans to trade wherever trade was profitable. This involved various degrees of intervention in less technologically developed parts of the world: intervention to insist upon the payment of debts, to protect one's nationals or their property, to insure for one's nationals minimum standards of western justice. Depending on the circumstance—the willingness and capacity of local governments to insure these objectives—the forms of intervention varied from an *ad hoc* landing of troops (or the threat of a British gunboat) to various continuing forms of control: colonies, dominions, dependencies, protectorates, mandates, trusteeships, and so forth. Intervention was possible only where it did not affect to an important degree immediate interests of other great nations—but for much of the nineteenth century this took in much of the world. Since it was almost always justified by economic objectives widely shared as "right," since in general the areas administered were open to all for purposes of trade on formally equal terms, and since it did not appear to endanger the security of other major nations, intervention was tolerated. Since the intervention was justified on principle, the law was enforced. It was enforceable because it did not threaten the security of other major nations and did not appear to affect their political positions adversely.

Thus, despite the conflicts between the great nations, in behavior that might be analyzed in terms of a competitive game, these conflicts were moderated by a non-zero-sum cooperative supergame. The supergame established norms that bounded the play of the competitive game. The nations of the "balance of power" system thus had an interest in maintaining the integrity of the great nations; there was an interest in maintaining the integrity of the nation's sovereign jurisdiction over its internal affairs, for otherwise it would not be a free agent in its international dealings. Such a lack of freedom would interfere with the neutrality of alignment necessary for the stable operation of the "balance of power" international system. Even nations at war with one another were bound by common interests, for they might be allies at some later date and so had an interest in behaving in ways that would leave room for such future cooperation. At least minimal confidence in the possibility of that degree of future cooperation was required. Declarations of war, limitations of objectives in war, and rules governing the conduct of war all played a role in maintaining that confidence, that is, in maintaining a social structure within which the stable "balancing" of the system could be effected. The alternative was an unlimited and unstable war of all against all, in which all might be lost and in which all would have to contemplate precarious and dangerous futures.

II. THE BREAKDOWN OF "BALANCE OF POWER" SYSTEM

For reasons which cannot be discussed in full here the "balance of power" international system fell into unstable equilibrium toward the latter part of the nineteenth century and was replaced by the loose bipolar system after the Second World War. Perhaps one of the most important events making the old system unstable was the cession of Alsace-Lorraine after the Franco-Prussian War. The inflammation of national sentiment produced by this event made it impossible during the next eighty years for France and Germany to enter into alignment with each other. Hostility and suspicion between the two nations induced the formation of strong alliances directed against each other. But these alliances necessarily were somewhat rigid, for the almost automatic "balancing" and "counter-balancing" of the old system was precluded by the Franco-German hostility.

As a consequence, the interest of either party in preserving the other as a major nation or of limiting its objectives in war was also vitiated. The mechanisms making for equilibrium thus were gravely weakened. The range of special treaties, arbitration agreements, and the establishment of the Hague tribunal may be viewed as vague responses to the need for some other sort of mediatory mechanism to protect the interests of the nations. In the absence of the self-movement of nations, treaties and special agencies were designed to fill the old international role of the shifting of alignments.

After the First World War, the League of Nations was brought into being as a more generalized remedy. This development was in itself evidence of the growing rigidity and rapid decline of "balance of power" international system. In the eyes of its sponsors and under the influence of Wilsonian idealism, the League of Nations was viewed as a break with the "power politics" of the past. Collective security was to replace the insecurity of the system of national alliances. War was not yet renounced as an instrument of national policy. But the old diplomacy, condemned as insidious because it was secret and selfish because it was generated by a class-bound diplomatic service, was renounced. National self-determination was the order of the day and every nation was to be the legal equal of every other nation. The dynamic force for peace was to be found in the democratic sentiments of the free citizens of independent nation-states, whose interests were harmonious and whose energies for constructive peace would be mobilized by national independence and democratic political processes.

Not all nations subscribed to this new and fanciful view of the world. France sought vainly for security guarantees from England and the United States and, in desperation, constructed an ineffective *cordon sanitaire* around the defeated Reich. This was not to be. Attempts to enforce collective security via the projected Geneva Protocols were transmuted into the ambiguous Locarno Pact. The 1920s saw a ridiculous and possibly disastrous series of disarmament conventions, while eventually the United States sank its fleet and agreed to naval limitations that made little sense from the standpoint of security. Meanwhile efforts to outlaw war eventuated in the supreme monument to human futility, the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

If the efforts following the First World War to compensate for the rigidities of the dying "balance of power" system responded to a genuine need of the international community, the means employed were in utter conflict with the requirements of the situation. If the system of alliances before the war was rigid and therefore made it difficult to prevent any war from becoming a war to the finish, it at least encouraged effective action. The weakness of collective security, however, lay in its fatal tendency to fragment the opposition to an expanding nation. It placed an emphasis on collective action within a formal organization when it was to the advantage of some not to act at all and of others to reply upon still others to act for them. Unlike the situation in Korea in 1950, when the United States felt obliged to act since no other nation had the capability, the relative equality of the great nations in the interwar period foreclosed the fixing of responsibility upon a single great nation. In the absence of an alliance that assumed responsibility automatically, therefore, every nation looked to some other nation to act. In the absence of formal agreement in advance, it was difficult to arrange effective action when trouble broke out. In the absence of clearly delineated aims clearly related to the national interest, the reasons for procrastination seemed stronger than the reasons for action. And collective security turned into collective insecurity.

The complete roster of disappointments does not need to be called; it includes Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Manchuria, Austria, the Sudetenland, and so on. If the failure of the League cannot justly be ascribed to a single cause, it would nevertheless be a serious mistake to underestimate the degree to which the fragmentation resulting from the collective security system was decisive. But other factors also entered in. The refusal of Britain and France, until too late, to cooperate with the Soviet Union (assuming the Russians would have moved) was a fresh violation of a cardinal rule of the "balance of power" system, namely, neutrality of alignment. The failure of French and British leaders to recognize the need to move against expansive nations was an element. And so did the pacifism which regarded war as an inherent evil and alliances as the prelude to war. The actions of the British Labour Party in calling for a halt to Nazi aggression at the same time that its members opposed increased arms budgets in Commons illustrates the curious schizophrenia of the period.

The transition from the "balance of power" to the loose bipolar system, from the First World War to the close of World War II, did not produce any variations with reasonable prospects for stability. Nor did the period produce standards of international law which had reasonable prospects for acceptance. The instability and transitional character of the international social structure in the period were directly responsible for the confusion and instability in the standards of law. No law without support; no support without a social structure that can provide support. But law is usually ineffective within nations too, during periods of rapid and revolutionary change. Law, by its very nature, conserves the values of a going or past social system. And when the values are themselves in transition, the system of law gives way to political or quasi-legal activity. Revolutionary Communist tribunals were the product of the effort to build a new social system, not the conservators of an existing social system. What was legal in Hungary during October 1956? The answer necessarily depended on who won. But, even so, both sides found it difficult if not impossible to abide by the procedures of any established system of law. When the direction of change is visible one may at least hope to discover the seed of the new law in the innovations of the legal process. But when the transitions fluctuate in several directions in rapid succession, order appears lacking.

Thus the period from 1870 to 1945, with brief interludes, was a period in which conflicting standards of law were asserted by nations which acted within a changing and transitory social structure. There was inconsistency between geographic regions and lack of regularity within regions, at least with respect to the more important political aspects of international law. Some of the norms that depended upon economic values fared better. But it cannot be said that the period of transition came to an end with the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945. The structure of international action still lacked the consistency which permits, if it does not guarantee, social stability. Many of the beliefs and activities of the time were founded on premises divorced from political reality and therefore divorced from the means whereby legal norms gain support from the community of nations.

For example, the Nuremberg trials could only be justified on the assumption that the use of force for aggressive purposes was really outlawed; that the nations of the world had no conflicting interests of a scope great enough to prevent agreement upon a standard outlawing aggressive war, and that sufficient consensus existed to make the trials of aggressive leaders an objective process not merely dependent upon the wills of the victorious parties.

The old concept of "just" wars had been rejected in the age of the modern nation-state, beginning with the Renaissance, precisely because it was incompatible with the effective limitation of war. After the Thirty Years' War the nations of the seventeenth century state system wanted to regulate the conduct and conclusion of wars; they therefore gave up the effort to judge the justness of wars, an effort that would have interfered with more important goals. Given the difficulties of getting warring parties to agree who had a just motive, the attempt to impose such a standard interfered with the limitation and regulation of the war process. Each nation asserted the justice of its cause and insisted on its right to use the means necessary to bring the war to a favorable conclusion. The "balance of power" system required for its stability standards independent of the justice of a cause, and the members of the system had an interest in endorsing such standards.

The Nuremberg trials are incomprehensible, apart from their function in satisfying world opinion by the punishment of the fascist leaders, if the *ad hoc* tribunals employed to hear the cases were expected to function as the standard method for trying such cases rather than as an expedient designed to meet immediate needs; in short they were comprehensible only if the reasons which led to the demise of the concept of the just war no longer operated. To make sense, these tribunals had to represent a development toward an ordered world community in which the use of force by national authorities without sanction from some international body was outlawed and in which effective tribunals for punishing transgressors were established (or alternatively a world in which nations had no joint or cooperative interests—a world represented by a zero-sum game). Such an ordered world community did not exist, could not exist under the conditions then prevailing, and had not existed at the time of the offense.

The United Nations represented the effort to create such a world. The United Nations represented a concession, in the minds of its authors, to the realities of international politics. They recognized that the major military capabilities of the world would be controlled by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. It would take military force to keep the peace. Therefore, the main responsibility was given to the new superpowers to keep the peace. The United Nations rested upon the hypothesis that the great nations would unite to keep the peace and therefore upon the corollary that the peace was to be kept against the encroachments of the smaller nations while the defeated fascist nations would be prevented from ever again building military machines with which they could threaten the peace of the world.

There is much to be said for the view that at least the European aspects of the Second World War were a direct consequence of the aggressive and even insane ambitions of Adolf Hitler. There is somewhat less to be said for the view that dictatorships are naturally aggressive, and even less for the view that the disarmament of Germany and Japan would eliminate the focal points of world danger. But the view that international conflicts of interest stem primarily from the psychologies of national leaders and from the cultures of particular nations is a great oversimplification of the situation.

Specific conflicts of interest may stem from any of the aforementioned sources. But it must be recognized that the international society is, in part at least, a competitive—and not necessarily peacefully competitive—society. The lives of individuals and the existence of social institutions are bound primarily to the largest unit of effective and inclusive organization. Within this organization hopes are satisfied, values fulfilled, and lives lived. Within it loyalties are organized and to it loyalties are pledged. For most of modern times, this largest and most effectively inclusive organization has been the nation. The greatest danger to any nation must stem from some other nation and the greatest deprivation most individuals can sustain must follow from the defeat of their nation by an enemy nation.

The United Nations was founded upon the hypothesis that the great nations would cooperate in keeping the peace through the machinery of international organization. But two great nations were eliminated by defeat and disarmament (Germany and Japan). China had never been a great nation effectively, whatever it may some day become under Communist rule. France had lost its greatness in defeat. And a few years were to demonstrate the reduction of England to second-class status. In effect, two "superpowers" remained, the United States and the Soviet Union. But each of these two nations constituted the greatest potential danger to the other. No substantial political or economic change could occur anywhere in the world without affecting their relative positions. Nor could any barrier to change be maintained without influencing their relative positions. In short, these two nations were placed in facing positions in perhaps the greatest conflict of interest the world has ever known. Almost any dispute would range them on opposite sides. Yet the peace of the world was supposed to rest upon their harmonious cooperation. Perhaps the expansive goals of Stalin worsened this condition. But one must come to the conclusion that the organizing concept of the United Nations was hopelessly inadequate.

In effect, two gravitational poles for world political organization came into being. They were in necessary conflict with respect to many important problems. Moreover, other nations inevitably must be attracted to one or another of the poles, for many would find their greatest safety against the encroachments of one in the protective shelter of the other. It took a long time to recognize this, for all were not as prescient as Winston Churchill in his Fulton speech. Nor did the awakening come all at once; and perhaps it came at all only for extraneous or not quite relevant reasons.

The story need only briefly be sketched here, for these sketchy details are already well known. Developments in Eastern Europe led to great anger in the West. When the rebellion in Greece and the threat against Turkey appeared to endanger the strategic position of the United States, the Truman doctrine was enunciated. A major objective of the Marshall Plan was to reduce the danger of Communism in Western Europe and, in accordance with this objective, the steel capacity of Western-occupied Germany was increased enormously. By the end of 1947, and possibly in response, the Cominform was organized, ambitious economic plans for Poland and Czechoslovakia were organized, and, early in 1948, the *coup* took place in Czechoslovakia.

One may view the process as one of successive responses and counter-responses. Russian control of Eastern Europe and the war in Greece constituted a threat to the West. The Truman Doctrine looked like a military threat to the Communist bloc and the Marshall Plan threatened the unity of the Communist Nations. Cominform and Czechoslovakian *coup* seemed to herald the threat of imminent war, although there is now considerable evidence that war was the last thing Stalin wanted then.

It was not the threat of war that endangered the West—at least until 1955—but the attractive power of the Communist bloc. It was not the visible Cominform, which probably never undertook any major activity, but the organizational character of the Communist bloc that constituted the true danger. Once a nation joined that bloc, it would find it difficult to leave, the example of Yugoslavia to the contrary notwithstanding. It would be attached by party controls, that is, by the power of Moscow to intervene between competing national Communist factions to maintain control and also by the fact that the national Communist regime would find it difficult if not impossible to remain in power without the support of the Soviet Union. In this way the external unity of the Communist nations is maintained.

On the other hand, if the Western nations were to behave as they appropriately had in the "balance of power" period, on the basis of immediate interest, they would be fragmented and the Communist bloc would gain a decisive influence in international affairs. Only a unity based upon long-term rather than upon short-term advantage could suffice to maintain the interests of the Western nations. If this unity was purchased by a false belief in the threat of imminent war, it nevertheless constituted a response to a real need in the new loose bipolar international system.

NATO, that unprecedented organization which established a supranational command and joint military facilities in peace time, a new kind of supranational organization, was the Western response to the Soviet bloc. Although efforts were made to relate NATO to the United Nations, clearly NATO represented a break with previous conceptions of the role of the United Nations in the world community. Perhaps for reasons of public opinion or perhaps because the formulators of policy did not themselves clearly see the revolutionary consequences of their actions, efforts were made to mute or to camouflage indications of the change. But it represented an adequate and necessary step to a potentially stable structure of international relations.

The new loose bipolar system during its early stages reflected the development of the new supranational blocs. There was a sharp gravitation toward the two poles of international influence. The devastation of the world after the Second World War, the economic impoverishment of large areas of the world, the economic power of the United States, Soviet conventional military capabilities and American monopoly of atomic weapons, disorganization in newly independent ex-colonial areas, and the Korean War aided and affected this development. With economic recovery in Western Europe, continued colonial unrest and the growth of governmental experience in the new nations, the stalemate in Korea, approaching Soviet nuclear parity, and the consolidation of Communist control in China, the situation achieved relative stability and some stresses in the opposite direction began to appear. The position of the uncommitted nations was strengthened and the members of the two blocs began to exercise somewhat greater independence in policy.[2]

The normative law that characterized the "balance of power" system could hardly be expected to survive unchanged during its period of instability and failure. The Hague tribunals and the League of Nations had provided sufficient evidence that the old system was collapsing and represented efforts to patch up the old system and to maintain its normative rules. But it was not really possible to keep in their fullness the rules governing non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, limitations on objectives, rules governing declarations of war and practices in occupied territory, and so forth, for these rules were too directly related to a system in which neutrality of alignment was a major characteristic. These were rules for dealing with opponents who might soon be allies. Even the rules governing the treatment of prisoners of war, so recently sanctified in treaty, no longer had as much support as earlier. They would still be observed when national and cultural values supported them or when the other side could take measures in reprisal and one still wanted to protect one's own nationals. But this last reason stemmed from expediency rather than from an interest in a normative rule. These changes in international normative law, like the political changes that gave rise to them, prepared the way for the new bipolar system.

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[2] This story has been told in detail in William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, *United States Foreign Policy: 1945–1955*, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1956.

III. THE BIPOLAR INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The loose bipolar international system—composed of two major blocs, a large number of uncommitted nations, and a universal organization like the United Nations—came into being as a consequence of the events recounted in the previous section. It differed from the "balance of power" international system in many important respects that have consequences for the operation of international law. In the first place, the blocs are more than alliances; they have supranational characteristics. In the second place, the system is not stabilized by the almost automatic operation of immediate interest that leads to the formation of alliance and counter-alliance. In the loose bipolar system alignment must be on the basis of long-term interest and the blocs become stable patterns of alignment within which conflicts of short-term interest tend to be subordinated. Since the members of the blocs lack an interest in maintaining the independence of the members of the opposing bloc in order to maintain the possibility of future combinations or coalitions, the particular motives for limitation of objectives and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations that operated in the "balance of power" system do not operate in the loose bipolar system. Indeed, apart from the positive motivations to intervene, the negative factor of the concentration of capabilities in the leading members of the blocs makes it difficult if not impossible to refrain from intervening. Almost any decision of the United States or the Soviet Union must have important consequences for the other members of their blocs and for uncommitted nations.

Interdependence is especially great in the modern world. The United States cannot ship wheat to Yugoslavia without affecting the Canadian wheat farmer. It cannot ship arms to Pakistan without effect upon the Indian budget and Indian politics. American aid programs affect the internal politics of the country to which they are addressed regardless of the terms of the program. And the absence of aid also has its effects. Interference does not have to be overt, for the knowledge that the activities of a nation will affect the judgment of the American Congress in voting funds will itself have an influence. There is no way to avoid this influence with the best will in the world, for no government can vote funds without considering the possible consequences of the loan. Even Soviet loans, technically free from all "strings," have important political repercussions within the countries to which they are made.

Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary is brutal and in Poland is obvious. But can the United States avoid all such interference? Does not the situation in Algeria necessitate efforts to influence French governmental policy? Obviously, but there are so many internal constraints that it is done in a halting and ineffective manner. And, if governmental changes may influence the viability of NATO, can the United States remain indifferent? Interference may not ordinarily be as obvious as in the Italian elections of 1948, but one eye must always be alert to the effect of policy upon friendly political parties within allied bloc countries.

In the "balance of power" system, intervention usually occurred in colonial, dependent, or minor areas; in the loose bipolar system positive intervention is more likely to occur within allied bloc nations than in uncommited areas. The competition between the two leading bloc nations will be effective in reducing direct intervention in the ex-colonial areas, as will the proud and new nationalism of these nations. The organic forms of union among the bloc nations will reduce the barriers between members of the blocs and lead to greater sharing of jurisdiction while the most zealous guarding of the nation's "sovereign powers" will occur within the new nations.

The fact that the loose bipolar system has two blocs has a direct bearing on the operation of the system. In the "balance of power" system a minimum number of five major nations probably was necessary for stability. The two blocs of the bipolar system, however, are in direct competition. Neither has an incentive to maintain the other. Rivalry is direct and is limited primarily by the horrors of thermonuclear war. No "balancing" role exists in this system and therefore mediation is not a function of the momentary freedom from commitment of a particular nation. Nor is alignment neutral. Communist nations necessarily tend toward the Soviet bloc. Communist China, for instance, although in many respects physically capable of asserting its independence of Moscow, takes great pains to maintain the priority of the Soviet Union as the leading member of the bloc. And within the free world there is a natural proclivity, except among those whose memories of colonial control remain active, to associate in some way with the United States.

Mediation is thus not a general role of all nations of the loose bipolar system but is a specialized role. Uncommitted nations are often able to exercise this role in the same way in which uncommitted parties are often most useful for mediatory purposes in industrial bargaining. The process of accommodation is a difficult one. The blocs would be in considerably greater trouble with each other if they did not have to appeal to uncommitted listeners or if they could not turn to such uncommitted nations to mediate a compromise. Withdrawal from an announced position may be both difficult and painful if not eased by moral pressure and suasion from independent and neutral bystanders who are able to invoke larger principles as well as their own independent judgment.

Sometimes the most difficult thing is to get contending parties to talk to each other. The uncommitted nations often perform yeoman work here. This task may be done irresponsibly as well as responsibly and it is possible that the greater responsiveness of the democratic nations to world public opinion may yet weigh heavily and negatively in the race for survival. The mediatory function of the uncommitted nations is nonetheless, in principle at least, an important one for the stability of the loose bipolar system.

The position of the uncommitted nations is protected both by its usefulness to the blocs from a mediatory point of view and by the desire of each bloc to keep these areas out of the grasp of the other. Although the uncommitted nations themselves lack important military capabilities, they are often for political, economic, or geographic reasons of considerable importance in the contest between the two blocs. The accession to the Soviet bloc of Southeast Asia, the Near East, or North Africa would be serious for NATO.

Another important agency which performs mediatory functions is the United Nations. Removed from its role as the keeper of peace, a role performed more adequately by the two blocs and the condition of thermonuclear equilibrium, the United Nations can more effectively perform its two remaining roles in the loose bipolar international system, that of mediator and that of forum. In these it helps to reduce tension between the blocs. It may also, under exceptional circumstances, and with the aid of the other bloc, mobilize the international community against one bloc that threatens immediately to undermine world peace. Even here it will play a supporting role to the bloc, as, in the case of Korea, the United Nations played a supporting role to that of the United States.

It is in the nature of the loose bipolar system for the bloc to subordinate the interests of the United Nations to its own interests, for, in the final analysis, the bloc must depend upon its own political and military resources in order to survive. However, it is also to the interest of a bloc to subordinate the interests of the other bloc to those of the United Nations, for in this fashion it can hope to mobilize support against that other bloc. In this way it can best appeal not only to the uncommitted but also to its own bloc members and to the citizens within the nations of the bloc. And the uncommitted nations, of course, have a particularly strong interest in subordinating the interests of both blocs to those of the United Nations, for by this means they can best compensate for their weakness in order to strengthen their position in the international system.

Unlike the major nations in the "balance of power" international system, the participants in the loose bipolar system do not have a uniform interest or lack of interest in fostering given principles of international law. Instead their interest varies with the role they occupy in the system. The uncommitted nations have the strongest interest in maintaining the normative rules without distinction as to role or size of nations, for observance of these rules corresponds best with the requirements for their safety. So they support doctrines of non-interference, "sovereignty," absence of force, and similar norms. Reliance upon voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations for the settlement of issues gives greatest importance to their numbers and formal voting equality. The blocs must pay some attention to these principles to attract support from uncommitted nations and to be able to use them against the opposing bloc when conditions so warrant. However, the blocs cannot safely consign their vital interests to the keeping of the General Assembly, for its voting processes may depend upon substantively irrelevant considerations and its formally equal members do not have to take responsibility for the consequences of their decisions. The United States and the Soviet Union may try to prevent others from resorting to force but they cannot themselves renounce the resort to force under conditions necessary to protect their vital interests. Nor can they always refrain from internal interference within another nation. (This interference, except within the Soviet bloc, is seldom likely to be as direct as it was during the Suez crisis of 1956.) For these reasons, the law of war and the right of reprisal may not have changed as much as the authors of the Charter of the United Nations intended.

In attempting to exemplify the relationship between the structure of the international political system and some broad and important elements of international law, significant differences between the "balance of power" international system and the loose bipolar international system have appeared. In the "balance of power" system each major nation had a strong interest in preventing other major nations from interfering in the internal politics of any major nation. This prescription was self-reinforcing because the other members of the international community could always combine against the transgressor. To some extent, although not completely, the norm was applied to other independent states.

In the loose bipolar system, on the other hand, each leading bloc member has a direct interest in interference. And the competitive bloc actor has an interest in permitting this interference when applied within the bloc itself, as the example of Hungary so fully demonstrated. The withdrawal of Hungary from the Soviet bloc would have constituted a deadly threat to the entire satellite empire and the loss of that empire would have threatened the parity of the Soviet bloc. The very considerations which forced Soviet intervention operated to secure American non-intervention. Under these circumstances resort to thermonuclear war made greater sense, if any, for the Soviet Union than for the United States (if we assume—perhaps incorrectly—that the Soviet Union had nuclear parity with the United States at the time) because the loss of the empire would have constituted a vital threat to the Soviet Union while the failure to exploit the loss fully was not a serious threat to the security of the United States.

For political, moral and strategic reasons, the United States cannot intervene in England or France, for instance, by means of military force. It is almost necessarily constrained, therefore, to use subtler but not necessarily less effective measures of political and economic intervention. However, this permits the Soviet Union also to intervene, and, since the intervention is not military, it is without the consequences American intervention would have had during the Hungarian uprising.

Non-intervention therefore applies primarily to the minor uncommitted areas rather than to the major areas of the world. And even in the uncommitted areas it is not supported by a strong sanction but rests only upon a tenuous and relative "balance" between the United States and the Soviet Union which may collapse at any moment. As a consequence, the legal values associated with non-intervention and those associated with "sovereignty" have less place in the present international world than they had under earlier conditions. Moreover, despite the strong stand of the uncommitted nations in favor of these older values, their stronger objections to the vestiges of colonialism have the function of further restricting national jurisdictions. Although the United Nations is still hedging in the cases of Algeria and Cyprus, the pressures for some form of extra-national intervention are growing. With the decline in the importance of the lone nation, the miracles of transportation and communication, and the spread of American-Soviet rivalry to all areas of the world, almost every situation is invested with an international interest. It is ironic that the writers of the Charter were more conservative than the authors of the League of Nations Covenant in protecting the inviolability of national jurisdiction. Their "realism" has not prevailed, however, against the requirements which inevitably flow from the new structure of international politics. Neither will the restrictions against the use of force and of reprisal have the same importance which the Charter writers intended.

POLITICS AND BUREAUCRACY IN THE WEST GERMAN *BUNDESRAT*

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The creation of the *Bundesrat*, when the Federal Republic was launched a decade ago, has brought into being a new variant among the several examples of second chambers in the lengthening history of federal governments. The purpose of this study is to investigate the working of that new model—in contrast to the expectations of its originators—and its relations to the other parts of a democratic system; and to assess its present merits and future utility.

I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF THE *Bundesrat:* SAFEGUARD OF THE DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE *Bund* AND THE *Laender*

The *Bundesrat* was designed as a safeguard of the division of powers between *Bund* and *Laender* as prescribed in the Bonn constitution.[1] The variety of legislative and executive powers it exercises were bestowed on it in order to provide an effective check against any fundamental change in the balance of power of the federal system. Clearly, the peculiarities of German federalism make it desirable to have this check in addition to the protection afforded by judicial review of legislative action through the Federal Constitutional Court. While in the United States both the federal and state governments have—at least in theory—their own fields of legislation, their own administrative apparatus and even their own funds and revenues,[2] the West German Federal and *Land* governments are closely interlinked. In practice, the Federal government does most of the legislating while the *Laender* do most of the administering.[3] This unique arrangement, by which the *Laender* are required to execute most federal legislation, has had a number of important consequences for West German government. Several federal ministries, for example, have become largely planning staffs since the actual administrative functions are exercised by the *Laender*.

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[1] Articles 70–82 of the Bonn Basic Law deal with the division of legislative powers between the Bund and the Laender, while the succeeding articles (83–115) are concerned with the division of administration and of revenues.

[2] I am aware that this is too simplified a characterization of the American federal system. From the American point of view, which stresses the emerging links rather than the historic and still existing separation between the two levels of government, it may seem a very doubtful statement. Nevertheless, it indicates the basic difference between American and German federalism.

[3] Land execution of Federal laws is the rule. Article 83 of the Basic Law says: "The Laender execute the federal laws as matters of their own concern insofar as this Basic Law does not otherwise provide or permit." In order to get a rough idea of the federal predominance in legislation as compared with its relative impotence in administration, it is only necessary to compare the respective articles of the Basic Law. Articles 73 and 74 give extensive lists of the legislative powers of the federation—of which, for political analysis, concurrent legislation is an integral part—while Article 87 gives a meager catalogue of the substantive federal functions of administration.

The system, which is based on a strong tradition among *Land* bureaucracies, ensures a substantial and mutual influence between Federal and *Land* governments. The danger of federal domination of *Land* administrations by means of its legislative prerogatives was recognized early by the *Laender* and, as a result, they have traditionally insisted on some means of controlling federal legislation and administrative directives. This right they never relinquished as long as a German federal system existed,[4] though it was much stronger during the period of the Bismarckian Empire than in the Weimar Republic. The Bonn solution falls somewhere between these historical examples by providing the *Bundesrat* with more powers than its ineffective Weimar predecessor while not conceding it the full powers of the imperial *Bundesrat.*[5]

Bundesrat approval is necessary for all constitutional amendments[6] since any amendment could upset the balance of the federal system. Furthermore, all federal laws affecting *Land* administration, distribution of *Land* territories or rectification of boundaries, and a number of financial and revenue questions, can be enacted only with the *Bundesrat's* consent.[7] The present constitution leaves it up to the *Laender* to determine, via the *Bundesrat,* whether a federal law unduly infringes on their rights. The framers of the constitution granted this checking power to the *Laender* as a last remedy and expected it to be exercised very rarely. This expectation now appears to have been a serious miscalculation. The *Bundesrat* can veto by a simple or two-thirds majority all laws not requiring its positive consent; this veto, however, can be overridden by an identical majority in the *Bundestag.*[8] A standing conference committee has been set up to deal with cases of conflict and its operations thus far have been highly successful, from the point of view of the *Bundesrat,* as will be indicated below. The *Bundesrat's* main power in executive matters is the requirement of its consent to all administrative directives concerning *Land* administration and to decrees (*Rechtsverordnung*). This has brought most federal regulations within the purview of the *Bundesrat.* A number of additional powers[9] are of only minor interest in this context, because the *Bundesrat's* political development has been based solely on its legislative functions.

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[4] The beginnings of German federalism can be traced back to the medieval feudal system. Since the middle of the 17th century we find a territorial representation *vis-à-vis* the emperor. For a general survey of these developments see Fritz Hartung, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte,* 6th impression (Stuttgart, 1950). Some interesting observations are made in Gerhard Anschütz, *Handbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts,* Vol. 1 (1923). A small selection of documents with an excellent introduction has been published by Ellinor von Puttkamer, *Foederative Elemente im deutschen Staatsrecht seit 1648* (Goettingen, 1955).

[5] In constitutional terms the imperial Bundesrat was the strongest second chamber Germany ever had. Its consent was required for all legislative bills and it had strong executive powers. The assembly of princes was supposed to embody the sovereignty of the Reich. Nevertheless, it did not play any significant political role, mostly as a result of Prussian hegemony. There is no recent monographic study on this interesting subject, but several valuable pages can be found in Hans Goldschmidt, *Das Reich und Preussen im Kampf um die Fuehrung* (Berlin, 1931). See also Peter H. Merkl's article in this issue of this REVIEW, below, p. 732; James H. Robinson *The German Bundesrath* (Philadelphia, 1891).

[6] Article 92, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law.

[7] The constitutional provisions concerning the power of absolute veto are scattered throughout the Basic Law. The numbers of the various articles are: 29.7; 79.2; 841; 84.5; 85.1; 87.3; 87b.7; 87b.2; 105.3; 106.4; 106.5; 107; 108.3; 120a; 134.4; 135.5; 143. (The number after the decimal point indicates the paragraph within the respective article.)

[8] The suspensive veto (Einspruch) power is regulated in articles 77.3 and 77.4 of the Basic Law. It can only be exercised after a conference committee meeting has been held.

II. INTERNAL STRUCTURE: THE IMPORTANCE OF BUREAUCRATIC PREPARATIONS

The *Bundesrat* is composed of representatives of the eleven West German *Laender,* each *Land* being entitled to three, four or five delegates, according to its population.[10] Only cabinet members of the *Land* governments may be named as delegates and—contrary to popular misconception—the delegates cannot send substitutes to plenary sessions. This is an innovation when compared with Weimar and imperial practice, where substitutes transacted the business of the respective second chambers and where, in some cases, the votes of one *Land* could even be cast by substitute delegates from another *Land.* The members of the *Bundesrat* vote according to the instructions of their governments and—as in most international conferences—the delegates of a *Land* must vote unanimously. In practice, one of the *Land* delegates will be nominated to cast all votes for his *Land;* thus, when the *Bundesrat* votes, not more than eleven hands are raised, each counting for three, four or five votes, depending on the *Land* represented.

The Constitutional Assembly, in its deliberations over the *Bundesrat* in 1948, recognized that the requirement that a *Bundesrat* delegate personally attend the bi-weekly or tri-weekly plenary sessions would mean a considerable loss of time from his duties in the *Land* cabinet itself; and so this requirement was not extended below the plenary session level. Therefore, delegates may send substitutes to meetings of the *Bundesrat* committees. In the Committee for Labor and Welfare, for instance, the respective *Land* ministers will be titular members, but as a rule officials of their ministries will substitute for them.[11] These substitutes cast the votes of their *Land*—each *Land* has only one vote in each committee—and they draft the committee's reports. The importance of the committees is illustrated by the fact that almost all *Bundesrat* decisions are made on the basis of committee reports and that committee recommendations are very rarely rejected in the plenary sessions. *Bundesrat* committees appear to be even more powerful than those of comparable parliamentary institutions. A resolution from the floor has practically no chance of adoption if it goes counter to a committee report.[12] The reason for this is to be found in the structure of the *Bundesrat* as well as in the peculiar timetable by which it works. Further, the substitutes who work in the committees dominate all negotiations and contacts preceding official deliberations. As a result, the bureaucratic element in the *Bundesrat* is unusually strong. These points may be best illustrated by following a bill through the drafting and deliberating stages.

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[9] These powers are otherwise very important for the Bundesrat, and many observers value them even more than participation in the legislative process. The Bundesrat must consent to many administrative regulations and thus has considerable influence in executive matters. Secondly, it participates in the election of judges of the Federal Constitutional Court, and can initiate or join proceedings before this Court. Thirdly, the Bundesrat has special legislative functions in cases of emergency, and participates in the so-called federal compulsion (Bundeszwang) in cases of conflict between the Federal and Land governments. There are some additional minor powers. All this indicates that the restrictions upon the legislative functions of the upper house do not give an adequate picture of all its activities. However, these functions have played the predominant role in the political development of the Bundesrat; and all the other functions, insofar as they have been exercised at all, have been influenced thereby. The present *political* position of the West German second chamber can only be understood through the development of its participation in legislation; the remaining functions do not contribute greatly to such an understanding.

[10] At present, four Laender have five representatives each in the Bundesrat (North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Baden-Wuerttemberg); three have four representatives each (Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Hessen); and three have three each (Hamburg, Bremen, Saar). Berlin has four associate representatives without the right to vote. Seats are redistributed after each official census; Laender with populations under two million inhabitants have the right to three seats in the Bundesrat; those with more than two but less than six millions get four seats; and Laender with more than six million, five seats. This slight differentiation of seats is intended to prevent domination by a coalition of small Laender over the large ones. Thus far there have been no attempts to effect such a coalition and an equalization of the size of Land representations probably would not have any considerable effect.

About three out of four federal laws are drafted and sponsored by the administration. The Federal Cabinet must send its drafts to the *Bundesrat* before submitting them to the *Bundestag*.[13] The *Bundesrat* has three weeks in which to recommend changes, which are then submitted to the *Bundestag* along with the original bill. After *Bundestag* action, the bill is sent back to the *Bundesrat* which may now either give its final consent or may place it under suspensive veto, depending on the kind of bill. Thus, each bill drafted by the federal administration will come to the *Bundesrat* twice. Where the *Bundesrat*'s positive consent is required for the bill, or where it is restricted to a veto which can be overridden by the *Bundestag*, the institution of the conference committee provides the *Bundesrat* with a good deal of informal influence. It is therefore in the interest of the administration to see that the *Bundesrat* will not object to its bills. In the past ten years a complicated structure of more or less formalized standing conferences of *Land* ministries has evolved which permits a great deal of informal contact previous to formal *Bundesrat* action.

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[11] The possibility of substituting Land officials in the committees is very important for the Bundesrat. It has been sharply criticized by opponents of the bureaucratic influences which are thus introduced. The committees vary in the ratio of substitution, the Foreign Relations Committee having the least with an average of about 90 per cent of its original members participating in its deliberations and only 10 per cent substitutes. The Committee for Internal Affairs runs to the opposite extreme with an average of substitutions of more than 92 per cent. The average for all committees shows that in about three cases out of four the ministers send substitutes to the committees.

[12] A statistical survey of Bundesrat committee reports (made by the present writer for a study of the political role of the Bundesrat, which will be published by Quelle & Meyer, Heidelberg, in the summer of 1959), shows that only one per cent of committee reports failed of adoption by the Bundesrat when only one report was made. In the case of conflicting reports from several committees, the percentage went as high as 30. Only in such cases can an independent political initiative from the floor be exercised.

[13] Article 76.2 of the Basic Law.

Generally, the *Bundesrat* committees will look very unfavorably on a bill with which they have not previously been acquainted informally. Generally, members of the federal ministry drafting a bill will try to discuss its merits and provisions with their colleagues in the *Land* capitals; or an official in the ministry will send a circular to his respective *Land* counterparts in order to test their views regarding the proposed legislation. Many administrative departments of the *Laender* have set up inter-*Laender* working groups for the purpose of discussing legislative drafts, and these organizations may be employed wherever there is enough time available.[14] By the time the draft in question is officially submitted to the *Bundesrat,* the members of the particular committee are likely to have had considerable contact with the federal administration.

This fact is significant for the internal power structure of the *Bundesrat,* since it increases the power of the bureaucrats *vis-à-vis* the political members. The three-week time limit allowed the *Bundesrat* for its initial comments is also important in this regard. The draft bill, as it comes from the Federal Cabinet, is first sent out to the *Land* ministries concerned with it. There an internal decision is made and a substitute delegate is sent to Bonn for the committee meeting. The resolution adopted in committee is then returned to the *Land* cabinet, which instructs its official representative in the *Bundesrat* to vote in its favor, to propose amendments, or to reject it. Since *Land* cabinets usually meet only two days prior to a *Bundesrat* session, a proposed amendment of a committee report by one of the *Laender* has very little chance of success. The cabinets of the other *Laender*, meeting at the same time, instruct their representatives how to vote on the committee reports only, and are unaware of proposed amendments. Such amendments therefore could only be considered at subsequent cabinet meetings, and these are very unlikely to occur in the short time remaining. As a result, plenary sessions do little more than register the votes of the eleven cabinets on the committee proposals.

Since the members of the *Bundesrat* are officials appointed by their governments and not popularly elected, lively debates for publicity effects are very rare indeed. The atmosphere is sober, often dull, and not politically inspiring. With few exceptions, real decisions are made in the committees, or even in the informal conferences of *Land* ministries preceding them. The net effect is to strengthen the participation of the lower administrative echelons in the decision-making process.

III. THE INCREASE OF FUNCTIONS: INTRODUCING ELEMENTS OF A GENUINE SECOND CHAMBER

The *Bundesrat* would have exercised only minor control functions similar to those of the *Reichsrat* during the Weimar Republic, had the provisions of the

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[14] The activities of these inter-Land organizations have been neglected by political scientists thus far. Neither their exact number nor their organization or influence has been described. An unofficial compilation made by an official of the Bundesrat lists 83 of them.

Bonn constitution not permitted a surprising expansion of its participation in the legislative process. As already indicated, the framers of the constitution intended to give the *Bundesrat* an absolute veto only in those cases where the balance of the federal system would be affected; and they believed this would occur very infrequently.[15] Contrary to these expectations, a gradually increasing proportion of federal legislation has been interpreted as requiring the *Bundesrat's* consent. Up to April 1958 no less than 50 per cent of all federal laws passed were in this category;[16] disregarding international agreements and other legislative peculiarities,[17] the proportion rises to two-thirds. This development indicates the extent to which the *Bundesrat* has emerged from its intended position as a bureaucratic organ of legislative and administrative review to that of a powerful second chamber.

The question whether the *Bundesrat*, originally created merely to represent the *Land* governments, is able to cope with its augmented responsibility, will be treated below. First the reasons behind this development must be brought into view. It is clear that only a few of the constitutional provisions regarding the participation of the *Bundesrat* in the legislative process contributed to the extreme expansion of its powers. Article 84, paragraph 1, of the Basic Law covers three-fourths of the cases requiring *Bundesrat* consent and is the basis for the new role of the second chamber. It states that those federal laws which are executed by the *Laender* and which regulate the establishment of administrative agencies or their respective administrative procedures need the consent of the *Bundesrat.* The implication is that the *Laender* can only be obliged to carry out federal legislation when they have consented to that legislation via the second chamber.

In recent years it has become increasingly doubtful whether the national government's constitutional power to pass the substantive parts of federal laws without the consent of the *Laender* still is meaningful when the *Bundesrat* has to approve the administrative parts of those same laws. The *Bundesrat* contends that the requirement of its consent to the administrative sections implies a responsibility for the entire bill. In other words, the *Bundesrat* has declined the role of a mere administrative review organ and claims the function of a genuine second chamber[18] with full participation and responsibility in the law-making process, or at least in that part of the process where its participation is constitutionally feasible. This theory of "co-responsibility" does not necessarily increase the number of bills upon which the second chamber must act, but its strict application may very well do so. In the first place, the *Bundesrat* maintains that all changes in laws to which it originally consented must be approved by it anew. This in itself is clearly a departure from the broad constitutional premise that the consent of the *Bundesrat* should be primarily a guarantee against major changes in the balance of the federal system. If that consent is a safeguard against undue central influence upon *Land* administration, later changes in the same law not touching its administrative provisions should not justify a claim for renewed action by the *Bundesrat.* However, this is precisely the prerogative which the *Bundesrat* demands under its co-responsibility theory.[19]

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[15] Critics contend that the constitutional Assembly was somewhat naive in believing this. An expert study of Weimar legal history alone would have yielded a much higher figure than the three or four bills per year estimated in the Constitutional Assembly.

[16] See the figures given in *Handbuch des Bundesrats* (Bonn, 1958), Pt. II, pp. 94–97.

[17] These special actions are published in a separate section (Part II) of the *Bundesgesetzblatt.*

[18] The status of the Bundesrat as a second chamber is not unquestioned. There are still some who classify it as part of the Executive, since it represents the executive branch of the Land governments and many of its functions are of an executive nature. Nevertheless, the leading commentaries on the Bonn constitution and the only available study on the Bundesrat, Karl Schaefer, *Der Bundesrat* (Bonn-Koeln, 1955), emphasize its legislative aspect.

A second increase of power stems from the *Bundesrat*'s insistence on an interpretation of the word *Einrichtung* ("establishment," in the sense of internal arrangement of offices), to justify its participation in cases of even the most minute internal administrative regulations. Federal officials would prefer an interpretation in the sense of *Errichtung* ("establishment" in the sense of creating new offices), which would give it a free hand in minor regulative issues.[20] The *Bundesrat*'s view has predominated in this respect as it has in others. Thus far, the federal government has not attempted to curb the second chamber's powers by seeking an interpretation of the respective constitutional provisions through the Federal Constitutional Court. In the early years of its existence the *Bundesrat* was dominated by a clear CDU majority. Its gradually increasing power thus presented no partisan opposition to the Federal Cabinet. But with the threat of an opposition majority in the *Bundesrat,* which arose for the first time in 1952 as a result of the merging of three southern German *Laender* and the subsequent redistribution of seats in the second chamber,[21] much thought has been given to the possibility of serious political conflicts involving the federal government and the Bundesrat. If there was a chance at an earlier stage that a Court ruling would favor the position of the federal government, that possibility is remote today, since the now firmly established practice follows the *Bundesrat's* interpretation.

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[19] *E.g.,* there may be an important and very complicated bill containing a single provision saying that state offices may be used for minor administrative details. Under present practice, the whole bill needs the consent of the Bundesrat. If any part of this bill is later revised, the consent of the second chamber must be renewed, even though the changes have nothing to do with the provision which originally necessitated Bundesrat action.

[20] The provision in question (Article 84, paragraph 1, of the Basic Law) says: "If the Laender execute federal laws as matters of their own concern, they determine the establishment (Einrichtung) of authorities and administrative procedures (Verwaltungsverfahren) insofar as federal laws approved by the Bundesrat do not otherwise provide." For a highly legal discussion of the interpretation of these two terms see Diether Haas, "Bundesgesetze über Organisation und Verfahren der Landesbehoerden," *Archiv des Oeffentlichen Rechts,* Vol. 80, pp. 81 ff.; and Karl Held, "Der Autonome Verfassungsstil der Laender und das Bundesratsveto nach Art. 84, par. 1 GG," in the same volume, pp. 50 ff.

[21] Arnold J. Heidenheimer has described the partisan considerations behind the "Suedweststaat" issue in his pertinent study of "Federalism and the Party System: the Case of West Germany," in this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (September 1958), pp. 815–816.

Did the *Bundesrat* expand its legislative role out of a desire for power, or in defense against attempts of the federal government to dominate the *Land* administrations? Critical observers hold both views, and both have a measure of truth.[22] At times the *Bundesrat* was attempting to enhance its powers and the federal government had to defend itself; in other cases the roles were reversed. In a system where both levels—the *Laender* as much as the federal government—have channels of influence to the other, this kind of internal power politics is inevitable. If it was not so manifest during the imperial and the Weimar epochs, this was not due to the internal harmony of the respective systems but rather to the "outside" influence of the Prussian state.[23] The majority in the imperial *Bundesrat* was as effectively controlled by Prussia as was the national government. Although the *Land* bureaucracies then were even stronger than they are now, so far as their participation in the national legislature was concerned they were neutralized by the identification of their largest partner, Prussia, with national interest. When the Weimar constitution limited Prussia's power the *Land* bureaucracies were set back by an overall increase in the legislative powers of the national government.

The Bonn constitution for the first time, consequently, provides for a strong participation of the *Laender* in federal legislation and administration without also introducing a neutralizing offset. For the first time in a modern German state too, the antagonism between the traditional *Land* administrations and their federal counterpart has become a major factor in domestic politics. The *Laender* had a definite advantage in the first years since they began operating in 1946, while the federal administration was set up only three years later, and was therefore partly staffed, in the beginning, with second-rate people who had been unable to find jobs elsewhere in the *Land* administrations. By the time the federal administration became an effective working machine, the *Laender* had already cemented their position in the *Bundesrat* and were unwilling to relinquish their prerogatives. The new political position which the second chamber has achieved has its effects, in turn, on its constitutional functions. More and more, party politics enter into its workings and its bureaucratic functions have been infiltrated by partisan considerations.[24] The disadvantages of this lie not so much in the fact that political considerations began to play a role, but that they did so clandestinely. It probably would have been much less dangerous had the constitution itself provided for party representation in the *Bundesrat*, apart from bureaucratic representation, instead of forcing the parties to come in the back door by means of the *Land* governments.

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[22] The Bundesrat's position is defended by Jakob Kratzer, "Zustimmungsgesetze," in *Archiv des Oeffentlichen Rechts*, Vol. 77, pp. 266 ff. and Harry Rohwer-Kahlmann "Verfassungsrechtliche Fragen der Zustimmungsgesetze," *id.*, Vol. 79, pp. 208 ff. For an opposite view see Hans Schneider, "Die Zustimmung des Bundesrats zu Gesetzen," *Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt*, 1953, pp. 257 ff.

[23] The President of the Federal Republic, Theodor Heuss, remarked on the effects of the elimination of Prussia on Germany federalism, when he was a member of the Constitutional Assembly in 1948 (*Sitzungsberichte des Hauptausschusses des Parlamentarischen Rats*, p. 207). His prophecy that the Federal Republic would develop a "federalism of the bureaucracy" has to some extent come true.

[24] The influence of partisan issues upon Bundesrat policies was well described by Heidenheimer, *op. cit.*, and his observations about party politics are a valuable comple-

IV. THE SETTLING OF DISPUTES: *Bundesrat* DELEGATES DOMINATE THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

The backbone of the Bundesrat's legislative power is the absolute veto it can exercise on a large portion of federal legislation. This veto, however, is used very infrequently despite the many conflicts between the *Bundesrat* on one side and usually both the *Bundestag* and the Federal Cabinet on the other. From 1949 to April 1958 only 14 bills failed to pass the legislature as a consequence of a final veto of the *Bundesrat*. The main reason for this apparent restraint is to be found in the success of the *Bundesrat* members in the standing conference committee, originally inspired by similar *ad hoc* committees of the Congress of the United States. The total number of committee members is twenty-two; eleven members are chosen by the *Bundesrat*—each *Land* naming one—and eleven members represent the *Bundestag*. The chairmanship alternates between *Bundesrat* and *Bundestag* members at three-month intervals. The committee

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ment to the present study. It would be misleading, however, to judge the role of the Bundesrat solely from the viewpoint of the party system. In its present structure as well as in its tradition the Bundesrat is a bureaucratic organ; its work is conducted less openly and with less concern for publicity than that of elected legislative chambers. It learned the lesson from its fight over the E.D.C. issue in 1952 that it can only lose in an open clash. The fact that the Bundesrat has very rarely taken a legislative initiative indicates also that it can act as a purely parliamentary institution only with great difficulty. The jealousy of the Bundestag is another reason why the Bundesrat seeks influence rather than open power. Bundesrat participation in the preparation of federal legislation far beyond any constitutional design (the institutionalization of which is a main reason for the decline in the number of formal meetings), the influence exercised through Bundesrat recommendations, and its unusual successes in conference committee, all show an expansion of Bundesrat powers in areas well suited for bureaucratic action. As a result the Bundesrat is today the strongest second chamber Germany has ever had. It is a mistake to assume that the Bundesrat is not active when it is not heard from; the reverse is more likely. It is true that the Bundesrat itself could not preserve the kind of federal balance envisaged by the federalist faction in the Constitutional Assembly. But no second chamber alone—neither the United States Senate nor the Swiss Staenderat which are both much stronger—has succeeded in preserving a particular form of federal structure in the face of major political trends in another direction. The Bundesrat has been quite successful in view of its constitutional limitations and its political context; more so, probably, than another form of second chamber, *e.g.*, a senate modelled on American lines. It is true that it has had these undesirable centralizing side-effects upon Land elections, the forming of Land coalitions and the structure of Land party organizations, which Heidenheimer describes so well. But these very disadvantages are an indication of the extent to which the Bundesrat performed a salutary function in checking the potentially dominating power of the Federal government. It is precisely for this reason that the parties inserted themselves into Bundesrat politics, as a result of which the disadvantages occurred.

meets only when called into session to work out a compromise draft of a controversial bill.[25] The Federal Cabinet, the *Bundestag* or the *Bundesrat* may take the initiating step. Conference meetings are restricted to controversial points of the bill in question. Both the *Bundestag* and the *Bundesrat* vote upon the compromise draft without debate. Committee meetings are strictly confidential in order to enable any member to shift from the position of his *Land* or his party sufficiently to effect a compromise without embarrassment.

The *Bundesrat* tends to call a conference whenever it does not want to assent to a law. It did so 125 times up to April 1958, as compared with three times for the *Bundestag* and six times for the Federal Cabinet in the same period.[26] A majority of these initiatives of the *Bundesrat* concerned bills which it could have stopped by absolute veto. Had it done so, the *Bundestag* or the Federal Cabinet would, in most of these cases, have called the conference committee into session. The *Bundesrat* is not at all reluctant to call for a conference session since it has been the party most likely to benefit from that procedure. The conference committee has confirmed the position of the *Bundestag* only three times, and the position of the Cabinet only once, during the period under consideration; it did so in every third case for the *Bundesrat.* The remainder of the cases ended in compromise proposals and a majority of these tended to favor the *Bundesrat* rather than the two other parties. It is impressive testimony to the strong influence the second chamber has exerted on the conference committee. The reasons are plain: political principles are much less in evidence in committee work behind closed doors, and the *Land* representatives' administrative experience and expert qualifications are even more impressive. The *Land* representatives frequently rest their arguments in conference committee on grounds of administrative infeasibility. The conference committee has operated very effectively thus far, as indicated by the small number of compromise proposals that have been rejected; and consequently, *Bundesrat* vetoes have been very rare. Nevertheless, the threat of a veto is always present as a silent partner of the *Bundesrat* group in the conference committee.

V. THE *Bundesrat vis-à-vis* THE FEDERAL CABINET AND THE *Bundestag:* A NEW COMPONENT IN THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

The growth in power of the *Bundesrat* has had a considerable bearing on the relationship between it and the other branches of the federal government. In addition, it has influenced relations between the *Laender* and the federal government, and affected the West German party system.

In theory, the *Bundesrat* is neither a *Land* institution nor a joint body of the *Laender* and the federal government but clearly an organ of the federal government. In every-day politics, it is contrasted to the Federal Cabinet and the first chamber of the federal legislature, the *Bundestag.* The President of the

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[25] The best article on the conference committee is Hans Wessel, "Der Vermittlungsausschuß nach Artikel 77 des Grundgesetzes," in *Archiv des Oeffentlichen Rechts,* Vol. 77, pp. 286 ff., covering mainly legal and theoretical questions.

[26] *Handbuch des Bundesrats, op. cit.,* Pt. II, pp. 94–97.

Federal Republic and the judicial branch are of less importance in this connection, though they too have occasionally been drawn into controversies involving the second chamber.[27] In order to understand the role of the *Bundesrat* in the triangle of Executive, *Bundesrat* and *Bundestag,* it is necessary to refer both to the provisions of the constitution and to the political structure of the parties. As already indicated, the *Bundesrat* has the right to review any bills submitted by the administration before they are introduced in the *Bundestag.* From the viewpoint of the administration this is a first but not very important obstacle. Of far greater importance is the *Bundesrat's* final veto power. Frequently, the *Bundesrat* emerges as the main opponent of the Executive by using its power or threatening to do so; while the *Bundestag,* though it is the primary legislative body, is far less concerned to check and balance the executive.

The reason for this reversal of functions may be found in the party system and party structure. The Chancellor is the nominee and so almost necessarily the leader of his party. To gain and hold his place he must ordinarily control the major faction in the lower house. If there is doubt about this, the leadership is in issue, as the dispute between Erhard and Adenauer in the summer of 1959 clearly showed. Adenauer, as the only Chancellor thus far, has dominated his party very effectively and there can be no doubt that a Social Democratic chancellor would likewise exercise strict control. This pattern is duplicated in the various *Land* governments. Generally, the Cabinet can expect to have the effective support of a majority in the *Bundestag,* at least on major political issues. Since most members of the Federal Cabinet are also members of the *Bundestag,* they are in an excellent position to present their views in party conferences. Some critics contend that, in the relation of the *Bundestag* and the Executive, the effective separation of powers is no longer the structural division between the legislative and executive branches of government but rather the party division between the Executive and the *Bundestag* majority on one side and the *Bundestag* minority on the other.[28] This practical modification of the separation of powers theory favors the Executive as the center of public policy formation. The less the *Bundestag* is able to control major lines of policy formation effectively, the more the *Bundesrat* emerges as a possible substitute in this vital function. The dynamic element in the process has been the steadily increasing role of the political parties.

Yet the introduction of party considerations does not adequately explain the present effectiveness of the *Bundesrat.* Thus far, it has never been controlled by a majority in opposition to the federal government. If it had been possible for the central party apparatus of the government party to control its party members in the *Bundesrat* as effectively as it has in the *Bundestag,* a considerable part of the checking potential of the second chamber would have been eliminated. On the contrary, however, the members of the *Bundesrat* have proven far less amenable to the influence of the national party leadership than their colleagues in the *Bundestag*. So the *Bundesrat* has been able to develop a political position of its own. Though not always untainted by partisan viewpoints, it has been sensitive of this distinct position *vis-à-vis* the central party leadership, and so has emerged as a substantial element in the West German system of checks and balances.

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[27] The most interesting such conflict was the legislative struggle over the European Defense Community. For a short account see Heidenheimer, pp. 816 ff.

[28] Compare Dolf Sternberger, "Opposition des Parlamentes und Parlamentarische Opposition," in *Lebende Verfassung* (Meisenheim, 1956), pp. 133 ff.

The position of the *Bundesrat* with respect to the *Bundestag* is determined by its relation to the Executive. The *Bundestag* generally follows the administration's lead but occasionally is willing to change bills according to the recommendations of the *Bundesrat*. This occurs most often when these are of a technical or administrative nature. The *Bundestag* is reluctant, however, to acknowledge the political role of the *Bundesrat*. This has led the latter deliberately to obscure its political intentions by cloaking them in recommendations of a technical character so that they will be more readily endorsed by the relatively inexpert lower house. Staff members of *Bundesrat* committees claim that this procedure is highly successful.

VI. THE *Bundesrat* AND *Land* GOVERNMENTS: THE SECOND CHAMBER AS THE PREDOMINANT BUT NOT SOLE CENTER OF *Bund-Land* RELATIONS

The relations of the *Bundesrat* and *Land* governments have several aspects. There is, first, the relation of the delegating power to its delegates. Who determines how the votes of the *Land* are cast in the *Bundesrat*? Or, more generally, does the *Land* executive or the *Land* legislature (*Landtag*) determine the general lines of *Bundesrat* policy? Both these questions can be answered in favor of the executive. Occasionally, *Land* legislatures have made attempts at influencing the casting of *Land* votes in the second chamber by passing resolutions to that end, but without success. Theoretically, a parliamentary majority is able to censure a *Land* cabinet for the voting behavior of its delegates in the *Bundesrat,* and can bring down the *Land* government on the issue. The past ten years, however, have shown that this is too rigid an interpretation of constitutional provisions to be employed in directing the voting of *Bundesrat* delegates. As a result, the *Land* cabinets have been quite free to determine their policy in the upper house.

This clear allocation of power between legislature and executive, however, does not extend to relationships within the executive itself. It is not yet clear whether the Minister-President has the sole power of instructing the delegates of the *Land* in the *Bundesrat* or whether the cabinet, as a collegial body, shall do so.[29] In the case of coalition *Land* cabinets composed of parties which, at the federal level, are in opposition to each other, this question has occasionally been a focal point of controversy. In the EDC crisis[30] the Baden-Wuerttemberg cabinet of Minister-President Reinhold Maier had a slight SPD majority as compared to the FDP and Refugee Bloc members. Thus, a vote would have brought out an SPD majority against the treaty. On the other hand, the Minister-President, according to the *Land* constitution, "determines general policy"[31] and it would have been within constitutional limits if he personally had gone to Bonn and cast the votes of his *Land* in favor of the treaty. To complicate the situation, the coalition partners had agreed at the beginning of their cooperation not to use a straight voting system on *Bundesrat* issues but to determine the position of the *Land* in mutual understanding. The outcome of the crisis was that no position of any kind was taken and the EDC treaties were passed by means of highly dubious procedural maneuvers in the *Bundesrat.* The net result within the cabinet was a stalemate. The Baden-Wuerttemberg constitution, which was drawn up shortly after this incident, attempted to give the cabinet a stronger hand by strengthening the collegial principle.[32] Up to the present, however, this solution does not appear to have eliminated the possibility of similar conflicts. In less controversial matters it is usually the cabinet which decides how the *Land* will vote in the *Bundesrat.* As a rule the cabinet member whose department reports the bill in question will take the leadership in the cabinet discussions. As already mentioned, the lower echelons in his department will have contributed very materially to the final decision through reports and recommendations. There is thus, a strong component of bureaucratic participation, though the formal decision is of a political nature.

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[29] Hamburg and Bremen are two exceptions since their constitutions provide explicitly for a cabinet system in which political questions are determined by majority decision. See Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Hamburg constitution and Article 117 of the Bremen constitution. The texts are available in R. W. Fuesslein, "Deutsche Verfassungen" (Berlin-Frankfurt), 1951.

Another aspect of the relationship between the *Laender* and the *Bundesrat* is the function of the second chamber as a representative of *Land* interests *vis-à-vis* the federal government. The *Bundesrat* has remained the focal point of these relations, though its attempts to monopolize them have been barred by the Federal Constitutional Court.[33] Direct cooperation between *Land* administrative departments and their federal counterparts may now be stipulated by federal law as a result of the Court's opinion. The large number of inter-*Land* working groups mentioned above provides a further, though informal, direct means of cooperation. The *Bundesrat* originally viewed the emergence of these groups with misgiving but now seems to find their preparatory work quite helpful. Finally, the quasi-diplomatic representations of the *Laender* in Bonn should be mentioned in this context. Their official task is to provide a closer cooperation between the *Laender* and the *Bund;* in practice they operate as pressure groups *vis-à-vis* the federal government. There is a great deal of communication between these assorted groups and the *Bundesrat*,[34] and they now function cooperatively rather than competitively.

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[30] Heidenheimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 816 ff., gives a short analysis of this crisis.

[31] The Baden-Wuerttemberg provisional constitution (Ueberleitungsgesetz) then in force contained this provision; it is also in the present Land constitution (Article 49, paragraph 1) and in the Basic Law (Article 65).

[32] Article 49, paragraph 2, clearly states that the casting of the Land's votes in the Bundesrat is a matter to be decided by the cabinet.

[33] See the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of May 21, 1952, in *Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts,* Vol. 1 (Tuebingen, 1952), pp. 299 ff., esp. p. 311.

If it were possible to describe the function of the *Bundesrat* within the federal structure in a short formula, it might be said that the second chamber has the dual effect of providing a stage for the antagonism between the *Land* and the federal bureaucracies while at the same time forcing them to some kind of advantageous cooperation. By means of the *Bundesrat*, the peculiar West German division of administration between *Bund* and *Laender* has developed into a new variant of the classical separation of powers. The federal executive is controlled not only by the federal legislature but by the executives of the *Laender* as well. The federal bureaucracy, in turn, is controlled not only by representative organs but by the *Land* bureaucracy as well. Both the Federal and the *Land* bureaucracies have developed loyalties to the respective political centers. As one result, the type of professional bureaucratism which played so pernicious a role in the Weimar republic has not materialized in contemporary West German society.

VII. NON-GOVERNMENTAL INFLUENCES: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS

To what extent do partisan considerations play a role in the *Bundesrat*? Some observers feel that they do so to a very regrettable extent. To these observers the upper house is supposed to be an impartial, almost infallible, institution untainted by politics and designed to correct the mistakes of the politically inclined first chamber. Any amount of partisan politics is seen as detrimental to this function.[35] This purist point of view overlooks the more meaningful fact that the influence of partisan politics has been limited to a small number of highly political issues while the bulk of the *Bundesrat's* work has not been greatly affected. In general, *Land* governments controlled by the "opposition" (SPD) are more likely to vote against the proposals of the federal government than are those controlled by parties in the Bonn coalition. But only a few *Laender* governments side with their central party leaderships regularly—for instance, Schleswig-Holstein and Rheinland-Pfalz on the Bonn coalition side, and Hessen on the side of the SPD. The others tend to vote along partisan lines, too, but in a much less pronounced fashion. Occasions on which all *Land* cabinets followed the wishes of their respective national party machines without deviation have been rare. Strict discipline on roll-calls occurred only three times in the years 1955 and 1956, namely, on the statute for the Saar and on two issues regarding military service.

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[34] The heads of some Land delegations have been given the status of cabinet members so that they can cast the votes of their Land in the Bundesrat. Officials of the delegations often attend Bundesrat committee meetings in place of—or together with—delegates from the Land bureaucracy. A special standing council (Staendiger Beirat) of the Bundesrat which acts as a kind of committee on procedures, is composed of members of Land delegations. Finally, the Federal Ministry for Bundesrat Affairs has an informational conference each Wednesday with Land representatives (this is its main activity and therefore it was not mentioned in the preceding discussion of the relations of the Bundesrat to the Federal government).

[35] The administration of the Bundesrat collects all commentaries in the press, in the radio and other means of mass communication and sends them to a circle of interested persons in mimeographed form. These *Presseveröffentlichungen ueber den Bundesrat* are an excellent and indispensable source of information for any research on the Bundesrat. The opinions referred to are quoted there at length.

The varying composition of *Land* cabinets has caused a moderation of partisan influences in the *Bundesrat* without, however, excluding them altogether. While in the lower chamber more or less strictly organized party factions confront each other, the *Land* representatives in the *Bundesrat* must modify the positions of their respective central party organizations in favor of those of the *Land* political organizations, *i.e.*, in most cases, the views of the particular party coalition of the *Land* concerned. As a result, the political parties do not control delegates in the *Bundesrat* in the same manner or degree as the representatives in the *Bundestag*. The situation is analogous to that in the United States Congress, where the party leadership operates mostly with a limited but loyal nucleus and where regional and other interests often eliminate or moderate the effects of any central leadership. There is little doubt that in the West German system of highly organized parties an extreme party discipline would prevail on all levels, if the federal system did not provide new centers of party loyalty in the *Laender*. Inter-party cooperation on the *Land* level, with its multiple possibilities for coalition, brings out new gradations and emphases of opinion within the parties which would otherwise be subordinated to strict discipline from above. The federal structure of the state as a whole thus has a direct and very wholesome influence on the parties by relaxing the otherwise rigid organizational lines. This is an important consequence of contemporary federalism in Germany.[36]

In the case of interest groups, it is less the overall federal structure and more the peculiar operational system of the *Bundesrat* itself which determines the pattern of pressure group politics. The method of reaching decisions in the *Bundesrat* makes it very difficult for lobbyists to operate effectively. The *Laender* representatives usually arrive in Bonn just prior to the short *Bundesrat* meetings and return to their *Land* capitals immediately thereafter. An attempt at influencing these individuals is not likely to be useful since decisions are not made on the floor but in committee. Interest groups accordingly try to acquaint committee members with their views and recommendations on various bills; in some committees such recommendations are distributed in mimeographed form to the deputies by committee clerks. Even the committee meetings, however, represent a relatively late stage in the process of decision. The more thoroughly the preceding contacts on the administrative level have prepared the way for formal deliberations, the less can positions be changed at the committee stage. It is much more advantageous for private groups to reach the administrative departments in the various *Laender* and to attempt to exert an influence during the preliminary deliberations. This is an extremely difficult task to direct centrally and therefore is usually left to the *Land* and local organizations of the respective interest groups. This kind of pressure activity occurs in the general context of the activities of local interest groups and thus has only an indirect effect on the *Bundesrat.*

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[36] The influences of Bundesrat politics on party organization in the Laender which Heidenheimer describes, *op. cit.*, have certainly diminished these effects. Actual voting behavior in the Bundesrat shows, however, that "Gleichschaltung" was not quite as effective as a look at the composition of Land coalitions might suggest.

VIII. THE *Bundesrat* IN THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM: WHAT ABOUT PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION?

The position of the *Bundesrat* within the West German system of government is directly linked neither to the political parties nor to the principle of representation with which the parties are closely associated. Most organs of the federal government consist of elected officials. The Federal President is elected by the Federal Assembly, an electoral college composed of the *Bundestag* and delegations from the *Land* legislatures. The *Bundestag* is elected by the people; the members of the Constitutional Court by the two chambers of the federal legislature; and of the members of the Cabinet at least the Chancellor is elected by the *Bundestag.* The members of the *Bundesrat,* however, are not elected but appointed by the *Land* governments. The suggestion that the upper house represents the populations of the West German *Laender* is not quite sound. For the *Land* governments are themselves executive rather than representative organs and are, in fact, distinguished from the representative organs in the *Laender* by the separation of powers theory. Strictly speaking, some indirect ingredients of representation exist, since the members of the *Bundesrat* are members of parliamentary *Land* governments and are thus, as a rule, members of the *Land* legislatures. But the final step away from delegation of a quasi-diplomatic type towards that of modern electoral representation has not been taken. The disadvantages resulting from this are more practical than theoretical. A kind of exaltation of the administrative functions of the *Bundesrat* has taken place, while its political functions are more or less disparaged. By refusing the *Bundesrat* the status of a full legislative second chamber the Constitutional Assembly adopted the classical concept of federalism, with emphasis on the maintenance of the autonomy of the member states as the chief object of a division of powers between federal and state governments. The modern view, which replaces this rigid confrontation with dynamic mutual control and cooperation, was not considered. The end effect of this arrangement has been the obscuring of political issues in administrative forms. Since it is not feasible to exclude political forces from such vital functions as those which the *Bundesrat* fulfills, an attempt should have been made to combine the bureaucratic and political elements. At present the theoretical legitimation of the *Bundesrat* covers only a portion of its actual activities; its position in the contemporary system of government requires a realistic reappraisal and corresponding changes in federal theory.

IX. SHOULD THE *Bundesrat* BE REMODELLED: A DISCUSSION OF REFORM PROPOSALS

The *Bundesrat* has established itself as one of the most important institutions in the West German political structure. This study has tried to point out its positive and negative effects on that structure. Before discussing some of the proposals for correcting present weaknesses, its main functions will be briefly recounted.

No doubt the predominant function of the *Bundesrat* has been to maintain and strengthen the rights and powers of the *Laender vis-à-vis* the federal government. All other problems treated above are less important for the functioning and balance of the West German federal system. A good argument can be made in defense of this function even if one does not subscribe to the doctrine of states' rights. After a period of centralization which began in the Weimar republic and was carried to the extreme under Hitler, it was a necessary first step in the reestablishment of a stable federal system to stabilize the rights of the *Laender* against federal powers. Criticism, therefore, should not be levelled at the upper house itself for taking an active part in this process of consolidation. An evaluation should focus, instead, on indirect damages to the federal structure and to the *Laender* themselves which might be the result of *Bundesrat* politics.[37]

A second function of the *Bundesrat* has been to check the legislation of the first chamber in a general way. Though it does not have the full legislative rights of the Swiss *Staenderat* or the United States Senate, the *Bundesrat* has achieved considerable influence on the legislative process and has often acted with the wisdom and restraint expected from a genuine second chamber. Thirdly, the *Bundesrat* has become involved in the tensions between the Federal Executive and its supporting majority in the *Bundestag*, on the one hand, and the *Bundestag* minority, on the other. Here it has aligned itself with existing partisan forces, instead of moderating or sharpening them. Finally, the *Bundesrat* has provided a setting for the peculiar antagonism arising between the federal and *Land* bureaucracies. It has given the *Land* bureaucracies a powerful means for checking federal legislative and administrative activities; this, in turn, has led to an interesting new division of powers.

Though the second chamber as it is presently constructed has found many critics, only a few have advocated its total abolition. There can be no doubt that the favorable effects of its participation in the legislative and administrative process have impressed even its most ardent opponents. Thus, reform proposals tend to maintain approximately the present structural solution while striking at certain negative effects. The creation of a one-chamber system, or a transformation of the *Bundesrat* into a "pure" senate, will therefore not be considered in the present discussion.

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[37] A description of these effects has been omitted from the present study since Heidenheimer's article goes into them at length.

Occasional proposals have been made to replace the present method of selecting members for the *Bundesrat* by appointment of representatives of a number of economic, social and cultural organizations.[38] In this quasi-corporate council, leaders of the trade unions would sit side by side with representatives of employers' organizations, members of standing conferences of local governments, presidents of the universities and technical colleges, and other organizations. Such a reorganization would eliminate the most frequently criticized disadvantages of the present *Bundesrat*, *i.e.*, its impact on *Land* elections and on the composition and policy of *Land* governments. The direct influence of the *Land* bureaucracies upon federal administration would cease and the *Laender* would be left to their internal problems. It is evident, however, that the representatives of the various social groups would vote according to their interests rather than their regional origins, so that the effect of a regional division of powers would be lost. This kind of decrease in the participation of *Land* governments in the processes of the federal government would be generally detrimental if the *Laender* were not at the same time protected against the impact of direct federal influence on *Land* administrative departments. The above proposal fails to deal with this problem and merely replaces the present truly federal second chamber with one which is essentially corporate.

A modification of this plan proposes to append a corporate body onto the present federal system.[39] The resulting three-chamber system would still guarantee participation of representatives of the *Laender* governments, but it would limit the *Bundesrat* to the field of genuine *Bund-Land* relations. This proposal has a measure of validity because it starts from the premise that the bureaucratic and political functions of the present *Bundesrat* should be separate. But its attempt at finding a new representational basis for the political function by introducing corporative representation is equally unsatisfactory. If a third chamber should be found necessary, it is probable that a senate-type chamber would have the greatest utility since it could absorb political functions much more easily than a corporative body, while permitting the present *Bundesrat* to continue as the representative of administrative interests. Adenauer proposed this solution in the Constitutional Assembly but found no majority for it. It was contended that any three-chamber system would be too complicated, and that in the interest of clear responsibility there should be only a second chamber without further subdivisions.[40]

Although these and other proposals for reform of the *Bundesrat* appear occasionally in West German periodicals, one cannot say that a genuine reform movement exists. In general, the *Bundesrat* has worked better than expected, and it unquestionably embodies a far better solution than that of the Weimar

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[38] Erich Dombrowski proposed this in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, editions of June 11, July 2 and July 5, 1954.

[39] The former Reichsminister Hans Schlange-Schoeningen in the *Kieler Nachrichten*, July 19, 1956.

[40] See the description given in v. Mangoldt, *Das Bonner Grundgesetz* (Berlin, 1953), p. 266.

Reichsrat or the preceding imperial *Bundesrat*. Any realistic proposals for modification, however, should recognize two factors stressed in this paper. First, the political functions of the *Bundesrat* should be acknowledged; introduction of a senatorial type of representative would probably best accomplish this. Second, the integrity of the bureaucratic functions of the *Bundesrat* should be guaranteed as long as the federal structure rests on the present administrative system.

Although the formulation of an institutional structure encompassing these two elements is now only an academic task, it seems likely that the nature of the party system would be of extreme importance. The introduction of some form of senatorial representation, for instance, would be more effective in a two-party system than in a multi-party system based on proportional representation.

The Federal Republic is still in a period of consolidation. Both the effectiveness of its constitutional system and its alleged provisionality have prevented much discussion of fundamental constitutional reform. Thus, the question of how to build an optimal second chamber suited to the peculiarities of German federalism will not arise until a constitution for a reunited Germany is drafted. In the meantime, it is only possible to analyze the experience of the present *Bundesrat*. Such an analysis, moreover, can also be useful in the event a West European political community comes into existence. A modified *Bundesrat* type of second chamber might be superior to a senate in the process of merging several well established national states, since it would provide an effective link between existing national bureaucracies and any new supra-national administration. This is a question for further study.

EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE FEDERALISM IN WEST GERMANY

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The form of government which we call federalism can readily be illustrated with examples from history. Its institutional structure and constitutional intricacies, however, still present real difficulties of definition by logical construction and have given rise to many conflicting interpretations of the term. Kenneth C. Wheare, in one of the more recent attempts at general definition, describes the federal principle as the "coordinate division of powers" between the central and regional governments, which in their respective spheres are "mutually independent" and "coequally supreme."[1] Such language envisions a system in which both central and regional governments have a complete set of the three branches of government with full powers in their respective spheres of jurisdiction, and a minimum of institutional overlap or interdependence. This picture of the mutual independence of the two levels of government can also be found in de Tocqueville and in the writings of Georg Waitz, the dean of German federal theory before 1867.[2] Not unlike the framers of the American Constitution, Waitz emphasized this requirement of mutual independence primarily because he feared that the future federal government might again lapse into dependence on the constituent states. He argued, moreover, that the *de facto* sovereignty of the well consolidated German states could only be balanced by vesting in the federal government the *Kompetenz-Kompetenz, i. e.*, the power to delimit the jurisdiction of either level of government. Only a strong *Reich* could hope to check the centrifugal effect of the particularism of the states.[3] The Fathers of the American Constitution, to the same end, assured the supremacy of the federal government with other devices.

In the narrow sense of an absence of institutional interdependence, the applicability of this "mutual independence" theory to the American federal system has been questioned in view of the cooperative patterns which have emerged during the last 25 years.[4] With this exception of recent vintage, however, the "mutual independence" of central and regional institutions still seems to describe rather well the essentials of American federalism, especially when we compare the United States with the German tradition. The German constitutional tradition does not conceive of its central and regional governments as entities each of which has a complete set of organs and full executive and legislative powers within their respective spheres of jurisdiction.

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[1] *Federal Government* (3d ed., London, 1953), pp. 1–7, 13–15, 32–33.

[2] Siegfried Brie, *Theorie der Staatenverbindungen* (Stuttgart: Enke, 1886), p. 103.

[3] Friedrich Meinecke, *Weltbuergertum und Nationalstaat* (3d ed., Muenchen: Oldenbourg, 1915), pp. 488–498.

[4] See William Anderson's book review, this REVIEW, Vol. 40 (Oct., 1946), p. 995.

I

In their design of the Constitutions of 1867 and 1871, Bismarck and the German princes seemingly took pleasure in disregarding the precepts of federal theory handed down by de Tocqueville and the school of Waitz. They introduced major changes into German federal theory and practice which were closely related to the presence of monarchies in all but three of the German states. The resulting confederate tenor was offset by Prussian hegemony instead of a strong *Reich* government. With respect to federalism, the two most important innovations consisted of the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*) and the division of legislative and executive functions. The *Bundesrat* was but a new edition of the old Confederate Congress and consisted, like its predecessor, of instructed representatives of the princes and administrations of the several states. According to the original design, the *Bundesrat* was to exercise the few executive functions of the *Reich* in addition to its role in federal legislation. In this manner, the states hoped to retain the executive and administrative prerogatives of their confederate past and to allow only legislative powers to the future federal government. This arrangement not only tended to leave the modern administrative state at the territorial level where it had evolved; it also gave the task of integrating Germany, economically and politically, a predominantly legislative character. Later on, a *Reich* administration evolved extra-constitutionally and gave this system a greater element of the "mutual independence" type of federalism. In its basic outlines, however, German federalism retained its asymmetrical distribution of legislative and administrative powers as well as the *Bundesrat* type of second chamber, even under the Weimar and Bonn Republics.

It can hardly be doubted that this institutional structure fails to conform to the mutual independence formula. The question of classification, then, is only whether students of comparative government should discard this deviant species as not federal or broaden the generic definition so as to include it as another form of federalism. Since the criterion of mutual independence in the institutional sense was drawn from the passing circumstances at an early stage in the history of modern federalism, it can hardly constitute a logically necessary and permanent requirement. Before we can decide whether or not to regard the German intergovernmental relations as federal, it will be necessary to reexamine the prevailing pattern in a manner differing somewhat from that commonly used for mutual independence systems.

II

A cursory glance at the list of federal legislative powers in the Imperial Constitution of 1871, the Weimar Constitution and the Basic Law of West Germany shows that the bulk of legislative powers has always been vested in the federal government. There were minor changes with the advent of "big government," but the general expansion of governmental activity only reinforced the one-sidedness in the original distribution of legislative powers. Under the present system, the German *Laender* (states) retain legislative jurisdiction only over education, culture, religious affairs, police, local government, parts of agricultural regulation, and intra-governmental matters pertaining to their administrative agencies, finances and civil service. A crude measure of this distribution can be obtained from a comparison of the legislative activity at both levels of government in recent years. In the two-year period from 1955 to 1957, for example, only forty-six bills were introduced in, and only thirty passed by, the legislature of the *Land* Rhineland Palatinate.[5] The legislature of the *Land* Hesse passed only twenty-two laws between 1954 and 1956.[6] Eight hundred seventy-five bills, by comparison, were introduced and 483 passed by the West German *Bundestag* during the four-year term 1953–1957.[7]

The bulk of administrative powers, on the other hand, was always left with the *Laender*. The spectacular growth of the *Reich* administration under the Empire and in the Weimar Republic created primarily top-level planning and supervisory agencies for new fields in which the actual administration was still left to the *Laender*. These federal ministries restricted their activity to bill drafting, the administration of funds, and a limited supervision over operations by the *Laender* agencies in their fields. There was no direct link of administrative control between the *Laender* administrations and the appropriate federal ministries. This distribution of administrative functions was clearly reflected in the three federal constitutions of the Empire, Weimar and Bonn. At first the federal government was entrusted only with the administration of foreign relations, defense and the mails. Later, navigation, the railroads, waterways, and fiscal administration were added. Under the Bonn Constitution, even the collection of federal revenues and the administration of waterways were delegated to the *Land* administrations under a system of closer supervision. All other administrative functions, and especially the execution of most federal laws, are still left to the *Land* governments.

This unequal distribution is also reflected in the size of the administrative establishment on both levels. Excluding the public economic enterprises and mails, the total administrative personnel of the three levels of government was distributed as follows:[8]

	Federal	*Laender*	Local
1928	13.1%	44.1%	42.8%
1954	9.0%	56.5%	34.5%

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[5] Wilhelm Froitzheim, "Im Juni 1947 begann die Parlamentsarbeit," *Staatszeitung* (*Staatsanzeiger fuer Rheinlandpfalz*), May 18, 1957, p. 13.

[6] *Hessen-ABC* (1956), pp. 84–85.

[7] Bundesminister der Justiz, *Die Bundesgesetzgebung waehrend der zweiten Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestags* 1953/1957, Beilage zum *Bundesanzeiger*, No. 160 (Aug. 2, 1957), p. 5.

[8] Compiled from Statistisches Reichsamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich 1930*, pp. 510–511; and Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1956*, p. 395.

III

If it is true that the vast bulk of legislation issues from the federal government and is administered by the *Land* bureaucracies, it seems logical to view the entire federal structure in the light of these relationships. To the extent of this functional overlap, the *Reichstag* or *Bundestag* is then the central legislature of the entire state. The federal Cabinet is the legislative drafting bureau and administrative committee of this central legislature, to which, also, it is responsible. From this organ issue the general rules in the fields of financial, economic and social policy, and in communications policy ranging from the mails to the national highway system and foreign trade. These rules are, on the whole, general enough to allow for a good deal of administrative discretion, supplementary *Laender* legislation and administrative rule-making, as the case may be. Except for the federal railroads and mails, the *Laender* administer them with their own agencies, personnel and funds. Thus they retain the actual exercise of governmental power in a regionalized framework of far closer control by the people and their legislative representatives than a unitary state could allow. Decentralized administration adapts central legislative policy to regional conditions and preferences. It permits the regional differentials typical of federal countries as much leeway as, and at times more than, is compatible with the necessary national unity of economic, social and financial policy. Indeed, national policy itself is determined by a legislative process that includes the participation of the *Laender* governments united in the *Bundesrat*, rather than being imposed upon the *Laender* by national representatives.

While this executive-legislative federalism is a system of rather strict separation of powers, there are means of mutual control quite reminiscent of the relations between a legislature and its executive. The central legislature, or rather its "administrative committee," can review the administration of its laws by the *Laender* for legality, and in a few isolated cases for efficiency as well. This federal supervision could hardly be carried out successfully except for the presence of a number of preconditions typical of German federalism. Among these are the system of legal unity in civil and criminal law; judicial organization and procedure; the federal powers to regulate (with the approval of the *Bundesrat*) the organization and procedure of *Laender* administrative agencies; and the federal jurisdiction over the legal status of the *Laender* civil service. Behind this federal supervision, the authority of the Federal Constitutional Court serves as the final arbiter of disputes between the central legislature and its decentralized administration. Direct federal intervention is reserved for very extreme situations. It is too drastic a device to be used in the complexities of modern society without severe after-effects and a lasting disruption of the state of mutual trust on which federalism is founded.

The *Laender* administrations, on the other hand, have a considerable array of controls and means of influence at their disposal in their relations with the central legislature. Most of these instruments are concentrated in their representation in the *Bundesrat*, where provisions for majority rule require their close cooperation. This cooperation among *Laender*, cooperation which is otherwise to be found only in common organs such as the conferences of *Laender* ministers (where the unanimity rule prevails), establishes a state of equilibrium between common *Laender* interests and federal interests; it is an element of stability unparalleled in federal systems of the senate type. Through the absolute veto of the *Bundesrat*, the *Laender* administrations can exercise an executive veto power on a large number of important subjects pertaining to the federal system, the *Laender* finances, and, in particular, the *Laender* administration of federal laws. Unlike the veto of the American President, the *Bundesrat* veto can neither be overridden nor is it limited to a mere negative decision. Here the decentralized administration has regular legislative functions of amendment and initiative; through the central legislature. Contrary to the original design, the fields subject to this absolute veto by the *Bundesrat* proved to outweigh in importance and number those falling under the suspensive veto. With the establishment of the Conference Committee and more intensive practices of negotiation, moreover, both absolute and suspensive vetoes are no mere gestures of futility; they are dynamic devices of political influence.[9] The *Bundesrat* possesses the same powers with regard to administrative rules and ordinances issued by of the federal Cabinet.

This system of executive-legislative relationships does not seem to suffer from the usual anemia of modern legislatures under the predominance of the executive branch; it is almost archaic in its conspicuous state of balance. The strength of the central legislature, however, is not only based on its huge "legislative drafting bureau," and on its financial control and the extensive funds at its disposal. It derives also from the influence of political parties in Western Germany. Party government dominates the *Bundestag* and culminates in the federal Cabinet and the opposition. It can influence the decentralized administration in many ways.

In this manner, executive-legislative federalism forms a closed circle of political processes in which the peculiar institution of the *Bundesrat* plays a pivotal role. The legislative process focuses primarily on the central legislature[10] on which the nationwide special interests concentrate most of their efforts. The decentralized administration has a particularly privileged access for the feedback of practical experience and sectional interests into the legislative process. The limited federal supervision, finally, completes this unusual arrangement.[11]

IV

While this executive-legislative federalism seems to be the prevailing pattern in Western Germany today, the mutual independence pattern is not entirely absent. It is in use wherever it is necessary for the autonomy of the central or *Land* governments and where the executive-legislative division of authority is not feasible. The first category embraces subjects relating to the "organizational autonomy" and financial independence of either level of government. The organizational autonomy includes, for example, budgetary administration and the organization and procedure of the agencies of either level. The financial independence of a government, on the other hand, concerns its ability to raise the revenues needed for the support of its administrative establishment and for the execution of its policies. In an age of big government, German federal theory and practice have found it very difficult to separate this aspect of public finance from the use of taxation for purposes of social and economic policy—an area in which the executive-legislative pattern has prevailed. For these latter purposes, the Weimar Republic centralized financial power to an extent rather injurious to German federalism. The framers of the Basic Law would no doubt have followed in the same track had not the Allied occupying powers obliged them to adopt a compromise along the lines of mutual independence.

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[9] It would be misleading to count the actual vetoes as a measure of the influence of the *Bundesrat*, since these vetoes only record its failures to utilize the levers of power at its disposal. Hans Schaefer, *Der Bundesrat* (Koeln: Heymanns, 1955), pp. 73–96; and Karlheinz Neunreither's article in this issue of this REVIEW, above, p. 713.

[10] The *Bundesrat* seldom makes use of its right to initiate bills. Schaefer, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–65.

[11] For details of this procedure of supervision, see Theodor Maunz, *Deutsches Staatsrecht* (6th ed., Muenchen: Beck, 1956), p. 163.

A second category of independent functions comprises such subjects as foreign affairs and defense for the federal government, and education, religious and cultural affairs, police, local government and the greater part of agricultural regulation for the *Laender*. In these fields, each government is vested with a fairly complete system of legislative, executive and judicial powers, with a minimum of overlap and mutual interference. To be sure, the *Bundesrat* participates in the passing of the federal budget and the establishment of federal agencies; and the federal government can contribute to the uniformity of the organization and procedure of *Laender* agencies and the status of *Land* civil servants with the consent of the *Bundesrat*. But the slight advantage of the *Laender* here is more than offset by the weight of party government on the federal side.

The executive-legislative and mutual-independence systems intermesh rather smoothly on both levels with minor shortcomings. Among these is the apparent failure of the *Land* legislatures to control the instruction of *Bundesrat* delegates by their respective cabinets.[12] Without this control, the *Bundesrat* may be thought to be in a position of political irresponsibility. This seems all the more surprising because the participation of the *Laender* in federal affairs is a very important and rather large part of their governmental functions.

Within the total activity at each level of government, the proportion between the executive-legislative and the mutual independence patterns is difficult to surmise. We can obtain an approximate measurement of it by looking at the quantitative aspects of the governmental functions of each level, divided crudely into the originally integrative functions where executive-legislative federalism prevails, on the one hand, and the independent functions, on the other. So at the federal level, we can lump together the legislative output of the Federal Ministries of Finance, Economics, Labor, Agriculture, Traffic, Housing, Marshall Plan, Refugees, Atomic Energy and some others to make up the first category; and that of the Federal Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice and Economic Cooperation as comprising independent federal activities. The unavoidable residues of independent activity among the ministries of the executive-legislative group and of executive-legislative activity among the ministries of the independent group may be disregarded, as probably canceling each other.

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[12] Werner Weber, *Spannungen und Kraefte im westdeutschen Verfassungssystem* (Stuttgart: Vorwerk, 1951), p. 93; Theodor Eschenburg, *Staat und Gesellschaft in Deutschland,* (Stuttgart: Schwab, 1956), pp. 631–632; and Neunreither, *op. cit.*

At the *Laender* level, we can establish similar groups in terms of the distribution of the average budget of the *Laender* over the functional fields. This measure also corresponds rather closely to the distribution of the administrative personnel.[13] Here, the financial, social welfare, social war effects, housing, roads, economic and agricultural administrations roughly constitute the category covered by the executive-legislative pattern; while the general, police, judicial and debt administrations, the economic enterprises and education make up the independent functions of the *Laender*. Education alone accounts for one-third of the personnel and one-fourth of the budget of the average *Land*. Table I presents the results of the two breakdowns.[14]

TABLE I. THE QUANTITATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MUTUAL INDEPENDENCE AND EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE PATTERNS IN THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES OF FEDERATION AND *Laender*

	Federal Legislation		Federal Ordinances	Average *Land* Budget
	1949/53	1953/57	1953/57	1953
On Mutual Independence Functions	28.3%	32.5%	9.7%	53.6%*
On Functions of Executive-Legislative Federalism	71.7%	67.5%	90.3%	46.4%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

* Exclusive of education, this figure would be 29.2%.

This quantitative comparison of the share of executive-legislative federalism at each level reveals not only the importance of this peculiar system but also a significant contrast in this respect between the federal government and the

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[13] The proportion of the average *Land* budget used for personnel expenditures is far higher than that of the federal budget, which again demonstrates the greater preoccupation of the *Laender* governments with administrative duties.

[14] Computed from *Wirtschaftskunde der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,* (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, 1955), pp. 469–475; Bundesminister der Justiz, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–6; and Bundesminister der Justiz, *Die Bundesgesetzgebung waehrend der ersten Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestags 1949/1953,* Beilage zum *Bundesanzeiger,* no. 161 (Aug. 22, 1953), p. 7.

Laender. To this day the *Laender* have retained a large proportion of independent functions which still reflect elements of their statehood in the old sense.

V

From this unorthodox analysis of German federal institutions we can return to our original question—is this federalism? Few will quarrel with the term as applied to the mutual-independence part of the relationship described above. Our question can therefore be narrowed down to its applicability to the executive-legislative part of the relations between the West German Federation and the *Laender*.

The most likely objections to an identification of this relationship with "true federalism" can be reduced to two basic positions:

(1) that executive-legislative federalism implies a pattern of dependence.
(2) that it is incompatible with the theory of sovereignty and statehood which requires both the federal and the *Laender* governments, or else one of the two levels, to be true states (*Staatenstaat*).

About this second argument Laski and Emerson have left nothing more to be said.[15] Sovereignty and statehood are concepts born with the rise of the modern absolutistic state, which superseded earlier federal arrangements because its reality was as incompatible with territorial pluralism as the theory of sovereignty was with that of federalism. The concepts are no more compelling than the prevalence of absolutism in fact requires.

The first objection is more weighty even without entering the issue of how one can establish federal supremacy without creating patterns of dependence. Ironically, the initial difficulty with German federalism lies in determining which level of government is dependent on which. Wheare, for example, ruled out Imperial Germany as a federal system because he thought the participation of the *Bundesrat* in *Reich* policy made the *Reich* dependent on the states. The implication was that, apart from the role of Prussia, Germany was a confederation at that time. The Weimar and Bonn Republics, however, are viewed as unitary by the same writer because their *Laender* seem to be too dependent on the central government. Despite the continuity of the governmental institutions and the absence of revolutionary changes in this respect in 1918, the German system of government is either said to have jumped from a confederate to a unitary mold or to have combined both side by side without ever entering the in-between stages of federalism. It is difficult to reconcile this concept with the notion of a continuum of degrees of federal decentralization of authority from a confederation to centralized unitarism.[16]

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[15] Harold J. Laski, *The Foundations of Sovereignty* (New York, 1921), pp. 17–29; *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (New Haven, 1917), pp. 268–275; and Rupert Emerson, *State and Sovereignty in Modern Germany* (New Haven, 1928), pp. 94–114. Also Carl J. Friedrich, "Federal Constitutional Theory and Emergent Proposals," in Arthur W. Macmahon, *Federalism, Mature and Emergent* (Garden City, N. Y., 1955), p. 512.

[16] K. C. Wheare, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–7, 25–26.

Some of the reservations toward this executive-legislative federalism are also due to the equation of law with command and the ensuing misconception of administrative activity. German federal legislation rarely creates more than a general framework for the substance of governmental policy. Much administrative activity is not identical with the execution of laws. Hence, the latitude of administrative discretion is quite adequate for the adaptation of federal policy to the peculiarities of the regional traditions, circumstances and political predilections. The *Laender* administrations generally retain complete control over their personnel and over the discretion exercised in any particular administrative act or policy within the letter of the law. Under the principle of "organizational autonomy," they are shielded, as well as bound, by the laws and constitutions of their respective *Laender*. Any federal effort to assure some uniformity with respect to administrative rules and the organization of their administrative organs has to be approved by a majority of the *Laender* governments in the *Bundesrat*.[17]

Federal supervision over the administration of federal laws by the *Laender* is a cumbersome and indirect process which entitles the federal government only to check the legality of an administrative act *post facto*.[18] Such supervision allows the federal ministries no prior influence on the administrative process. After an allegedly illegal act has taken place, the federal government can raise a "complaint regarding shortcomings (*Maengelruege*)" with the *Land* government concerned, with the *Laender* governments in the *Bundesrat*, and ultimately with the Federal Constitutional Court. Any federal enforcement against a recalcitrant state is again subject to the sweeping powers of the *Bundesrat*.[19] For these reasons, the execution of federal laws by the *Laender* is not at all a mechanical subordinate process. In view of the great range of federal legislative jurisdiction, the execution of federal law by the *Laender* is the main field for the formation and demonstration of the political character of each *Land*. More generally, it is relevant to note here also that legislation by its very nature lends itself well to determination from one center, while by the same token administration is more amenable to differentiated application to the manifold social reality as it varies from region to region.

As to the dependence of the federal government on the *Laender* governments in the *Bundesrat* or *Reichsrat*, there was always a wide gap between constitutional theory and practice. Under the Empire, the centrifugal tendencies of the formal constitution and the confederate past were easily held in check by Prussian hegemony. The integrating role of Prussia replaced that which the federal government plays in other federal systems. Under the Weimar and Bonn Republics, the *Reichsrat* or *Bundesrat* has played an important but relatively passive role. Like the executive branch in the original conception of the separation of powers, it has been content with exerting a modifying influence and veto power over the policies of the "central legislature" rather than actively determining federal policy. Hence, the relationship between the *Bundesrat* and the policy-determining organs has been as little of a pattern of dependence as that between the federal legislators and the *Laender* administrators. It would seem to be more appropriate to speak of a pattern of coexistence and voluntary cooperation which prevails at the crucial joints of the federal system.

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[17] Diether Haas, "Bundesgesetze ueber Organisation und Verfahren der Landesbehoerden," *Archiv des oeffentlichen Rechts*, LXXX (1955), 81 *et seq.;* and Kurt Held, "Der autonome Verwaltungsstil der Laender und das Bundesratsveto nach Artikel 84(1) des Grundgesetzes," *ibid.*, pp. 50–80. Also Wilhelm Laforet, "Verwaltung und Ausfuehrung der Bundesgesetze," *Die Oeffentliche Verwaltung* (1950), p. 221 *et seq.;* and Karl Pathe, "Die Ausfuehrung der Bundesgesetze," *Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt* (1951), p. 681 *et seq.*

[18] There are a few cases in which the federal supervision and control goes farther than this, but they concern mostly federal subjects of jurisdiction, the administration of which had been delegated to the *Laender*. Apart from the collection of federal taxes by the *Laender*, this category is not very important.

[19] Hans Schaefer, "Bundesaufsicht und Bundeszwang," *Archiv des oeffentlichen Rechts*, LXXVIII (1952/1953), 1–49; and Georg August Zinn, "Die Bundesaufsicht nach dem Grundgesetz," *Die Oeffentliche Verwaltung* (1950), p. 522 *et seq.* Also Bundesverfassungsgericht, *Entscheidungen*, III, 49 *et seq.*

In summary, this executive-legislative federalism would seem to be quite compatible with the essential criteria of federalism. The rigid requirement of the mutual independence of the executive and legislative institutions of both levels is at best a product of historical circumstances, and not an indispensable part of a general definition of federalism. This is hardly surprising in view of the fact that this requirement has never been applied to judicial functions, the third branch of the original division. Here, integrative and arbitral functions, the superimposition of federal courts upon state courts and "mutually independent" court systems at both levels have long existed side by side in the oldest of the modern federal systems.

THE ROLE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE: SOME EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE THEORY OF EDMUND BURKE*

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The problem of representation is central to all discussions of the functions of legislatures or the behavior of legislators. For it is commonly taken for granted that, in democratic political systems, legislatures are both legitimate and authoritative decision-making institutions, and that it is their representative character which makes them authoritative and legitimate. Through the process of representation, presumably, legislatures are empowered to act for the whole body politic and are legitimized. And because, by virtue of representation, they participate in legislation, the represented accept legislative decisions as authoritative. But agreement about the meaning of the term "representation" hardly goes beyond a general consensus regarding the context within which it is appropriately used. The history of political theory is studded with definitions of representation,[1] usually embedded in ideological assumptions and postulates which cannot serve the uses of empirical research without conceptual clarification.[2]

I

Many familiar formulations treat representation in a non-functional fashion, viewing it as something valuable in itself, as an ultimate end, and seek to discover or specify its "nature" or "essence." Functional theory, on the other hand, deals with representation from the point of view of the political system as a whole or its component units. Herman Finer, for instance, has suggested that "responsibility is the chief and wider aim, and representativeness merely a convenient means to attain this. . . . The desire for responsible government is paramount; people not merely wish to represent their views, but actually to make and unmake governments."[3] But while functional formulations treat representation as a means for the attainment of some other political objective, failure to test functional propositions by way of empirical research leaves the

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[1] For a convenient and comprehensive summary of definitions, see John A. Fairlie, "The Nature of Political Representation," this REVIEW, Vol. 34 (April–June, 1940), pp. 236–48; 456–66.

[2] An effort at conceptual clarification is made by Alfred De Grazia, *Public and Republic—Political Representation in America* (New York, 1951).

[3] Herman Finer, *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government* (New York, rev. ed., 1949), p. 219.

problems raised by theory in the realm of hypothesis rather than reliable knowledge. In connection with Finer's proposition, for example, there has been little, if any, empirical analysis of the extent to which the represented do, in fact, want to enforce political responsibility, and how capable they are, under modern conditions, of exercising the necessary control. Nevertheless, once relevant concepts are clarified, a functional formulation of representation can open up areas of research which, in turn, may contribute to theoretical cumulation.

The relationship between the representative and the represented is at the core of representational theory. The term "representation" directs attention, first of all, to the attitudes, expectations and behaviors of the represented—to their acceptance of representatives' decisions as legitimate and authoritative for themselves. More particularly, representation concerns not the mere fact that they do accept such decisions, but rather the reasons they have for doing so, their rationalizations of the legitimacy and authority of the decisions made by their representatives.

Sometimes the adjective "representative" denotes nothing more than the publicly approved process by which representatives are to be chosen—as when a distinction is made between a "representative body" (meaning a group of men elected by specific modes of popular election) and a "non-representative body" (meaning a group of men selected by royal or executive appointment, entailed inheritance, or some other non-electoral process). Such usage implies that citizens' attitudes and expectations include, and may extend no farther than, the belief that representatives' decisions must be accepted as legitimate and authoritative *if* the representatives have been selected in the approved manner. In other words, elected officials are called "representatives" primarily because of the way they have been chosen. Even in a looser usage an appointed commission may be approvingly called a body of "representative" citizens, or may be attacked as "unrepresentative," depending on whether its members might conceivably have been chosen had they been subject to election rather than appointment; and their views will correspondingly be accorded or denied a measure of authority and legitimacy.

But the appropriate process of selecting public decision-makers has never been the really fundamental question for theories of representation. Behind every proposal for altering the method of selecting officials is some assumption, at least, about the effect of such changes on what decision-makers or decision-making institutions do, and how they do it. Proposals for reform must assume or show that the proposed change will bring it about that *what* representatives decide and *the way* they reach decisions is more nearly in accord with expectations and demands of the represented than has been in the case under the system to be reformed. The various defenses of existing systems of selection which postulate "virtual representation" have in common some shading of the belief that the process of selection is not of major significance in determining what representatives do or how they do it, or that decisions made by representatives can be brought in harmony with public expectations, without altering whatever process of selection is being defended by the advocacy of virtual representation.

The relationship between the process of selection of legislators and the modes and consequences of legislative behavior, or the relationship between public expectations and legislative decisions, offer wide and fertile fields for empirical research. Our purpose here, however, is less ambitious than a full-scale investigation of such relationships. It is to eliminate those particular ambiguities in the concept of representation which concern the actions or behavior of representatives, by use of the concept of "role," and to demonstrate the utility of this approach for further research relevant to the theory of representation.

II

A convenient and useful starting point in theoretical clarification is Edmund Burke's theory of representation. For, in following his classic argument, later theorists have literally accepted Burke's formulation and ignored its contextual basis and polemical bias. Burke ingeniously combined two notions which, for analytical purposes, should be kept distinct. In effect, he combined a conception of the *focus* of representation with a conception of the *style* of representation. Parliament, Burke said in a famous passage,[4]

> is not a *congress* of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a *deliberative* assembly of *one* nation, with *one* interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.

The sentence indicates that Burke postulated two possible foci of representation: local, necessarily hostile interests, on the one hand; and a national interest, on the other hand. He rejected the former as an improper and advocated the latter as the proper focus of the representative's role. But in doing so, he also linked these foci of representation with particular representational styles. If the legislature is concerned with only one interest, that of the whole, and not with compromise among diverse interests, it follows that the representative cannot and must not be bound by instructions, from whatever source, but must be guided by what Burke called "his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience." Moreover, Burke buttressed his argument by emphasizing the deliberative function of the legislature—presumably in contrast to its representational function. Yet if one rejects his notion of the legislature as only a deliberative body whose representational focus is the whole rather than its constituent parts, the logic of Burke's formulation is no longer necessary or relevant.

Today, many "publics" constitute significant foci of orientation for the representative as he approaches his legislative task. Under the conditions of a plural political and social order, these foci of representation may be other than geographical interests, be they electoral districts or the larger commonwealth. The modern representative faces similar choices concerning the style of his representational role not only *vis-à-vis* his constituency or state and nation, but *vis-à-vis* other clienteles, notably political parties, pressure groups and administrative agencies. From an analytical point of view—though not, of course, from an empirical standpoint—the style of the representative's role is neutral as far as these different foci of representation are concerned. Regardless of his focus of representation—a geographical unit, a party, a pressure group, or an administrative organization—he is not committed to take either the role of free agent, following his own convictions, or the role of delegate, bound by instructions. In other words, Burke's linkage of a particular areal focus of representation with a particular representational style constitutes only a special case in a generic series of empirically viable relationships between possible and different foci of representation and appropriate styles of representation.

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[4] In his "Speech to the Electors of Bristol" (1774), *Works*, Vol. II, p. 12.

Of course, different foci of representation need not be mutually exlusive. They may occur simultaneously, and appropriate role orientations may be held simultaneously. For instance, a party may be so strong in a district that, in the representative's mind, the interests of district and party are identical. Or a pressure group may have such pervasive influence—as, for example, the Farm Bureau in a predominantly agricultural constituency, or the AFL-CIO in a predominantly working class district—that, again, the interests of district and pressure group become identified. Moreover, it is possible that different focal role orientations are activated *seriatim* as circumstances require. In particular, one may assume that on matters of no relevance to the representative's district, roles oriented towards party or lobby as foci of representation may serve as major premises of choice.

The generic extension of Burke's special case, broken down into analytic components, suggests that the focal and stylistic dimensions of representation must be kept separate in empirical research. Burke combined them for polemical reasons: he was writing in opposition to the idea of mandatory representation which had much popular support in the middle of the eighteenth century.[5] The result of this polemical commitment was that the problem of *how* the representative should behave *vis-à-vis* his clienteles became a substantive problem—*what* he should do for the clienteles. But the fact that a representative sees himself as reaching a decision by following his own convictions or judgment does not mean that the content of his decisions is necessarily oriented towards a general rather than a particular interest, just as his acceptance of instructions from a clientele group does not necessarily mean that he is oriented towards a special rather than the public interest. A representative may base his decisions on his own conscience or judgment, but the cause he promotes may be parochial. Or he may follow instructions, but the mandate may be directed towards the realization of the general welfare.

The distinction between the focal and stylistic dimensions of the representative's role allows us to suggest that representation is not concerned with what decisions should be made, but with how decisions are to be made. Now, it is axiomatic that decisions made in institutional contexts, such as legislatures provide, are made in terms of a set of premises which guide the behavior of decision-makers. The notion—explicit in Burke and other traditional formulations—that legislative decisions can be purely rational is not tenable in view of the fact that rationality, while not altogether absent, is invariably bounded by the legislature's institutional environment.[6] One of these boundaries is the representational fabric of the legislature. The representative system provides the representative with some of the assumptions in terms of which he defines his role. The roles he takes, in turn, whether in the focal or stylistic dimensions of representation, provide the premises for decision.

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[5] *Cf.* Samuel H. Beer, "The Representation of Interests in British Government," this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (Sept. 1957), p. 613, who points out how little general legislation was proposed or enacted in those days.

Premises underlying decisions made by legislatures, then, may be of two kinds: (1) they may be premises relevant to the focus of representation; and (2) they may be relevant to the style of representation. With regard to the first kind, for instance, a representative may be guided by premises such as that legislation should benefit either his district or the state, that it should be "liberal" or "conservative," that it should or should not favor special interests, that it should or should not be in performance of his party's campaign pledges, and so on. With regard to the second kind of premises, the representative's choices may be circumscribed by his stylistic role orientation, whether he sees himself following his own conscience or instructions. In this dimension the premises involved in his decisional behavior refer not to the focus but to the style of his role as representative.

III

The issue of styles of representation—free agency versus mandate—has been confounded by the fact that the enabling source of a representative's power is the electorate of a geographical district. Representation of geographical areas introduces a certain amount of ambiguity into the relationship between representative and represented which is likely to be absent under schemes of proportional or vocational representation.[7] Part of this ambiguity is the widely held expectation, contested by Burke but shared by many citizens and politicians alike, that the representative is a spokesman of the presumed "interests" of the area from which he has been elected. Of course, implicit in this expectation is the assumption that a geographical unit has interests which are distinct and different from those of other units, and which should be represented in public decision-making. This assumption has been challenged on a variety of grounds: that the geographical area as such, as an electoral unit, is artificial; that it cannot and does not generate interests shared by its residents; that it has no unique interests; and so on. Schemes of proportional or vocational representation have been advanced to make possible the representatation of allegedly more "natural" interest groupings, such as minority groups, skill groups or economic groups.[8]

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[6] For the conception of "bounded rationality" as well as the notion that roles constitute some of the premises of decision-making behavior, we are indebted to Herbert A. Simon's writings, notably *Models of Man* (New York, 1957). Our own formulations of the concept of role are developed in John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, *Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research* (Glencoe, 1959).

[7] For a perspicacious discussion of ambiguities in representation, see Harold F. Gosnell, *Democracy—The Threshold of Freedom* (New York, 1948), pp. 124–42.

The assumption that geographical districts have particular characteristics—such as population attributes and industrial, agricultural or commercial properties—and, hence, unique interests which are, or ought to be, factors influencing the direction of public decisions continues to be shared not only by voters, politicians and others involved in policy-making, but also by scientific students of the political process. It underlies many studies which seek to relate legislative roll-call votes to the socio-economic characteristics of electoral districts,[9] as well as those studies which analyze the socio-economic composition of legislatures.[10]

It is a further assumption of these studies that legislators, having lived in their districts for all or substantial parts of their lives, share the values, beliefs, habits and concerns of the people who elected them and whom they presumably represent. Indeed, a literal interpretation of "represent" is to make something present that is not actually present. But this interpretation is most tenuous under modern conditions. Electoral districts tend to be so heterogeneous in population attributes, so pluralistic in the character of their group life, so diverse in the kinds of values and beliefs held, that whatever measures of central tendency are used to classify a district are more likely to conceal than to reveal its real character. The notion that elections are held as a method to discover persons whose attributes and attitudes mirror those most widely shared by people in their district appears to be of dubious validity.

This does not mean, of course, that the geographical district is dysfunctional from the point of view of maintaining the political system. The very circumstance of heterogeneity in the district tends to free the representative from being readily bound by a mandate, to make for discretion and political responsibility, and to enable him to integrate conflicting demands. The function of representation in modern political systems is not to make the legislature a mathematically exact copy of the electorate.

But the difficulty of finding an identity between representative and represented does not also mean that a representative's point of reference in making decisions cannot be his district. It may or may not be, and whether it is or not is a matter of empirical inquiry. We merely doubt that what orients a representative towards his district rather than some other focus of attention is the similarity between his district's characteristics and his own. We cannot assume, therefore, that even if a representative incorporates in himself the characteristics of his district—which, for argument's sake, may be admitted when he comes from a relatively homogeneous area—he will be more oriented towards the district than a representative who, from the point of view of district characteristics, is a deviant. In fact, the latter may be more concerned with his district and seek to discover its "interests," if they are discoverable, than the former. And if a district interest, so-called, can be specifically singled out, it is more likely to be the interest of a politically salient group in the district than of the district as an undifferentiated entity.

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[8] Most theories of functional or proportional representation are motivated or supported by tacit and untested assumptions about the relationship of legislators' behavior to the process by which they are selected. This is merely a special case of the general democratic assumption that political responsibility is the mechanism *par excellence* for bringing legislators' actions in line with the expectations of the represented.

[9] See, for instance, Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore, 1951); or Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley, 1958).

[10] See, for instance, Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (Garden City, 1954); or Charles S. Hyneman, "Who Makes Our Laws?" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 55 (December, 1940), pp. 556–81.

In so far as the district rather than some other unit, such as the entire commonwealth, is at the representative's focus of attention, it is more likely to be a function of political than of demographic or socio-economic variables. The problem is one of discovering under what conditions the representative can afford to disregard the district and still hope to maintain the confidence of his constituents. We might speculate, for instance, that in so far as he cherishes the position of power he holds, he is unlikely to ignore his district. We should expect, therefore, that representatives from districts where competition between the parties is keen are more district-oriented than representatives from one-party districts. Yet, we also know that competitive districts are more likely to be found in the heterogeneous metropolitan areas where district "interests" are difficult to ascertain.[11] In other words, what tends to orient the representative towards his district is likely to be the mechanism of political responsibility effectuated by political competition. District-oriented representatives from metropolitan areas where party competition is strong are, therefore, likely to rely on their own judgment, for a mandate must yield here to discretion to satisfy the demands of political responsibility. Discretion, of course, does not mean that the representative is wholly free to act as he pleases. On the contrary, it means that he will have due regard for all the considerations relevant in the making of legislative decisions. And among these considerations, certainly, the "interests" of his electorate or segments of the electorate, as well as his own estimate of the limits which these interests set to his actions, are important. As Burke admitted,

> it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion high respect, their business unremitted attention. . . .

Though analytically the foci and the style of the representative's role are distinct, they can be expected to be related empirically in a system of mutually interpenetrating orientations. In other words, just as we need not assume that a commitment to district invariably involves the representative's following instructions from his district (the role orientation of Delegate), or that a commonweal-oriented representative is invariably a free agent (the role orientation of Trustee), so also we need not assume that the foci of a representative's role are invariably unrelated to his representational style. In fact, it is the functionally related network of roles which makes for a representational *system.* We can assume, for instance, that a representative who is highly sensitive to the conflict of pressure groups, but not committed to any one, is more likely to be a Trustee in his representational role than the representative who feels close to a particular group and, consequently, is more likely to be a Delegate. Similarly, we might expect that a representative not strongly attached to a party, but not independent of it, is likely to shift between his own judgment and instructions (the role orientation of Politico).

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[11] See Heinz Eulau, "The Ecological Basis of Party Systems: The Case of Ohio," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 1 (August, 1957), pp. 125–35.

IV

An opportunity to test the validity of the theoretical distinction here made, between the focus and style of representation, as well as of the representative's role, was afforded in connection with a comparative research project undertaken by the authors during the 1957 sessions of the state legislatures in California, New Jersey, Ohio and Tennessee.[12] State legislators in these four states were asked the following question, among others: "How would you describe the job of being a legislator—what are the most important things you should do here?" Of the 474 respondents, 295 gave answers relevant to the stylistic dimension of the representative's role, and 197 of these gave additional answers referring to the areal focus of their role.[13]

Responses concerning the stylistic dimension yielded three major representational role types: Trustee, Delegate, and Politico.[14] These types may be described as follows:

1. *Trustee:* This role finds expression in two major conceptions which may occur separately or jointly. First, a moralistic interpretation: the representative is a free agent, he follows what he considers right or just—his convictions or principles, the dictates of his conscience. Second, a rational conception: he follows his own judgments based on an assessment of the facts in each case, his understanding of the problems involved, his thoughtful appraisal of the sides at issue.

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[12] The samples for the four legislatures are 91 per cent in Tennessee, 94 per cent in California and Ohio, and 100 per cent in New Jersey. The four states composing the total sample represent different regions of the country, different ratios of metropolitan and non-metropolitan population, and different degrees of party competition. The interviews, using fixed schedules, uniform in all four states and including both open-ended, focussed-type questions as well as closed, or fixed-answer type questions, averaged about two hours.

[13] The reduction in the number of respondents from the total samples is, of course, due to the open-endedness of the question. Hence not all respondents could be used in the construction of the role types as they emerged from representatives' own definitions, and in the analysis.

[14] In constructing stylistic and areal-focal role orientation types, the responses to the question were coded in terms of (a) characterization of job; (b) objectives of job; and (c) criteria of decision. Each total answer was broken up into individual statements and coded in terms of manifest content rather than latent meanings, though meaning was taken into consideration in locating manifest statements. Role orientation types were constructed by combining relevant manifest statements which seemed to make for a major orientational dimension. In general, data concerning criteria of decision yielded the stylistic orientation, and data concerning the objectives of the job yielded the areal orientation.

The orientation of Trustee derives not only from a purely normative definition, but is often grounded in conditions which make it functionally necessary. The represented may not have the information to give intelligent instructions; the representative is unable to discover what his clienteles want; preferences remain unexpressed; there is no need for instructions because of a presumed harmony of interests between representative and represented—all of these circumstances may be cited as sources of the role orientation of Trustee.

2. *Delegate:* Just as the Trustee is by no means an empirically pure type, the orientation of Delegate allows for a number of conceptions. All Delegates are, of course, agreed that they should *not* use their independent judgment or convictions as criteria of decision-making. But this does not mean that they feel equally committed to follow instructions, from whatever clientele. Some merely speak of consulting their constituents, though implying that such consultation will have a mandatory effect on their behavior. Others frankly acknowledge their direct dependence on instructions and accept them as a necessary or desirable premise for their decisions. Some may even follow instructions counter to their own judgment or principles. In other words, the possibility of conflict in role orientations is clearly envisaged and resolved in favor of subordinating one's independence to what is considered a superior authority.

3. *Politico:* The classical dichotomization of the concept of representation in terms of free agency and mandate was unlikely to exhaust the possibilities of representational styles. Depending on circumstances, a representative may hold the Trustee orientation at one time, and the Delegate orientation at another time. Or he might seek to reconcile both in terms of a third. One can think of representation as a continuum, with the Trustee and Delegate orientations as poles, and a midpoint where the orientations tend to overlap and, within a range, give rise to a third role. Within this middle range the roles may be taken simultaneously, possibly making for conflict, or they may be taken serially, one after another as conditions call for.

Because the data do not permit sharp discrimination between the two possibilities, we shall speak of representatives who express both orientations, either simultaneously or serially, as Politicos. In general, then, the Politico as a representational role type differs from both the Trustee and the Delegate in that he is more sensitive to conflicting alternatives in role assumption, more flexible in the way he resolves the conflict of alternatives, and less dogmatic in his representational style as it is relevant to his decision-making behavior.

The spell of the Burkean formulation on the interpretation of representation tended to create reactions which, it seems, are almost as arbitrary as Burke's formula itself. In particular, the functional notion, itself quite realistic under modern conditions, that the legislature is an agency for the coordination and integration of diverse social, economic and political interests makes apparent the simple-mindedness of Burke's theory, now as then. Carl J. Friedrich, for instance, has pointed out that "the pious formula that representatives are not bound by mandate, that they are subject only to their conscience and are supposed to serve the common weal, which is repeated in so many European constitutions, while significant as a norm, may lead to differentiating as well as to integrating results."[15] Yet, in concentrating on the multiplicity of potential representational foci, Friedrich went too far in his rejection of Burke. For, once the distinction is made between the style of the representative's role and its focus, Burke's "pious formula" is still relevant. Both the focus and the style are likely to be influenced by the character of politics at a given time and by the demands of contemporary political circumstances on the representative as a decision-maker. Functional analysis cannot limit itself to the foci of representation alone, but must also pay attention to those political requirements which may be relevant to the representative's style.

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[15] *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston, rev. ed., 1950), p. 297.

Our hypothesis may be stated as follows: the exigencies of modern government, even on the relatively low level of state government, are exceedingly complex. Taxation and finance, education and public welfare, legal reform, licensing and regulatory problems, transportation, and so on, are topics more often than not, beyond the comprehension of the average citizen. Unable to understand their problems and helpless to cope with them, people are likely to entrust the affairs of government to the elected representatives who, presumably, are better informed than their constituents. People may pay lip service to the notion that a representative should *not* use his independent judgment,[16] but in fact they are unable, or do not care, to give him instructions as may once have been possible when the tasks of government were comparatively simpler. It is likely, therefore, that the representative has become less and less a Delegate and more and more a Trustee as the business of government has become more and more intricate and technical. Rather than being a "pious formula," the role orientation of Trustee may be a functional necessity, and one should expect it to be held by state legislators more frequently than that of Politico, and the latter more frequently than that of Delegate.

TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS IN FOUR STATES

Representational Role Orientation	Calif. (N=49)	N.J. (N=54)	Ohio (N=114)	Tenn. (N=78)	Total (N=295)
Trustee	55%	61%	56%	81%	63%
Politico	25	22	29	13	23
Delegate	20	17	15	6	14
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

A test of this general proposition is possible by way of comparative analysis of the distribution of representational role styles in the four states. As Table I indicates the role orientation of Trustee is held by a greater number of legislators than that of either Politico or Delegate. In all four states it appears more frequently, and significantly more frequently, than the other two. Moreover, the Politico appears somewhat more frequently in all states than the Delegate.

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[16] In the years before the second World War, public opinion polls several times sampled expectations in this regard. Relevant poll questions were: (1) Do you believe that a Congressman should vote on any question as the majority of his constituents desire or vote according to his own judgment? (2) Should members of Congress vote according to their own best judgment or according to the way the people in their district feel? (3) In cases when a Congressman's opinion is different from that of the majority of the people in his district, do you think he should usually vote according to his own best judgment, or according to the way the majority of his district feels? In three of four polls, 61, 63 and 66 per cent, respectively, of the respondents said the Congressman should vote the way people feel. In the fourth poll, only 37 per cent gave this answer. See Hadley Cantril, ed., *Public Opinion, 1935–1946* (Princeton, 1951), p. 133.

The Trustee orientation appears significantly more frequently in Tennessee than in the other three states, a fact that seems to contradict the proposition that the orientation of Trustee varies with the complexity of governmental affairs. As Tennessee is less urbanized and industrialized than the other states, one should expect Tennessee legislators to be less often Trustees and more often Delegates than legislators in California, New Jersey or Ohio. But it may also be that "complexity" is a function of perceptions, regardless of the real situation. If so, then to Tennesseans the relatively less complex character of socio-economic life may appear more complex than it actually is, compared with the other states. The more frequent appearance of the Trustee orientation there may only be symptomatic of an even greater feeling of helplessness and inefficacy on the part of people *vis-à-vis* governmental problems, as it is perceived by state representatives. Such perceptions may be a reflection of the lower educational level in Tennessee; but to demonstrate this is beyond the limits of this analysis.[17]

V

If, as suggested earlier, a representative's areal-focal orientation does not automatically derive from ascertainable district interests or from personal characteristics he may share with his constituents, the question arises where such orientations do come from, and how they intrude on the representative's conception of his role. For the purposes of this study, it was possible to delineate three areal-focal orientations which may be described as follows:

1. *District-orientation:* District-oriented representatives had essentially two alternatives: either they could simply mention their districts or counties as being relevant in their conception of their jobs, or they could explicitly place their districts as being above the state as an important factor in their legislative behavior. Among the former, the most frequent responses suggested that it is the representative's job to take care of his district's needs and pass legislation which will benefit his district or county. Others emphasized the policy problems involved in legislation and the necessity to protect what they considered district interests from the policy point of view. Or the emphasis was on the services which these representatives think they are expected to render for their district. Another group of district-oriented representatives specifically pointed to the importance of placing the interests of their district above those of the state, though they usually admitted that state concerns should also be given consideration.

2. *State-orientation:* As in the case of the district-oriented respondents, state-oriented representatives may either mention the state alone as the salient focus, or they may also mention the district, but clearly tend to place state above district. Some emphasized the

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[17] As the Trustee orientation includes responses stressing traditional moral values, it might be assumed that these virtues—such as following one's conscience or what one feels to be "right"—are more valued in rural Tennessee than in the three more urbanized states. But inspection of the frequency with which this attitude appears in Tennessee as against the other states does not reveal significantly different distributions of relevant responses: California—18%; New Jersey—8%; Ohio—28%; and Tennessee—23%.

need of state policy or state programs as an overriding consideration. A second group pointed to both state and district as relevant foci, but tended to give the benefit of doubt to the state. Finally, some state-oriented representatives explicitly emphasized the desirability of overcoming parochial considerations in favor of the state.

3. *District-and-state-orientation:* A third major group of respondents who spontaneously concerned themselves with the areal focus of their role mentioned both district and state, but, apparently, did not envisage a possibility of conflict and thought that they could attend to both foci without undue difficulty. Yet, the generality of the responses given in this connection may be deceptive, and coding them under this rubric may have been somewhat arbitrary in a number of cases. Though the actual language used tended in the direction of the state as the focus of role orientation, the tone often appeared to be more indicative of a latent district orientation. One should expect these hyphenated representatives to resemble district- more than state-oriented representatives.

Areal role orientations may be assumed to be a function of the dynamics of the democratic political system with its emphasis on the responsibility of the representatives to the represented. Political responsibility—a set of relationships in which the elected are sensitive to the power of the electors over them, and in which the elected are aware of the sanctions which make responsibility a reality—is predicated on the existence of a competitive political system where constituents have a genuine choice, *i.e.*, where the representatives are periodically confronted with the real possibility of removal from office. The sanction of removal inherent in a competitive party system serves to focus representatives' attention on their district rather than the state as the crucial point of reference. Representatives from competitive areas are more likely to be district-oriented than representatives from one-party areas, while representatives from one-party areas are more likely to be state-oriented than those from competitive areas.

An initial, though crude, test of this hypothesis is possible by examining the distribution of areal role orientations in the four states. Tennessee representatives might be expected to be less district-oriented than representatives in the other states, in view of the predominant one-party character of Tennessee politics. As Table II indicates, the data support this hypothesis. Though the percentage differences are small and statistically not significant, except in the California-Tennessee contrast, only 21 per cent of the Tennessee representatives are district-oriented as against 35 per cent in California, 27 per cent in New Jersey, and 28 per cent in Ohio. But the most noticeable aspect of Table

TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF AREAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS IN FOUR STATES

Areal Role Orientation	Calif. (N=113)	N.J. (N=79)	Ohio (N=162)	Tenn. (N=120)	Total (N=474)
District	35%	27%	28%	21%	27%
District-and-State	14	28	25	8	19
State	20	14	16	9	15
No mention	31	31	31	62	39
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

II is the fact that Tennessee representatives in significantly greater proportion failed to express themselves spontaneously in this connection. Why this is so can, at this point, be only a matter of speculation. Tennessee representatives may take whatever areal foci they have so much for granted that they feel no need to mention them, or they may simply be less articulate than representatives elsewhere. Finally, while there is a somewhat sharper differentiation between district and state role orientations in California than in New Jersey and Ohio (where the combined category figures more prominently), relatively few representatives in all states mentioned the state alone as the focus of their areal orientation.

A more severe test of the hypothesis is possible by relating areal role orientations to the political character of representatives' home districts. Because party competition as an independent variable has no room for operation in predominantly one-party Tennessee,[18] Table III presents the combined data for California, New Jersey and Ohio alone.[19] As Table III shows, 53 per cent of the representatives from competitive districts were district-oriented, while only 33 per cent of those from one-party districts were so classified. On the other hand, one-party district representatives held in significantly greater proportion a state orientation than those from competitive districts.[20] The data support the hypothesis that areal orientation varies with the political character of the district in which representatives are elected.[21]

TABLE III. POLITICAL CHARACTER OF ELECTORAL DISTRICTS AND AREAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS IN THREE STATES*

Areal Role Orientation	Political Character of District		
	Competitive (N=72)	Semi-competitive (N=77)	One-party (N=96)
District	53%	48%	33%
District-and-State	28	34	33
State	19	18	34
Total	100%	100%	100%

* California, New Jersey and Ohio. "Non-respondents" on the areal dimension have been omitted.

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[18] Of the 46 Tennessee respondents who mentioned an areal orientation, only four came from competitive and five from semi-competitive districts.

[19] Competition in district was severally defined in the four states on the basis of past election returns. Space limitations prevent us from specifying the criteria here. They may be obtained from the authors.

[20] $\chi^2=9.238$ for the entire array, where d.f. $=4$, $p \geq .05$. If the middle categories are omitted and only competitive and one-party districts are compared with respect to state and district orientation alone, $\chi^2=7.12$; d.f. $=1$; $p<.01$.

[21] However, this finding may be spurious. It might be less a function of the political character of the district than of its ecological character. Competitive districts are, more

VI

The analytical distinction between the foci and the style of representation is helpful in dissecting the representative's role. Actual behavior is not a function of discrete role orientations, however, but of a system of such orientations. It is the network of interpenetrating roles which gives pattern and coherence to the representational process. It is essential, therefore, to relate areal and stylistic role orientations to each other in terms of significant hypotheses about conditions of their co-variation in the representational system.

It has been suggested earlier that, analytically, stylistic role orientations are neutral. What correlation may be found empirically, therefore, should depend on some crucial attribute in the independent variable—in this connection the areal role orientation. It may be suggested that this crucial attribute is the condition of effective political responsibility. In so far as they differ, district-oriented representatives are ultimately responsible to their constituents, while state-oriented representatives are not responsible to an equivalent state-wide constituency. The state-oriented representative cannot point to a state-wide clientele from which he could possibly receive a mandate.[22] Hence the hypothesis may be advanced that state-oriented representatives are more likely to be Trustees than district-oriented representatives, whereas the latter are more likely to be Delegates than the former. As Table IV demonstrates, this is in fact the case. While 84 per cent of the state-oriented representatives are Trustees, only 37 per cent of the district-oriented and 55 per cent of the district-and-state-oriented representatives are so. And while 36 per cent of the district-oriented representatives are Delegates, only 8 per cent of the district-and-state-oriented and none of the state-oriented hold a mandatory view of their representational role.

Moreover, Table IV supports some corollary hypotheses. In the first place, because a representative is district-oriented, he need not be a Delegate any more frequently than a Trustee. This simply means that though a representative may clearly have his district at his focus of attention, he may nevertheless act on behalf of the district, in his own conception, as a free agent. Such a representative will say that he knows and understands what the district needs

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often than not, located in metropolitan areas, while one-party districts are more frequent in non-metropolitan areas. It seemed advisable, therefore, to control the districts' political character by their ecological character. For this purpose, the districts were divided on the basis of the 1950 Census specifications. The hypothesis concerning the relationship between political character of district and areal orientation was clearly maintained in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan districts. However, while the pattern proved similar in both ecological categories, a greater proportion of district-and-state-oriented representatives appeared in the non-metropolitan than in the metropolitan areas, suggesting a pull towards greater dichotomization of areal orientations in the metropolitan environment. In view of the intimate connection in industrialized states between metropolitan and state-wide problems, this result is not surprising. It seems that the state is more salient as a focus of attention for representatives from metropolitan districts (no matter what their political character) than from non-metropolitan districts.

[22] He might, of course, receive instructions from a state-wide clientele such as a pressure group or political party, but these constitute other dimensions of his attention foci.

TABLE IV. AREAL-FOCAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS IN FOUR STATES*

Representational Role Orientation	District-oriented (N = 89)	State-District-oriented (N = 64)	State-oriented (N = 44)
Trustee	37%	55%	84%
Delegate	36	8	—
Politico	27	37	16
Total	100%	100%	100%

* χ^2 for the entire array = 37.759; d.f. = 4; $p < .001$.

and wants, and he rejects the notion that anybody in the district can tell him what to do. As Table IV shows, among the district-oriented representatives, almost equal proportions, 37 per cent and 36 per cent respectively, are Trustees and Delegates. On the other hand, state-oriented representatives are more likely to be Trustees than anything else. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the state-oriented representatives do not and cannot recognize a state-wide areal clientele which could give them instructions. As Table IV indicates, none of the state-oriented representatives is a Delegate, and only 16 per cent are Politicos.

Finally, if the representative's areal focus is both his district and the state, one should expect that he will take the role of Politico more frequently than either the district- or the state-oriented representative. For, because he stresses both foci, he is likely to be subject to cross-pressures: as a district-oriented representative he will take the role of Delegate at least as frequently as that of Trustee; as a state-oriented representative he will take the role of Trustee more frequently than any other. We should expect, therefore, that this representative will not only be a Politico more frequently than the other two areal-orientational types, but also that he will take the Trustee role more frequently than the Delegate role. Both hypotheses find support in the data reported in Table IV. While the differences are small, 37 per cent of the district-and-state-oriented representatives are Politicos, while only 16 per cent and 27 per cent of the other two groups admit to this representational style. Moreover, a majority are also Trustees, while only 8 per cent are Delegates—evidence of the differential effect of areal role orientations on the particular stylistic roles which seem most appropriate.

This analysis supports the notion that the areal-focal and stylistic dimensions of representation give rise to role orientations which, though analytically distinct, constitute a role system, and that this system gives the process of representation both its structure and its function.

PRIMARY GROUP INFLUENCE ON PARTY LOYALTY[1]

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Political science, like other fields of social inquiry, has had an enduring interest in questions of stability and change. This interest—until now principally expressed in studies of the rise and fall of institutions—has lately been focused increasingly upon individual and group behavior, in a search for the influences that hold men to their political beliefs and affiliations or cause them to shift about. Such influences are important not only for the study of voting and party membership, but for *haute politique* as well—for the great and dramatic questions surrounding political loyalty, conformity, deviation, apostasy, and other states of membership or disaffiliation. Although the research reported below concentrates on the former, it is our hope that it may also cast light upon the latter. It is concerned specifically with primary groups—those small, face-to-face, solidary, informal and enduring coteries that we commonly experience as family, friendship and occupational peer groups.

I. THE POLITICAL ROLE OF PRIMARY GROUPS

The belief that people who associate together come to think alike is now so thoroughly buttressed by research and daily observation that it has become a commonplace. Studies have also shown that the more intimately we relate to our associates, the greater the correspondence between their views and ours. Since we interact most frequently and familiarly with the members of our own primary groups, it is mainly in these groups that our social and political attitudes are anchored. An impressive body of data supports the claim, earlier advanced by social theorists like C. H. Cooley, that the primary group is an essential bridge between the individual and the "great society," serving to transmit, to mediate, to interpret, and, in the end, to sustain society's norms. Primary groups, it now seems plain, are among the principal "carriers" and repositories of cultural beliefs and values. They are instrumental in launching and supporting class, religious, and ethnic identifications, and are even thought to function as intermediaries between consumers and the mass media.[2]

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[1] The research reported in this article was made possible by a Faculty Research Fellowship granted to the senior author by the Social Science Research Council. The project was carried out through the Laboratory for Research in Social Relations, University of Minnesota, with financial assistance from the Graduate School Research Fund.

[2] *Cf.* Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York, 1909), especially chs. 3 and 4. For a review of current theories and research on the role of primary groups, see Edward Shils, "The Study of the Primary Group," in Daniel Lerner and Harold Lasswell, *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford, 1951), pp. 44–69; Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1955), chs. 2–5; also Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* (Evanston, Illinois, 1953), *passim.* Two valuable works dealing with small group influence on the formation of political attitudes have become available since this manuscript was prepared: Herbert H. Hyman, *Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959); and Sidney Verba,

Almost every major voting study furnishes additional proof that primary groups are essential links in the complex process by which political norms are indoctrinated and party preferences implanted.[3] They find, for example, that members of the same primary groups characteristically vote alike, think alike on issues, and affiliate with the same party; that voters in doubt about whom to vote for usually resolve their indecision by embracing the political preferences of their friends; that approximately three out of four young people vote as their parents do; and that the more uniform a group's political outlook the firmer the voting intentions of its members. Homogeneity of opinion among primary group members also affects voting turnout and the level of political curiosity. People who disagree with their families or friends about politics are less apt to vote and less likely to develop or to retain an interest in politics.[4] But primary groups may help to reinforce habits of participation and interest as well as to inhibit them. Patterns of participation, as one study concluded, are "contagious"—likely to be active when voters belong to politically aware groups and apathetic when they belong to politically indifferent ones.[5]

II. THEORY OF PRIMARY GROUP INFLUENCE

The singular influence exerted by primary groups on the behavior of their members arises from a number of attributes that distinguish them from other types of groups.[6] Compared with larger and more impersonal associations whose

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The Experimental Study of Politics: The Contribution of Small Group Experiments in Leadership to the Understanding of Political Leadership, unpublished dissertation, (Princeton University, 1959).

[3] *Cf.* Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and Wm. N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954), pp. 88–9, 92–3, 96–7, 120–2; P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1948) ch. 15; Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Illinois, 1954), pp. 199–206; R. S. Milne and H. C. Mackenzie, *Straight Fight* (London, 1954), pp. 44–5, 123–5; Eleanor Maccoby, Richard E. Matthews, and Anton S. Morton, "Youth and Political Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 18 (Spring, 1954), pp. 23–9; Alice S. Kitt and David B. Gleicher, "Determinants of Voting Behavior," *ibid.*, Vol. 14 (Fall, 1950), pp. 393–412; Mark Benney and Phyllis Geiss, "Social Class and Politics in Greenwich," *Brit. J. of Sociology*, Vol. 1 (1950), pp. 324–7; Kenneth Helfant, "Parents' Attitudes vs. Adolescent Hostility, in the Determination of Adolescents' Sociopolitical Attitudes," *Psychological Monographs*, Vol. 66 (1952).

[4] Kitt and Gleicher, *op. cit.*, pp. 401–2; Berelson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 120–2; on the effects of "cross-pressures" of various types on the decision to vote, see Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–64. However, in their study of the 1952 election, *op. cit.*, pp. 202–3, Campbell *et al.* found no connection between level of participation and membership in groups of "divided political loyalty."

[5] Lazarsfeld, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 142; Campbell *et al*, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

[6] For a review of theories concerning the psychology of small group influence, see Henry W. Riecken and George C. Homans, "Psychological Aspects of Social Structure" in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954), Vol. II, pp. 786–832; Daniel Katz, "Social Psychology and Group Processes," *Annual Review of Psychology* (1951), Vol. 2, pp. 137–172; C. I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis and H. H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion* (New Haven, 1953), ch. 5. An important attempt to elaborate and to apply a theory of group structure and influence has been made

direct impact is only occasionally or sporadically felt, the members of a primary group enjoy unparalleled opportunities to make their attitudes known, to check, modify, or correct each other's views, and to bring dissenters into line. Their power is further augmented by their extraordinary capacity for rewarding conformity and punishing deviation, and, what is equally important, for doing so immediately, directly, and tangibly. Other associations, in contrast, must rely upon "reinforcements" that are often more distant in time, more dimly perceived, more ambiguous, and likely, therefore (as numerous experiments in the psychology of learning make plain), to be far less effective. Then, too, primary groups enlarge their influence through being able to dispense (or withhold) rewards that are specially valued by their members: more than any other social institution, they have the faculty to satisfy fundamental needs for affection, acceptance, approval, and self-definition, for the grounding of values, and for the resolution of conflicting standards of conduct.[7] Should the use of rewards fail, a primary group may, and often does, win obedience by rejecting or threatening to ostracize the deviants—measures with a potency that increases in proportion as the latter esteem the group or find no alternative groups to turn to.[8]

Primary groups have also been found to play an important part in defining the "social reality" we experience, which means that they not only "structure" certain of the ways in which we perceive the world—itself a powerful source of influence upon us—but that they also furnish us with many of our standards and with an image of ourselves in relation to these standards.[9] Since their portrait of us is obviously important for our happiness, it is not surprising that we usually try to behave as they would like us to. Yielding to a primary group and to its power to define social reality may also help us gain confidence in many of our beliefs. In fact, one reason we fraternize with like-minded people is to reas-

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by Leon Festinger, Stanley Schachter, and Kurt Back, *Social Pressures in Informal Groups* (New York, 1950), ch. 9; also by George C. Homans, *The Human Group* (New York, 1950). For summaries of small group theory as it applies more immediately to the research problem considered below, see Henry W. Riecken, "Primary Groups and Political Party Choice," in E. Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck, *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959), ch. 8; and Katz and Lazarsfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–115.

[7] See E. A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (1948), pp. 280–315; also T. M. Newcomb's study of the Bennington College community in *Personality and Social Change* (New York, 1943), and W. F. Whyte's *Street Corner Society* (Chicago, 1943).

[8] For experimental data bearing on these tendencies, see Stanley Schachter, "Deviation, Rejection, and Communication," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* (1951) 46, pp. 196–207; Kurt Back, "Influence through Social Communication," *Ibid.*, pp. 9–23; H. H. Kelley and E. H. Volkhart, "The Resistance to Change of Group Anchored Attitudes," *American Sociological Review* (1952) Vol. 17, pp. 453–465; L. Festinger and John Thibaut, "Interpersonal Communication in Small Groups," reprinted in G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley, *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, 1952), pp. 125–134. For evidence that group influence may be exercised even in the absence of cohesiveness, see the landmark experiments by S. E. Asch and M. Sherif, brief descriptions of which are available, *ibid*, pp. 2–11, and 249–262.

[9] Festinger, Schachter, and Back, *op. cit.*, pp. 168–176; Katz and Lazarsfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–6.

sure ourselves of the wisdom and probity of our opinions.[10] Through the "feedback" mechanisms of congenial primary alliances we frequently manage to soften the conflict between our opinion preferences on the one side and the empirical realities that crowd in upon us on the other. These alliances also furnish the social support we need to face and to discount the possibility that other people may consider our opinions false, foolish, or even base. The effect of these ministrations is, of course, to increase our dependency upon them and to permit them to impinge even more strongly upon our attitudes.

Some of the pressure for uniformity exerted by primary groups is unintentional, a mere incident of the tendency for people who associate together to arrive at common opinions, especially about subjects that are inherently ambiguous.[11] But much of their influence is deliberate, the result of the group's efforts to realize its goals and to survive. Since the governing of primary groups depends so heavily upon voluntary and informal incentives, they may require a greater measure of agreement than other associations. In a small, face-to-face group, differences of outlook stand out sharply, looming especially large in proportion to the size and intimacy of the group. Disagreements are, furthermore, difficult to confine: the ready accessibility of members to each other heightens the danger that any differences among them may spread to the entire group and divide it severely.

Partly to avoid such catastrophes, the members of small groups quickly set about to resolve disagreements that arise among them. Research has shown, for example, that when disagreements are first discovered, a disproportionate number of comments are addressed to the dissenters in the hope of persuading them to modify their opinions and to restore the group's equilibrium.[12] In general, the intensity of the effort to impose uniformity will depend on the felt relevance of the disputed opinions to the group's activities or goals. The presence of dissension not only interferes with the fulfillment of the group's purposes but also weakens its confidence in its own opinions and hence in its own viability. Finally, primary groups set about to achieve unanimity not merely for the instrumental reasons cited, but for the simple reason that their members have learned to understand things in a certain way and find it puzzling and discomfiting to confront alternative ways of seeing them.[13]

III. HYPOTHESES AND PROCEDURES

We were concerned in the present study not merely to verify anew the connection between group membership and political orientation but to explore the role which primary groups play in strengthening or weakening party loyalty—in the contribution they make to life-long patterns of political support at the one extreme or to political apathy, vacillation, or defection at the other. We began our inquiry with a number of assumptions, *e.g.*, that political preference is rooted in primary group memberships, changing as they change; that the parental family ("family of orientation") functions to sustain as well as to initiate the political affiliations of its offspring; and that other primary groups, such as peers and the "family of procreation" (spouse and children), serve mainly as secondary or reinforcing agents to bolster or undermine the political predisposition implanted by the family of orientation.

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[10] The theoretical statement and summary of research bearing on these processes is set forth most thoroughly by Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, 1957).

[11] See Sherif, *loc. cit.*

[12] Festinger and Thibaut, *loc. cit.;* Schachter, *loc. cit.*

[13] Katz and Lazarsfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

The ability of the parental family to stabilize the party affiliations of any of its members would depend most critically, we thought, on the following considerations: (1) the strength of the family's initial political indoctrination; (2) the degree of unity with which its remaining members support its original preferences; (3) the extent to which the family continues to offer opportunities for affection and solidarity ("cohesiveness"); (4) the physical availability of the members to each other ("physical distance"); (5) the degree of exposure to certain "life style" influences (occupation, class, education, religion, etc.) that reinforce or counteract the family's initial preferences; and (6) the degree of correspondence between the political views of one's parental family and one's newer primary group alliances (*e.g.*, friendship and occupational groups and family of procreation).

We anticipated that instability or shifts in party preference would most frequently occur (1) when the parental family has little interest in politics; (2) when one belongs to or enters primary groups with conflicting political norms; (3) when the groups that gave life to the original norms themselves change, experience conflict, or cease for whatever reason to reinforce their earlier views; and, (4) closely related to this, when a voter has become estranged or physically cut off from the groups in which his political outlooks have been anchored.

Systematic inquiry into these and related matters was undertaken in 1953–54 through a field project based on directed, two-hour interviews (conducted by professional interviewers) with a sample of 215 adults in the Twin City area of Minnesota. Since only a minority of voters reject their parents party preferences, special procedures were employed to muster a sample of political "changers" large enough to be statistically useful. Essentially, we proceeded by first drawing a random, cross-section sample of the general population, and by then selecting our final sample from this pool, stratifying it purposely in such a way as to overrepresent the number of voters who favor a different party from their parents.

All respondents were presented with the same interview schedule and, wherever possible, were asked identical questions. The interview inquired in detail into the past and present life of the individual members of the respondent's family, friendship, and occupational groups, their social and intellectual background, their political habits and preferences, etc. A special effort was made to collect all vital information on the respondent's voting history and political attachments. From the copious data yielded by these questions we then constructed indexes for each of the variables that interested us, assigning index scores to each respondent according to the information elicited. Since we were compelled to rely heavily upon recall data—a risky procedure at best—we preferred to ask as many detailed, factual questions as possible, approaching the same core of information from several directions and combining each individual's answers into appropriate index scores. In this way we hoped to catch inconsistencies and to offset somewhat the failures and distortions of memory that time and prejudice are bound to introduce.[14]

More than a dozen indexes were worked out to assess such key variables as: respondent's party stability, modal political orientation of his parental family, "social distance" between respondent's "life style" and that of his parental family, degree of family cohesion or solidarity, reinforcement by friendship groups and spouse, and so on. The elements from which these measures were fashioned will be set forth as we present the findings concerning them.

IV. RESULTS: THE INFLUENCE OF FAMILY INDOCTRINATION

The observation that three out of four voters adopt the party attitudes of their parents merely begins the analysis of family influence on political preference. Not all voters, for example, maintain their affiliations with equal firmness. Some cling tenaciously to the same party, supporting its candidates regularly and without regard for their individual merit. A smaller number at the other extreme identify with a party but vote only intermittently for its candidates. Here we have called the former "stable" voters and the latter "unstable" voters. A third class of voters, who are less consistent than the "Stables" but more consistent than the "Unstables," have been labelled "moderately stable" voters (or "Moderates").[15]

Whether a voter shifts or remains firm in his party support may depend on a number of political factors, including changes in social conditions and the impact of individual candidates and issues. The influence of these factors is, however, severely circumscribed by a voter's readiness to receive them. Many voters are so unfaltering in their conviction and so deaf to the opposition's appeals that no practical way can be found to disengage them from their habitual attachments; others are held so loosely to a party that any of a number of influences (a dramatic issue, an unfamiliar candidate, a compelling slogan, an alarming rumor, an unfavorable ethnic background, etc.) may be sufficient at the moment to dislodge them.[16] A voter's susceptibility to defection would, we thought, greatly depend on how firmly his party affiliations have been anchored in his primary groups, especially his family. As Table I shows, voters who share their parents' political orientation are far more likely to be consistent in their party support than voters who have rejected parental preferences. Although the latter have renounced the family's political outlook, they are unable to rid themselves of its influence entirely, and have difficulty embracing a new political loyalty without wavering. Only 29 per cent of them become stable voters, compared with 53 per cent stable among voters who continue to support their parents' party.[17] Similarly, 43 per cent of the voters who disown the family's political loyalties are unstable in their adopted preferences, whereas among those who cling to the family party, few (only 16 per cent) turn out to be unstable.[18] Table I also suggests, for reasons we will later consider, that the Republican children of Democratic parents are, on the whole, slightly less stable than the Democratic children of Republican parents.

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[14] The interview schedule is too lengthy, and the manner of constructing the indexes too complex, to be described in detail in this paper. Information concerning them may be had upon request, however, through the Laboratory for Research in Social Relations, University of Minnesota.

[15] The classification of voters as *stable*, *moderate*, or *unstable* was determined from their responses concerning: present party preference, first vote, first presidential vote, presidential candidates supported in 1944, 1948, 1952, present preferences in congressional and state elections, self-description of voting habits and consistency of party support, etc.

[16] The effect of such factors on stability of preference was explored in an unpublished study by Herbert McClosky and Norris C. Ellerston, carried out through the Laboratory for Research in Social Relations. The degree to which voters responded to these factors was found to be determined largely by the stability of their party attachments.

TABLE I. STABILITY OF PREFERENCE, WHEN VOTERS AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE PARTY LOYALTIES OF THEIR PARENTS

Respondents are→	Republicans		Democrats		Total	
↓	Parents Were Republican	Parents Were Democratic	Parents Were Democratic	Parents Were Republican	Voter Supports Same Party as Parents	Voter Supports Different Party from Parents
	(%'s Down)		(%'s Down)		(%'s Down)	
Stable Voters	52.8	17.4	54.0	38.5	53.4	28.6
Moderate Voters	30.2	30.4	32.0	26.9	31.1	28.6
Unstable Voters	17.0	52.2	14.0	34.6	15.5	42.8
Sample Size*	53	23	50	26	103	49

* The sample sizes in this and the following tables vary somewhat. Some of the total sample of 215 voters have been excluded from one or another of our indexes or classifications owing to inappropriateness or lack of reliable information required by the particular index (*e.g.*, voting record, family political background, marriage status, etc.).

The present study proceeded on the hypothesis that the primary family not only launches but also helps to sustain the political loyalties of its offspring. Since many voters remain in communication with their families throughout their lifetimes, and since they are likely to have parallel life styles, the family's influence can be expected to endure far beyond the time of the original indoctrination. This expectation is in some measure borne out by the data presented in Table II. There we have grouped our respondents according to the initial and current affiliations of their families, taking into account the modal preferences of the entire family, siblings as well as parents. Those whose family members were predominantly Democratic when the respondent was "in his teens" and who remain primarily Democratic today were placed in the D-D category. Republicans in the parallel condition were classified under R-R; while voters whose political backgrounds varied over time in any way were placed in the "Conflicted" column.

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[17] Unless otherwise indicated, all differences discussed are statistically significant at, or beyond, the .05 level.

[18] Apparently these relationships are also somewhat affected by the *strength* of the family's indoctrination, the more strongly indoctrinated favoring the party of their parents more frequently and consistently than the weakly indocrinated. The differences are not large, however, and are only significant at the .07 level. Possibly our measure of "strength of family influence," resting as it does on retrospective reporting, is too insensitive to give full scope to this variable.

TABLE II. STABILITY OF VOTERS, ACCORDING TO THE CONSISTENCY OF PARTY LOYALTIES EXHIBITED BY THEIR PARENTAL FAMILIES, FROM THE TIME VOTERS WERE IN THEIR "TEENS" TO THE "PRESENT"

Respondent's Preference and Stability	N	Family Political Preference* R-R	D-D	Conflicted
			(%'s across)	
Stable Republicans	(32)	84.4	6.2	9.4
Moderate Republicans	(23)	60.9	13.0	26.1
Unstable Republicans	(21)	42.9	38.1	19.0
Unstable Democrats	(17)	23.5	35.3	41.2
Moderate Democrats	(26)	11.5	53.8	34.6
Stable Democrats	(37)	10.8	56.8	32.4

* R-R—Family preference has remained consistently Republican over the years.
D-D—Family preference has remained consistently Democratic over the years.
Conflicted—Family preference has varied or shifted over the years.

These percentage distributions show that a voter's party regularity is strongly affected by the consistency of his family's political preferences. Moving from the Stable Republicans at the one extreme to the Stable Democrats at the other, the frequency of respondents with an R-R pattern of family preference sharply declines, falling from 84 per cent to 11 per cent, while that of respondents with a D-D family background gradually increases, rising from 6 to 57 per cent. The more unstable the voter, in short, the greater the probability that his family has either shifted its past support from one party to the other or has consistently favored the opposition party. The data in the "Conflicted" column also suggest once again that stability among Democrats may be less dependent than Republican stability upon appropriate family influences.

Comparable inferences can be drawn from the data on family "reinforcement"—a term which has reference to the *strength* with which the family has, over the years, reinforced its initial political indoctrination.[19] As can be seen from Table III, party regularity is significantly affected by the strength of reinforcement a voter receives from his family. If his family has been united and steadfast in its support, exhibiting the characteristics of a dependable, homogeneous, and politically aware reference group, he is far more likely to turn out a stable voter than if any or all of these conditions are absent. On a six-point stability measure in which a high score of 6.0 signifies stable support for the parents' party and a low score of 1.0 represents stable support for the opposition party, the strongly reinforced voters have a mean stability score of 4.77 while the weakly reinforced have a score of 3.89. Examination of the distributions and percentages in Table III will show these relationships in greater detail.

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[19] The "index of family reinforcement," which was built to measure this variable, takes into account the initial and current party outlook of each family member, siblings

TABLE III. VOTER STABILITY AND STRENGTH OF FAMILY REINFORCEMENT (DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS COMBINED)

Respondents' Stability	Family Reinforcement		
	Strong	Moderate (%'s Down)	Weak
6 Stable Voters—Support Family Party	40.7	45.1	20.0
5 Moderate Voters— " " "	27.1	21.6	25.7
4 Unstable Voters— " " "	13.6	13.7	8.6
3 Unstable Voters—Reject Family Party	8.4	9.8	22.9
2 Moderate Voter— " " "	6.8	2.0	14.3
1 Stable Voter— " " "	3.4	7.8	8.6
Sample Size	59	51	35
Mean Stability Score	4.77	4.75	3.89

Findings from small group research also lead one to expect that reinforcement (and hence family influence) will be greater when its members like one another and are able to see each other often. A voter who is psychologically or physically cut off from his family should be less influenced than one who is frequently exposed to his family and hopes to win or keep its affection. To test this hypothesis a measure was developed for the purpose of classifying respondents into those who satisfy the conditions of high "solidarity" and low "physical distance" (the "favorable" condition) versus those who fail to meet either or both these requirements (the "unfavorable" condition).[20] Comparison of the two

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as well as parents. It includes the direction and intensity of the initial indoctrination and of all adult members of the family at present, all of which are scored in relation to the respondent's party preference. The "intensity" scores, in turn, take into account levels of political interest, frequency of political discussion with parents and siblings, strength of party attachment among the several family members, etc.

[20] The measure of "physical distance" took into account place of residence of each family member, the actual geographic distance between them, and the average number of times respondent saw each of them. The cohesiveness measure was comprised of a scale of items testifying to various aspects of family harmony and solidarity, which was principally developed, and generously made available to us, by Luther T. Jansen. See his

groups is presented in Table IV and shows that the hypothesis is strongly supported. Frequent exposure to one's primary family and affection for its members thus have a substantial impact on the nature and stability of party loyalties. Voters who become alienated or separated from their families tend either to renounce its initial political affiliations entirely or to retain them more tenuously. Among voters who share the family's political attachments, 58 per cent of those in the favorable condition, but only 32 per cent in the unfavorable condition, are stable party supporters.

Comparison of voters in the favorable and unfavorable conditions who have *discarded* their family preferences yields similar results, but, as our hypothesis would anticipate, in inverted form, *i.e.*, for such voters family propinquity and solidarity serve to weaken rather than to strengthen party regularity. Among voters who have renounced the family preferences, 57 per cent in the favorable condition, but 37.5 per cent in the unfavorable condition, are unstable. Family solidarity and interaction can thus either strengthen or weaken stability, depending on whether one shares or rejects the family preferences. The stronger the attachment to the family, the greater its influence and the more difficult it becomes to hold firmly to views of which it does not approve.

TABLE IV. VOTER STABILITY AND FAMILY REINFORCEMENT, UNDER CONDITIONS "FAVORABLE" AND "UNFAVORABLE" TO REINFORCEMENT (DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS COMBINED)

	Respondents in the "Favorable" Condition Who Support:		Respondents in the "Unfavorable" Condition Who Support:	
Respondents are ↓	Same Party as Family	Different Party from Family	Same Party as Family	Different Party from Family
	(%'s Down)		(%'s Down)	
Stable Voters	58.1	23.8	32.3	25.0
Moderate Voters	28.4	19.1	44.1	37.5
Unstable Voters	13.5	57.1	23.6	37.5
Sample Size	74	21	34	16

V. STABILITY, LIFE-STYLE, AND SOCIAL DISTANCE

Since disunity *within* the primary family discourages party regularity among its members, it seemed reasonable to expect disagreements *between* primary groups to beget similar consequences. In order to test this and related hypotheses, detailed information was collected on all individuals named by a respondent as his primary group associates, especially his spouse, friends, and oc-

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"Measuring Family Solidarity," *American Sociological Review* (December, 1952), Vol. 17, pp. 727–33. We should have liked, of course, to allow "cohesiveness" to vary while controlling for "physical distance" (and conversely), so that we could measure the effect of each of them separately. The size of the samples did not make this feasible, however, so we paired them in this way.

cupational associates. In addition, however, we tried to ascertain, as carefully as possible, the memberships which define his life-style, *i.e.*, his educational, religious, and socio-economic identifications, on the assumption that these categories of social stratification are also indirect measures of primary group affiliations. A voter who belongs to a church or social class, in other words, will doubtless be a member of some of the face-to-face groups which comprise the larger category. These smaller groups, furthermore, are often the vehicles that transmit the social and political norms of the larger aggregation. All such groups, it was assumed, have power to inspire loyalties, to set norms, to grant or withhold rewards for conformity and non-conformity, and thus to weaken or reinforce the family's influence on the respondent's political values. Retaining the family's life-style should lead one to hold its preferences more firmly; placing "social distance" between oneself and one's family, *i.e.*, attaining a higher or lower SES level than one's parents, switching to a different religion, etc., should cause one to become politically more unstable.

In order to assess the strength and direction of political influence arising from life-style associations, each respondent and his family were scored on a politically related "index of life-style," their scores ranging from 1.0 (Strongly Republican) to 5.0 (Strongly Democratic). Like the Lazarsfeld *et al.* "Index of Political Predisposition,"[21] which it resembles in certain respects, our life-style index rested upon several assumptions about the political relevance of SES and religious group factors, along with a further assumption about the relation of education to party preference. To illustrate at the extremes, in the Twin City area a Catholic worker and trade union member who has not gone beyond grade school and whose income is small can safely be assumed to have encountered pressures that are overwhelmingly Democratic; a Congregationalist or Episcopalian businessman who has attended college and earns a high income can be supposed, on the basis of known patterns of voter preference, to have experienced a powerful thrust in the Republican direction.[22] Between these extremes, of course, voters with more heterogeneous life-styles are to be found who are politically more cross-pressured.

The validity of these assumptions may be determined from Figure 1, where

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[21] Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, *op. cit.*, ch. 3. The Index of Political Predisposition combines three criteria—occupation, religion, and rural-urban residence—in ascertaining a voter's "natural" party predisposition. Ours was an urban sample, which meant that we could not employ the rural-urban criterion at all. Our index also differs from Lazarsfeld's in that its SES rating took into account income as well as occupation. Furthermore, we did not rely on the Catholic-Protestant distinction alone, but took into account the rate of church attendance and the Republican or Democratic predispositions of the *specific* Protestant denominations. Finally, our index also used education as a criterion. Each of these was weighed and combined into a single life-style score for each respondent. In determining the weights for the index we are indebted to Angus Campbell and the Survey Research Center for making available to us in advance data on the demography of party affiliation from their 1952 election survey.

[22] For voting patterns arising from religious affiliation, see W. and B. Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude: a Study of Eight Major U. S. Religious Groups," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (1948), pp. 377–389.



FIG. 1. Life-Style and Stability of Voter Preference.

it can readily be seen that the index of life-style has a strong bearing on both the direction and stability of political preference. Thus, not only do Democrats and Republicans have life-styles appropriate to their actual party preferences, but the variations in their life-style scores correspond closely with the variations in their level of party stability. As their life-style scores approach 1.0, stable Republican preferences become more frequent; as they approach 5.0, Republican preferences give way to loyalties that grow increasingly and more firmly Democratic. Both the Republican and Democratic unstables tend to fall in the middle—or cross-pressured—ranges of the index. Although the data are not shown in the table, voters whose life-styles conflict with their preference tend, on the whole, to be unstable, while the reverse is true for voters whose preference and life-style are congruent.

Our primary purpose in calculating life-style scores, however, was to enable us to compute a score of "social distance" (or "mobility") between an individual voter and his family, in order to test the hypothesis that social distance weakens a family's influence by exposing a voter to other, conflicting primary group influences. In measuring "social distance," life style scores were worked out not only for the respondent but for *all* the members of his family as well, taking into account their social characteristics at present and at the time the

TABLE V. RELATION BETWEEN VOTER STABILITY, FAMILY PREFERENCE, AND SOCIAL DISTANCE

Family Preference Is Republican				Family Preference Is Democratic			
	Respondent's Social Mobility Is:				Respondent's Social Mobility Is:		
Respondent's Preference Is ↓	Favoraable (Rep)	Neutral	Antagonistic (Dem)	Respondent's Preference Is ↓	Favorable (Dem)	Neutral	Antagonistic (Rep)
	(%'s Down)				(%'s Down)		
Republican	84.6	60.8	42.1	Democratic	84.3	62.9	50.0
Democratic	15.4	39.1	57.9	Republican	15.5	37.0	50.0
Sample Size	39	23	19		32	27	12
Mean Stability Score*	4.90	3.91	3.32		5.25	4.04	3.50

* The Mean Stability score is computed on a 6 point scale in which 6.0 represents highest party stability in the same direction as the family preference, and 1.0 represents highest stability in the direction of the party opposed by the family.

respondent was "in his teens." By comparing the respondent's score with the modal life-style score of his family, we could assess how far he had moved (in his social characteristics) from the other members of his family. As can be seen in Table V, social distance factors have an important bearing on the stability of a voter's party loyalties. It is plain from these figures that family influence increases or decreases as its members enter other groups with parallel or conflicting party attitudes. More than 84 per cent of the voters who remain in a milieu favorable to the politics of the family retain its preferences, whereas among those who have moved into a politically hostile environment, only 45 per cent remain loyal to the traditional family party.

Stability *within* a party preference is likewise affected by social distance. As the entries in Table V show, stability declines sharply as one moves from the "favorable" to the "neutral" to the "antagonistic" social distance columns, the mean stability scores falling from 5.25 to 4.04 to 3.50 for the offspring of Democratic families, and from 4.90 to 3.91 to 3.32 for respondents from Republican families.

VI. SPOUSE AND FRIENDSHIP GROUP INFLUENCE

Further warranty for some of the foregoing inferences about primary groups can be gained from the data on the spouse and peer groups of our respondents. We find, for example, that a large number (84 per cent) of our married respondents have the same party loyalties as their mates,[23] and that voters who agree with their partners' preferences are considerably more stable (51 per cent of these are stable and 21 per cent unstable; among voters who disagree with their mates, only 14 per cent are stable and 57 per cent are unstable). The spouse also plays an important part in reinforcing the political orientation earlier instilled by a voter's parents. When both the spouse and parents favor the same party, the chances are overwhelming (93 per cent) that a voter will also favor that party; when, however, their political outlooks are diverse, the probability that a voter will remain loyal to his parents' party falls to only 28 per cent.

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[23] *Cf.* Campbell *et al.*, *The Voter Decides*, p. 201; Maccoby *et al.*, *op. cit.;* Lazarsfeld *et al.*, *The People's Choice*, pp. 140–5.

Conflict between one's parental and acquired families also has a marked effect on the stability of voting, reducing it severely (Table VI). The stronger the political interest and preference of the spouse, moreover, the greater his or her influence on the respondent's party loyalties. But this influence can work both ways—to increase stability when husband and wife agree in their party attitudes, or to decrease it severely when they disagree. The magnitude of this influence is doubtless a function of the frequency of interactions between husband and wife, and of the solidarity ordinarily achieved by primary groups of this type. As anticipated, there was a tendency for women to switch to their husbands' preferences more often than the reverse. However, our sample of "switchers" was too small to place much confidence in this conclusion.

TABLE VI. INFLUENCE OF SPOUSE'S PARTY PREFERENCE ON VOTER STABILITY*

	Family Background Is Republican			Family Background Is Democratic			Family Background—Combined Samples		
	Spouse's Preference Is:			Spouse's Preference Is:			Spouse's Preference Is:		
	Strongly or Moderately Repub.	Neutral or Weak	Strongly or Moderately Dem.	Strongly or Moderately Dem.	Neutral or Weak	Strongly or Moderately Rep.	Same as Family's —Strong or Moderate	Neutral or Weak	Different from Family's —Strong or Moderate
Respondents' Mean Stability Scores:	5.35	4.00	2.60	5.38	4.50	2.50	5.36	4.20	2.60
Sample Size:	28	15	19	21	12	13	49	27	32

* The measure of spouse's strength of party preference is an index comprised of data on the spouse's level of political interest; frequency of voting; frequency of political discussion; intensity of party feeling; and direction of party preference. The Mean Stability Scores are computed, as before, on the 6 point scale previously described.

It should also be noted from Table VI that, when family background is taken into account, no difference is found between the stability of voters who marry Democrats and those who marry Republicans. A respondent from a Democratic family who marries a Republican is badly shaken in his voting habits, but no more so, apparently, than a voter from a Republican family who marries a Democrat.

Data on the friends named by our respondents, including friends at work, at church, in neighborhoods, clubs, and other social activities, furnish additional proof of the crucial role which primary groups play in stabilizing political loyalties. As Table VII demonstrates unmistakably, the higher the proportion of friends who support a voter's party, the more stable his preferences: as one reads downward in the left-hand columns, from the Stable Republicans through the moderate and unstable voters to the Stable Democrats, the frequency of Republican peers steadily declines (from 60.8 per cent to 18.8 per cent) while the proportion of Democratic peers uniformly rises (from 21.2 per cent to 53.8 per cent). Whereas stable voters have the highest proportion of peers who share their preferences, the unstable voters draw their friends almost equally from both parties and are subject, therefore, to greater cross-pressure. But they are also politically less aware, they select their friends with less regard for political belief, and they know least about the actual affiliations of their friends; they were unable, for example, to identify the party preferences of 38.6 per cent of their friends, while the comparable figure for the Moderates was 30.2 per cent and for the Stables 23.4 per cent. Whether out of anxiety or apathy, the Unstables seem somewhat more inclined to avoid friendships with people who reveal strong political convictions—a practice which tends to prolong their own instability.[24]

TABLE VII. RELATION BETWEEN STABILITY OF VOTING PREFERENCE AND PROPORTION OF DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PEERS*

	Total Sample		Voters from Republican Family Backgrounds		Voters from Democratic Family Backgrounds	
	Proportion of Peers who are:		Proportion of Peers who are:		Proportion of Peers who are:	
Respondents are: ↓	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Stable Republicans	60.8	21.2	59.2	20.8	75.0	15.0
Moderate Republicans	43.8	21.6	47.6	21.8	50.0	26.6
Unstable Republicans	36.6	26.0	34.0	24.0	44.6	28.2
Unstable Democrats	27.4	29.2	30.0	36.6	21.4	24.2
Moderate Democrats	23.4	50.6	30.0	52.8	24.6	48.6
Stable Democrats	18.8	53.8	22.0	54.0	18.2	51.4
Sample Size	193		81		70	

* The proportions of peers named whose party preferences were unknown to the respondents have been omitted from this table. In every case, however, it would be the percentage remaining after subtracting the proportion of Republican and Democratic peers from 100 per cent: *e.g.*, for the Stable Republicans in the total sample, the party preference of 18.0 per cent of the peers is unknown; for the Unstable Republicans, the proportion is 37.4 per cent.

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[24] The Elmira study found, for example, that voters, and especially uncertain or undecided voters, avoid talking with people who hold different views. See R. H. Baxter, "Interpersonal Contact and Exposure to Mass Media during a Presidential Campaign," unpublished dissertation (Columbia University, 1951).

Controlling for family background does not alter the nature or direction of these findings in any important way. Stability, as anticipated, is greatest when the loyalties of one's peers predominantly correspond with (and thus reinforce) the political outlook of one's family. However, when the majority of a voter's peers do *not* support the party favored by his family, the conditional probability is high (over 80 per cent) that he will abandon the family's voting tradition and shift his support to the opposition. Approximately one-third of these "shifters" become stable opposition supporters.

The rather impressive power exerted by friends on voting behavior does not mean that they have entirely displaced the family, as a source of influence. In Table VIII, we hold friendship preferences constant and vary family background, and find the family continues under all conditions to register an impact upon the preference and stability of the offspring. As the figures show, Republican voters from Republican families are proportionately more stable than voters from Democratic families, even when the latter have as many Republican friends as the former. The same relationships hold for the Democrats when we control for the number of Democratic friends.

TABLE VIII. FAMILY INFLUENCE UPON VOTER STABILITY WHEN FREQUENCY OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC FRIENDS IS CONTROLLED

	Percentage of Stable Republican Voters:			Percentage of Stable Democratic Voters:	
Proportion of Republican Friends	From Republican Families	From Democratic Families	Proportion of Democratic Friends	From Democratic Families	From Republican Families
↓	%	%	↓	%	%
Under 20%	25.0	0.00	Under 20%	25.0	0.00
21%– 60%	41.6	0.00	21%– 60%	57.7	46.1
61%–100%	69.6	50.0	61%–100%	66.6	44.1
Total Repub. sample	76		Total Dem. sample	75	

In considering the relative influence of family and friends, furthermore, we should keep in mind that the connection between stability and the party preferences of one's peers is not the simple, unilateral relation it may appear at first to be. Cause and effect in this matter are not always easy to distinguish. Our choice of friends is, in some measure at least, governed by our political views, and these in turn have largely been predetermined by our families. Since our families also help to fix our levels of party loyalty, they are indirectly responsible, in part, for the high correlation between voting stability and the party affiliation of friends. Unfortunately, the magnitude of such indirect family influence cannot be assessed and demonstrated in studies of the type we are now considering. Its importance, nevertheless, can safely be assumed.

The data on friendship groups, it should be observed, show no significant or systematic differences in the strength of the influence exerted by Democratic or Republican peers. The correlation between voter stability and the proportion of peers with congruent preferences is .40 (sig. $>$.001) for the Republican respondents and .37 (sig. $>$.01) for the Democratic respondents.

VII. PRIMARY GROUP INFLUENCES COMBINED

So far we have seen that each type of primary group registers its own separate impact on our political loyalties. What happens, however, when they are combined? Our theory suggests that their influence ought to be cumulative, becoming stronger (or weaker) as favorable (or antagonistic) units of reinforcement are added. Warranty for these expectations may be found in Table IX where combined data are presented for four of the more important variables employed in the study: family reinforcement, social distance, spouse's preference, and peer group influence. Each time one of these factors supported a respondent's party preference, he was assigned a plus (+) score for that variable; each time a variable was in conflict with his preference, he was given a minus (−) score.

TABLE IX. THE COMBINED EFFECT OF FOUR PRIMARY GROUP INFLUENCES (FAMILY REINFORCEMENT, SOCIAL DISTANCE, SPOUSE, AND PEER GROUPS) ON VOTER STABILITY

Respondents are:	Number of Favorable (+) Reinforcements* (%'s Down)			
	1+	2+'s	3+'s	4+'s
Stable Voters	17.6	35.7	58.1	70.5
Moderate Voters	17.6	32.1	27.9	23.5
Unstable Voters	64.7	32.1	13.9	5.9
Sample Size	17	28	43	17

	Number of Favorable (+) Reinforcements			Voters Who Support Initial Family Preference			Voters Who Have Switched from Initial Family Preference		
				Number of Favorable (+) Reinforcements					
Respondents are: ↓	1 or 2 +'s	3 or 4 +'s	(N)	1 or 2 +'s	3 or 4 +'s	(N)	1 or 2 +'s	3 or 4 +'s	(N)
	(%'s Across)			(%'s Across)			(%'s Across)		
Stable Voters	26.0	74.0	(50)	18.9	81.0	(37)	46.1	53.8	(13)
Moderate Voters	42.9	57.1	(28)	36.9	63.1	(19)	66.7	33.3	(6)
Unstable Voters	74.1	25.9	(27)	66.7	33.3	(12)	78.6	21.4	(14)

* Favorable or (+) = Association with a primary group whose party loyalties are congruent with those of the respondent.

It should first of all be noted that group affiliations tend to be mutually reinforcing. When the total number of "reinforcements" were tallied for all respondents, 64 per cent were found to be favorable (+), 24 per cent were negative (−), and 12 per cent were neutral. Regular party supporters, however, have experienced a significantly greater proportion of positive reinforcements than unstable supporters, the figures being 82 per cent for the former and 54 per cent for the latter.

Examination of Table IX shows that 74 per cent of the Stables have been exposed to three or more positive reinforcements (out of a possible four), while only 25.9 per cent of the Unstables have been so consistently reinforced. When we compute the percentages vertically, the degree to which stability depends upon the frequency and homogeneity of primary group support becomes, if anything, even more obvious. The probability that a voter will be stable if all his reinforcements are favorable is 70.5 per cent; it declines sharply, however, as the number of his positive scores diminishes—dropping from 70 to 58 to 35 and finally to 17 per cent. Similarly, if all four group reinforcements are favorable, the probability is small (only 5.9 per cent) that a voter will become unstable, whereas it is quite high (64.7 per cent) if only one of the four reinforcements is favorable. Clearly, party loyalty strongly depends upon the ratio of favorable to unfavorable primary group supports.

Controlling for initial family background modifies these results only in detail, for stability rises as reinforcements increase, no matter what political outlook voters have received from their families. Nevertheless, a voter who does not follow his family's preference is less likely to be stable than a voter who does, even when both have been subjected to the same number of subsequent group pressures. The impact of the family's initial indoctrination persists, in short, even if it does not always result in retention of the parents' party.

Correlations were computed which summarize and elaborate these findings somewhat. The simple correlation between family reinforcement and the level of respondent's stability is, to begin with, .27 (sig. .01). If we add social distance and compute a multiple correlation, the figure rises to .41, with similar correlations for Republican and Democratic respondents. When spouse and peer group variables are added, the multiple correlation rises again, this time to .49.[25] Had we also been able to take account of family solidarity and propinquity (which unfortunately we could not, owing to complications involving the small size of the N), these correlations would doubtless be even higher, since family influence is increased, as we have seen, when physical and psychological "distance" are favorable to reinforcement.

VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The data presented in this paper largely confirm the hypotheses with which the project began and furnish additional support for some of the inferences about primary groups suggested by the Elmira study, the Maccoby study, and others. The findings make it plain that the indoctrination, retention, or shift of party loyalties is significantly related to, and often determined by, family and other primary bonds. Of course, our results do not explain stable or shifting patterns of support in *particular* elections, for these, as Key and Munger correctly point out, require explanations that are more immediately *political*, *i.e.*, that chiefly take account of issues, candidates, or changing political conditions.[26] What the findings do show, however, is that voters differ widely in their susceptibility to political influence, and that their tendencies to shift or remain stable in response to such influence will vitally depend upon the strength and homogeneity of their primary group affiliations.

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[25] The multiple correlation for stability, family reinforcement, spouse, and peer group preference is .49, even if social distance is omitted. This is consistent with our assumption that social distance variables can, for many purposes, be viewed as indirect measures of primary group membership.

Specifically, the following inferences seem warranted from our data:

1. The family is a key reference group which transmits, indoctrinates, and sustains the political loyalties of its members. Voters who support the party favored by their families develop firmer and more consistent habits of party allegiance than voters who renounce the family preference.

2. Family influence on the stability of a voter's preference increases when (a) the party outlooks of its members are homogeneous; (b) political interest and loyalty among the other members are high (this affects direction of preference more than stability, however); and (c) the same family preference has been retained over time. Family influence on party allegiance becomes stronger, in addition, when its members like and often see each other; however, these factors undermine the party loyalty of voters who have rejected the family preference. The family thus serves as a continuing agency for defining the party affiliations of its members.

3. A voter's political attachments are strongly affected by both his and his family's "life-style" (occupation, income, education, and religion). Homogeneous life-styles that are consistent with the family's political loyalties reinforce those loyalties; heterogeneous life-styles, and discrepancies between life-style and party preference, weaken them. Social distance, *i.e.*, changes in life-style away from the modal family pattern, diminishes family influence by placing a voter among new and often conflicting primary groups.

4. Unless they embody a party viewpoint or life-style that conflicts with the family's outlook, primary groups other than the parental family, such as spouse and peer group associates, operate to reinforce the party loyalties a voter acquires from his family. The more widespread the agreement among them, and the more intense their outlook, the more stable his own party allegiance. Compared with party regulars, unstable voters are less often able to identify the political affiliations of their friends.

5. Disagreements among the several primary groups to which a voter belongs are among the most important sources of party irregularity and defection. Most voters, however, are anchored in a matrix of politically harmonious primary associations—a result, to some extent, of conscious selection and of the tendency for the social environment to bring together people of like views.

6. Democrats and Republicans were observed to differ somewhat in their

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[26] V. O. Key and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: the Case of Indiana," in Burdick and Brodbeck, *American Voting Behavior*, ch. 15.

response to family and other primary group influences, but the differences were neither large nor systematic enough to warrant firm generalization. If family political background is allowed to vary freely, Republican voters appear to conform more strongly than Democrats to family influence. They also appear to be less affected by changes in life-style or social mobility—a result consistent with the findings reported by the Elmira study, by Maccoby, and others.[27] These inferences, which imply the greater tenacity of Republican loyalties, are misleading, however, for they overlook the consideration that some of our Republicans and Democrats were initially indoctrinated by families of a contrary political persuasion. When we took this into account and controlled for family party preference, the differences between Democratic and Republican voters either disappeared or reversed themselves: Democrats from Democratic families and Republicans from Republican families proved to be equally stable; while Democrats from Republican family backgrounds turned out, on the average, to be somewhat more stable than Republicans from Democratic backgrounds. Voters whose origins were Democratic, in short, appear more resistant to conversion than voters from Republican backgrounds. These findings could mean either that Democratic families leave a more enduring imprint on the politics of their members or—a more plausible explanation—that the balance of non-family forces in the Twin City community favored the Democrats. On this explanation, the apparently greater tenacity of Democratic family influence would be largely an artifact of our measurement procedures, and would arise from our inability to assess independently other important influences in the community. In any event, the belief that Republicanism is the more magnetic and enduring preference, owing to the higher status of its more visible supporters and its symbolic identification with the middle and upper classes, is not substantiated in our data. The Republican party does tend, on the whole, to be the party of status, but it is not always the preferred or prestige party. Especially since the New Deal, with its strong impact on political affiliation and perceptions, the advantage of being the prestige party belongs, in many communities, to the Democrats.

7. Reference to the role of the community environment underscores the need to observe that primary group memberships cannot, by themselves, account for all the variance in political belief and affiliation, and that other influences, such as economic interest, status needs, the mass media, the behavior of the parties themselves, etc., will often have to be considered. We should also enter the qualification that, having dealt in this research largely with party affiliations, we cannot be certain that the results can be generalized to all forms of political attachment. We have, nevertheless, proceeded on the assumption that the several forms of political support are sufficiently alike so that knowledge gained from the study of party affiliation will prove useful in the investigation of other forms of political loyalty.

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[27] Maccoby *et al.*, *op. cit.;* Berelson *et al.*, *op. cit.*

ZORACH V. CLAUSON: THE IMPACT OF A SUPREME COURT DECISION*

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It has become a commonplace that the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is. Scholars of American constitutional law have, therefore, focused their studies largely on the Court's opinions as indices of the Constitution's current meaning. But however well established may be the Court's role as the expounder of the constitutional document, the impact of a decision will depend on many individuals and circumstances far beyond the confines of the Court. This paper will examine the effects of the decision in *Zorach v. Clauson*[1] on public policy in the seven years since its announcement. It will attempt to follow the repercussions of one Supreme Court decision through the entire political process within one area of political conflict—in this case the conflict over church-state relationships.[2]

The impact of the *Zorach* decision on state court decisions, on administrative rulings, on legislative action, and on the educational policies of local school districts may also be viewed as a case study in federalism. Within the federal system, what limits affect the power of the Court to dictate adherence to the Constitution throughout the states? How effectively does it function as an instrument of national supremacy? How responsive are state and local authorities to shifting constitutional interpretations?

I. THE DECISION

Despite considerable diversity in detail, "released time" programs of religious education have one principle in common: release from ordinary class-room attendance for students wishing to attend religious classes. Generally one hour a week is set aside for the purpose, and those students whose parents do not elect the religious classes for them are herded to study halls or given make-work exercises for the hour. The classes provided by the religious bodies of the community are referred to in religious education circles as "weekday church schools."

From a modest beginning shortly before World War I the released time movement expanded irregularly through the '20s and '30s, and then surged ahead

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[1] 343 U. S. 306 (1952).

[2] For somewhat similar studies see Walter Murphy, "Civil Liberties and the Japanese American Cases: A Study in the Uses of *Stare Decisis*," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 11 (March, 1958), pp. 3–12; Jack W. Peltason, *Federal Courts in the Political Process* (Garden City, N. Y., 1955), ch. 6; and Gordon Patric, "The Impact of a Court Decision: Aftermath of the McCollum Case," *Journal of Public Law*, Vol. 6 (Fall 1957), pp. 455–464.

dramatically in the wartime and post-war religious renaissance.[3] In the late '40s, however, one Mrs. Vashti McCollum pressed a suit through the Illinois courts and to the Supreme Court of the United States, challenging the constitutionality of the released time program of the Champaign schools, as a breach in the wall of separation between church and state. The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, agreed.[4] Justice Black, speaking for the Court, noted: "Here not only are the State's tax-supported public school buildings used for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The State also affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through use of the State's compulsory public school machinery. This is not separation of Church and State."[5]

Public reaction to the *McCollum* decision was distinctly hostile. A number of communities across the country defied the Court and continued to hold religious classes in school rooms. A brief examination of the periodical indexes for the next few years indicates the extent of the wrath and condemnation heaped on the Court in leading journals. More particularly, in the constitutional uncertainty about released time that the *McCollum* case created, school districts and religious bodies began to cast about for acceptable programs and to test in the courts the applicable limits of the *McCollum* rule. During this period of constitutional sparring another test case, *Zorach v. Clauson*, emerged from Brooklyn.

This case questioned the released time program of the New York city schools. Unlike the Champaign plan the New York program required that religious classes be held off the school premises, that all costs (even of application blanks) be borne by the organizations, and that there be no announcements or comments on the program during regular school sessions. The churches were, however, to make weekly attendance reports to the schools. Taxpayer-parents challenged the arrangement on the ground that the weight and influence of the public schools were placed squarely in support of released time, since the program depended on the schools' suspending classes and enforcing attendance. The New York courts swept aside these contentions to uphold it. In a 6-3 decision the U. S. Supreme Court sustained the state courts and the New York plan itself.

Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas first dismissed the argument that coercion had been used to get students into religious classes, and then turned to expound a theory of the separation of church and state quite at odds with the Court's earlier statement of an absolute separation in the *Everson*[6] and *McCollum* cases:

> The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects, there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific

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[3] For the best brief but authoritative survey of released time in America, see Erwin L. Shaver, *The Weekday Church School* (Boston, 1956). Dr. Shaver served for many years as the Executive Director of Weekday Religious Education of the National Council of Churches.

[4] McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948).

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 212.

[6] Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947).

> ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other. That is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other—hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.[7]

For further support Douglas listed current instances of church-state cooperation, noting that even the Supreme Court's sessions begin with a plea for Divine guidance. Following this enunciation of new doctrine, he uttered his frequently quoted dictum on religion in American life and institutions:

> We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. . . . When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe. . . . [W]e find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence.[8]

Government must, therefore, not coerce religious observance, but it may cooperate with religious bodies, accommodate itself to their convenience, and even encourage programs of religious instruction. "[I]t can close its doors or suspend its operations," Douglas wrote, "as to those who want to repair to their religious sanctuary for worship or instruction. No more than that is undertaken here."[9] In conclusion Douglas reaffirmed the *McCollum* precedent and distinguished the facts there at issue from those before the Court.

Each of the three dissenters spoke individually. Justice Black, the Court's spokesman in the *Everson* and *McCollum* cases, could find no significant differences between the Brooklyn and Champaign programs—at least not enough to justify upholding the Brooklyn plan. He concluded by reaffirming his doctrine of an absolute separation, pressing its wisdom upon the Court. Justice Frankfurter argued the coercive elements of a system in which the non-religious student was compelled to remain in school and regretted that the appellants had been denied an opportunity to prove coercion in the lower courts. Justice Jackson's dissent—which can at best be called intemperate—deals as much with the Court itself as with religious education. After reiterating the argument that the program rested on state coercion, Jackson turned to remind his "evangelistic brethren" that "what should be rendered to God does not need to be decided and collected by Caesar."[10] He agreed, too, that the distinction between the Champaign and Brooklyn programs was "trivial, almost to the point of cynicism" and concluded his philippic by supposing that the majority opinion would "be more interesting to students of psychology and of the judicial processes than to students of constitutional law."[11]

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[7] Cited note 1 above, p. 312.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 314.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 324–325.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 325.

So much for the case and decision itself. We turn now to the impact of the *Zorach* decision on released time programs and on church-state relations in general.

II. INITIAL REACTION AND RECEPTION

The friends of released time reacted immediately to the *Zorach* decision with extravagant praise. It was tritely hailed as the "*magna carta* for the weekday religious education movement,"[12] "a landmark in the history of America,"[13] and "a great piece of jurisprudence."[14] Justice Douglas was saluted for averting the dangers of advancing secularism. Even the date of the decision was commemorated: "during the week of April 28 each year . . . some weekday classes hold special observances and contribute to a fund to help bring weekday church schools to communities which do not have them."[15]

In their attempts to explain the general doctrine of church-state relations in the *Zorach* decision to their readers and members, the supporters of released time programs were generally agreed in their interpretations. Most noted with triumph that the decision "radically revised the Everson-McCollum doctrine on 'separation' "[16] and that the Court had had to retreat from its unrealistic doctrine of complete separation. One well-known religious educator went so far as to observe that "the principle of friendly co-operation between the state and religious bodies was substituted for that of absolute separation" and that the whole issue of separation "may be said to be wide open."[17]

Enthusiasm and wide-sweeping interpretation also marks these commentators' development of the narrow legal issues in the decision. The "shadow of illegality has been dispelled,"[18] the decision "removes the apparent stigma that weekday religious education has been under in the minds of many,"[19] the decision "established without a doubt the legality of releasing pupils from the public schools"[20]—so went announcements of the good tidings. At least in the initial burst of optimism, the local religious leader or educator might easily have gathered that all released time programs had been sanctioned and that the *McCollum* precedent was no more. For instance, one commentator noted simply that the Court "reversed" itself in the *Zorach* case,[21] and another thought it had "cut the heart out of the McCollum decision" and "greatly modified, if not virtually overruled" it.[22] To be sure, Erwin L. Shaver, the generally recognized leader of the released time movement, cautioned that there was "no contradiction" between the two cases, explaining the "seeming reversal" on the basis of two differing sets of facts.[23] His was, however, a lone counsel of caution.

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[12] Erwin L. Shaver, "Weekday Religious Education Secures Its Charter and Faces a Challenge," *Religious Education*, Vol. 48 (January–Feburary, 1953), p. 43.

[13] Walter Howlett, *A Review and Challenge of Sixteen Years* (published by the Greater New York Co-ordinating Committee on Released Time, no date), p. 6.

[14] Robert C. Hartnett, "Religious Education and the Constitution," *America*, Vol. 87 (May 24, 1952), p. 225.

[15] Shaver, *The Weekday Church School*, p. 60.

[16] Hartnett, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

[17] F. Ernest Johnson, "Religion and Education," *Progressive Education*, Vol. 33 (September, 1956), p. 146.

[18] Shaver, *op. cit.* note 15 above, p. 31.

[19] "Following the Best of Our Traditions," *National Council Outlook*, Vol. 2 (June, 1952), p. 20.

[20] *Introducing the Weekday Church School* (published by the Division of Christian Education of the National Council of Churches, no date), p. 15.

The exuberance of released time advocates was matched by the disappointment of its opponents. Varied in approach, their comments reflected both a generalized dissatisfaction with the decision, and a desire to minimize its effect. The *Christian Century* in its initial editorial reaction went to great pains to point out that the New York program differed fundamentally from the one invalidated in Champaign. Unlike the favorable commentaries, it concluded that the *McCollum* precedent had certainly not been overruled. It also thought, contrary to the supporters, that Justice Douglas's opinion "will not clarify the church-and-state issue, but will produce much future litigation."[24] *Church and State,* publication of the Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, ran only a brief news item devoted largely to excerpts from the dissenting opinions.[25]

For his part, Professor R. Freeman Butts attempted to underplay the Court's dictum, quoted above, by distinguishing between "we as a people" and "we as a government" and by insisting that "we as a government" must be neutral on all religious issues.[26] Another authority on school law, while deploring that the Court had "really muddied" the waters of constitutional doctrine in the *Zorach* case, nonetheless concluded that it was not a reversal of the earlier Champaign precedent.[27] Finally, some among the opponents of released time avoided or ignored the force of the *Zorach* decision entirely. The chairman of the Anti-Defamation League, for instance, has observed that the *Zorach* decision reaffirms the doctrine of church-state separation laid down in the earlier *Everson* and *McCollum* cases.[28]

This brief excursion into the reactions to the *Zorach* decision indicates that representatives of interest groups on the two sides of the issue have, by perceiving within the bounds of a distinct frame of reference, really divided the Court's precedent into two sharply contrasting images. Readers who overlap these self-selected audiences are confronted by two "precedents" rather than one. Whether *McCollum* was reversed or followed, whether the separation doctrine is clarified or confused, whether all or only some released time programs have judicial approval seems to depend on the commitments one brings to his appraisal of the decision.

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[21] Herbert B. Mulford, "A Pattern for Religion in Public Education," *Religious Education,* Vol. 49 (September–October, 1954), p. 333.

[22] Robert F. Drinan, "The Supreme Court and Religion," *The Commonweal,* Vol. 56 (September 12, 1952), p. 554.

[23] Shaver, *op. cit.* note 12 above, p. 40.

[24] "The Court Concurs," *Christian Century,* Vol. 69 (May 14, 1952), p. 582.

[25] *Church and State Newsletter,* Vol. 5 (May, 1952), p. 2. This account gives 21 lines of type to the majority opinion and 76 to the dissenters.

[26] "The Relation between Religion and Education," *Progressive Education,* Vol. 33 (September, 1956), p. 142.

[27] Lee O. Garber, "Confusing Decisions on Released Time," *Nation's Schools,* Vol. 50 (August, 1952), p. 72.

[28] Henry E. Schultz, *Religious Education and the Public Schools* (published by the Anti-Defamation League, New York, 1955), p. 5.

III. THE IMPACT ON RELEASED TIME PROGRAMS

The impact of a Supreme Court decision should be most obvious in its direct and primary effect on the policies in question. In this instance the *Zorach* opinion, touted as a "magna charta" for the released time movement, rescued certain programs from the constitutional limbo to which they presumably had been consigned by the *McCollum* case. The empirical question, then, is whether it has in fact stimulated and accelerated the growth of these programs. This turns out to be not an easy question to answer.

Aggregate statistical totals of the number of children receiving released time religious training are impossible to come by. Several commentators seem to agree that after the *McCollum* decision in 1948 the released time programs fell off by some 20 per cent, accounting for a pupil loss of about 10 per cent.[29] By 1953 the total attendance was variously estimated between 2,000,000 and 2,500,000—back just about to the pre-*McCollum* total. Three to five years later, leaders of the movement were setting enrolments at about 3,000,000 in programs in over 3,000 communities in 45 or 46 states.[30] All of the losses after the *McCollum* decision were apparently recouped by 1953, and in the last five years enrolments have risen to an all-time high. Dr. Shaver sums up the growth in recent years as "a modest increase since 1952, although not a great one."[31]

Enrolment statistics from scattered states and communities also confirm the general impression of a modest over-all growth since *Zorach*, with more substantial increases in some instances. The United Lutheran Church, for example, reports a 28 per cent growth in weekday church schools and a 13 per cent increase in pupils between the years 1951 and 1953.[32] And if one accepts various data from the state of New York at face value, enrolments there have doubled, from 225,000 in 1952 to 450,000 in 1956.

Accounts of the impact of *Zorach* in specific communities supplement these statistical indications. The school board in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, was reported (in a journal that can hardly be called friendly) to have inaugurated a released time program immediately after the decision of the Brooklyn case. "Protestant and Jewish leaders represented in the local Council of Churches withdrew their formal opposition to the plan after the April 28 Supreme Court decision upholding the New York system of 'released time,' but voted not to participate themselves during the coming school year."[33] Finally, in these community policy debates the impact of the decision is reflected in the determination of some religious groups to press their newly won advantage. The *New York Times* reported in late 1952 the efforts of the United Lutheran Church "at increasing church pressure on public schools to permit children to receive weekday religious education under the released-time system."[34]

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[29] "State Support of Church Schools" (mimeographed excerpts from the reports of the Board for Parish Education of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod), p. 19, and Shaver, *op. cit.* note 12 above, p. 41.

[30] *Ibid.;* Erwin L. Shaver letter to the author, March 14, 1958; various mimeographed press releases of the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine of the National Catholic Welfare Conference; and Charles H. Tuttle, "No Poor Relation in the House of the State," *National Council Outlook*, Vol. 2 (June, 1952), p. 4.

[31] Shaver letter to the author, March 14, 1958.

[32] W. Kent Gilbert, *Suggested Procedures for an Evaluation of the Weekday Church School Series of the United Lutheran Church in America* (Columbia U.: D.Ed. thesis, 1955).

The ability of local authorities to begin released time programs may depend to some extent on the willingness of state legislatures to authorize or tolerate them. Yet no new legislation on the subject has been enacted by any state since the *Zorach* case decision. Bills to authorize released time programs in New Hampshire were beaten down in the 1953, 1955, and 1957 legislative sessions. Similar proposals have also been introduced in the Michigan and Arizona legislatures with similar results. Evidently, the Court's permissive opinion has failed to influence legislative policy-making in the states. However, enabling legislation is not usually necessary; only 13 states have laws expressly permitting absence for religious instruction.[35] In most states the localities simply begin their programs under the regular educational authority with some vague assurances that they are not violating any state statutory or constitutional restrictions on religious education. Even in Virginia, where released time flourishes as in no other state, no explicit state authority for it exists.

In these circumstances the states' attorneys general, as the construers and appliers of state limitations, assume an important role in charting the legal progress of released time programs. Here the impact of *Zorach* is easier to assess. In only four instances, apparently, has a state attorney general found occasion to mention the *Zorach* precedent in dealing with released time or similar programs of religious education. The attorney general of Iowa upheld a released time plan in Dubuque that was virtually identical to the Brooklyn plan.[36] An opinion in Indiana reaffirmed the constitutionality of a state statute that an earlier attorney general had held to be in grave doubt after *McCollum.* Here again there were no significant differences between the program authorized and the one the Court upheld in *Zorach.*[37] Thirdly, the Vermont attorney general in 1954 cited *Zorach* v. *Clauson* in holding unconstitutional any religious classes in the schools during school hours. He hastened to add, however, that there would be no federal or state constitutional objection to classes held off school premises and made available to all sects.[38] Finally, the Oregon attorney general referred to *Zorach* somewhat ambiguously in holding that local school boards are not free under the Oregon released time law to refuse requests for a released time program in a local community.[39] Reports persist that attorneys general in several other states have informally decided such issues since 1952, but these are unconfirmed and too sketchy and fugitive to deal with here.

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[33] *Church and State Newsletter,* Vol. 5 (June, 1952), p. 3.

[34] October 14, 1952, p. 35.

[35] See: Research Division of the National Educational Association, "The State and Sectarian Education," *Research Bulletin,* Vol. 34 (Dec., 1956) for the best summary of state legislation. It cites 14 states with permissive legislation, but the New Mexico listing turns out to involve a favorable ruling by the attorney general on the basis of ordinary school legislation. The 13 are: California, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and West Virginia.

[36] Opinion of August 18, 1953, *Thirtieth Biennial Report of the Iowa Attorney General* (1954), pp. 73–76.

To round out the picture, mention ought also to be made of the uncertainties the decision has created. In relaxing the stringencies of the *McCollum* decision, it has still not resolved the status of such a program as Utah has adopted. Released time classes in that state extend to five hours a week, receive high school credit in some parts of the state, and are taught by special, state-accredited teachers. A learned observer therefore suggests:

> Elements showing some degree of control by the state of released time teachers, the degree of identification and coercion inherent in granting credit, some danger of unconstitutional administration, a possibility of attack on the ground of state preference for one religion, plus an unusual amount of time allowed for religious studies tend toward a stronger case for unconstitutionality than *Zorach.*[40]

This compilation indicates that the impact of *Zorach* on local policy decisions has been a tonic to the movement, although it has hardly revolutionized the pattern of religious education.

IV. THE ISSUE OF COMPLIANCE

It is no secret that after the *McCollum* decision, and despite it, many communities continued to hold released time classes in public school buildings. The most conservative estimate places non-compliance at 15 per cent of the programs,[41] and other estimates run up to 40 and 50 per cent in some states. Five years later in the *Zorach* case the Court reaffirmed the *McCollum* ruling but offered the localities a clearly constitutional alternative: religious education off school premises. Have local religious and educational groups met the Court half-way and given up released time in the school room?

The answer is "no—not entirely." In 1956 a knowledgeable authority on school law wrote that "school systems in virtually every state violate in some way the legal principles concerning religious instruction in the public schools."

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[37] Opinion No. 24 of June 1, 1956, *Opinions of the Attorney General of Indiana* (1956), pp. 105–114.

[38] Opinion No. 14 of July, 1954, *Biennial Report of the Attorney General of Vermont* (1954–1956), pp. 95–98.

[39] Opinion No. 2890 of December 2, 1954, *Biennial Report and Opinions of the Attorney General of Oregon*, (1954–1956).

[40] Ruth W. Wilkins, "Constitutionality of Utah Released Time Program," *Utah Law Review*, Vol. 3 (Spring, 1953), p. 339.

[41] Shaver, *op. cit.* note 12 above.

Some of the violations are unwitting, he wrote, but knowing violators include "some persons holding responsible church or school positions."[42] Apart from such generalizations, precise estimates of non-compliance are not easy to make. Apparently, all or most of the programs run by the Virginia Council of Churches still use school rooms,[43] many communities in Texas do also,[44] and there are many reports of school room use in scattered places. Released time programs are conducted in school rooms in five Pennsylvania counties of which I am aware. Finally, *Religious Education* two years ago disclosed that a casual poll of released time programs indicated that 32 per cent were still holding classes in school buildings, although some were paying token rentals of from $5 to $100 a year.[45]

Uncertainty about what constitutes non-compliance complicates this assessment. The transparent ruse of "renting" community educational facilities for five dollars a year is an obvious evasion of the *Zorach* rule. But what of holding religious instruction in schools during the lunch hour?[46] Or after school hours? Or what of giving high school credit for Bible classes? Or of holding released time classes in publicly owned community centers? Or of giving class credit for otherwise acceptable released time programs?[47] Apparently, in this "twilight area," the very groups that are most adept in expanding aid to religion by analogous application of the precedent have been unwilling at the same time to apply the limitations of *Zorach.*

Dr. Shaver and the Division of Christian Education of the National Council of Churches, to be sure, have clearly and repeatedly urged compliance. The very vigor of their urgings may, in fact, be taken as some indication of the degree of non-compliance. In a 1956 speech Shaver urged the need for dispelling

> the mood of illegality which still pervades the weekday church school movement in some quarters. Much of this is due to the same attitude of defiance or indifference to decisions of the Supreme Court that one finds in the segregation issue. Such an attitude toward the Zorach decision should be opposed just as strongly as the non-conforming attitude toward the segregation decision.[48]

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[42] E. C. Bolmeier, "Legality and Propriety of Religious Instruction in the Public Schools," *Educational Forum,* Vol. 20 (May, 1956), p. 480.

[43] Luther Flynn, *A Study of Moral, Spiritual, and Religious Values in the Public Schools of Virginia* (U. of Virginia: D.Ed. thesis, 1956).

[44] William A. Flachmeier, *Religious Education and the Public Schools of Texas* (U. of Texas: Ph.D. thesis, 1955).

[45] Erwin L. Shaver, "A Look at Weekday Church Schools," *Religious Education,* Vol. 51 (Jan.-Feb., 1956), pp. 18–39.

[46] *New York Times,* February 20, 1955, p. 88. The program then reached 100 of 280 high school pupils in Bangor, Michigan.

[47] *Church and State Newsletter* and the releases and memos of the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine, though obviously parties to the dispute, repeatedly carry stories of such local practices. See also Flachmeier, *op. cit.,* and Jack J. Early, *Religious Practices in the Public Schools in Selected Communities in Kentucky* (U. of Kentucky: D.Ed. thesis, 1956).

[48] Frank M. McKibben, *Report and Interpretation of the First National Conference on Weekday Religious Education* (National Council of Churches, no date), p. 12.

Other writings and speeches of his repeatedly urge local religious groups to refuse the help of school authorities in recruiting and registering students, to avoid the use of public school machinery and buildings for any aspect of the program, and to refrain from trying "to 'get by' with legal infractions because their communities may not object."[49]

Conceivably, what appears to be non-compliance to an outside observer may be only the ignorance of some local officials. To get some limited information on this possibility, I sent questionnaires to the county superintendents of schools in Pennsylvania's 67 counties. One question confronted them with five possible forms of released time program and asked them to mark the alternatives they thought the Supreme Court would presently consider unconstitutional. The results, summarized in Table I, indicate that nearly all the 50 county superintendents who responded to this question were well aware of the prevailing constitutional law on released time. If anything, they lean to a rigid interpretation of separation, as their overwhelming judgment on the uncertain third alternative indicates.[50] If this degree of constitutional sophistication prevails in the other states, non-compliance with the *Zorach* decision must be knowing evasion. In fact, in Pennsylvania the five county superintendents indicating classroom use for released time in their counties are even more aware of the constitutional niceties in this area than the average superintendent.

TABLE I. JUDGMENTS OF 50 PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF RELEASED TIME PLANS

Released Time Plan	Responses of "Unconstitutional"	% "Unconstitutional"
1. Classes in school rooms, taught by regular teacher	49	98
2. Classes in school rooms, taught by representatives of religions	47	94
3. Classes in school rooms, taught after regular school hours	41	82
4. Classes taught off school premises by representatives of religions	8	16
5. Classes taught off school premises when all classes dismissed	1	2

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[49] Shaver, "A New Day Dawns for Weekday Religious Education," p. 8. For his other warnings, see *The Weekday Church School; Introducing the Weekday Church School* (National Council of Churches, no date); and *Remember the Weekday to Teach Thereon* (National Council of Churches, no date).

[50] A total of 59 of 67 answered the questionnaire, although only 50 responded to this question. A total of 33 superintendents reported they have released time programs in their counties, and 26 reported they do not. Of the 33 counties with released time, at least five still use school rooms, and two use community centers. The respondents making "correct" judgments on the issues of constitutionality are evenly divided between counties with released time programs and those without.

V. THE PRECEDENT EXPANDS

The impact of the *Zorach* rule does not stop with its direct consequences. Contrary to the gloomy expectations of Justice Frankfurter and others, there has been no further ardent rash of released time litigation following *Zorach,* nor has the decision fired up old debates on the issue. All sides in the general controversy over church-state relations have apparently decided that released time is now a settled issue, and have shifted their efforts to more advanced proposals. In this shifting of debate the *Zorach* decision has served both as legal precedent and political symbol and has had, consequently, a far-reaching influence quite beyond the particular facts on which it originally rested. The possibility of exactly this sort of application of the decision prompted the editors of the official organ of the National Council of Churches to warn:

> . . . it is perhaps inevitable that some will uncritically assume that now "anything goes." This unwarranted implication will and ought to be stoutly resisted. This decision deals only with a specific case before the court. The decision says nothing explicitly about public aid to parochial schools, about required Bible reading and prayer in the public schools, or about the chaplaincy system of the Armed Services, military hospitals and government schools.[51]

But their advice went unheeded.

At the very least, the *Zorach* precedent has been applied by analogy to validate or support varieties of religious education other than released time programs. When, for instance, the New York Board of Regents in March, 1955, recommended the injection of moral and spiritual values into the public school curricula of the state, it cited the *Zorach* dicta to buttress its assumptions about the relevance of religious education to the Republic.[52] One scholar, proposing programs of teaching "about" religion in a "non-denominational" manner in the public schools, surmises that in light of the *Zorach* decision "there is good reason to believe that non-indoctrinational study of religion as a part of the culture will not fall under the ban."[53] Speaking also of this kind of program, another scholar appraises the *Zorach* decision and declares that now "we have *Carte blanche* to do what we think is morally, educationally, and philosophically sound in this field on the college level."[54] For another commentator permissive cooperation is quickly transformed to compulsory alliance:

> If, as the Court said, the state follows the best of our traditions when it encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs (off public property), how much more faithful to American tradition is the state when it requires that its own schools teach America's [religious] heritage to its young citizens and future guardians of our Republic?[55]

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[51] "Following the Best of Our Traditions," *National Council Outlook* (June, 1952), p. 20.

[52] Mentioned in Joseph F. Costanzo, "Religion in Public School Education," *Thought,* Vol. 31 (Summer, 1956), p. 218.

[53] F. Ernest Johnson (ed.), *American Education and Religion: The Problem of Religion in the Schools* (New York, 1952), p. 190.

[54] David W. Louisell, "Constitutional Limitations and Supports for Dealing with Religion in Public Higher Education," *Religious Education,* Vol. 50 (Sept.-Oct., 1955), p. 289.

[55] Costanzo, *op. cit.,* pp. 237–238.

Similar expansions of the *Zorach* rule to cover other issues of religion in education have occurred in the courts. A Massachusetts court in reaffirming the legality of Bible reading in the public schools drew attention to *Zorach* as sanctioning a similar religious activity in the schools.[56] A year later the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that employment of members of religious orders, wearing religious garb and symbols, to teach in public schools did not violate the church-state separation. In so holding, it cited the *Zorach* case as an example of the Supreme Court's approval of analogous aid to religion.[57] The Tennessee Supreme Court also recently ruled that reciting the Lord's Prayer, reading a verse of the Bible, or singing an "inspiring song" in the public schools did not breach the constitutional separation. In the course of its opinion the Court cited *Zorach*, but only to refer to its insistence that in cooperating with religion government be "neutral when it comes to competition between sects."[58]

The outward expansion of the *Zorach* precedent does not stop here. Courts and interest groups have taken its new doctrine of a "part-way" separation of church and state to expand the permissible area of government aid to and cooperation with organized religion. At the minimum some commentators edge cautiously away from the new doctrine to assert that "the legality of a friendly governmental attitude toward religious sects and institutions is now solidly affirmed."[59] And at the other extreme, one scholar found in the *Zorach* decision proof that the separation of church and state can in reality amount to a denial of religious liberty: "If and where a community feels so strongly about religion in relation to the education of its children that it insists on some token of religious faith within the school, what we are dealing with is an elemental demand for religious liberty."[60] The California Supreme Court, in ruling that aid to religions in the form of property tax exemptions was not unconstitutional, also took note of the Court's new and relaxed doctrine of separation.[61]

Beyond these influences on other forms of religious education and on the issue of church-state relations, the precedent has spread slowly outward to touch more general questions of religious liberty. And no part of the decision has contributed so much to this inflation of the precedent as Justice Douglas's gratuitous assertion that "we are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."[62] One could, in fact, discuss the *Zorach* decision simply as a study in the misadventures of a dictum, for the courts have been as uncritical and unrestrained as laymen in embracing it.

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[56] Commonwealth v. Renfrew, 126 N.E. 2d 109 (1955).

[57] Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W. 2d 801 (1956).

[58] Carden v. Bland, 288 S.W. 2d 718 (1956), p. 722. I should also note that in one state case the *Zorach* decision was used to deny an expansion of church-state cooperation. The New Jersey Supreme Court held the distribution of Gideon Bibles in the public schools to be preferential aid for some religious sects. See Tudor v. Board of Education, 100 A. 2d 857 (1953). This is, however, the only instance of the restrictive use of the precedent in state or federal courts of which I am aware.

[59] Paul N. Elbin, "Religion in State Schools," *Christian Century*, Vol. 69 (September 17, 1952), p. 1061.

[60] F. Ernest Johnson (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 195.

[61] Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 298 P. 2d 1 (1956), p. 7.

[62] 343 U. S. 306, p. 314.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for instance, turned to it to support its contention that "immoral" has a sufficiently precise and definite meaning for statutory use.[63] A Federal district court used the dictum to support a denial of a petition for naturalization to an atheist who refused to take the statutory oath of allegiance. In the *Zorach* case, wrote the judge, the Supreme Court "has not deemed it to be old fashioned to declare, 'We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.' "[64] The same phrase has also helped a New York judge find meaning for "immorality" in a concurring opinion,[65] and in another case supported the upholding of a pledge of allegiance to "one nation, under God."[66] Similarly, a member of the New York Board of Regents notes that in the *Zorach* ruling the Court proclaimed that "belief and dependence upon Almighty God is still the basic law of this great nation."[67] So the Court's dictum is turned from a statement of social fact to a constitutional imperative.

Finally, one ought to note that the *Zorach* precedent has in the hands of laymen expanded curiously in another direction. From its pages the friends of released time have fashioned two spurious constitutional doctrines. One of these comes from Erwin Shaver, who in several of his writings has read the Court's decision to demand rather than permit released time in the states. "It is now," he writes, "the 'unalienable right' of every parent of a public school child, if he so requests it, to have his child excused for 'religious observance and education.' In no state or local community can this right be denied."[68] The other is voiced by a number of partisans who have convinced themselves that the decision "reaffirms the right of parents to determine the content and method of their children's education,"[69] and that "parental rights in education—a longstanding American tradition—received new vindication" in the decision.[70] There has been no judicial support for these two constitutional excursions.

The impact of *Zorach* beyond the bounds of the facts it decided and the rules it enunciated illustrates how Supreme Court precedents, as soon as they leave judicial hands, enter another realm of policy-making and become symbols in political debate and deliberation. A certain expansion and exaggeration of doctrine in this process is normal and expected. But the expansion is encouraged and accelerated when the decision is as freighted with sweeping dicta and legal homilies as *Zorach*. It is no overstatement to say that in their rush to embrace

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[63] Commonwealth v. Randall, 133 A. 2d 276 (1957).

[64] Petition of Plywacki, 107 F. Supp. 593 (1952), p. 593.

[65] Commercial Pictures v. Board of Regents, 113 N.E. 2d 502 (1953), p. 511.

[66] Lewis v. Allen, 159 N.Y.S. 2d 807 (1957).

[67] *New York Times*, June 16, 1952, p. 13.

[68] Erwin L. Shaver, "A New Day Dawns for Weekday Religious Education," *International Journal of Religious Education*, Vol. 28 (July-August, 1952), p. 8.

[69] Shaver, *op. cit.* note 12 above, p. 39.

[70] Msgr. John S. Middleton, Secretary of Education for the New York Archdiocese, in *New York Times*, April 29, 1952, p. 23.

Justice Douglas's comforting words the friends of the decision have smothered its legal distinctions.

VI. THE PRECEDENT VANISHES

On the other hand, there have been several instances where the *Zorach* decision has, surprisingly, been ignored when directly relevant; and ignored not only by interested groups and individuals but also in opinions of state courts and attorneys general. Since 1953 several such courts and officials have omitted mention of the *Zorach* rule in deciding the very questions of religious education and separation in which technicians of the law might be expected to consult the precedent. The fact that one finds the *Zorach* precedent serving in unlikely cases and failing to serve in other, more likely ones, lends credence to the old proposition that, contrary to the canons of jurisprudence, judges may deduce precedents from decisions.

The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in holding state payments to sectarian training schools invalid, in 1955 cited the *Everson* and *McCollum* cases as the last words on the separation of church and state.[71] And a dissent in a Kentucky case in 1956 cited the *Everson* case at length on the issue of separation without mentioning the Court's relaxation of the doctrine in *Zorach.*[72] In response to a 1954 query about the denominational use of public school facilities, with or without rental fee, the Nevada attorney general held such practices to breach the separation of church and state. After confessing he could find no cases deciding these particular facts, he cited the general dicta of the *Everson* and *McCollum* cases without mentioning the Court's less rigorous standards in *Zorach.*[73] Finally, the Illinois attorney general, approving the holding of sectarian classes on school premises by regular school teachers before or after school hours, did not mention *Zorach.* The *McCollum* precedent stands curiously alone in his opinion, even though for this purpose it is probably a less favorable precedent than *Zorach.*[74]

VII. IN CONCLUSION

Initially, a precedent such as *Zorach v. Clauson* legalizes certain policies within the states, and interested parties and officials of the state apply the precedent to identical or similar programs. This much is the immediate and intended result of the Court's action, and it can be measured in terms of the growth of the program. More important, however, may well be the secondary impact of the decision on new and unsettled issues. The expansion of the *Zorach* precedent illustrates the tendency of an opinion to radiate constitutional sanctions far beyond its original boundaries. Its history ought also to suggest that a

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[71] Almond v. Day, 89 S.E. 2d 851 (1955), p. 858.

[72] Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W. 2d 801 (1956), pp. 812–813.

[73] Opinion No. 316 of February 19, 1954, *Reports and Official Opinions of Attorney General of Nevada* (1952–1954), pp. 232–235.

[74] Opinion No. 204 of March 12, 1955, *Illinois Attorney General's Opinions for 1955*, pp. 84–86.

Supreme Court precedent is in no sense an objective fact, that its interpretations and application depend as much on the goals and involvements of the groups concerned as on the words of the decision itself. To rephrase the old saw, the precedent in reality consists of what influential partisans and decision-makers say the Supreme Court says it is.

In effect, the *Zorach* precedent represents a continuation and extension, rather than a resolution, of conflict in the arena of church-state relations. By altering the balance among the contending interests, the decision has reframed the issue, shifted somewhat the focus of the conflict, triggered new interest group activity, and brought other policy-making organs into action. Released time programs are sanctioned and grow modestly with greatly diminished opposition, and their proponents take a cue from *Zorach* to press for new policies in the area of greater lenience the Court appeared to open up in the decision. So a decision such as this, especially one so thickly larded with popular dicta, creates a political and constitutional climate which encourages new goals and further innovations in aid to religion, thereby leading to the next test case. Beyond resolving old policy conflicts, then, the precedent has been used to advance and sanction new policy goals.

The evidence of non-compliance with the *Zorach* ruling indicates the limited effectiveness of the Court in maintaining constitutional uniformity within the federal system. Especially in religiously homogeneous communities where there are no dissident elements strong enough to protest or begin court action, the *McCollum* and *Zorach* rules are evaded and ignored. Although centralized judicial review of the litigation of such controversies has brought some uniformity of doctrine, the highly decentralized machinery of compliance thwarts real national uniformity of practice.

Finally, this analysis of the impact of *Zorach v. Clauson* illustrates once again that the doctrines of sociological jurisprudence cut two ways. Doubtless the Court felt forced by prevailing values to retreat in the *Zorach* case from its earlier absolutist position on the separation of church and state. But in so accommodating the mores of the time, it has created a symbol and an endorsement—the *Zorach* precedent—that is at the moment reshaping and molding the very values which the Court will have to attend to in later decisions.

COMMUNICATIONS

ON DERGE'S METROPOLITAN AND OUTSTATE LEGISLATIVE DELEGATIONS

In the December, 1958 issue of this REVIEW, "a note of factual skepticism" was introduced into the standard theme of urban-rural conflict in state legislatures. The conclusions drawn in that article were limited to Illinois and Missouri, but the overtones suggest—and not too subtly—that a similar examination of other legislatures might well show an urban-rural conflict to be a myth elsewhere too.

The conclusions are:

> " . . . the traditional belief in bitter conflict between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas in the state legislature must be rejected for Illinois and Missouri, at least at the roll-call stage (because)
>
> 1. Non-metropolitan legislators seldom vote together with high cohesion against metropolitan legislators.
> 2. Metropolitan legislators do not vote together with high cohesion.
> 3. Metropolitan legislators are usually on the prevailing side when they do vote together with high cohesion."

Several observations on these conclusions are in order. First is the old methodological issue surrounding roll-call analyses. There is no need to go over worn ground here, but one is again distressed to see insignificant school-bond validation acts and significant public housing or transit acts lumped together as equally important phenomena which help to demonstrate something as important as urban-rural conflict or lack of it. Moreover, nothing is offered to dispel the continuing doubt about roll-calls—even "contested roll-calls"—as useful in determining "the positions taken by legislators and to uncover group conflicts" (p. 1053). Derge was well aware of this problem when he *excluded* the Missouri Senate from his report because, as he says, "The conventions of the Missouri Senate apparently operate to reduce recorded conflict." Two of these conventions, as he notes, are "pre-voting compromise and consensus." So, we really do not have a "rejection" of "traditional beliefs" regarding Illinois and Missouri, but only Illinois and half the Missouri legislature. To state that an unproductive roll-call analysis of the Missouri Senate (see footnote 12, p. 1054) showed "no more, and possibly less, metropolitan conflict" in that body does not help much. If conventions, customs, informalities, etc., preclude use of the Missouri Senate in his roll-call analysis for both states, then citation of an unreported roll-call analysis for the Missouri Senate would seem to fail for the same reasons.

Secondly, we need a further look behind the finding (p. 1057) that "metropolitan legislators usually do not vote together with high cohesion." Derge gives us highly useful information on this point, and in light of the facts, the lack of cohesion comes as no surprise. Several characteristics of the "metropolitan" areas he uses as examples are noteworthy, *viz:*

1. The unique cumulative voting system in Illinois gives the Chicago delegation in the Illinois House a bipartisan character, *e.g.*, 36 per cent of the Chicago seats are held by Republicans—the overwhelming Democracy of Chicago notwithstanding. In short, a Trojan Horse born of a proportional representation scheme tends to split the Chicago delegation on roll-calls at Springfield.

2. In St. Louis City and County, Derge notes the "commonplace" that in the Missouri Assembly, the bitter opposition to city bills comes from the suburban county delegation, a majority of which is Republican. Here again, the "metropolitan" delegation is bi-partisan. Party politics and the big-city *vs.* suburb conflicts being what they are, it could be expected that cohesion in voting at the state capital would be low. The St. Louis city wage tax is a good example.

3. In Kansas City, Derge points out that factional battles which cut the Jackson County Democratic party off from the non-partisan, managed City Hall tend to split that delegation in the Legislature, and, in the author's words, "may nurture a condition in the selection and control of the legislative delegation which operates against city interests in the state capital."

The upshot of these examples is that "metropolitan delegations" rarely vote as a block, and the old urban-rural conflict theme in our literature is thereby said to be weakened. I would suggest instead that at least two of these three examples are weak. Chicago under cumulative voting does not send a "city party" to Springfield. It sends two city parties, each in business for itself. Kansas City's electoral processes and form of government seem to insure that something other than a city party goes to the capital also. St. Louis may send a city delegation, but when suburban areas of the county are added to it for analytical purposes, it becomes something quite different from a city party.

The St. Louis example presents a more typical problem for such urban-rural analyses. Here the fuzziness of the traditional theme comes forth. As Derge rightly points out, "the literature on 'urban-rural' conflict does not proceed from a precise definition of what is 'urban'." Yet, while this objection is valid, it does not seem fatal. Agreed, the language has been imprecise, but most writers in this field (I may be presuming entirely too much) are thinking of a conflict between cities of a substantial size—say, 100,000 or more—and other parts of the state whose non-representative legislative majorities are in control when they wish to be. Writers usually refer to the lack of experience on the part of non-big-city legislators as to big-city problems such as transit, welfare, housing, racial tensions and so forth. All then point out that the response by the state legislature where cities are under-represented is less than adequate.

The overall point one should make in these matters is not what voting patterns look like (Derge knows as well as anyone that people vote the way they do for a great many reasons, their locale being only one), but rather what are the substantive results of legislation in states where one or both houses are non-big-city-dominated (to risk a clumsy phrase) while the majority of people live in big cities?

Having read the analysis on Illinois and Missouri, I was tempted to apply the method to my own state of New Jersey, but for the same reasons that the author did not report on the Missouri Senate, quickly discarded the idea. The conventions of the two houses in New Jersey do not lead to meaningful roll-calls. Almost all roll-calls in the Senate are unanimous or nearly so—a well developed caucus system and considerable log-rolling make them insignificant for analytical purposes.

Instead, I made a brief analysis of the purpose of all important bills passed by both houses in the session just ended on May 25, 1959. Such a procedure is at best rough and ready, but it does show something of the big-city *vs.* non-big-city conflict in New Jersey.

Several items of basic information are in order prior to the findings. The New Jersey Assembly (lower house) is directly representative by population. Members are elected at large by county. There are 21 counties. In the Senate, each county has one Senator regardless of population. For example, Essex County has 1,000,000 persons; Sussex has 40,000. Six counties contain at least one city of over 100,000 persons. These six counties have almost 3,000,000 persons, or 58 per cent of the state's population. In the Assembly, they occupy 58 per cent of the seats; in the Senate, 28 per cent. The delegations from these six counties in the Assembly are wholly Democratic (35–0). Of the six senators, 5 are Democrats, one a Republican. The Senate operates by a majority party caucus system. There are 13 Republicans among the 21 senators. By their rules, a vote of seven members in caucus is required to release a bill. Committees are dormant, except for Judiciary which is non-big-city dominated and which controls gubernatorial confirmations.

Each bill passed by the New Jersey houses has a "statement" as to its purpose. As an aide to the President of the State Senate, I had ample time to keep general notes as to what each successful bill would accomplish. I also asked my employer a great many questions about the bills during the long floor sessions. Here are the results:

1959 NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE

Assembly Bills Passed	247	
Number of bills predominantly "city" in benefit—*e.g.*, pro-labor, housing, city roads, major municipal personnel bills, pork-barrel for cities, etc.	87	(35%)
Number of these "city bills" which passed the Senate also	35	(40%)
Number which died in the Senate	52	(60%)
Senate Bills Passed	192	
Number of "city bills"	23	(12%)
Number passing Assembly also	14	(60%)
Number which died in the Assembly	9	(40%)

Roll-calls (contested or otherwise) aside, these results show:

1. The big-city-dominated Assembly passes a higher percentage of big-city-benefit bills than does the non-big-city Senate (35 per cent as against 12 per cent).

2. Assembly-passed big-city bills fare less well in the Senate than do Senate-passed big-city bills in the Assembly (40 per cent success as against 60 per cent).

I therefore conclude that there is public policy conflict between the big cities and the non-big-city counties in New Jersey, and that conflict reflects itself in the character of bills emerging from each house of the Legislature during the 1959 Session.

It might be added that of the 23 big-city-benefit bills originated and passed by the Senate, over half were sponsored by the three senators who are well-known aspirants to the governorship. This and other significant ingredients of the state legislative process may be more useful in the understanding of "urban-rural conflict" than roll-calls.

Is it possible to reverse the English in Derge's conclusions, to wit: In the Illinois Legislature and in the Missouri House, certain electoral schemes, city-suburb antagonisms, and nonpartisan election processes tend to muddy the analytical waters to a point where roll-call analyses fail to show the actual big-city *vs.* outstate or downstate conflict that exists in those two states?

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A COMMENT ON DAVID BRAYBROOKE, "THE RELEVANCE OF NORMS TO POLITICAL DESCRIPTION"

With wit and common sense Braybrooke (in this Review, December 1958, p. 989) has focused our attention on an uncomfortable problem of political inquiry. He has rightly chided us for our failures as political scientists in sliding carelessly between the prescriptive and descriptive uses of such words as "function." Moreover, he has gone beyond criticism to offer as one solution of the fact-value problem his own model for measuring "success" in bodies politic. The Braybooke "success" model has, it would seem, two purposes: (1) To provide a controlled assimilation of moral norms into the process of descriptive inquiry. In the interests of methodological realism the process of political description should neither, on the one hand, "wash away the distinction between facts and values" (p. 989), nor, on the other hand, "banish the prescriptive elements" (p. 997). Such banishment "is neither a practical nor a reasonable program for political science" (*ibid.*). (2) To suggest a descriptive framework which would facilitate a working level agreement even between political scientists who may hold fundamentally different moral views. Moral controversy should not be allowed to obstruct descriptive work, for "there should be no controversy between scientists and moralists regarding the necessity of getting undistorted facts" (p. 991). Both these aims are laudable. Indeed, Braybrooke's general intentions win my hearty applause. Yet it seems to me that his model fails to achieve either of its purposes.

To what extent, in the first place, does Braybrooke actually assimilate prescriptive elements into a descriptive framework? Immediately after saying that they cannot be banished he states that "moral considerations . . . involved in the notion of success . . . can be dealt with non-committally" (p. 997). The model, he says, is a "standard guide for collecting . . . information, whether or not we wish to prescribe anything ourselves about such functions." (*ibid.*) But as soon as a moral consideration is dealt with non-committally it ceases to be a moral consideration. It is a datum. It is a moral consideration for the observed, to be sure, but not for the observer. No one denies that men in politics act on some kind—all kinds—of moral grounds. But this is not the methodological problem, which is how the observer, the political scientist, handles his own moral judgments—how, and how far, he admits them into his descriptive efforts. After seeming to raise this problem and promising to hold out a practical solution to it, Braybrooke sidesteps, and all of a sudden there is no problem anymore. The difficulty seems to be that Braybrooke has confused the distinction between the prescriptive and the normative. He talks both of prescriptions and norms and seems to treat them as synonyms. Actually, there are moral or prescriptive norms and there are descriptive norms. At the beginning Braybrooke appears to promise that he will show us the necessary connections between the two types, but in the end he gives us only a sample of the latter.

Indeed, possibly because he has confused this distinction, he has not even given us a pure brand of descriptive norm. Take his norm of "justice," for example; it turns out to be not very useful as a descriptive norm. "By the heading 'justice' I mean to indicate the consideration of how goods (in the broadest sense, including leisure and honors) are now distributed in a society . . ." (p. 998). Meat is to be attached to this conceptual bone (like the other main concepts in his system, "security" and "progress") by inquiry structured around three sub-heads: "inherited rights," "consequences," and "procedures." Braybrooke's definitions of these terms of course make them more operational than a mere listing might suggest; but I do not think I do them an injustice in saying that, however operational, they settle nothing with reference to the problem of value factors in description. Let us assume that two political scientists try to use the Braybrooke model and attempt to describe the inherited rights bearing on the distribution of honors in a society. Suppose they consider the honorific status of youth. They have before them data which give the average age of corporation presidents, public officials, and disc jockeys at different periods, which list the average number of father-and-son banquets per acre for two decades, which itemize public expenditures for education in different districts for different years, and so forth *ad infinitum.* Under the category "Honors, inherited, youth . . ." political scientist A writes "moderately high" whereas political scientist B writes "moderately low." Political scientist A happens to be an idealist. Political scientist B happens to be an economic determinist. My example is crude, but the point is simple: Braybrooke's model does virtually nothing to resolve the problem he started with: how can we cope with the moral judgments which inevitably intrude into political description short of sticking with objective trivia or making all facts subjective? Braybrooke has muddied the very relationship he started out to clarify.

Since the model fails to achieve purpose one, it must also fail to achieve purpose two, *i.e.*, scholarly agreement on description despite moral conflict between scholars. Braybrooke, of course, is not interested in producing a model that would somehow resolve moral conflicts. "Approaching the topics of the schema with one set of moral principles people may condemn a government as unjust, reckless, and improvident; other people, invoking another set of moral principles, may find it none of these things and count it a success. They would both be using the same schema. . . . I am not claiming that the schematic notion illustrated is an entirely *satisfactory* representation of the meaning of 'success.' I am just claiming that there would be general agreement among thinking people that it is more adequate than the primitive notions [*e.g.*, "workable," "viable," "flexible," etc.] mentioned" (p. 1000). But is a, forgive me, primitive notion of success qualified by standardized sub-heads more productive of useful information than, say, a possibly peculiar concept of viability developed out of a rich historical context by an individual scholar of some imagination? Or would two observers with fundamentally different moral principles really be using the same schema even if they tried to accept Braybrooke's? How could they agree on the data to be covered by terms like "leisure," or "honors," let alone "rights"? How can we expect fundamental moral (or epistemological, aesthetic, ontological) positions to be nullified by a descriptive model so ambiguous that, as it stands, a Thomist could well reject it on the ground that the factor of personality *per se* is not taken into account, at the same time that a logical positivist might reject it because the categories are not precise enough for useful quantification?

I would not wish to argue that description must wait until moral conflict is resolved, *i.e.*, until the world ends. Braybrooke has a portion of my sympathy in saying "The trick, both in theorizing about ethics and in doing it [sic], is to raise questions in the order that will maximize agreement" (p. 1001n). I would say, rather, that the trick in theorizing is first to decide what is important and then go after the facts and agreement. The trick in "doing it" is, indeed, to raise questions in the order that will maximize agreement. The sad thing on this score is that, knowing the trick, Braybrooke still missed it.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Co-operation and Post-War Change, 1939–1952. By Nicholas Mansergh. (London, Toronto, New York: Oxford University Press. 1958. Pp. xvi, 469. $10.10.)

The Commonwealth in the World. By J. D. B. Miller. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1958. Pp. 308. $5.00.)

Commonwealth Perspectives. By Nicholas Mansergh, Robert R. Wilson, Joseph J. Spengler, James L. Godfrey, B. U. Ratchford, Brinley Thomas. (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1958. Pp. viii, 214. $4.50.)

Evolving Canadian Federalism. By A. R. M. Lower, F. R. Scott, et al. (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1958. Pp. xvii, 187. $3.50.)

Here are four new and important books dealing with the British Commonwealth. Each deals with a different aspect of it, in different scope, with differing breadth of view, and with a very different purpose. It would be difficult to find a greater mixture of works on a single general topic. But, let it be said at the outset, it would also be difficult to find four books on this topic that set as high a standard of competence and utility. Two are by individual authors and two are collections of essays emanating from the Duke Commonwealth-Studies Center; two deal with the Commonwealth as a whole (one historically and one analytically), one deals with a variety of restricted topics, and one deals with a single dominion; three are formed around a central theme, while one offers only a collection of impressions about widely differing aspects of Commonwealth affairs. No set of general observations would apply with equal validity to all four volumes and the purpose of this survey will doubtless be best served by considering each of them in turn.

Professor Mansergh's new *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs* conforms to the same high standard set by the preceding volumes in this series. Its subtitle clearly indicates the scope of his survey: it is a masterly review of the principal developments and problems in the Commonwealth since the outbreak of the war. This is in effect the fifth volume in a continuing series of such *Surveys* begun by Sir Keith Hancock in the late thirties. The first four volumes (the fourth was also written by Professor Mansergh) brought the story of Commonwealth Affairs down to 1939; the present volume continues the *Survey* through the war itself and into the fundamental alterations that took place in the first half dozen post-war years. A complete collection of the *Survey* stands as an incomparable history and analysis of Commonwealth evolution since the Statute of Westminster. And to this one also ought to add the superb, two-volume, collection of *Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs 1931–1952*, also published by Professor Mansergh, in 1953.

The present volume is concerned with three principal topics: Commonwealth organization and cooperation in the conduct of the war; the post-war changes in the composition of the Commonwealth; and the relations of the Commonwealth countries, to the rest of the world and to one another, up to 1952.

Even at the height of the war, the cooperation of the Commonwealth members rested on little more than shared purpose and common goals and, as the author makes clear, the Commonwealth, if it needed the United States to protect its values and security in a world at war, was none the less the most enduring and successful alliance of free nations the world has ever seen. Problems arose in the alliance, of course: Ireland refused to take part; Australia was dissatisfied with the priority given to Europe and the Middle East; India seized the opportunity to press its claims to self-rule. But the coherence of common purpose held firm and the Commonwealth emerged from the war with its ideals and relationships intact even if the stresses of war had made inevitable a radical transformation of its composition and structure in the post-war years.

Professor Hancock in the original volume of the *Survey* pointed to the contradiction between the declared ideals of the Commonwealth association and the continued maintenance of imperial rule over the peoples of Africa and Asia. Immediately after the war (and before, too, in some areas) local nationalism began to pose a growing threat to the coherence of the "old" white Commonwealth; and in these post-war years nationalism has produced some fundamental alterations—alterations that have redeemed the promise of the liberal ethic implicit in the oft-stated ideals of the pre-war Commonwealth. Indeed, if it was to hold true to its ideals, as Professor Mansergh says it had to do, it could only take the path it has followed. The years of the present volume of the *Survey* saw the independence and partition of India, the establishment of Pakistan, the dominionhood of Ceylon, the withdrawal of Burma, and the final separation of republican Ireland. Vast changes these, and changes that required not only a new composition but a new rationale for the Commonwealth. To these questions the third part of the volume is devoted, and in many ways it is the most valuable of the three. Mansergh is an historian on the grand scale, but he is also an analyst and interpreter. It is far more significant, he rightly says, that the Asian dominions decided after the war to remain with the Commonwealth than that the association of older members came through the war unimpaired. But a new interpretation was needed and, if Mansergh devotes his major interest to the events themselves, he is nevertheless always to be relied upon as a sound interpreter of the significance of these events.

A much more venturesome attempt at interpretation is found in the second volume under review. Indeed, Professor Bruce Miller's *The Commonwelath in the World* is likely to be accepted as a landmark in the analysis and explanation of the nature and position of the contemporary Commonwealth; it deserves to achieve the same position of eminence in this field as the *Survey* volumes have achieved as histories. Professor Miller's view of the politics of the Commonwealth is highly realistic; he is concerned with what has happened to it since the war and with what is likely to happen to it in the future. He has no ax to grind or cause to espouse; he is not a reformer and he is most skeptical of those, such as the "Expanding Commonwealth" group of Conservative MP's, who provide blue prints of a future transformation of this association. In this view, what has produced the Commonwealth is a common historical acceptance of British values and British institutions, but what makes it a going concern is that it serves the interests of the component members. Both these considerations are of importance and, while the additional countries that might "expand" the Commonwealth might conform to the second criterion, they can scarcely be expected to accept the first.

This is a wide-ranging book, with an acuity of perception and a breadth of view that are often daring and sometimes breathtaking. Mr. Miller is concerned with the realities of political life in each of the thirteen present (and future) members of the Commonwealth (he includes Nigeria, Rhodesia, and the West Indies) and, while he is not equally skillful at summarizing for each of them, his effort is a real *tour de force.* His major concern is with the country's attitude toward the Commonwealth itself and toward its fellow members. For each one he analyzes first the interests, and then the policies, of the country as regards membership in the Commonwealth, and seeks to show the relation between the two. No similar effort has, I believe, ever been made and certainly none has ever been so successful.

Professor Mansergh points out in the *Survey* that the three distinguishing characteristics of the pre-war Commonwealth have now become obsolete. "Equality of status" and "freedom of association" had a positive meaning in 1926 as applied to British colonies of settlement that were just emerging from a legal subordination. But since the war these phrases have become otiose for an association of obviously independent states. The Commonwealth is multi-racial now and a good bit more than merely British. Furthermore, in a rather different way, "common allegiance" too has necessarily been abandoned, in consequence of a general recognition of the republicanism of some of the members. Mansergh like Miller, is concerned with the impact of these post-war developments, but Miller's is the real effort to calculate the results. In effect, Mansergh displays the problems while Miller seeks for solutions; Mansergh tells a history, and one rich with insight and interpretation, but Miller writes speculatively and analytically of the present and of the future.

For Mansergh the post-war Commonwealth is a fascinating problem in multiracial association, to be explained in the light of the intricate and infinite variety of relationships among these many peoples. For Miller, it poses anew the century-old and continuing problem of togetherness. As in 1839 and again in 1926, the Commonwealth has had to ask itself, "Of what does our association consist?"

Bruce Miller's answer to this fundamental question is that it consists of nothing more (or less—by all means, nothing less) than convenience—a "concert of convenience" he calls it. In his analysis of the interests and policies of the several members, he finds a considerable variation. The advantages and disadvantages of Commonwealth membership are not, of course, the same for all members: one would scarcely expect them to be the same in the older "colonies of settlement" as in the newer "colonies of administration." But what he does find in common is a "concert" or agreement on certain fundamentals. Sometimes the concert is little more than a negative agreement about the things they do not like or will not tolerate. But mainly it is a concert of *convenience:* this is the principal ingredient that holds the Commonwealth together; it is convenient for the members to belong, it is not convenient for them to withdraw. But, above all, each member is free and must be free to assess its own convenience. And this is important beyond the obvious, for Miller perceives and decries a continuing habit among the British people to speak of the Commonwealth with a "proprietorial tone." While students and statesmen usually recognize this fundamental autonomy, popular discussion too often pays it merely lip service and then goes on to assume that the system is after all dependent somehow upon British wisdom and judgment. It would be convenient, in Professor Miller's view, to bring the British people into the concert as well.

The other two volumes under review are issued by the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, which, under the chairmanship of the President of this Association, has for the past several years been making a highly significant contribution to the study of Commonwealth affairs. Neither volume makes any pretense of offering the great synthesis or analysis represented by the two books already mentioned, but each does provide a useful collection of briefer studies of the kind that makes books like Miller's and Mansergh's possible. Several of the essays in the two books stand, indeed, as major contributions to the literature on the Commonwealth.

The volume entitled *Commonwelath Perspectives* also contains a pair of essays by Nicholas Mansergh, both on themes more elaborately developed in the *Survey*. The first deals with "Commonwealth Membership" and the second with "Commonwealth Foreign Policies 1945–1956." The first, in fact, adds little to what has already been told of the problems of nationality and composition in the post-war system, although the explanation of the new formulas of association is clear and useful. The second essay brings the story of external relations down to 1956 (whereas the *Survey* volume ended with 1952).

Commonwealth Perspectives is a mixed bag, but a bag full of interesting and useful pieces. J. J. Spengler of Duke contributes an article on the demographic forces in the Commonwealth and concludes that though they are largely centrifugal, other considerations mainly concerned with defense and economics (convenience?) may serve to maintain the bonds of union. One of the most useful pieces is the analysis by Dean James L. Godfrey of North Carolina of the constitutional evolution of Ghana, certainly as complex an approach to self-government as the Commonwealth has recently witnessed. Another is by Robert R. Wilson of Duke on "The Commonwealth and the Law of Nations," in which the author explores some of the differences between the *inter se* legal relationships of the Commonwealth countries and the relations obtaining among other states under the ordinary rules of international law. B. U. Ratchford, also of Duke, contributes an economic analysis of health and welfare programs in Australia, as a case study of a problem that persistently troubles the economic policy and development of at least the older dominions.

The final essay in the volume is, for political scientists, perhaps the most valuable of all. Here Professor Brinley Thomas of the University College of Cardiff and explains in quite lucid terms the working and the problems of the sterling area. Most writers on this topic are economists (naturally enough), and the standard of clarity to which they usually attain leaves much to be desired. Thomas's is one of the best brief explanations I have seen.

In the other Duke volume there is more consistency of theme and subject matter, inasmuch as it is devoted exclusively to a particular institutional arrangment in a particular member of the Commonwealth. There has as yet been no general treatise of Canadian federalism but, until it appears, studies like these will not only lead to it, but also provide students of that fascinating subject with their primary sources of information and analysis.

Unfortunately, however, there is little new ground broken in this particular collection of studies and one is left with the impression that some of the essays have been put together from old notes. But even so, such surveys are often of considerable use as handy summaries, and this is clearly true of most of these. Moreover, the introductory essay by A. R. M. Lower of Queen's University is a first-rate piece of work. In it he examines certain "Theories of Canadian Federalism—Yesterday and Today," portraying with skill and even brilliance the theoretical problems engendered by the position of Quebec and by the frequent intransigence of the French community as participants in the Canadian federation.

All the contributors are distinguished Canadian scholars and it is perhaps unintentionally ironic that, in a volume whose central theme is the place of French Canada in the Canadian federal system, there is no contribution from any French Canadian. F. R. Scott of McGill surveys "French Canada and Canadian Federalism"; J. A. Corry of Queen's has an interesting essay on "Constitutional Trends and Federalism," which is highly useful in bringing up to date the judicial interpretation of the constitution and relating it to the political life of Canada. F. H. Soward of British Columbia writes with his customary skill on "External Affairs and Canadian Federalism," and Alexander Brady of Toronto makes an interesting, if rather misplaced, comparison of federalism in Canada and the West Indies.

All in all, this is a useful collection, but (except for Lower's introductory lecture) scarcely an outstanding one. It will serve its purpose, however, and students of federalism or of Canadian politics can read it with profit.

The study of Commonwealth affairs seems to have increased in quantity and in general interest during the post-war years, and it is interesting to note that in the twentieth century, no less than in the eighteenth and nineteenth, most of the principal work on the Commonwealth—and especially on the theory of the Commonwealth—is being done by students from outside the United Kingdom itself. Evidence of this may be found in the authorship of these four volumes, which, taken together, constitute a most impressive contribution to the furtherance of our understanding of this significant and fast-developing scheme of association.

WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON.

The University of Texas.

The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the "Elite." BY JAMES H. MEISEL. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1958. Pp. vi, 432. $7.50.)

Professor Meisel's study of Gaetano Mosca is an excellent piece of scholarship, the sort of book that appears when a man is devoted to his subject and is determined to place it in as broad a setting as possible. It is at once a portrait of Mosca's intellectual development and a critical study of the "elitist" concept to which Italian thought has made a classic contribution. Indeed, if Professor Meisel's book has a structural limitation, it is peculiarly related to the large task that he has chosen. A precise intellectual historian, concerned with editions and texts, Professor Meisel is anxious to avoid any shortcuts in building up the pattern of Mosca's thought. He leads us through Mosca's intellectual growth almost paragraph by paragraph, passage by passage. At the same time, he is a constructive political theorist, constantly evaluating Mosca's argument not only in terms of Mosca's own evidence but also in terms of evidence the Italian writer did not know. These are two difficult roles to maintain simultaneously, and if in the end the historian triumphs over the philosopher, if the analysis of "elitism" tends to get lost a bit in textual detail, we ought not to complain excessively. The very scope and variety of Professor Meisel's work make it absorbing reading throughout.

Mosca himself was a writer of ambivalent tendencies, as Professor Meisel shows us very well. There were always "two Moscas," the theorist of the "ruling class" and the theorist of "juridical defense," and one is reminded of the two facets of Machiavelli, or even Plato, which historians of thought forever seek to reconcile. The truth is that in the history of ideas the line between "elitism" and democracy is much more difficult to draw than we usually like to concede, since a fundamental exploration of the phenomena of politics can rarely leave either one or the other completely out of account. But the case of Mosca's "juridical defense," which, strictly speaking, is a libertarian rather than a democratic concept, may be a bit peculiar, by virtue of the extremism with which it is advanced. Mosca is not content with institutional checks and balances. He insists on a plurality of social forces as well, involving not only the separation of economic and political power and of church and state, but actually a diversity of moral concepts in the structure of community life.

But writers are not remembered, and not influential, for the modifying concepts which a student, familiar only with their popular reputation, is suddenly fascinated to discover when he reads them. They are remembered, perhaps rather cruelly, for what we call their "leading ideas," and in Mosca's case the "leading idea" is not social pluralism but the monistic implications of a "ruling class." What is the nature of this concept? In essence it is based on the paradox, well described by Professor Meisel, that an autocracy is really impossible since the autocrat requires assistants and a "democracy" is equally impossible since the people require leaders. Hence in all states there is a "political class," a minority, which wields power. The fate of this minority and the question whether it will be supplanted depend on the force of its ideology and the skill with which it recruits its members; but, even if it is overturned, the result can be only the appearance of another minority. There is here, as Michels put it in his famous phrase, "an iron law."

The pessimism that this idea, or versions of it, has introduced into the democratic thought of the twentieth century has been very great. But this is due, I think, less to the idea than to the twentieth century, for one can find it in most conservative theorizing after the French Revolution, when it failed to prevent outburst after outburst of the highest democratic optimism. Maistre, in his anticipations of a French Restoration, formulated it beautifully. Why our age is peculiarly vulnerable to this sort of reasoning is a complicated question, having surely much to do with the heightened bureaucratization of our life, the rise of the mass media, and the emergence of totalitarianism. But it is well to remember that in one sense the concept of a "political class" is no more a threat to democratic conviction today than it was, say, in 1848.

For it is, of course, a most unreal and unnecessary concept of democracy that defines it in terms of the absence of a leadership group. One is reminded here of Jeremy Bentham, the classical theorist of democracy most often smiled at today because of his *naïveté,* with whom it was an article of faith, derived not from Machiavelli but from Ricardo and the philosophy of the division of labor, that government was a specialized business to be entrusted to special men. What concerned Bentham was not the presence of a "political class," which he assumed as desirable, but the mechanism of election by which that class could be made to reflect the popular will. On this score Mosca himself admits that in "liberal" systems the need of elites to appeal to "the vast unorganized majority" obliges them to adapt themselves somehow to its demands. Pareto also says the same thing, which, unless we are to concentrate on a minor strand in modern thought, the yearning for the direct democracy of the Greek City, concedes much more of the traditional democratic case than is usually recognized.

Of course this does not deal with many significant arguments stemming from the power of elites to manufacture opinion or their propensity to combine with one another. But it is interesting that these arguments, which by now have yielded a pessimistic strain even in American thought half a century old, running from the early Walter Lippmann to the later C. Wright Mills, have never really established the meaninglessness of the popular will in any of the Western democracies. They have indeed acquired a curious and familiar status, in terms of which we are accustomed to greet them. They terrify but somehow they do not destroy. They advance but somehow fall short of victory. There can be no doubt that one of the reasons for this, as Professor Dahl has recently indicated in his acute essay, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model" (this

REVIEW, LII (1958), 463–9), is that the "elitist" theme has never been formulated in such a way as to make it susceptible of the empirical demonstration it requires. A heavy burden of proof, even when Mosca's "new school" has become a bit old, remains with the Machiavellians.

When Mosca sought to pluralize his ruling class, when he yearned for the separation of political from economic and religious power, he echoed an ancient liberal hope. This hope is as significant today as it ever was, but the last page of Professor Meisel's book suggests to me that it could in the end have an ironic twist. He refers to a controversy now going on in England, largely related to educational reform and to the "elites" we associated with occupational endeavor. Some fear has been expressed that a perfectly functional form of recruitment to these aristocracies—perfectly Jeffersonian, as it were—will yield new tensions, for the men who have failed their examinations for entry into the "elite" will then have only their failure to rationalize their relationship to their leaders. A society, as Mr. Worsthorne has put it, "dominated by men whose privileges are invulnerable because entirely deserved," is indeed a society whose difficulties we have not yet fully contemplated. Surely R. H. Tawney, or G. D. H. Cole, in an earlier age in British thought when the concept of "function" seemed the magic clue to every problem, did not foresee any difficulties. But if our society ever does become too functional, too remorselessly Jeffersonian in its recruitment of occupational "elites," may it not be that the "political class," narrowly defined, will emerge as a saving force? For it is of the essence of the democratic view that recruitment of the "political class" can never be reduced to the rules of civil service, since its task involves a type of virtue that is not quite the equivalent of reason. Hence, while we may have to accept our scientists at intelligence-test value, we need never so accept our politicians. In a scientific age, in other words, the ordinary man in a democracy may well have reason to rejoice that his "political class," though it is a class, is at any rate political.

LOUIS HARTZ.

Harvard University.

Political Power and the Governmental Process. BY KARL LOEWENSTEIN. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1957. Pp. 442. $6.00.)

If, as Mr. Loewenstein says in his preface, this volume "constitutes the prolegomenon to a more ambitious and fully documented treatise on comparative political institutions," what is to come will be truly formidable. The prolegomenon is a well written and substantial piece of work that surveys governmental arrangments from China to Peru and from Libya to Ontario. Forty closely printed pages provide a "scholarly apparatus" drawn from several languages. An introductory section deals with the theorists from Aristotle to Orwell. The chains of political power are horizontal and vertical. The relations between parliament and the government, judicial review and the electorate are horizontal. Federalism, guaranties of individual liberties, and pluralism are vertical. Some readers will think that what is called horizontal is vertical and *vice versa.*

Relying, perhaps, on the maxim that "though modesty be a virtue, yet bashfulness is a vice," Mr. Loewenstein says that he has made "a pioneering attempt to establish what lately has come to be spoken of as a 'conceptual framework'." Why make the attempt? Why not just use the "scientific method" as defined by a Nobel Prize winner: Do your damnedest with no holds barred?

Mr. Loewenstein's conceptual context "is the exercise of the political power fundamental for all political organizations." And he puts this question to himself: "Is power concentrated in the hands of a single power holder or state organ, or is it mutually shared and reciprocally controlled by several power holders or state organs?" Unlike many of his contemporaries, Mr. Loewenstein does not pretend that in focusing on "political power" he is following a new fashion. As a resident of Massachusetts, he is doubtless familiar with a little book published in 1830 by a Boston lawyer, one William Sullivan, *The Political Class Book: Intended to Instruct the Higher Classes in Schools in the Origin, Nature, and Use of Political Power.*

To the question—how far in different systems is power concentrated or mutually shared?—Mr. Loewenstein gives challenging answers as of different regions and of different periods of the governmental process. In comparison with the more ambitious work that is projected, this volume must have omissions. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the larger work will deal more with politics alive—that is, with power possessed and used by presidents, prime ministers, or parliaments on various occasions. To be sure, personalities do stalk across these pages, but frequently there are generalizations about the possession and use of power that make the reader furnish his own examples. We political scientists should not forget the wise advice of the Yale philosopher, Brand Blanshard, in his little book *On Philosophical Style:* " . . . Most men's minds are so constituted that they have to think by means of examples; if you do not supply these, they will supply them for themselves, and if you leave it wholly to them, they will do it badly."

It is all very well for us to know what, for example, the British constitutional arrangments are; the checks and balances that seem to be firmly based on precedent after precedent. It can happen, however, as at the time of Britain's Suez adventure, that all these checks and balances go by the board. The government of the day decides on a policy without consulting the permanent officials most of whom would have been opposed; the cabinet is divided but only two minor ministers resign; the parliamentary brake fails to work; the party in power approves the policy and disciplines dissentient members; the opposition party disciplines its members who think that something is to be said for the Suez "brinkmanship." An ounce of analysis of such an incident is worth a pound of generalizing.

In a work of such vast scope some slips are almost inevitable, but they are remarkably few. The British government has used the Emergency Powers Act of 1920 more frequently than Mr. Loewenstein intimates and he has added two names to the roster of presidents of the French Republic: Leon Bourgeois, of whom in 1896 parliament made "short shrift" and De Gaulle (no date mentioned), who "foundered on the rock of tradition." Perhaps in the latter case Mr. Loewenstein was peering into the future.

LINDSAY ROGERS.

Columbia University.

Democracy and the Challenge of Power. BY DAVID SPITZ. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1958. Pp. ix, 228. $5.00.)

Professor Spitz describes his work as "not a treatise but an essay," intended "more as a stimulus to thoughtful discussion . . . than as an exhaustive treatment of the subject." While his essay is remarkably brief and its style refreshingly simple and unpretentious, the discussion is nevertheless both wide-ranging and cogent.

The challenge of power about which Spitz writes is that lying in the fact that, even though democracy is in principle a method for controlling abuses of power, abuses can and do occur in democratic systems. Abuse of power (in a democracy) Spitz lucidly defines as any exercise of any form of power inimical to essential rights and liberties—namely, the "rights appropriate to the maintenance of equality" (especially of citizenship and opportunity) and "the rights necessary to the maintenance of democracy itself" (especially liberties of speech and association). In three terse chapters he catalogues past and present abuses of power in American democracy under the headings of oppressive acts by government, by private organizations and individuals, and by "public sentiment." Particularly noteworthy here is his argument that, contrary to Tocqueville's dictum, there is no "tyranny" in "the mere insistence on conformity, or in the indiscriminate pressures that are imposed in the effort to bring that conformity about, or in the apathy and despair that may enervate a body politic," however undesirable these may be on other grounds. "[Tyranny] exists only where there is an actual denial of democratic rights . . . by organized powers, governmental and nongovernmental alike." Therefore, "tyranny of public opinion" must be defined as "the attitude or state of mind that sustains and gives impetus to abuses of power by those who possess it in a democratic state."

This point is closely related to a fundamental proposition in Spitz's overall argument: "the problem of power is not a single problem capable of being dealt with by a single solution, but . . . many problems, requiring a multiplicity and variety of solutions, each calculated to meet a particular difficulty in an appropriate way." In the second half of the book Spitz considers and rejects as inadequate, because too single-minded and simple, a series of familiar "solutions" to the problem of power—the "schizophrenic" effort to combine the principle of responsibility (accountability to the electorate and majority rule) with fragmentation and check-mating of power (through checks and balances and federalism); withdrawal from the political community by the victims of political oppression; appeal to "right principles" of various sorts; appeal to the "right man," variously defined; and the institution of economic or other modes of democracy beyond the prevailing political one. Such considerations lead to the conclusion that democracy can control abuses of power better than oligarchy "not on the ground that it constitutes 'the' solution but rather on the ground that it better guarantees the right of free experimental choice among different 'solutions'."

In the course of his argument, Spitz makes constant allusion to countless names and issues familiar to the student of political theory. These illuminate and illustrate the central line of argument for the reader familiar with the allusions. But this is not a book on academic political theory or theorists. Neither is it a book written primarily in advocacy of some particular side in specific issues, although the author refers constantly and freely to various policy issues, old and new, and leaves no doubts whatever concerning his own preferences in all these cases.

His aim is the broader one of clarifying fundamental principles so that critical policy disputes may be settled consistently with both the mode and the substance of democracy. It is only by sure understanding of those principles that we can infallibly recognize critical policy disputes which reflect genuine conflicts of principle (democratic *versus* nondemocratic). And recognizing the existence of such conflicts may be as important a task as settling them in the light of democratic principles. For, as Spitz says, abuses of power in a democracy may result from unreflective actions as well as from malevolent intent.

Abuses from the latter source can be controlled only by outright force and power. But at least some "unreflective abuses of power" may perhaps be avoided through the kind of cogitation upon democratic principles so neatly exemplified in Professor Spitz's essay.

JOHN C. WAHLKE.

Vanderbilt University.

Parties and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioral Approach. BY AVERY LEISERSON. (New York: Alfred A. Konpf. 1958. Pp. xvii, 379, x. $5.75.)

This substantial work marks the most skillful present attempt to splice research findings in political behavior into the many loose ends left by an institutional discussion of how parties function. Not content with describing voting behavior within the party framework in America, the author ventures to analyze, probing cautiously but persistently into the causes for the manifest action of individuals in the context of political and other social institutions. Nevertheless such behavioral analysis contributes to rather than dominates a study of political institutions that is unprecedented in the degree to which it reaches back in history and beyond Western culture in the search for basic principles. Such a book is not only appropriate but overdue in a time when the major strategic and tactical, theoretical and practical problems in politics are no longer how Democrats or Republicans produce a winning agglomeration of voters but how constitutionalism and popularly responsible government grow, flourish, and decline.

Thus Leiserson discusses at considerable length the difference between totalitarian, absolutist, and liberal ideologies; one-party rule and dictatorship; representative and responsible parties; and the fact that constitutional government preceded democracy in Western civilization. Without ignoring them, he spends less time on such problems as the relationship between single- and multimember districts and the two-party system, presidential primaries, the locus of party control, or the myth of the independent voter. The result is a book that is analytically provocative about a timeless but contemporary series of basic issues. In an excess of empiricism we have tended to assume these could and should be considered only by that currently rather unfashionable and deprecated group known as political theorists.

We are well served, for example, by the discussion of primitive and authoritarian tribal social organization, caste and class systems, and modern totalitarian societies with cohesion and order based on personal loyalty to leader or party. Even more suggestively we get an outline of the emergence of the two-party system in England from a long history of conflict between factions within the king's court and between different segments of the ruling class (landed aristocrats, church, mercantile and manufacturing entrepreneurs) that formed *ad hoc* alliances with or against the crown. There is repeated use of such historical data, in a refreshing reminder that time is a political dimension and that institutions do not spring out of Jovian heads but are often unwittingly conceived, born, and matured.

One might suppose that Leiserson purports to have arrived at a rather definitive set of universal laws governing political phenomena in all ages and civilizations. On the contrary, he leans over backwards to remind us of the pitfalls of pontification. He does this explicitly—and implicitly, as when he says that constitutional government came before mass democracy in the West. (Surely this is not the case in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Indonesia, and perhaps not in nineteenth-century France.) There is indeed an over-simple generalization about the relation between politically conscious armies and dictatorships, Latin America being cited as an example, to the neglect of the constitutional aftermath of the English Puritan Revolution and of the military overthrow of Peron in Argentina. But, broadly speaking, the book presents suggestive hypotheses that extensively employ what data are available on the workings of political institutions in a variety of contexts. There is some tantalizing brief mention of developments in underdeveloped areas of the world.

The book is advanced enough in its starting point to raise the question of its readability by audiences less erudite than graduate students. This is a recurrent question. The answer to it is that what in one time seems to be beyond the scope of the most advanced scholars and scientists later is readily digestible by relative beginners. This has clearly been the case among physicists with the Einstein relativity theory. All of which suggests that the problem is not one of basic comprehensibility. This book should be food for thought for political scientists and their students for a considerable time to come.

This major advance in analysis and synthesis is of course not without fault.

There is a tendency to back into propositions and definitions. After a sometimes involved discussion of what parties are, Leiserson produces a succinct functional definition of them as intermediaries between citizen and government. There is a manifest failure to distinguish between personality and human nature—a distinction as conceptually important as that between an iron pot and an iron atom. Largely rejecting basic research and plugging for the use of intervening variables, the author proceeds gently to point out the merit and the inadequacy of research that relies on such intervening, supposedly independent variables as social class, race, and party identification. Occasionally repetitive and discursive, the book has defects of its virtue: a remarkably sage and successful effort to comprehend within a study of institutions the current and inescapably unsystematic efforts in the study of politics to become systematically scientific.

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Unofficial Government: Pressure Groups and Lobbies. Edited by Donald Blaisdell. (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science. 1958. Pp. x, 228. $2.00.)

Interest Groups on Four Continents. Edited by Henry W. Ehrmann. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1958. Pp. xiv, 316. $6.00.)

Serious professional attention to interest groups is primarily a development moved by American political scientists in the last three decades. Two recent collections of essays sponsored respectively by the American Academy of Political and Social Science and the International Political Science Association are measures of the extent to which this concern has dug deep and spread far. The horizontal dimension exceeds the vertical, but both surpass the production of six decades of academic political science before Herring's work on group representation in 1929. There are many questions about interest groups still to be explored and analyzed, and much of the achievement is still more descriptive than analytical. But it is of moment that the problem is recognized, and interest groups are not the only sector of political science for which adequate analysis is still to be developed.

The collection in the *Annals*, edited by Donald C. Blaisdell, is a group of sixteen essays organized under six titles: pressure groups in government, the big three of pressure politics, the operation of pressure groups, the regulation of lobbying, the group theory of politics, and American and foreign pressure politics. Under each of these titles, except the regulation of lobbying, there are three essays dealing with various aspects of the subject. Thus, pressure groups in the government are discussed with reference to the Congress, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary. The big three of pressure politics are management, the farmers, and the unions. Throughout, the coverage is broad, the treatments are professionally skillful, and, given the customary confinements of space, none can cavil that the authors chose to do one thing rather than another.

Still—it would be appropriate (perhaps in a longer collection) to consider the internal structure of interest groups, to regard these agencies of political aspiration and attainment as systems of private government. This might be a useful addition to the valuable insights into group cohesion and to the perception of group membership provided by Oliver Garceau and Alfred de Grazia.

To discuss single essays or sections for their intrinsic interest is a matter largely of subjective choice, and a reviewer's preference may not be like that of the reader, but three essays may be mentioned with some prospect that they may be held in special regard by others also. The first is the essay of Clement Vose on litigation as a form of pressure politics. Political analysis of the judiciary tells much that the lawyers leave out of their professional papers. The second is the essay by Samuel Beer on group representation in Britain and the United States. The discussion of interest group phenomena in Britain has proceeded a little like the discovery of the planet, Pluto. American observers knew it must be there before anybody could see it, and now everybody does. The third is the essay by Henry Ehrmann on pressure groups in France and, like the Beer essay, reflects the concern with evidence abroad of the activities of what was once thought to be a peculiarly American institution.

The volume on interest groups on four continents is a memorable one: that is, it is literally to be remembered as the first volume to treat of interest groups as a more or less global phenomenon of politics. The title is a little more catchy than cautious, though, since on at least one of the continents—Australia—formal political science has been taught only since 1945 and there are no studies of interest groups extant. And on one of the other continents—Asia—the only paper is about Japan where, it is said, interest groups (not studies, but groups) have been in existence only since the end of the Second World War and the constitutional changes in the Japanese political system. The rest of the essays in the collection deal with interest group phenomena in Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, the United States, and Yugoslavia, each of these pieces being written by a national of the country discussed.

The formal papers, however, are only the first of the two principal parts of the volume which, in its totality, is a report of the proceedings of the Fifth Round-Table of the International Political Science Association which was held in Pittsburgh in September 1957. The second part of the volume is a report of the seven sessions of discourse and debate; it covers the identification and organization of pressure groups, pressure groups and public opinion, the influence of pressure groups on parties and elections and on the governmental process, and some remarks about the influence of pressure groups on political consensus and decision-making.

It is in the nature of things that written papers seem to be more communicative in a book than a reported discussion. The papers were meant for reading and the discussion was meant for hearing. The report of the discussion, able as it is, cannot match the terseness, precision, and discipline of the papers.

Each of the papers has something uniquely interesting. Thus, although Australia is a late comer to political science, and there is no literature on interest groups, the preliminary classification of such groups by W. A. Townsley seems very promising. Pressure groups are said by Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg to exercise a disproportionate influence in Finland. George Lavau says that interest group research is becoming an important study in French political science, although the connotations of the phrase are almost all immoral. It is a test of the new empirical temper of French political science that it seems to be pushing forward against rationalistic inhibitions that assume that the last word was said by Rousseau when he voiced disapproval of partial societies. And in Sweden, although interest groups are extensively discussed, and have been for many years, the discussion is in Swedish, and little of the material has been translated. Throughout both the papers and the proceedings on interest groups, there is a sense that the common concern in the subject may help to develop truly comparative studies, and not merely cumulative records of autochthonous events.

The study of interest groups, however, like the study of much else in political science, has problems of concept, nomenclature, method, and technique still to solve. For example, even in the designation of the principal category of study, what are called interest groups in the French, Swedish, American, and Yugoslav papers, are called pressure groups in the Australian and Japanese papers, and lobbies in the English paper. But while some despair, and others joke, at the prospect of systematic comparative studies, it is certainly too soon to say that descriptions of interest group phenomena around the world may not help to develop new statements about what Alfred de Grazia calls "associational democracy" and thus contribute to a higher and more nearly universal synthesis of the data.

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Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy. BY WALTER MILLIS WITH HARVEY C. MANSFIELD AND HAROLD STEIN. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1958. Pp. 436. $4.00.)

Doubts about the effectiveness of United States foreign policy are widely reflected. They spur inquiry into how to make it better. This leads to a search for defects in the policy-making process. Burgeoning proposals for solution range from suggestions for creating an analogue of the RAND Corporation for the State Department to blueprints for a national academy in which a conclave of best minds might cerebrate on the broad terms of policy independently of and above the level of political contention.

An array of such institutions would doubtlessly be prolific in producing policy papers to add hugely to the bales already constantly accumulating and destined to become material for endless inquiring scholars in centuries to come. Whether they would do much for the improvement of policy is quite another thing. The inherent difficulty of all such schemes is that the plans produced, whatever their merits, are of no avail unless brought to bear at the place and moment of decision. Moreover, the time and place of decision are sometimes elusive. The limits set upon decision in one juncture are likely to have been established in some series of antecedent actions undertaken quite without regard for their eventual consequences. Events have an obdurate way of defying policy assumptions. This is especially so with respect to the tendency of reality to disregard the categories prevailing in bureaucratic establishments. Actions presumably belonging in the military pigeonhole turn out to be hotly political. Economic decisions reverberate into defense. External reality is apparently all of a piece, whereas action always tends to be departmental. Besides, history flows in an endless stream, whereas policy tries to make it manageable by dividing it into arbitrary time spans. Such are the circumstances making policy such a confusing and generally unsatisfactory business. This is a recurring theme of this clarifying and highly satisfactory book. Anyone concerned in the Sisyphean task of making policy rational and efficacious in face of the "unordered redundancy of known events" could hardly find a better book in which to begin his search for wisdom.

The book results from a collaboration, unplanned at the outset but successful. Harold Stein began the effort but was forced out by illness in 1955. Harvey C. Mansfield then took it up, covering the period from the Hoover administration through World War II. Walter Millis, with his fine combination of a historian's thoroughness and a top-flight journalist's readability, then got into the work, bringing the story through the Truman period and the first five Eisenhower years in the last three-fourths of the text.

The book establishes the terms of the puzzle rather than attempts to solve it. "The civil and military elements in our society have become so deeply enmeshed that neither the uniformed officers nor the administrative bureaucracy nor the representative legislature speak from any firm, independent position of principle or policy," Millis writes. He finds "no adequate standards by which either the military officer demanding greater defense efforts or the congressman resisting these demands in the interests of tax reduction can gauge the real effect of either position on the national security." The civil administration, too, is "without adequate standards" for its role "as regulator between the two." Such is "the true problem of civil military relations in the mid-twentieth century." Questions like that of the relative ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff or that of military or civilian preponderance in staff planning have only minor importance.

In earlier times, Millis goes on, "the twin objects of providing for the common defense and promoting the general welfare" could be kept separate and the former normally put aside in deference to the latter. This relationship no longer obtains, and "terms other than those which seemed appropriate to the past" must be found for relating the military and civil factors in the national life.

On the way to this dour conclusion, the book informs us on many important episodes of the past three decades. Professor Mansfield ably and succinctly tells anew the hit-or-miss way the big questions were handled in World War II, emphasizing the fallacy of considering military and political questions as if in separate planes of reality. Millis manages to bring zest to accounts of post-war reorganization and the inter-service squabbles of a decade ago—concerning which he puts up a good case for the Navy recalcitrants. His retelling of the problems of strategy in Korea and the Truman-MacArthur row is first-rate—this being one part of the book as to which I can exercise the advantage of having informed recollections. He hits the nail on the head, also, in telling of the bureaucratization of the National Security Council under Robert Cutler's aegis and manages to make something funny of Cutler's quantitative approach to the process of grinding out policy papers.

Everybody concerned should be commended for an excellent piece of work, especially Millis for demonstrating something the political science profession might well take to heart: to wit, that writing can have both seriousness and vivacity.

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Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. By JAMES S. COLEMAN. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1958. Pp. xiv, 510. $7.50.)

Local Government in West Africa. By L. GRAY COWAN. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. Pp. x, 292. $5.00.)

It is remarkable how quickly colonialism is passing into history—not that colonialism is dead, nor that its consequences have disappeared, but as an issue it belongs to the first half of the twentieth century, not the second. It is no longer a genuine moral commitment on the part of Europeans, in which, whether under the guise of assimilation, trusteeship, or partnership, western tutelage was said to be required. In the past decade there has been no area that has seen a quicker rout of colonialism than West Africa. Only last year, in French Africa, the option to remain within the French community was placed in the hands of Africans. In British West Africa, Ghana was the first to become independent, but now Nigeria, with internal self-government in all three regions, will shortly receive full independence in October 1960. Suddenly the issues of the day in West Africa are questions of the relationships that Africans in their own countries will choose to have with one another and with other nations of the world. The issue of colonialism that remains has now taken on a racial dimension, because the principles of independence and national self-determination, as well as the principle of one man, one vote, are only denied in those parts of Africa where there is European settlement, and where the political scene is dominated by white minorities. Nationalism can easily take the form of Africans against Europeans, as the movement toward national autonomy probes southward to touch Salisbury, Nairobi, or even further south. Witness the outrage in an Afrikaaner newspaper in South Africa which regards extending the franchise for Africans as folly, and points out that "in Kenya the native population was promised, not minority representation, but equal representation with Europeans in the Legislative Council, plus two seats in the

Cabinet. They refuse to accept this. They demand equality man for man" (*Dagbreek en Sondagnuus*, March 22, 1959). They may well be concerned. West Africa is leading the way for other Africans to follow—and the way is toward African self-government.

Two books by American scholars long familiar with the African scene will go a considerable distance in helping us to understand the role of West Africa in a contemporary affairs and, as well, how matters developed as they did. James Coleman's beautifully written study, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism,* is in my view the best study of African politics by an American political scientist. It is an essential work if one is to understand what is occurring in West Africa and fully appreciate the significance those developments for Africa as a whole. This study, for the period it covers and the material encompassed, will represent the most substantial work on the subject for years to come. Not only has Coleman dealt with the more salient historical characteristics of the West Africa scene, but he has also focussed on nationalism and westernization in Nigeria through the consequences of missionary effort and Christianity, the spread of Islam, the growth of commerce, the spread of education, the development of African elites, their rise and transformation, and most of all, the misunderstood contribution of Brazilians, Creoles, and the Garvey tradition in the development of modern nationalism. These factors are skillfully woven into a Nigerian tapestry in which the figures and the setting illustrate both the passion and the heat of modern nationalism.

Coleman deals with the transformation of the coastal elites into contemporary nationalists. He shows some of the stubborn difficulties in the way of creating an all-Nigeria consciousness, as distinct from regional or tribal loyalties, and in this way copes with the problem of ethnic parochialism, a particularly stubborn problem in Africa today, where custom and tribal differences continue to divide people from one another and separate the older generations from the younger.

In a sense the disputes that arise today from the persistence of such conflicts are fresh and new. The old divisions simply serve to facilitate conflict rather than to bridge the differences which appear. Therefore, Coleman's treatment of the rise of the nationalist movement in Nigeria is of particular pertinence in understanding these problems. Beginning with the nationalism of the Nigerian National Democratic Party, Coleman shows that, while it was limited in scope and elitist in its recruitment, it nevertheless took an all-Nigeria approach. But as nationalism expanded, as the passion for membership increased and as new kinds of recruitment occurred, appeals to local nationalism developed. It was through the Egbe Omo Oduduwa that the Action Group in western Nigeria came. Similarly in the East, tribal unions that really helped to expand and enlarge the participation of eastern Nigeria in political organizations led eventually to the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons under Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe.

Quite rightly, Coleman discusses Nigerian nationalism as a peculiarly southern phenomenon. Only recently has northern nationalism begun to appear as a significant factor. Its main focus was in relation to the problem of northern autonomy in a Nigeria moving rapidly toward independence. Northern Nigerian nationalism has been a protected nationalism. It has raised its porcupine quills against encroachment from the south. It seeks to preserve that which has never been destroyed and, since in the north the classic pattern of indirect rule was displayed, many of the institutions, the privileges and powers of chiefs, and the religious sanctions, which had supported a whole range of highly organized traditional activities, still survive in a very powerful form.

Coleman handles his material brilliantly. The tables that he has laboriously compiled are extremely useful, as anyone who has worked with African records will immediately recognize. Here can be found first class information on leadership: ethnic background, education, occupational differentiation, religion, and a lot more.

Another factor discussed, conspicuously absent in the more usual treatment of Nigerian materials, is the stimuli for Nigerian nationalism that have come from outside Nigeria: i.e., from the United States, Sierra Leone, Brazil. There were many contributors to Nigerian nationalism who were not Nigerians in their origin or who had been Nigerians many years before, had been taken away as slaves, and had returned, as in the case of the Yoruba Brazilians, to live in Lagos or other major towns as fairly prosperious traders and substantial citizens. The first local manifestation of western cultural expression came through the efforts of these "strangers." The Creole and Brazilian nationalism was directed toward gaining self-respect for Africans and giving them a sense of stature leading to participation in the social, political, and economic activities of Nigeria. It was perhaps the Garvey tradition that put a more populist edge on all this. Coleman thus shows how Nigerian nationalism is linked with America, which, in an indirect fashion, played an important part in the growth of mass nationalism in Nigeria.

Coleman deliberately does not treat colonial administration as an entity in itself. He is concerned primarily with Africans, their problems, their organizations, the way they view the world, and their aspirations as they move toward the building of a united Nigeria.

We can therefore view Cowan's book as complementary. It is a useful administrative history, dealing primarily with patterns of local administration in West Africa, French and British. For the British area, it concentrates almost entirely on Nigeria. Cowan tries to trace the varying conceptions of British rule, linking these views with the problems encountered by the administrative authorities in developing a native system of authority and subsequently of democratic local councils in Nigeria. He gives a good overview of the problems facing administrators, dealing with material that Professor Coleman excluded from his area of study: namely, the problems of the district officers and the problems of structural and administrative change from a governmental point of view. If Coleman's book deals primarily with nationalists in Nigeria, Cowan's deals essentially with the administrative history of Nigeria. Taken together they produce an extremely well balanced account for the American student seeking to evaluate and understand what kind of changes have occurred in British Africa.

Cowan also deals with French West Africa at considerable length. Here he runs into trouble. It is difficult to compare "local" government in French West Africa with that of Nigeria. On the basis of comparable units and levels of government, Cowan's book has the fundamental weakness of comparing what is not readily comparable. Nor has he used a set of analytical tools whereby functional comparisons could be made. Moreover, he tends to treat French West Africa as a single entity (indeed including French Equatorial Africa in some of his remarks). One gets the impression from reading this book that French administration really was a seamless web throughout all the eight territories of former French West Africa; he makes very little distinction between applications of policy in one territory and another or within territories themselves. The policies with respect to Guinea and the treatment of chiefs in Guinea or Niger were rather different from the treatment of chiefs in the Ivory Coast, but there is little discussion of the differences in this volume. Instead of dealing with some of the specifics and variations of these situations, Cowan generalizes about the differences or similarities involved in direct and indirect rule. Nevertheless, for the period considered (and Cowan's book brings us up to the *foi-cadre* of 1956 in French West Africa), this is a very useful survey of the main features of French and British administration. In its treatment of the Nigerian material it supplements Coleman's book. In its treatment of the French West African material it shows the contrast between the French administrative pattern and the British quite well. What is now needed is a third volume dealing with the politics of French Africa in much the same fashion that Coleman deals with nationalism in Nigeria. When this has been accomplished we shall have available useful and extensive coverage of West Africa, its development, and its transformation to independence. One can anticipate that the books yet to be written about West Africa will deal more with the new spirit that is abroad in that part of the world. That new spirit is Pan-African, anti-racialist, and egalitarian, and in its own way represents a spiritual and moral force with implications for the rest of Africa and indeed the world.

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French West Africa. BY VIRGINIA THOMPSON AND RICHARD ADLOFF. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1958. Pp. 626. $8.50.)

Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff are pioneers. Their mammoth *French West Africa* is the first full-length book in the English language on post-war events in that fifth of the African continent. Since 1945, the eight states of French-speaking West Africa have been moving towards self-government along a road bearing different signposts from those on the road taken by the English-speaking West African states—though they point in a similar direction. The tale of these developments is both interesting and important. Yet it has until now been told in English only in a few tantalizingly brief articles.

Aside from being a much-needed "first," the book has other qualities to recommend it. It is comprehensive in its treatment of events through 1956. Its three weighty sections—devoted respectively to politics, economics, and social and cultural affairs—discuss not only French colonial policy, but also the affairs of Senegal, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Dahomey, Soudan, Niger, Mauretania and Upper Volta. The material was gleaned from French secondary sources and official archives, as well as newspapers and unpublished documents and field work, principally during the autumn of 1953.

The subject is significant and the effort expended by the authors was considerable. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the book has several drawbacks. Labels are too easily employed: "inter-tribal intrigue," "anarchic independence," "warlike Peulhs" push back "more primitive Negroes." Even within the confines of a single chapter, the authors rarely produce an adequate framework to make intelligible the mass of assembled data. There are, of course, some happy exceptions. The brief chapter on the chiefs makes satisfactory reading. On the whole, however, the relevant and the irrelevant are jumbled together, and the reader is not given the elements with which to do his own evaluation of the material. To the extent that there is any expressed viewpoint, it is too frequently but a translation of the views expressed in the early 'fifties by higher French officials in Africa. Thus the material selected for presentation appears to be more outdated than in fact it is, for the changes that have occurred in the area since the bulk of the work was done have been more nearly along lines sketched out at the time by African than by French officials.

The rapidity of change in Africa is a handicap confronting all contemporary students of the area; certainly not even the keenest observer could have foreseen the abrupt advent of the Fifth Republic and the Community, not to mention the independence of the Republic of Guinea. However, adequate interviews with African mass party leaders might well have altered many of the judgments Mr. and Mrs. Adloff express. This precaution might have modified generalizations like the following: "As for established social and religious practices, most West Africans reject almost out of hand any legislation that might undermine them and are particularly opposed to the emancipation of their women." As soon as they acquired power, the leaders of Guinea wiped out the administrative role of the chiefs; those of Soudan made plans to do the same. Even the conservative leaders of Ivory Coast began to consider legislation to revise the matriarchal system of inheritance. As for the role of women, not only were several elected to representative assemblies, but also one of them, Mme. Ouezzin Coulibaly, became the first African woman to hold a ministerial portfolio. It is true that most of these events occurred after the book went to print. Nevertheless, the intent of African mass party leaders to take these actions was quite evident in the early 'fifties.

In dealing with contemporary Africa, the problem of sifting truth from fiction in printed as well as oral evidence is enormous. Nevertheless, surely a more satisfactory method of checking on data might have been employed for the book. More errors of fact appear than can be listed. Abdoulaye Ly (p. 115) is not a former president of the Dakar students' association. Mamba Sano (p. 136) was not a Socialist but a member of the Overseas Independents group. The section on contemporary Niger politics (pp. 160–162) is so full of errors that it is best disregarded. Nazi Boni's party (p. 177) was the *Mouvement Populaire d'Evolution Africaine* (M.P.E.A.). Sékou Touré (p. 139) had visited France several times prior to his election to the French National Assembly in 1956; his party is the *Parti démocratique de Guinée*, not the *Bloc Africain de Guinée* (p. 137), which was the party of his officially supported former adversaries. The officially favored communal meeting halls were the *centres culturels* rather than the *cercles culturelles* (*sic*, p. 515). And they failed less because of the dearth of funds than because Africans opposed administrative direction in youth and cultural organizations.

These drawbacks of Mr. and Mrs. Adloff's book may be due at least in part to their attempt to be too comprehensive. A region on which political data has already been assembled, the accuracy of most facts established, and the variety of possible interpretations explored, might perhaps be a suitable subject for an encyclopedic approach. But these conditions do not obtain in contemporary French-speaking Africa.

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The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945. BY HARRY J. BENDA. (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve; New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1958. Pp. xiv, 320. $5.50.)

Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia. BY C. A. O. NIEUWENHUIJZE. (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve; New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1958. Pp. xii, 248. $5.00.)

The books under review undertake a somewhat broader role than that suggested by their titles. They pursue in a very fruitful way the essential task of analyzing the complex processes of political and cultural adjustment in Indonesia under the influence of foreign rule. They afford, for example, a reasoned explanation of the progressive spread of Islam among the peoples of the Indies under the often rival leadership of the aristocratic official class and the more orthodox popularly-oriented village teachers and scribes. The authors also contrast the modern "reformist" Muslim organizations of the 1920's with the violently reactionary Dar ul Islam. These several diverse traditionalist elements were all in measurable disagreement with the emerging westernized nationalists, themselves divided into several camps, who assumed political leadership following World War II. This complicated factionalism is the crux of current Indonesian politics.

The two accounts are far from identical, however. Dr. Van Nieuwenhuijze's five autonomous essays follow a sociological and psychological approach, while Dr. Benda's account is historical. The cumbersome paragraphing and diction of the Dutch author contrast sharply with Benda's articulate exposition. The former nevertheless disarms his critics in his foreword by expressing the hope that his halting use of the *lingua franca* of the Atlantic community may be accepted with something of the same doggedness exhibited by English-trained scholars in refusing to read books in languages other than their own.

Among other things, Professor Benda presents a penetrating analysis of the values and shortcomings of Snouck Hurgronjie's crucial role in the formation of the ethical policy of twentieth-century Dutch colonialism. Despite all efforts at accomodation, Dutch colonial authority eroded away after World War I under pressure of increasing popular unrest in a rapidly changing political climate. The answering Dutch policy of political suppression and the virtual abandonment of Hurgronjie's program was colorless, negative, and ineffectual. Japanese occupation policy from 1942 to 1945, by contrast, was elastic and imaginative. It modulated from deliberate initial efforts to promote Islamic organization and awareness to a cleverly executed "divide and rule" technique which left all contending elements dependent on Japanese support. Popular unrest, developing eventually from military exploitation of Javanese resources and manpower combined with unfavorable fortunes of war, obliged the Japanese in the end to enlist urban nationalist cooperation designed to resist militarily the impending reestablishment of colonial rule. Dr. Benda has assayed an enormous volume of source materials, in Dutch and Indonesian, covering the occupation. If the policy delineation seems at time to be confused, the available sources are far from conclusive since the Japanese sometimes improvised.

Several of Dr. Van Nieuwenhuijze's essays cover territory traversed by Benda, but he contributes much besides. He examines, for example, the methods by which a "closed community," such as Indonesian society, undertook to sustain itself and to ward off dangerous alien intrusions. The House of Islam, being itself a "closed community" on a larger scale, proved highly acceptable to the Javanese in the face of early European Christian threats; it may be a somewhat less adequate defense now. The author also demonstrates how the Indonesian use of such potent modern terms as "religious liberty" and "democracy" carries entirely different connotations from the use of such terms in the West. His final essay describes the so-called "deconfessionalized" efforts of mediating, secularized Muslims to make modern political goals less objectionable by using traditional terminology in a fashion designed to blunt the sharpness of religious and cultural sectarianism. Dr. Sukarno's *Panta Sila* formula calling for faith in God, in humanity and righteousness, in national unity, in democratic consultation, and in social justice is a case in point. The substitution of a Ministry of Religion for the impracticable idea of an Islamic state is another. This kind of cultural improvisation obviously postpones the needed reappraisal of traditional values in terms of modern requirements, but it also avoids the forbidding alternative of the too abrupt scuttling of older values, however outmoded, before new ones can properly be assimilated. The problem has implications which extend far beyond the shores of Java.

Dr. Van Nieuwenhuijze's penetrating insights do indeed go far to compensate for the task of coping with his labored diction.

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Government Administration in New Zealand. BY R. J. POLASCHEK. (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Public Administration; London: Oxford University Press. 1958. Pp. 324. $6.00.)

From somewhat later beginnings, New Zealand has forged ahead of Australia in some aspects of teaching and writing about public administration. The smaller country enjoys certain advantages for this purpose: a full apparatus of modern government for two million people living in a manageable area; a unitary system with all its nerve centers in one capital; the concentration of university studies of administration in the same city; and a close relationship between the academics and the practitioners. The two-year, full-time post-graduate diploma course in public administration at the Victoria University of Wellington was largely secured, shaped, and sustained through its growing pains by liberal-minded public servants. Public administration teaching has been mainly in the hands of men who have passed through this course and later have taken a turn as full-time university staff. Departmental heads take part in its seminars, and its students, who are selected officers in their late twenties and thirties, produce research papers rooted in first-hand knowledge and experience. By this means, and through the twenty-year old *New Zealand Journal of Public Administration*, there has accumulated a fund of material from which books have begun to be produced. Even at the outset of this development, Leicester Webb's *Government in New Zealand* (1940) devoted special chapters to administration, while Leslie Lipson's *The Politics of Equality* (1947) was able to build more detailed sections on his own and others' work meantime. And, in this atmosphere, senior and responsible officials have been willing to contribute to public discussion with a frankness unusual outside the United States.

Government Administration in New Zealand, intended as a general introductory text, is a sharply critical book, as well as closely packed with empirical information. An obvious strain is involved in trying to combine these two qualities, though Polaschek manages by his manner of writing to disguise it admirably. He has made good use of the fund of previous New Zealand scholarship in the field (though missing some relevant Australian contributions to it) and has added a rich quota from his own research in primary sources and from his experience and personal contacts in the public service. This mass of knowledge is skillfully woven into three sections, on Organization, Staff Control, and Controls, the first two introduced by brief historical chapters. The only omissions I noticed easily were of some discussion of the relative claims of Treasury and Public Service Commission in staff control, and of the more important subject (briefly mentioned on p. 287) of developing decentralization in the public service. The book does not attempt to survey local government, which is already the subject of a volume in the series of Annual Convention proceedings published by the New Zealand Institute of Public Administration. There are admirable appendices, showing the Topsy-growth of departments and agencies, and a competent (though incomplete) bibliography of books, pamphlets, and periodical articles. The index is quite inadequate. But, in sum, both the citizen and the student reader are given a comprehensive introduction to the structure, organization, finance, staffing, and daily operation of a governmental machine as intricate—within its scale—as any outside the federal countries.

A pioneer introductory study could not be so comprehensive as this attempts to be without some sacrifice. The historical chapters, for example, are necessarily cursory, leaving a somewhat confused impression and sometimes giving quite misleading summaries of complex events. To take only one instance, the single paragraph on the wartime Economic Stabilisation machinery (p. 48) cannot possibly convey an accurate picture of the reality.

The critical observations in the book are weakened not only by compression but also by a general lack of comparative perspective in viewing New Zealand institutions. Both praise and blame might have been tempered in many places by reference to other countries' manner of facing similar problems. For example, New Zealand is not the only country with an inchoate structure of central and local administration resulting from the blithe disinterest of politicians and private citizens (and indeed of most public servants) in either logical organization or the design of machinery for the co-ordination of policy. It is true, for example, that the New Zealand approach to the public corporation can hardly be dignified even as one of "trial and error," since that at least implies a will to profit by past error (see the summary of alternations in railway management on p. 56). But the history of the corporation form in New Zealand has many parallels in Australia and elsewhere. Similarly, New Zealand shows and excessive proliferation of autonomous central departments—forty-one in 1957 (after a reduction of twelve between 1946 and 1954) under a Ministry of sixteen. But this is only an extreme case of a problem that exists in all modern states. Polaschek's presentation of the arguments for and the difficulties confronting departmental consolidation is, however, more sophisticated than many academic discussions of the subject. He realizes that consolidations must always be piecemeal, and he recognizes the ineluctable fact that no matter what the principle of grouping units—whether by function, process, or clientele—the range of separate governmental activities is too wide to be compressed into a score or less of "logically" unified departments and agencies.

On co-ordination in policy-making, Polaschek is again on uncertain ground. Briefly, his argument is that a system in which Ministers are expected to be so accessible to the public and also to bear so much of the burden of departmental co-ordination is unworkable. The New Zealanders have tried to make it work by seeking co-ordination through an elaborate series of Cabinet and interdepartmental committees. This confuses responsibility and leaves the ordinary citizen without any hope of understanding the actual processes of policy formation. But this is also a universal problem, and we probably cannot expect it to be solved by permanent machinery of any kind. Different sections of the community, at least to the extent that they are well organized, can usually gain some understanding of and access to areas of Ministerial and departmental decision-making that affect them particularly. And the changing pattern of events results now in one major issue (say, balance of payments), now in another (say, the general wage structure) coming to the fore. With each change in emphasis the center of policy making shifts to a different group of departments and Ministers, and it is not too difficult for the press and the interested sections of the public to concentrate attention and pressure on the crucial deliberative organs thus coming into operation.

As a final example of the problem of perspective, Polaschek is severely critical of the Public Service Commission, which he accuses of pusillanimity and lack of enterprise in discharging a number of its staffing responsibilities. Among these shortcomings he includes a half-hearted approach to staff training especially for the higher ranks. In this I think he does less than justice, partly through failing to compare the New Zealand effort with staff training abroad: in other British countries it began on a serious scale some years later than in New Zealand and has little to teach New Zealand in detailed techniques. As to higher training, in my opinion there is nothing in other British countries to compare with the Diploma course at Victoria University either in scope, method, or influence in the service. Perhaps Mr. Polaschek was unduly constrained by modesty on this head, in view of his own valuable association with it.

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Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics. BY ROBERT C. WOOD. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1959. Pp. xi, 340. $4.00.)

As striking as the scale of the suburban migration of recent years is the patchwork of plausible interpretations, general and particular, that it has produced. No major socio-political change in recent history has attracted so many oracles whose gifts of free-floating imagination are in inverse proportion to their concern for evidence. In a welcome shift toward sounder ground and with boldness, insight, humor, and restraint, Professor Wood has undertaken to develop a new perspective on suburbia; acknowledging that the data are limited, he has chosen to work out a conception that would economically accommodate at least the whole range of those that are known and effectively provide a realistic framework for future investigation. His effort is both commendable and refreshing; the degree of his success is remarkable.

Wood offers a welcome challenge to the assumption of what he calls the "looking glass" school of Riesman, Whyte, and others, that the "group-man" conception of American character is new and that the suburban haunts of the breed are the sign of the future. The relevance of this view, he argues, at best is to the dormitory suburb, not to the whole range of the phenomenon. More important, the political units of suburbia, which he places at the center of his concern, are anything but modern in their values and practices. Wisely looking to the realm of government for the kernel of his conception, Wood finds an anachronistic attachment to the "conviction that small political units represent the purest expression of popular rule," a conviction so strong that the "efficiency expert"—who also comes off rather badly from this penetrating analysis—dares not challenge it and even the critics of the "looking glass" accept it as valid. This dominance of old values permits the author, with a nice irony, to phrase his conception in terms of "suburbia as renaissance." Though "at odds with the prerequisites of contemporary life," suburbia as ideology is real; adherence to the values of the "republic in miniature" provides the best interpretation of the suburbs and "fundamentally . . . explains the nature of the American metropolis." With astounding stubborness the worship of the self-governing small town not only made a virtue of early necessity, but in Wood's view, also imposed the resulting unchallenged ideology on an industrial society; twentieth-century technology provided the means for attempting its re-institutionalization.

The theory of inevitable "metropolitan dominance," dear to the hearts of many economists and sociologists, is challenged, Wood argues, by the creation of galaxies of small communities and by the persistence of behavior patterns that have more resemblance to those of the perennial small town than to anything that can legitimately be labeled as modern. Acknowledging the fact that there are "suburbs and suburbs," Wood asserts the existence of patterned differences among them and finds common to all of them the use of political boundaries to perpetuate the uniqueness produced by population grouping.

Wood does not accept the specious "theory of conversion" as an explanation of suburban voting. He is, however, almost equally unhappy with the "theory of transplantation." Apparently because it seems to fit somewhat better his "renaissance" thesis, he rather finds the distinctive feature of suburban politics in an extreme "no-partyism" which carries with it the obligation of high participation and a rejection of all structures intervening between citizen and government. In this setting the suburban political leader, required by the general party structure rather than by the community, rarely intervenes in affairs below the county level, yet he can use the variety of special-district offices to groom an organization, and he "is able to receive credit for the good government he does not control and for the big majorities he does not produce." Suburban decision-making, in consequence, is essentially the result of personality politics, but, especially in the explosive public school area, a pattern of bureaucratic control is an all but inevitable consequence of the impossible demands of the no-party assumption.

Despite the inadequacies of the general property tax and the challenges of water supply, pollution, and transportation problems, Wood concludes that some sort of independence for suburban governments is entirely feasible. The fortunately situated will continue to use zoning and related techniques to keep values high, and the more numerous low-value communities will pay for independence in poor services and through the patchwork-maintaining system of state and federal grants in aid. Both will be buttressed by the special authority, which, he thinks, implies no threat to governmental parochialism. Resolution of the problem of the metropolitan area, therefore is, in Wood's view, a question of values. The ideology of the small town, despite the philosophic authority in its support, sacrifices the values of democracy to the partly contradictory ones of fraternity. Not within its limits but within the "gargantuan city" lies the possibility of achieving the ends of the American creed—the rule of law, effective institutions of popular government, and individualism tempered by responsibility for others. The prospects of change are poor, but "rejecting the vision of the metropolis" means forfeiting the chance to provide "variety under arrangments consonant with freedom."

Despite the freshness and persuasiveness of his thesis, Wood's analysis has some unfortunate limitations. Struggling with a deficiency of data, he occasionally pushes what evidence he has farther than is reasonable, as in his somewhat questionable handling of census data in chapter four. Though he emphasizes the variety in suburbia, he fails to avoid entirely the pitfalls in the way of concentrating exclusively on the dormitory town. He tends to oversimplify both the origins and the potentialities of the regional authority, and he shows the effects of an early enthusiasm for the "conversion" theory of suburban voting. In the light of his major contribution to a tough-minded rethinking of the problem of the metropolis, however, such shortcomings as these are slight. This is an important book; one may hope, a foretaste of further reports testing Wood's challenging hypotheses.

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Small-Town Politics: A Study of Political Life in Glossop. By A. H. Birch. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. vi, 199. $4.00.)

Students of British affairs will be grateful to Professor Birch and his colleagues of the University of Manchester for this penetrating study of British grass-roots politics. For that matter, the 18,000 citizens of Glossop also should be grateful to Birch *et al.*: Glossop now joins that select number of towns, British and American, that figure prominently in the research literature of political behavior. Although it would be literally incorrect to say that Glossop, which is thirteen miles from Manchester, appears "on the map," it is clear that Glossop has become an important place-name in our developing political cartography.

Small-Town Politics is rich in unique detail, but the generalized findings of the inquiry are hardly peculiar to Glossop, or to England, or to the United Kingdom. In Glossop, as in most American towns of comparable size, the recent decades have produce marked changes in social structure and leadership. The old aristocracy, which owned the cotton goods firms and presided over the town's affairs at the beginning of the century, has disappeared entirely or declined in importance. No new aristocracy, writes Professor Birch, has taken its place, largely because "the majority of the managers, scientists, lawyers, clergymen, surgeons, and senior public officials . . . are likely to be immigrants rather than natives. . . . " The "immigrants" may be in transit between one job and another, but the point is that while in Glossop most "immigrants" do not play a prominent role in the social and political life of the town. Meanwhile, the most able of the younger people of all classes go on to the universities and technical schools, and from there to opportunities elsewhere. Such geographical and social mobility is undoubtedly of benefit to the nation, but, as Professor Birch notes, the consequences for leadership and civic loyalty in the towns of England are rather unfortunate.

The political behavior of Glossopians suggests that assorted political *mystiques* of Anglophilia need careful re-examination. Politics is rarely discussed in Glossop, and it does not appear that national issues have much effect on party members. Labour Party members register the most disagreement with the official Party line, and Conservative Party members the least, but issue orientation as such has little to do with local party behavior. The Glossop political parties, like parties elsewhere which shall be unnamed, are "self-perpetuating and self-contained, busy with their own affairs, not greatly troubled from day to day by party leaders, party bureaucracy, or even by party policy."

Despite a voting turnout of 80–85 per cent in national elections, more than half the sample of 601 individuals interviewed expressed itself as having "no interest" in politics. The "no interest" 56 per cent presumably includes a significant number of non-voters in local elections: at least 45 per cent of Glossopians do not participate in municipal elections, and about 60 per cent do not vote in county council elections.

It is also of interest that the Glossop citizenry votes Conservative in national elections, although the bulk of the population consists of industrial workers, most of whom live in houses without indoor toilets. The finding that 33 per cent of the workers voted Tory in the 1951 General Election is consistent with other studies of British working-class political behavior, but the explanation offered is rather novel. According to Professor Birch and his colleagues, the Tory workers are not mainly those who have been weaned away from the Labour Party by the Conservatives, but those whom the Labour Party has failed to convert from their traditional Conservative allegiance. The Labour Party, argue the authors, is a comparative newcomer to the British political scene, and it has not yet been able to win over the substantial segment of the working-class that identifies with the Church of England and with the Conservative Party. Indeed, the authors go so far as to argue that Anglican religious preference is the crucial factor, that "religious affiliation is the key."

This is an intriguing hypothesis, but, like other hypotheses in *Small-Town Politics*, it is not entirely proven. There can be no question, however, that such hypotheses point the way toward further, needed research, and are an important supplement to the established empirical data upon which the Glossop study is largely based. Professor Birch is also to be commended for the skill with which he was woven together the separate reports of his colleagues in a variety of disciplines. Finally, those of us on this side who are inclined to identify research with Foundation largesse should take note that a revolutionary precedent has been established by *Small-Town Politics*. The research expenses for the Glossop study, which were indirectly borne by the Rockefeller Foundation, amounted to $560.00!

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The Common Law of Mankind. BY C. WILFRED JENKS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1958. Pp. xxvi, 456.)

In this volume Mr. Jenks collected several papers previously published (1951–1956) and two new papers. New are his lectures at the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies on "The Universality of International Law" and the study on "Atoms for Peace." Three papers are reprinted: "The Scope of International Law," "Employment Policy and International Law," and "Craftsmanship in International Law." The remaining five papers are now published in an expanded version: "The Impact of International Organizations upon International Law," "An International Regime for Antarctica," "International Law and Activities in Space," "World Organization and European Integration," and "International Law and Colonial Policy." Clearly the papers fall into two categories: the studies on universality and the scope of international law are chiefly theoretical contributions; the others are mainly concerned with practical aspects of international law and relations.

"The Scope of International Law" is essentially a plea for a thorough revamping of the traditional exposition of international law that has become "wholly artificial" (p. 50) and an up-dating of the concept itself. In place of the nineteenth-century notion of a body of rules or precepts governing the relations and delimiting the jurisdiction of States, he urges the concept of the common law of mankind, meaning "the law of an organized world community, constituted on the basis of States but discharging its community functions increasingly through a complex of international and regional institutions, guaranteeing rights to, and placing obligations upon, the individual citizen, and confronted with a wide range of economic, social, and technological problems calling for uniform regulation on an international basis which represents a growing proportion of the subject-matter of the law" (p. 8). The law thus conceived, is "in an early stage of its development" (p. xi), and reflects "the imperfect development and precarious nature of the organized world community" (p. 58). The development has gone far enough, however, to merit greater attention of writers and a substantially larger share in the exposition of the law. The author suggests that, in addition to the traditional core, there should be included the constitutional parliamentary, and administrative law of contemporary international institutions; the rules, largely derived from multilateral instruments, governing economic relations among States, comprising monetary and general economic policy; human rights (civil liberties, political, economic, and social rights) protected by international guarantees; property rights, such as copyright and patents, of a distinctly international character; common rules established by multilateral instruments and applicable to public services, corporations, and individuals rather than to States and dealing with matters such as aviation, communications, etc.

The view that international law is a primitive legal order, that it is the law of the society of States, and that it applies to individuals is, of course, not new, having been giving currency by Kelsen, the Vienna School of "Pure Law," and many others. Various aspects of contemporary development have been subjected to intensive study for a good many years but it is true that by and large not much of it has been included in general textbooks and treatises on international law. Writers of such books have tended to confine themselves to customary international law which has general validity and to treat only incidentally the law created by multilateral treaties. Mr. Jenks's point—and it is a good one—is that some of these treaties have been so widely accepted that there is now a good reason for paying greater attention to them even though there may still be some doubt as to their durability. The difficulty in using contemporary materials in teaching international law especially in the United States stems from the widespread preference for the case method. And case books have been notoriously short in this respect.

Of profound interest are Mr. Jenks's lectures on the "Universality of International Law." Here he is not concerned with the scope of international law but rather with the method of finding it. For generations the materials relied upon by writers and governments have related almost exclusively to the practice of Western or European States and their overseas offshoots, and analogies have been drawn principally from civil law or common law or both. Mr. Jenks is deeply impressed with the emergence of many new States and a truly worldwide society of nations. After a necessarily very summary and somewhat abstract survey of the major (Latin American, Islamic, Hindu, Jewish, Chinese, Japanese, African, Soviet, and Western European) legal systems, he concludes that they "afford sufficient common ground to give us elements of an effective universal system of international law" (p. 169). However, in order to find and create the necessary concrete underpinning for the universality of international law, which chiefly exists in a formal sense only, he urges that international lawyers "need a broader and longer perspective," that we should "learn to think in terms of a group of major legal systems," that "we must seek to develop from the common elements of these legal systems . . . a universal legal order which gives reasonable expression to our sense of right and justice." If we do all that, "we may reasonably expect that by and large the great majority of the newer countries will accept the established rules of international law as a common heritage, no longer adapated in all respects to contemporary needs and calling for modification and development by orderly processes, but nevertheless constituting an essential element in the community life of the universal society in which we all proudly claim membership and in the stability and progress of which we all share a common interest" (p. 169).

This call for a broadening and deepening of our perspective and a more flexible and understanding interpretation and application of principles of international law is most welcome and adds weight to similar views expressed by others. One may question, however, whether even this broadminded approach is not altogether too solipsistic ("give reasonable expression to *our* sense of right and justice") and whether it will meet with a corresponding attitude in the new or newer countries. Moreover, even if it be conceded that on a high level of abstraction—and Mr. Jenks had no choice in this matter—it is possible to find common elements in the different legal systems, the real question is whether there are common elements at the working or operational level of international relations. The reviewer is bound to stop here, for he has already sinned against the author's fundamental prescription that "progress in political and legal evolution is made by exploiting to the full the opportunities which open before us rather than by critical analysis of the limits of those opportunities coupled with an insistence on conditions of further progress which are unlikely to be fulfilled" (p. 205). Surely, to wait for the spontaneous materialization of a genuine international community before undertaking the overdue overhaul of the exposition of and approach to international law is a counsel of perfection dreamed up by writers in their dens and cannot have any relevance for the man of affairs who is confronted with the here and now. On the other hand, critical analysis of the existing rules and conflicting interpretations is an indispensable condition of progress.

It is not possible to discuss the other parts of this significant book. All of them are highly competent and imaginative contributions. Mr. Jenks is a master craftsman and students of international law and relations owe him a debt of gratitude for having illuminated many problems and for making extremely worth-while suggestions for the future of international law and organization. His wealth of knowledge of practice and literature is enviable; he shares it generously with the reader. The bibliographical footnotes add in considerable measure to the usefulness of the volume.

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The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective. BY CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1958. Pp. x, 252. $475.)

Studies in Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory. BY JEROME HALL. (New York: Oceana Publications. 1958. Pp. 300. $6.00.)

Although neither author would accept without qualification the definitions or value judgments of the other, these two fine works in legal philosophy and jurisprudence approach their subjects with refreshing similarity and complement one another significantly in content.

Ordinarily, a reviewer would hesitate to term similarity "refreshing." In the literature of legal philosophy and jurisprudence, however, the disagreements and divergencies among authors are so common and extensive that any detectable identities of approach are worthy of special note. Political Scientist

Friedrich and Lawyer Hall merit further acclaim for their integration of legal and political data in their respective books. Each shows a thorough, if not affectionate, understanding of the capacities of the other's profession; and their works would be of inestimable value if they did nothing more than rebuild bridges of common interest between lawyers and political scientists.

Both authors regard as a basic task of the legal philosopher the development and utilization of comprehensive and systematic techniques of analysis. Professor Hall says that "the legal philospher cannot rest content until he has organized his thought in a valid, comprehensive unity which is relevant to the challenge of his day." Viewing the intellectual and spiritual life of man as part of his experience, Professor Friedrich maintains that "the ever-recurring problem is how all of human experience may be made fruitful for the progressive understanding of a particular object of knowledge. . . . Only by taking account of all the different kinds of experience can we give an image of the law adequate to reality and at the same time general."

Professor Friedrich divides his book into two principal sections: the historical development and a systematic analysis. In nineteen brief but sharply delineated chapters, he examines the development of philosophical doctrines of law from the heritage of the Old Testament, or "Law as the Will of God," to the revival of natural law in twentieth century Europe and America, in which "the social sciences are directed toward ascertaining and understanding recurrent phenomena, and thus have replaced divine revelation or abstract reason, in the sense of rational understanding of the nature of law and justice."

The chapter on "Law as Participation in the Idea of Justice," which deals with Plato and Aristotle, illustrates Professor Friedrich's concern with more than the "historical perspective" which the title of the book suggests. The contributions of Plato and Aristotle to legal philosophy are shown to have a timeless quality about them; for they prepared in large measure "the foundation for all later philosophy of law" through their distinctions between the general law of nature and the particular law of each community as well as between public and private law and statutory law and equity.

The section of systematic analysis gives the author an opportunity to present his own views about legal philosophy and to compare them with the contentions of the scholars studied in the section on historical development. While rejecting Popper's claim that Plato was a "totalitarian," for example, Friedrich cannot accept Plato's "exclusive conception of reason" as a basis for understanding the nature of "justice." To Professor Friedrich, justice must be understood as a changing reality. "Its changes occur in response to the dynamic process of politics, and justice needs to be comprehended within the context of politics." Similarly, "authority" is not a static concept based on positive law, but is "subject to considerable oscillation." All genuine authority, the author maintains, rests upon the communicator's "capacity for reasoned elaboration" or the ability "to realize the ideas, values and beliefs of the community's members." The basic norm of society from which the conceptions of justice and authority are derived is "the participation of the people . . . within the framework of a constitution resolved upon by the people themselves." Professor Friedrich's philosophy of law synthesizes elements of organic, sociological, and pragmatic conceptions. One need not agree with all he says to recognize the superior value of his book as a teaching device and as a challenge and stimulus to one's own thinking.

Professor Hall's book is also divided into two principal sections. The first consists of a series of essays on many facets of jurisprudence, including authority, legal classification, Plato's legal philosophy, cultural determinants of jurisprudence, integrative jurisprudence, and, of special value to the political scientist, unification of political and legal theory. The latter part of the book consists of six studies in the theory of criminal law and is designed to examine conceptions and principles like causation and responsibility that can not only explain the positive law of crimes but also serve as common instruments for analysis of other subject areas of the law.

Throughout the book, Professor Hall stresses the integrative approach to jurisprudence, for he is concerned with finding and building upon common ground with other scholars. Seeking to avoid the "pellucid particularism" that concentrates exclusively on a single aspect of value, fact, or idea, Professor Hall urges that an "adequate" legal philosophy must be ultimate ("constructed on simple irreducible ideas that are intellectually defensible"), comprehensive ("take account of all significant aspects of legal problems"), and consistent ("that doctrines defended and results obtained in dealing with some problems be not contradicted by those maintained elsewhere").

Just as the separation of legal axiology, formal legal science, sociology of law, and legal ontology from one another is deemed artificial, so too is the rigid demarcation of political from legal theory. "The long tradition of political valuation under the aegis of the natural law philosophies and the rise of sociology of law alone render such a demarcation untenable. . . . " Like Professor Friedrich, Professor Hall finds in Plato and Aristotle the coalescence of legal and political theory that could provide a model for the modern scholar's work. There is richness of insight and detail in his essays that make essential their careful study by lawyers and political scientists alike. In short, these books by Professors Friedrich and Hall are welcome, needed additions to the literature of political and legal science.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Job of the Federal Executive. By MARVER H. BERNSTEIN. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 1958. Pp. x, 241. $3.50.)

This small volume constitutes the report of a 1957 round table discussion at the Brookings Institution on some problems of federal service and recruitment. The twenty-four participants included political executives of the assistant secretary rank, high-level career civil servants, and a scattering of academicians and others currently outsiders. The eight meetings of the group are reported with generous reliance on verbatim, though unattributed, quotations and with careful attention to classical problems of federal administration.

The main purpose of the volume is to remedy "the shortage of books and other materials that help to explain the jobs of federal executives" and, it would seem, to provide a primer for recruits (especially those from the business world) to the upper reaches of the federal service. One thoroughly documented theme is that of the differences between public and private employment. Although the book will contain few surprises for the political scientist, it will be of use to teachers of public administration, much of whose literature is based upon wartime and Fair Deal experience. There is rich documentation here respecting such questions as the inevitability and advantages of "political" involvement by career civil servants (the Senior Civil Service proposal does not come off well in this discussion), the glacial growth and change of agency policy, the "double chain of command" resulting from Presidential staff, the relatively indecisive role of the Cabinet, and the pervasiveness of Congressional controls. The verbatim comments are enlightening on all of these points. One of the most interesting is that (at pp. 54–56) obviously describing the operations of the Assistant Director of the Budget for Legislative Reference and providing a succinct picture of Executive Office staff performance.

So far as the job of the political executive is concerned, the book's conventional conclusions are enlivened by personal narrative. Top-level executives spend little time in "defining agency objectives," no "job description" is possible for such positions, much time is spent in interagency "defence of the empire," and, with little time for thought, political executives still manage to produce politically acceptable compromise programs most of the time. Seekers of the "public interest" will be interested in the comment of two high political executives that they endeavor to delegate as much interest group contact as possible to lower agency levels.

Beside the documentation of perennial problems the volume tentatively suggests and comments upon some post-war trends. One suggestion is that there is a general increase in Congressional efforts at control—more individuals and interests tend to direct their business with the bureaucracy through Congressmen; Congress is increasingly employing one or another version of the legislative veto. There is a good, if inconclusive, discussion of the effects of Congressional committee staffs. A second suggestion is that there is a long-run trend away from the party as a source of executive personnel, and a short-run trend for the movement between private and public employment to slow down, reflecting, it is said, "a growing rigidity in our social structure" and less flexibility in industrial employment. Neither of these "trends" is systematically documented, but it is interesting that experienced government executives agree in remarking them.

The problem of the 1953 changeover in administration and the tentative honeymoon of the new political executives and the old careerists receives serious discussion and suggestions of a practical rather than an institutional sort on how to make marriage work. Recruitment, orientation, and retention of both political and career executives are discussed, but the relations of personal experience, while interesting, add little to the accumulating literature on these problems.

In summary, this is an excellent volume of its rare kind, which, for the political scientist, might be termed a documentary. The text is highly readable; the verbatim comments are literate, thoughtful, and illuminating. The book should assist the orientation of both the executive and the student.—CHARLES E. GILBERT, *Swarthmore College*.

The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs. By Holbert N. Carroll. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1958. Pp. xviii, 365. $5.00.)

Opening with an historical introduction, Professor Carroll concentrates on the period during which the role of the House of Representatives in foreign affairs has expanded most dramatically, the twelve years following the end of World War II. Most of this study is devoted to the internal organization and operation of the House, with but rather brief consideration accorded its relations with the Senate and with the executive branch. Carroll writes clearly and is an acute observer of the congressional scene.

His account of the internal power structures of the House in all their diffuseness, diversity, and changeability is unsurpassed. He indicates the shifting composition of the majorities on different issues during the floor stage of action. He depicts perceptively the relationships among the House party leaders, the Rules Committee, and the ranking members of the legislative committees—revealing clearly how the bulk of their efforts is directed toward developing bipartisan majorities. Though somewhat critical of the degree to which this leadership is decentralized and personalized, he concedes the difficulty of formalizing it through party machinery because of deep-seated factional cleavages. Especially praiseworthy is his exposition of the patterns of influence within and among the House committees. Borrowing Bagehot's felicitous distinction between the "formal and efficient elements" of government, he describes incisively the nature of the "efficient part" of each committee, a bipartisan group of variable size and composition which may or may not include the "formal part" (the chairman and party majority), but which supplies the actual leadership on a given subject. He realistically appraises the differences in prestige and power among the committees. After having established the inseparability of foreign and domestic issues, he discusses the resulting problem faced by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in opposing a measure with undesirable foreign policy implications handled by a more influential committee like Ways and Means.

Similarly, he highlights the grave hindrances to collaboration among House and Senate committees from such factors as tradition, protocol, institutional rivalries, and qualitative differences in their memberships and staffs. He portrays accurately the conglomerate nature of the executive as well as the legislative branches and the crisscrossing alliances among disparate parts of each, together with their clientele groups. Displaying insight and a grasp of the manifold integrative function fulfilled by conference committees, he also notes how coordinating devices in the administrative establishment help combat centrifugal tendencies within Congress. Here and in his over-all conclusion, which pragmatically and favorably evaluates our governmental system as a whole, he recognizes the totality of the governmental process.

However, superimposed on this perspicacious description is a dedication to some rather incongruous preconceptions. Perhaps the most basic is Carroll's continuing concern with the need for integrating control over foreign policy within the House of Representatives. Despite his acknowledgment that such defects are usually remedied by the Senate, by conference committees, or otherwise, he appears unduly distressed by incoherent and irresponsible actions of particular House committees or even of the entire House. Occasionally approaching a preoccupation with tidiness, he apparently would like integration at every stage of the process rather than be satisfied that adequate synthesis is ultimately achieved. Also, he repeatedly deprecates the informal and unsystematic way in which policy is coordinated, although that is a concomitant of the flexibility in our system which he often extols. Likewise, he is thoroughly addicted to the literary theory of party government. In plain disregard of his own findings about the paucity of relations among the party groups in the two chambers and executive branch, the predominantly bipartisan functioning of Congress, and the deep-rooted obstacles to developing more responsible political parties, Carroll persistently makes this sort of assertion: "A party can function better than any other agency as a link between the House and the Senate and with the President."

Fortunately, the adverse effects of clinging to such postulates are minimized by his careful scholarship. Avoiding tendentiousness throughout, he does not vigorously push his recommendations for modest procedural and structural changes incorporating them. Hence, the main value of this study—which is very great indeed—as an authentic exposition of the organization and operation of the House of Representatives is unimpaired.—Kenneth Kofmehl, *Purdue University.*

The Man in the White House: His Powers and Duties. By Wilfred E. Binkley. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1959. Pp. 310. $6.00.)

A reading of the bibliography of W. E. Binkley's *The Man in the White House* points up the fact that most books devoted to the subject of the American Presidency are relatively recent. One of the first was the present author's historical study of the relationship between the President and Congress, *Powers of the President,* which came out in 1937. (The book was more accurately retitled *President and Congress* when it was brought out in a revised edition ten years later.) The present volume, which draws heavily on its predecessors, is organized functionally rather than chronologically, and it contains, of course, much recent material. I found Binkley's sometimes biting, but on the whole kindly, comments on President Eisenhower of particular interest. He feels that the "romantic amateur in the art of politics" has learned a lot in office.

If books on this distinctive American institution are a recent phenomenon, they are now being produced with increasing frequency. It is fitting, therefore, to ask what this book has that Laski's, Hyman's, and Rossiter's books do not have. *The Man in the White House,* for one thing, is more historical in its approach than most of the books in the field. I felt that some of the early chapters, on the pressures brought to bear on the President and the effect of the nomination and election procedures on the institution, contained new and valuable insights. Then, too, the book has a distinctve title in a field in which almost all books have used only the slightest variations on the standard descriptive title, *The American Presidency.*

As in his book on political parties, Binkley stresses the "natural history" of the institution he is describing. He does not believe that the Presidency can or should be tampered with to any great extent. He quotes Justice Holmes approvingly, "For most of the things that can be called evils, the main remedy is for us to grow more civilized." The book is highly laudatory of most aspects of the Presidency and I can find only three fairly specific proposals for reform. He would like to change back the line of Presidential succession, after the Vice-President, from the Speaker of the House to the Secretary of State. He suggests that Presidential disability be handled by a Congressional resolution asking that the Vice-President preside for the period of the President's illness. His most sweeping proposal calls for the adoption of a legislative cabinet of the type advocated by Corwin.—George Goodwin, Jr., *University of Massachusetts.*

Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party. By Robert V. Remini. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1959. Pp. viii, 271. $5.00.)

Organization, some regularized specialization, and co-ordination of roles and tasks in the governmental and electoral arenas are distinguishing features of modern political parties, seeking to mobilize mass followings. It is to this problem in the Democratic party in the formative decade of the 1820's that Professor Remini, of Fordham College, primarily addresses himself, applying the historian's tools to the genesis and nature of American party organization.

The Era of Good Feelings was an era of party disintegration. The old-Jeffersonian mansion was becoming a higgledy-piggledy house of many wings, occupied by disparate cliques appealing to disparate sectional and other groups and exhibiting little family feeling, except on ritual occasions in the Great Hall of party symbolism. Seeking to stand "above party" and amalgamate old-Federalists with old-Republicans, President Monroe dispensed patronage quixotically and presided ineffectually over the dissolution of the Congressional caucus and the New York-Virginia axis. Entering the Senate in 1821, Martin Van Buren's great concern was with renovating and modernizing the Jeffersonian party house. Not really a "Little Magician" (like LaGuardia, when Van made a mistake it was a "beaut"), he was however the chief architect of an elaborate, articulated New York organization, in which the Albany Regency as a central directory prompted co-ordinated activity in every locality.

His efforts toward national reconstruction in an era of broadening suffrage were intensive. He put his New York masons and joiners to work on the national edifice. Carefully, he drew in Thomas Ritchie and the Virginia Junto as subcontractors. He wrote letters and travelled, particularly in the South, recruiting (like Jim Farley, except for the green ink) a loyal corps of local political carpenters. He labored and pleaded (with little success) for a party-building distribution of patronage. Unable to refashion the Congressional nominating caucus as a corridor to party cohesion, he did organize effective caucus strategy in Congress against John Quincy Adams's "broad-bottomed" administration. He proposed a national nominating convention for 1828, though the blueprint was not taken up until 1832. Lacking materials for a co-ordinating national party press, he did by 1827 link Edwin Crosswell's Albany *Argus* and Ritchie's Richmond *Enquirer* into a jerry-built information office. Little Van's culminating architectural achievement, however, was to connect the Crawford, Calhoun, and Jackson wings of the party structure, and to establish cooperative activity among these wings. He sought thereby to build a national Jeffersonian organization around the glory of Jackson's name and to seal off the Adams and Clay factions from the "true" party house.

Throughout this book, Van Buren appears not as the "Red Fox" or "noncommittalist" of traditional history, but as a principled old-Republican in new times who saw in party organization a proper democratic edifice. Though Professor Remini perhaps exaggerates his hero's role as master-builder and Jeffersonian advocate and is sometimes unclear as to what he means by "organization," he presents effectively a mass of new data to show the important contributions Van Buren did make. Devotees of disciplined, programmatic parties should fix Little Van large in their hagiography. Others, concerned with what party evolution can tell us about party nature and function, will find his party-building a revealing chapter in organization.—William Nisbet Chambers, *Washington University (St. Louis).*

American Labor Unions and Politics, 1900–1918. By Marc Karson. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 1958. Pp. xv, 358. $6.50.)

Labor and the New Deal. Edited by Milton Derber and Edwin Young. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1958. Pp. xi, 393. $6.00.)

These two books are recommended to those interested in labor and trade unionism and in the interrelationship between workers or unions and government policy and action. The reader will understand more clearly the nature and extent of political action by unions in the United States. The pragmatic, opportunist nature of the political action of the A.F. of L. is thrown into sharp focus. *American Labor Unions and Politics* is reported to be the first volume of a projected two-volume study. The quality of this volume gives rise to the hope that the second volume will appear soon.

Professor Karson details and documents the early involvement of the A.F. of L. in lobbying and in attempting to affect the outcome of elections. His analysis of the reasons for and nature of this political participation is most interesting. The antipathy of Samuel Gompers against any version of socialism is well-known. The continuing fight, covering a score of years, between the Socialists and Gompers and his supporters and the bitter personal recriminations growing therefrom are developed very well.

The influence of the Roman Catholic Church in solidifying the conservative political leanings of the A.F. of L. looms large in the view of Professor Karson. The large fraction, estimated at one-half or more, of Catholics as members or officers of early twentieth-century unions is noted. This composition of membership and leaders furnished a fertile seed bed for Catholic influence. Gompers' antipathy against the Socialists made him ready to accept the anti-socialist activity of the Church as a means of fighting the "radicals."

Despite this basically conservative "bread and butter unionism" approach to the problems of workers, Professor Karson notes a willingness of the officers of the Federation to turn to government for help in realizing goals that economic action of unions could not achieve. Such goals as relief from abusive use of injunctions, relief from the anti-trust law, and creation of a Department of Labor are examples. The Democratic Party, especially during the Wilson administration, proved to be reasonably receptive to the representations of the A.F. of L.

At the close of this interesting and well-documented presentation, Professor Karson draws a conclusion that seems to this reviewer not to be supported by his discussion. He says "the top men running America's unions are called labor leaders, but actually most of them are more adept at following than leading. Socially, they follow the prejudices of their members; economically, they follow the values of business. . . . " In a potentially democratic organization leadership and "followership" admittedly must be mixed. However, the studies of this reviewer and of other students of trade unionism suggest that the above statement is a serious overstatement.

Labor and the New Deal is the joint product of a dozen students of labor relations at the Universities of Illinois and Wisconsin; one of the editors of the volume is attached to each university. Essentially the volume centers on the very significant expansion of labor legislation during the New Deal period, the growth and change in unions, and the shifts in collective bargaining and industrial relations patterns.

Many of the contributors do not confine themselves to the New Deal period. While some historical perspective often is useful, it is doubtful if nineteenth-century events must be reviewed. Nor is it clear that events should be traced into the 1950's if the New Deal years are to be covered. Some chapters are limited essentially to the era noted in the title; others go far beyond. This comment is not applicable to the chapter dealing with "Labor and the New Deal in Historical Perspective."

A volume with a number of contributors must show variations in style, method of treatment, and the like; this is true in this instance. This reviewer found the presentation of "Organized Labor and Protective Labor Legislation," "Industrial Management's Policies Toward Unionism," and "Collective Bargaining Developments" to be most profitable reading. In general the various studies confirm the dearth of strong, positive leadership by the A.F. of L. in the 1930's in supporting the development of protective and social security legislation. However, even luke-warm support of such legislation was a long step forward from the opposition which the A.F. of L. had voiced up to the 1930's.

Professor Perlman in his concluding chapter calls attention to the significance of " . . . labor's self-integration into the evolving American society. . . . " Both Professor Karson and contributors to *Labor and the New Deal* point out the acceptance by the bulk of the union movement of private enterprise and Professor Karson notes the shift of Gompers from opposition to support of involvement of the United States in World War I. Up to 1895 the A.F. of L. sought to ensure racial equality in its member unions but yielded to opposition and, after the later date, accepted unions barring Negroes. All of these suggest that leaders yield to public (or member) opinion when the pressure is great. As noted above, Professor Karson draws somewhat the same conclusion, in his comment on union leadership.

Admittedly, union officers can not ignore the views of members or the public in making policy or conducting the affairs of a union. However, both books and many other studies call attention to numerous instances in which union leaders do go against the tide of opinion and push for the achievement of goals that go beyond those of immediate interest to the members. In the view of this reviewer, while membership opinion is important, there is room for, and there actually exists in the union movement in the U. S., an opportunity for and practice of leadership by the officers.—GLENN W. MILLER, *The Ohio State University*

How They Became Governor: A Study of Comparative State Politics, 1870–1959. BY JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Governmental Research Bureau. 1957. Pp. 103.)

This is a study of the career patterns of American governors from 1870 to 1950 in terms of the public offices held before the governorship. The author's main effort is to locate the states in which particular patterns prevail and to suggest some explanations for the differences that are revealed. In the judgment of the reviewer, Schlesinger's study is much more interesting and significant than previous studies of the social origins and status of public office-holders.

Ready summary is virtually impossible, but reference to some of Schlesinger's major findings may suggest the wealth of material contained in his study. He finds that succession to the governorship from other state-wide elective offices was most frequent in New England, Iowa, and a few southern states. He also finds that a low percentage of governors who had held other state-wide elective offices as their last office before the governorship represented a change in party control. To put crudely what Schlesinger refines, it appears that succession from state-wide elective offices tends to occur in states where inter-party competition is weak or limited.

Schlesinger discovers that the number of governors with legislative experience declined significantly from 1870 to 1950, but that there were some striking regional variations. For example, the decline was extraordinary in the mid-Atlantic and mid-western states but relatively small in New England and in the South, where succession to the governorship from the legislature is still relatively frequent.

The number of governors with law enforcement experience has increased generally and is most common in the border states, Montana, and Colorado. It is also reported that a relatively high percentage of governors succeeding from federal elective office, local elective office, or from no office at all represented a change in party control, a fact that suggests that these patterns occur when a minority party temporarily succeeds or in a highly competitive situation.

This study merits attention. It provides information not previously available and some interesting hypotheses. It will suggest to many the possibility of further inquiry along the same lines.

Executives for Government: Central Issues of Federal Personnel Administration. By Paul T. David and Ross Pollock. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 2nd ed. 1958. Pp. xii, 196. $1.50.)

This small but cogent volume adopts a "problem paper" approach to four major issues in the federal civil service. These are the development of a supply of competent "political" executives, "career" *versus* "program" staffing, alternative approaches to a senior career service system, and how and where to draw the line between political and non-political positions. The chief point of departure is the Task Force report on personnel of the second Hoover Commission, but other recent proposals are examined and some new ones advanced. For each issue the authors set forth explicit and clearly differentiated alternative policies and argue, in general, for "incremental" change. Apart from the clarity and comprehensiveness of its brief discussion, the volume is noteworthy for its attempt to set issues of personnel in the context of the party system and the large interest groups. The "concept of responsible party government" is taken as a frequent point of reference, though largely (and explicity) as preference rather than as tendency. There are useful supplements and documents on the current Career Executive Program and on party clearance procedures under the Eisenhower administrations; there is a good bibliography of recent literature. Students of personnel administration will want to read this book.

Efficiency in Government through Systems Analysis: With Emphasis on Water Resources Development. By Roland N. McKean. (New York: John Wiley and Sons. 1958. Pp. x, 336. $8.00.)

This book is a worthy addition to the growing list of economists' analyses of federal water-resources programs. It is, however, of broader scope and of more interest to political scientists than are most such studies. It contains (in Part 2) a useful general discussion of economic, "maximizing" criteria for public investment decision, including a brief exposition of the "suboptimization" problem. The agnostic analysis of this section may reinforce skepticism about the general meaningfulness of the "efficiency" criterion in public administration. Water-resources projects are taken as case studies (in Parts 3 and 4) and (in Part 5) the tools developed in earlier sections are tentatively and suggestively applied to performance budgeting generally. Various forms of benefit-cost and rate-of-return criteria for public investment are examined in this book, the practical problems in employing each are well discussed with comments that go beyond most previous discussions, and with the conclusion that "no single test can point clearly to the set of projects that is optimal." The analysis is critical as to the specific guidance that the economist's criteria can provide alone and unaided by administrative experience. But the author does argue to a general preference for rate-of-return criteria over the conventional benefit-cost methods, the major distinction being that the former does not assume a fixed budget while the latter does. This argument leads him to take issue with some other recent treatments of the subject, particularly the work of Otto Eckstein and John V. Krutilla. Students of administration and budgeting will find this a most useful book.

Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. By V. O. Key, Jr. (New York: Thomas A. Crowell Company. 4th ed. 1958. Pp. xiv, 783. $6.50.)

In the introduction to this fourth edition of an established text, the author remarks, in a typical phrase, that "this is not a routine revision in extent sufficient only to make obsolete the stocks of the earlier edition in the hands of the second-hand book dealers." His comment is accurate. The broad structure is fundamentally unchanged, but each section has been reassessed, up-dated, and usually rewritten. Much of the older statistical material has given way to the results of recent empirical inquiries, including the author's survey of American state politics. The leadership in the field that this text has long enjoyed has lately been challenged by a number of excellent books by younger scholars. This new edition will not completely put the rivals to flight, but it certainly confirms the authority of our most penetrating and productive student of parties, and it is written in the engaging style we have come to expect.

The Governing of Men: An Introduction to Political Science. By AUSTIN RANNEY. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1958. Pp. xii, 628. $6.00.)

This is a new textbook for use in courses offering a general introduction to government and politics. It is the author's intention to give the students "the facts," but in an interesting concluding chapter he discusses the problem of selecting, discovering, and organizing those facts. The approach throughout is topical: that is, the author proceeds from the forms of government to individual rights, to parties, to legislatures, and so forth. The reader will find references to many political systems, the American national government, however, being most prominently displayed. There are chapters on local government and international politics. This text is on a level appropriate for serious college students; it makes abundant and skillful use of the best in the literature. The footnotes and bibliography are outstanding.

City versus Farm? By MURRAY CLARK HAVENS. (University. Ala.: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama. 1957. Pp. v, 56.)

This is a study of roll calls in the 1955 and 1956 meetings of the Alabama House for the purpose of determining the extent of urban-rural conflict in the state. The author concludes: "Conflict between urban and rural representatives failed to develop on the majority of roll calls during 1955 and 1956. . . . Even in such areas as agriculture and municipal legislation, where the lack of identical interests is obvious, clash between these two groups was rare or nonexistent. On the other hand, there were seventy-eight roll calls . . . on which urban-rural conflict was present to a significant degree. Involved were issues, such as reapportionment and race relations . . . " (p. 49).

This reviewer's count of the number of roll calls considered is 281; and, as the author reports, there appears to have been a significant urban-rural division on seventy-eight. But, by this reviewer's count, thirty-five of these had to do with reapportionment and, somewhat surprisingly, another ten had to do with professional licensing. Five of seven roll calls on race relations showed an urban-rural division. The other roll calls showing this division were scattered. It is interesting to note that urban-rural division was not significant on roll calls dealing with labor, education, health, and welfare and was relatively insignificant in regard to taxes and appropriations. It is this reviewer's impression that urban-rural conflict even in the one-party politics of Alabama is rather unimportant.

Leadership in the Michigan Legislature. By MARGARET G. FULLER. (East Lansing: Michigan State University, Department of Political Science. 1957. Pp. 73.)

This is a neat and well-executed study of the leaders in the Michigan legislature in the 1956 session. A panel of members, lobbyists, and reporters was used to identify the leaders, a fairly small group relative to the size of the body. Among the findings are the following: lawyers and real estate and insurance agents were more numerous in the leadership group than in the legislature as a whole; the leaders had either more or less education than the typical legislator; the leader's districts tended to be representative of the districts held by their party; the leaders were somewhat more likely to support their party than non-leaders; the leaders had served longer than the average members but did not hold their positions simply because of seniority; formal and informal leadership were identical.

Public Administration. By MARSHALL EDWARD DIMOCK, GLADYS OGDEN DIMOCK, AND LOUIS K. KOENIG. (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc. Revised ed. 1958. Pp. xviii, 573. $7.00.)

This textbook has been extensively revised to take account of criticisms by its users although, as the author's state, "the basic orientation is the same." Louis W. Koenig has become the third author and has contributed a series of chapters on the Chief Executive, his policy staff, the Cabinet, central staff agencies and similar subjects. The authors make it known that they have not lost any of their faith in the hallowed "principles of administration." They are admittedly "sanguine about this field called public administration and are not inclined to brush aside the writings and discoveries of the past as so many 'myths and proverbs'."

The Worker Views his Union. By Joel Seidman, Jack London, Bernard Karsh, and Daisy L. Tagliacozzo. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1958. Pp. xi, 299. $5.75.)

This is an investigation of the attitudes of union members, based upon an intensive study of six midwestern locals: coal miners, plumbers, steel workers, metal workers, knitting-mill employees, and telephone workers. Chapters are devoted to each of the six and are followed by others dealing with such subjects as leadership in local unions, union democracy, and scope of union activities. Although these latter chapters are intelligently done, it may be doubted that the student of politics will find anything new in the way of ideas or evidence, although some of the facts reported may find use as additional documentation or as new illustrations.

Goverment in Modern Society: With Emphasis on American Institutions. By Wallace Brewster. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1958. Pp. ix, 619, xxvi. $6.95.)

This is a general introduction to political science with the major emphasis upon American political development, institutions, politics, and ideology. Conversely, it could be described as an introduction to American government and politics considered against a broad background of general descriptive and normative principles. A section on "Fundamentals of Government" fills the first 136 double-column pages. A substantial amount of comparative material is distributed throughout: for example, a full chapter on the British Parliament follows the chapters on Congress and a short section on the British judicial system follows the discussion of American courts. Two concluding sections deal respectively with "Modern Philosophies of Government" and "Government of the International Community." It is an ambitious textbook. Generous footnotes invite the student to wide-ranging exploration, which the length of the book may however, discourage.

American Government: Readings and Problems for Analysis. By Thomas H. Eliot, William N. Chambers, and Robert H. Salisbury. (New York, Toronto: Dodd, Mead and Company. 1959. Pp. ix, 299. $2.75.)

This is an ingeniously constructed book, which invites students to address themselves to a series of specific hypothetical situations with the aid of divergent interpretations of general issues. It is meant to supplement a descriptive textbook. The problems are well divised and should arouse interest. The authors suggest that the book could also be used, without assignment of the problems, as a book of supplementary readings. The readings are well selected but, as in most books of readings, they are unfortunately short.

Ogg and Ray's Essentials of American Government. Revised by William H. Young. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 8th ed. 1959. Pp. xii, 764.)

This eighth edition of the *Essentials* follows for the most part the organization and coverage of the latest edition of the *Introduction,* which was also revised by Professr Young. The chapter on "Administering Dependent Areas and Territories" is omitted. The text is condensed; footnotes are omitted; the bibliographies are shortened. As a result, the first two sections of the book, which deal with the national government, are covered in 531 pages. An additional 191 pages are given to state and local governments. The material, including that given in tables and charts, has been carefully brought up to date.

American Government and Politics: National, State, and Local. By Harold Zink, Howard R. Penniman and Guy B. Hathorn. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand. 1958. Pp. vii, 446. $5.25).

This is a short descriptive textbook designed for a one-semester course. The approach is structural; the coverage is traditional; the analysis is rigorously objective.

American Government: National, State and Local. By William Vernon Holloway and Emile B. Ader. (New York: The Ronald Press Company. 1959. Pp. vi, 492. $6.00.)

This is an elementary textbook covering the usual range of topics. There is little to distinguish it from numerous other books of the same type.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

The Vichy Regime, 1940–44. BY ROBERT ARON IN COLLABORATION WITH GEORGETTE ELGEY. TRANSLATED BY HUMPHREY HARE. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1958. Pp. 536. $7.50.)

Events in France since May, 1958, have forced us to take a fresh look at certain elements of the French political tradition submerged since the end of World War II. For this reason Robert Aron's book comes at a good time for British and American readers, though its unabridged original French version was published three years before the death of the Fourth Republic.

The Vichy Regime is not an apologia, nor is it a latter-day *J'accuse;* fortunately it also avoids the vices of that *tertium quid,* the "objective study" which carefully weighs everything and ends up telling us nothing. Rather, *The Vichy Regime* is a masterly examination of the Vichy period which essentially tries to provide answers to two questions: first, what was it that Vichy leaders attempted to do and what did they conceive to be the rationale for their actions; and, second, judging by the goals they set themselves, expolicitly or implicitly, did they accomplish what they set out to do? Professor Aron does not get entangled in "moral" judgments but shapes his presentation in such a way that the answers become quite clear-cut when they should be and uncertain when they obviouly were in doubt.

Aron's study of Vichy provides evidence that the current regime in France is indeed part of a long-standing tradition of strong executive government characterized by a heavy reliance on career bureaucrats for ministerial posts (at least as long as Pétain retained actual control of affairs, *i.e.*, April, 1942) and the prominent role played in public affairs by the personal friends and supporters of the chief of state. *The Vichy Regime* also serves to remind us that the corporative social theory of the Vichy National Revolution found its way into the *Journal Officiel* and contributed to the downfall of the Fourth Republic by giving legal sanction to the unbridled self-seeking of occupational groups empowered to fix a wide variety of conditions involving their activity. Vichy's attempt to articulate and implement a corporative scheme throws much light on the difficulties of European Christian Democratic movements trying to mediate between their search for a Christian "personalism" and the political authoritarianism of influential elements in these same movements.

Pétain and Laval emerge as the central figures of the Vichy regime while all the others are merely supporting actors. It is Aron's major premise that whatever Pétain did was motivated by his desire to protect the French people against the Germans and to regenerate France in the light of certain ideals to which he held unwaveringly. Pétain's principal weakness was his inability to understand political strategy and to grasp the techniques of political propaganda. Because of this he yielded to the Germans or to Laval on what he considered secondary questions and thereby suffered major political defeats (see especially his actions surrounding the meeting with Hitler at Montoir, p. 218). Aron contends that after Laval's return to power in April, 1942, Pétain ceased to have much influence on the conduct of Vichy's affairs but remained at his post in order to continue his mission of protecting the French people. Did Pétain's actions afford the French people this protection? Professor Aron would probably reply that this is one of the questions to which the answer must remain in doubt.

Laval's portrait, as it emerges from Aron's pen, is of an entirely different order. Like many of the radical Vichyites, Laval was attracted to the "socialism" of the New Order Germany claimed to be erecting in Europe. But above all, Vichy gave Laval the chance to play the role the Third Republic had denied him. His unbounded self-confidence and egotism took the form of a conviction that only he could guide the affairs of the country, that only he could talk with Hitler and produce favorable results for France. Aron points to this trait of Laval's unerringly when he notes that Laval's remark about a German victory being the bulwark against Bolshevism was part of the game he played on behalf of France (and Laval) no matter what the price. Aron suggests, correctly I believe, that in the end Laval "paid more for his words than for the facts they covered."

The title of this work in French was *Histoire de Vichy.* This has been justly changed in its English-American edition, for this is not a history, a chronology. It is a perceptive and illuminating study of a political regime which since 1945 has been either neglected or the object of political diatribes. *The Vichy Regime* does much to remedy this shortcoming.—ALFRED DIAMANT, *University of Florida.*

The Advent of the British Labour Party. By Philip P. Poirier. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1958. Pp. 288. $4.50.)

Labour and Politics, 1900–1906: A History of the Labour Representation Committee. By Frank Bealey and Henry Pelling. (London: Macmillan and Company; New York: St. Martin's Press. 1958. Pp. xi, 313. $7.00.)

These volumes deal with the rise of the British Labour Party between 1900 and 1906, mainly using the same source material, emphasizing the same developments, and coming to the same conclusions. Professor Poirier, of Ohio State University, presents enormous amounts of evidence ordered by a brief analytical framework, whereas Professors Bealey and Pelling, of North Staffordshire and Oxford respectively, are more concerned with detecting trends and portents, though their evidence, too, is voluminous.

Both volumes stress the role of the trade unions in the formation of the Labour Party, though many cross currents swirl about. Both agree that the role of the Fabian Society was small, though Poirier is more concerned with demonstrating this than are Bealey and Pelling. Though the Socialist tag was extravagantly pinned on the new Labour members of parliament by the Conservatives in 1906, Bealey and Pelling make the interesting point that only two of the M.P.'s ascribed a significant influence on their thinking to Marx but many more listed the Bible and such authors as Carlyle, Ruskin, and Dickens. Religious nonconformity was far more important than continental socialism.

Keir Hardie runs through both books as a self-denying, occasionally horse-trading champion, always proud of his worker's background and ill at ease in upper-class parliamentary society. The Labour Representation Committee, he hoped, would gain greater influence than its size warranted by copying the tactics of the tightly disciplined, obstreperous Irish delegates to the House of Commons. Ramsay MacDonald appears as a lively journalist who above all was good at harmonizing the many conflicting interests and personalities restively united in the Labour Representation Committee—the unions, the Independent Labour Party, the Social Democratic Federation for a brief time, and the Fabians, among others.

Both stories begin with the Labour Representation Conference in February 1900, in the midst of the Boer War—with its divisive effects on the Liberal Party—and the sharpening discord between labor and employers. The momentous Taff Vale decision dramatized for the unions how the machinery of government favored the employers and led to increased union activity for political measures to redress the balance. Bealey and Pelling deal at greater length with Taff Vale than does Poirier. Both volumes emphasize the Clitheroe by-election in which, after much soul-searching and some pressure from London Liberal Party headquarters, the field was left open to a Labour man. This was a prelude to the important secret understanding in 1903 between Herbert Gladstone, the Chief Liberal Whip, and Ramsay MacDonald, executive secretary of the L.R.C., that the Liberals would not contest certain seats in return for Labour support elsewhere. The climax, in each volume, is the election of 1906, in which the L.R.C. won some twenty-nine seats, and, shortly thereafter, took the name of the Labour Party.

It is a comforting evidence of sound scholarship on both sides of the Atlantic that the authors of both volumes have told such parallel stories and are so nearly harmonious in their conclusions. Almost the only difference between the books is their price. Each is an extremely detailed account of the Labour Party in its crusading youth. Either is required reading for the specialist in British government.—Edward G. Lewis, *University of Illinois.*

The British Communist Party: A Historical Profile. By Henry Pelling. (New Yok: The Macmillan Company. 1958. Pp. viii, 204. $3.75.)

Henry Pelling, the Oxford labor historian, has provided us with a lucidly written account of the main stages in the development of the British Communist Party. He has gathered a great deal of essential information about the variegated history of the Party from its turbulent inception in 1920 to its decline and retreat in the middle fifties. He accurately charts the various shifts and turns in the party line, and shows how these turns were never, except perhaps in the early years, determined by internal British development but rather by the changing needs of the Moscow decision makers. This is an excellent summary treatment of the main trends in British Communist history, the early sect-like period, the reasons for the influx of intellectuals in the thirties, and the successful infiltration of key positions in the trade union movement during the war years and after.

Yet, when reading this account one is but too often aware that this is but a "historical profile" rather than a full scale treatment of the subject. One misses more detailed discussion of the early history of the Communist Party and of its historical roots; one wants to know much more about the strategies of infiltration that it used so successfully in the trade union movement and elsewhere. There is hardly anything here about the internal life of the Party.

By and large the fortunes and policies of the British Communist Party run parallel with those of its American counterpart, since both parties, of course, followed directions from the Comintern and its successors. Yet there are a number of interesting dissimilarities, which need to be explored. For one familiar with the purges, exclusions, and witch hunts that have marked the history of the American Communist movement, it is most interesting to learn that the Politbureau of the British Communist Party has remained remarkably stable over a long period of time. "In the thirty years beginning in 1922," writes Pelling, "when the body was instituted, we can identify only some twenty-seven men and one woman who belonged to it . . . there have been few defections, and the most active survivors constitute a majority of the enlarged Political Committee of 1957." What accounts for this remarkable stability? What accounts for the fact that though immediately after the outbreak of the Second World War a majority of the Central Committee and a number of the most prominent leaders, such as Pollitt and Campbell, continued to favor the West against Hitler, refusing for several weeks to accept the new party line which characterized the war as "imperialist," there were no retributions for this remarkable lack of Bolshevik discipline?

One gains the impression that the British Communist Party, despite its infeudation to Moscow, always leaned to the soft side. (Ignazio Silone recalls an incident from his early days in Moscow which seems relevant here: at a Comintern meeting when the Russian delegate, Piatnitsky, had suggested that the British branches should formally submit to trade union discipline but should in practice do exactly the contrary, the British delegate burst out indignantly: "But that would be a lie!" This most unBolshevik remark led, of course, to uncontrollable and interminable laughter among the Russians.)

Questions such as these, however, can be answered only by someone who has probed into the more subtle aspects of the inner life of British Communism, and this Mr. Pelling has not been able to do. His account suffers from a lack of empathy; one gains no sense of what it was like to be a British Communist. There is but minimal concern in this book with the concrete social context—the general strike, the depression, the war—in which the party developed. The author has given us a useful chronology of events and an explication of major trends, but we are still in need of a more searching interpretative analysis of the appeals of British Communism.—Lewis A. Coser, *Brandeis University*.

Constitutional Developments in India. By Charles Henry Alexandrowicz. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1957. Pp. viii, 255. $3.15.)

Profesor Alexandrowicz—Barrister at Law (Lincoln's Inn), editor of the Indian Year Book of International Affairs, and Professor of International and Constitutional Law at the University of Madras—has produced a stimulating and informative study which should prove valuable alike to students of the government and politics of India and to those whose interest centers in comparative institutions. The author focuses attention on selected vital issues, among them fundamental rights, the nature of Indian federalism, elections and the party system, international law and commonwealth relations. He also takes up the important but still unresolved question of the admissibility of evidence from the Constituent Assembly Debates in judicial interpretation of the Constitution, showing that preventive detention was upheld through reference to the Debates, whereas evidence that the compensation provisions of land reform legislation were in accord with the intentions of the Constitution makers was excluded.

The longest and most controversial section of the book deals with the nature of Indian federalism. The author objects to the term "quasi-federation," so often applied to India, finding it both imprecise and inaccurate. In his view India is a true federation with "vertically divided sovereighty." Most commentators have been impressed by the power which the Centre can wield over the States. Alexandrowicz stresses the powers held by the States. This reviewer has followed his argument with interest but remains unpersuaded. That part of his argument which rests on the Centre's special treatment of Mysore and Travancore-Cochin [now Kerala], loses some of its force when the background is explored further. We know from V. P. Menon's account (*The Integration of the Indian States*, pp. 468–9) that these two relatively advanced States were given verbal assurances by Patel that they would be treated differently from other "Part B" States in order to induce them to accept the Constitution without weakening the provisions for Central control over the States. Patel's special mention of these two States in his speech of 12 October 1949 before the Constituent Assembly and the subsequent leniency shown them by the Centre were in fulfillment of this promise.

Of greater importance to Alexandrowicz's argument is the "existence and functioning of parliamentary and Cabinet Government in the States." In this reviewer's opinion, the weight that one allows to State autonomy must depend ultimately upon an assessment of the role of the Governor. In discussing the Governor's powers as such, Alexandrowicz regards them as doubly limited, both by the State Cabinet, whose advice "in the closed world of local politics he can hardly disregard," and by directives from the Centre. If the question concerns only the bounds restraining the personal ambition of a Governor, there can be no quarrel with this statement. If, however, the focus is on the freedom of action of a State government which finds itself seriously at odds with the Centre, it is quite another matter. The Governor has after all been given broader discretionary powers by the Constitution than has the President. The reason would seem plain enough. He could not use them in opposition to the Centre, whose appointee and agent he is, but the Constitution, as witness Article 163, clearly contemplates situations in which the Governor would act forcefully in opposition to the State Cabinet. His powers, in short, are mainly an instrument for Central control over the States, ready to be invoked whenever the situation warrants..

Recent Constitutional developments have tended to add to the Governor's powers. When Regional Committees were instituted in Andhra and Punjab, it was provided that in cases where these committees differed, the Governor's decision was to be final and binding. These developments came too late to permit Alexandrowicz much more than a note, but he questions the binding nature of the Governor's decision. It was written into the Constitution, however, and the intension appears to have been to strengthen the already strong position of the Centre in relation to the States. This development makes it no easier to accept India as a "true federation." Whatever position one may take on this controversial point, however, the general excellence and usefulness of the book remain unquestioned.—Margaret W. Fisher, *University of California, Berkeley.*

Bund und Laender. Edited by Ossip K. Flechtheim (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag. 1959. Pp. xi, 162.)

This weighty and concise little volume presents a series of lectures on the problem of West-German federalism by some outstanding German political leaders and political scientists. Having digested them, one ponders why it is that, while democracy as a way of life becomes more vital, the institutions and procedures of democracy face increasing danger of becoming tools for manipulating positions of power and interest. Whether the presidency, in the Bonn system, emerges as a strong or—in political terms—a rather meaningless post seems to depend on whether it is occupied by a Heuss or an Adenauer; election systems—as has been the case in France and Italy also—are juggled to safeguard or obtain political advantages; and federalism tends to become a system where ostensibly autonomous regional units are turned into vantage-points from which to defend partisan political positions or vested interests. As a matter of fact, one gains the impression that today there are hardly any *Laender* left which command a genuine feeling of "belongingness." True, Kurt Sieveking, mayor of Hamburg, in his essay on "Hamburg, A City State," makes an eloquent plea for the recognition of an ancient and still live attachment of Germay's city-state populations (in West-Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen) to their units, but this, after all, is local rather than regional government. There remains Bavaria, here loyally represented by the "Royal Bavarian Social Democrat," Wilhelm Hoegner, a *Land* whose nature as a genuine region is generally admitted. Beyond these one is inclined to agree with the somewhat radical conclusion in Heinz Kreutzer's essay on "Bund and Laender in the German Federal Republic" to the effect that the "Federal" Republic, in view of the decline of the functions of its member-units, today constitutes a "decentralized unitary state" rather than a federally organized one. This decline is apparent not only in fields like legislation, in which the role of the *Laender* is prefunctory, and not only in regard to finances, in which, as Gert von Eynern points out in his essay, the *Laender* become increasingly dependent on the federal level of government, but also in the less institutionalized phenomena of political life, such as the growing "nationalization" of issues, elections, and party politics in the *Laender*. As Flechtheim, in his own essay on the parties' approach to federalism, has found, being more or less in favor of state-rights etc. has become for the major parties a purely practical question, the answer depending on whether, like the originally "particularist" CDU, one controls the federal government and therefore favors strong central powers, or whether, like the SPD or the Free Democrats (both originally strongly centralistic), one in in the opposition at Bonn but has certain positions to defend in some of the *Laender*.

As one can see, this volume is distinguished by a refreshing amount of realism and an equally commendable absence of doctrinairism. In this respect, it is a characteristic product of the Berlin *Hochschule fuer Politik*, which arranged the lectures and whose development itself reflects the recent history of political science in Germany. Founded in the early twenties when the influence of persons like Max Weber was still strong, the only institution of its kind during the Weimar Republic, when persons like Theodor Heuss were among its members, disbanded when Nazi obscurantism no longer tolerated free thought, it was revived in 1948 in the teeth of a new obscurantism threatening its very home and has recently been merged with the Free University of Berlin as one of its institutes—for mutal profit, so one may hope. As a forum for free political discussion and a center of freely conducted political science it is a symbol of freedom in the beleaguered city—JOHN H. HERZ, *The City College of New York*.

Porträt einer bolschewistischen Partei: Entwicklung, Funktion und Situation der SED. BY CAROLA STERN. (Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft. 1957. Pp. xx 367. Paper cover. DM 12.80.)

Agitation und Propaganda: Das System der publizistischen Massenführung in der Sowjetzone. BY ERNST RICHERT, IN COLLABORATION WITH CAROLA STERN AND PETER DIETRICH. (Berlin and Frankfurt: Verlag Franz Vahlen. 1958. Pp. xiii, 331. DM 24.50.)

Macht ohne Mandat: Der Staatsapparat in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands. BY ERNST RICHERT. (Cologne and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 1958. Pp. xl, 181. DM 20.)

The regime of the German Democratic Republic (DDR) can be understood only through a close examination of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), its controlling and directing organ. Miss Stern's book renews and solidifies her reputation as the most knowledgeable specialist on this difficult subject. Basing her analysis of the origin, development and role of the SED on SED-published documents, speeches and articles of leading party functionaries, and on confidential party documents and oral reports received from SED functionaries who fled to West Berlin, the author reviews the several phases of party history from 1945 to early 1957. She shows by what methods the SED succeeded in preventing all anti-Communist forces from exercising political influence in the DDR (and former Soviet Zone of Occupation) and how it now exercises a monopoly in political decision making and a rather effective control and direction of most phases of public life. The accent of her careful study lies on the description and analysis of party policies; no attempt is made to cover extensively all aspects of government: for instance, economic and agricultural policies. Miss Stern herself points out some of the lacunae in her book: for instance, we do not know to what extent the SED Polit Bureau may be able to make decisions of its own within the framework of the Moscow Communist Party directions and how the Kremlin is kept up to date on SED activities.

Miss Stern's well-organized and carefully documented book is indispensable to any student of the DDR and Moscow's satellite Communist parties, among which the SED is still hitched to Stalin's star. The extensive appendix contains a wealth of detailed information: the most important decisions of party conventions and conferences, lists of the members and candidates of the party Central Committee, the Secretariat, the Polit Bureau, and other party divisions and sections, together with extensive bibliographical data about SED functionaries. There is a chart of the party structure, descriptions of the functions of various party divisions and offices and of party-affiliated institutions and organizations (including publishing houses, periodicals and newspapers, party training schools (up to the Ph.D. level) and the names of their directors and editors. There is also a good bibliography and an index of persons. A subject matter index, unfortunately, is lacking.

The *Institut für Politische Wissenschaft* at the Free University in Berlin—of which Miss Stern is a staff member—devotes more time and energy to the study of the DDR than does any other research institute in Germany. Under the able editorial direction of Professor Otto Stammer of the Free University, it publishes its own series of *Schriften*, of which the books reviewed below constitute volumes 10 and 11, respectively.

In *Agitation und Propaganda*, Mr. Richert and his collaborators offer a detailed description and analysis of the use of press, radio, and films in the DDR for the double purpose of killing off independence or individuality of public thinking and, simultaneously, forming a public opinion cast in the iron image of the SED. This is also true of the newspapers allowed, for tactical reasons, to maintain a "non-partisan" front appearance, such as the *Berliner Zeitung*. Compliance with the class character of the public information system is ensured by forceful actions against publishers and editors alike. Part III of this book deals with the Communist propaganda methods (in part first developed in the U.S.S.R.) in the factories, villages, and homes of the DDR. They include publications addressed to specific groups working or living together, such as shop and village newspapers, and pamphlets, wall-papers, and Red Corners (bulletin boards affixed to walls on street corners) addressed to the public in general. There are also so-called city radio stations, loudspeakers on trains and at mass meetings, exhibits in shop windows, numerous over-size pictures of the heads of German and foreign Communist leaders, and the big letter slogans on banners carried in demonstrations or reaching across streets. There is further large scale and systematic oral propaganda in the places of employment, in villages, and from house to house. The SED spends enormous amounts of money and man-power on these various forms of propaganda and on the whole system of propaganda schools and training institutions described in Section V of the book.

Mr. Richert's *Macht ohne Mandat* examines briefly the role of the SED as the directing force in the DDR and, at length, the functions of the various pieces of state machinery. The author studies the respective tasks of the cabinet, the planning organizations, the administrative departments and local government organs, and the institutions that serve to secure and demonstrate the power of the state: the administration of justice, the people's police, and other organs for state security and control. Special attention is paid to the task assigned to the *Kaderpolitik* of the SED: that is, its personnel policy, its methods of selecting the right people for the right jobs in the key positions of the regime. In an Introduction to the book, Professor Martin Drath, Judge on the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, comments thoughtfully on the subject of "*Totalitarismus in der Volksrepublik.*"

Both of these *Schriften* are characterized by an enormous amount of documentation, careful attention to both detail and synthesis, objective analysis, and a tireless effort to fathom the workings of a political system that seeks to cover itself with a cloak of secrecy. So far as material is available, understanding is gained and passed on to the grateful reader.

Agitation und Propaganda has no index (which would help to sell its wares) and *Macht ohne Mandat* has an index of persons only. Both books have a useful list of abbreviations commonly used in DDR terminology. Neither of these two volumes has a separate bibliography, but numerous references may be found by anyone searching through some 800 and 700 footnotes, respectively.—John Brown Mason, *Georgetown University.*

The Spartacist Uprising of 1919 and the Crisis of the German Socialist Movement: A Study of the Relation of Political Theory and Party Practice. By Eric Waldman. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Pres. 1958. Pp. xii, 248, $8.00.)

During the first week of 1919, Berlin was the scene of a badly planned and completely ill-starred revolution. On January 5, a huge outpouring of workers protesting the removal of Emil Eichhorn, the Independent Social Democratic Police President of Berlin, had seized the offices of *Vorwärts* and several public buildings; and a Provisional Revolutionary Committee, composed of Karl Liebknecht, Wilhelm Pieck, leftist Independent Socialists, and Revolutionary Shop Stewards, called for the overthrow of the Ebert Government. By the end of that week, the insurgents had been put down and a few days later Rosa Luxemberg and Karl Liebknecht were brutally murdered.

Professor Waldman's monograph, the first of a series of German Studies projected by Marquette University, examines these events of "Spartacus Week" in the light of the growth of radical sentiment during World War I in the ranks of German Social Democracy and of the subsequent interplay between revolutionary theory and the events themselves. It is a competent case study but little more than that; one will look to it in vain for fresh historical evidence or for much original analysis.

The author easily disposes of Communist

charges that the Spartacus Uprising represented a deliberate provocative action of the Majority SPD to force a showdown with its opponents to the left. Equally he dispels the notion that the rising was the planned and premeditated action of international Communism to overthrow the provisional German republican government. The very designation, "Spartacus Uprising," as he points out, is misleading, for the Spartacists, newly emerged as the KPD, and particularly their most authoritative spokesman, Rosa Luxemburg, opposed the revolutionary attempt, although they supported it out of a sense of "proletarian solidarity" once it occurred. The collapse of the uprising was assured by the indecisiveness of its leadership and, in any case, as Rosa Luxemburg well knew, the revolutionaries were hopelessly outnumbered and underarmed in the face of the majority Socialists' determination to "restore order" with the assistance of the military.

All of this raises the question of theory and practice. Leninists of a later generation, while venerating Rosa Luxemburg as a martyr, view the "failure of the German revolution" as proof, among other things, of the ideological inadequacies of Luxemburgism, particularly its romantic faith in the spontaneity of the revolutionary masses. The author recounts the substance of subsequent Communist charges (somewhat misleadingly assigning to them a significant role in the fusion of the KPD and SPD in the Soviet Zone after World War II). However, he does not really come to grips with the claim that a Leninist party might have won Germany for Bolshevism in 1918–19. To treat this issue would have required a much broader consideration of the relevant German social forces and of the psychology of the German workers and their leaders than is offered here.

It is a pity that the author's quest for scholarly objectivity has resulted in the reduction of the drama of revolution to the terms of dispassionate academic prose. The Spartacus Uprising, he concludes, "was a violent outburst of the sharp hostility which then existed between the socialist factions. The immediate cause was an incident which probably in a different situation would have failed to produce such a serious political crisis."—MELVIN CROAN, *Harvard University.*

Rural Local Government in Sweden, Italy and India: A Comparative Study. BY HAROLD ZINK, ARNE WAHLSTRAND, FELICIANO BENVENUTI, AND R. BHASKARAN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1958. Pp. xiii, 142. $4.25.)

The volume here reviewed is one of the latest on comparative local government. Although the literature on that subject is relatively meager, it is not a new field for political scientists. Without getting involved in Aristotle's or Machiavelli's comparisons of city-states, one may start with two books published by Albert Shaw in 1895 on municipal government in Great Britain and in Continental Europe. Other American and British pioneer writers on comparative local government include Frank J. Goodnow, John A. Fairlie, William B. Munro, Frederic C. Howe, Percy Ashley, and G. Montagu Harris.

Particular mention should be made of Harris. His *Problems of Local Government* (London, 1911) summarized the proceedings of the First International Congress on the Administrative Sciences (Brussels, 1910) which was largely on local government. Harris also wrote *Local Government in Many Lands: A Comparative Study* (London, 1926; 2nd ed., 1933) and *Comparative Local Government* (London, 1949). He was active in the International Union of Local Authorities (founded in 1913), which today still continues to encourage the comparative study of local government.

Rural Local Government in Sweden, Italy and India was initiated by UNESCO and carried out under the auspices of the International Political Science Association, which had devoted its 1952 Congress at The Hague to the theme, "Local Government as a Basis for Democracy." The three countries examined were selected by UNESCO while the scholars were chosen by IPSA, with Professor Zink (Ohio State University) as the general reporter; Director Wahlstrand (Gothenberg School of Social Work and Municipal Administration) as the reporter for Sweden; Professor Benvenuti (University of Padua) as the reporter for Italy; and Professor Bhaskaran (University of Madras) as the reporter for India.

Unlike Harris's *Local Government in Many Lands*, which is mainly a country by country account, the present study is truly comparative, as an examination of any of the ten chapters (legal status, intergovernmental relations, finance, citizen participation, etc.) will disclose. Within each chapter, the situation in each state is clearly set forth so that, if the reader wants information on only one of the three, he can readily get it. The problem of comparing systems which in many ways are so different is formidable. It is a tribute to the skill of the writers and particularly of the general reporter that worth-while comparative observations are really developed.

Critics should remember that a short book of 142 pages (counting the bibliography and index) cannot indulge in lengthy description. For example, India's Five-Year Plans and their village development projects are only referred to. Sociologists and social anthropologists may argue that not only government but the rural community as a whole should be compared along the lines suggested by Robert Redfield and others. Without denying the value of the interdisciplinary approach, political scientists prefer to begin with something more tangible such as government. The authors are to be congratulated for preparing a fine pilot study against a tight deadline and with a limited budget.—Roger H. Wells, *Bryn Mawr College.*

El constitucionalismo a mediados del siglo XIX, Vol. I. By Herbert Krüger, et al. (México, D. F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. 1957. Pp. xv, 783.)

This is the first volume to emerge from an ambitious project undertaken by the Law School of the National Autonomous University of Mexico in observance of the centenary of the promulgation of the Mexican Constitution of 1857. Although the country has had a half-dozen written constitutions during the course of its national history, the 1857 document may be regarded as especially deserving of commemoration for at least three reasons. In the first place, the federal system was introduced to Mexico with that charter; moreover, it asserted the rights of the lower classes against a clerical and landowning aristocracy; and the writers of the Revolutionary Constitution of 1917 (currently in force) regarded the 1857 instrument as a major basis for their own work.

The volume attempts a reappraisal of the century-old document by placing it in the perspective of world-wide constitutional developments as of the middle of the nineteenth century. Essentially, the project is an edited collection of essays written by an impressively distinguished roster of non-Mexican scholars dealing with their respective countries' mid-nineteenth-century constitutional experiences. For the most part, the chapters are contributed by internationally recognized authorities on the constitutional law of the countries involved. Thus the essays on Germany were written by Herbert Krüger and Hans Schneider; on Argentina by Carlos Sánchez Viamonte; on Austria by Josef L. Kunz; on Belgium by Pierre Wigny; on Brazil by Alfonso Arinos de Melo Franco; on Central America by Salvador Richardo Merlos and Ismael A. Vargas B.; on Colombia by Guillermo Hernández Rodríguez; on Chile by Julio Heise González; on Spain by Luis Sánchez Agesta; and on the United States by Clifford C. Alloway, J. A. C. Grant, Ernest J. Brown, Paul A. Freund, and Mark de Wolfe Howe.

It is both foolhardy and difficult to offer an evaluation of a work expected to include at least one more volume, to be published later, on the basis of the first volume alone. Readers of this review are therefore advised that they are strictly prohibited from lynching its author if what he says here is flatly contradicted by the subsequent volume or volumes when published. In the first place, it should be noted that this study of mid-nineteenth-century constitutionalism has thus far told us virtually nothing about the Mexican Constitution of 1857 itself; rather, we are given a picture of events in other countries at the time when that charter was written. That image depicts Mexico during the War of Reform as undergoing the constitutional symptoms of a social revolution—liberation of the lower classes—fairly common to the countries discussed in the volume, whether this movement took the form of changes in land tenure, constitutional "modernization" in Germany, or the Civil War amendments in the United States. On the question of the international diffusion of federalism, the case for Mexico's having been in constitutional tune with the times is not so clear. Movements toward decentralization of the power of government were also afoot in Austria, Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, to be sure; but in Germany, Chile, and the United States, the trend was toward a strengthening of the central governments at the expense of the constitutional authority of the regional entities. Moreover, no sharp international pattern emerges—at least, not in this first volume—associating nineteenth-century federalism with the expansion of civil rights.

In general, Latin-American works on constitutional law tend to emphasize either history or exegesis of legal texts. Viewed against that background, it is to the credit of the volume under review that it not only attempts a mature synthesis of these alternatives, but also takes a noteworthy step toward the emergence of a genuinely comparative constitutional law. It is not a serious matter that little is said in this volume about Mexico's Constitution of 1857; libraries are already well-stocked with analyses and summaries of that document. On the whole, the editors have exhibited good taste in choosing to observe an important centenary by publishing this solidly respectable piece of scholarship.—GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN, *Northwestern University.*

Some Aspects of the Indian Administrative System. BY SRI RAM SHARMA. (Sholapur: Institute of Public Administration. 1957. Pp. viii, 160. $3.00.)

Sri Ram Sharma, Director of the Institute of Public Administration, Sholapur, presents excerpts from and discussion of four official surveys of public administration in India. These four studies, published originally between 1951 and 1956, comprise the survey of Indian Public Finance undertaken for the U. N. Department of Economic Affairs by Ursula K. Hicks and three reports submitted to the Government of India, of which one is by A. D. Gorwala, a former member of the I. C. S., and the remainder by Paul H. Appleby, the American consultant.

Mr. Sharma's book has a number of obvious weaknesses. The organization is confusing and the indexing bizarre. Citations to the original surveys are both inadequate and inaccurate. A check of two readily available sources (the Hicks survey and the second Appleby report) reveals that both have suffered from Sharma's abridgement technique. The Hicks survey has been mangled, and the Appleby report greatly altered in tone. It is necessary to call attention to these defects, but that is not to say that the book is totally without value. In particular, those chapters which discuss points raised by Appleby contain observations which from time to time throw a sudden sharp light on Indian problems. These chapters can be read with profit, but it would be well to read them with Appleby's own statements also in hand.—MARGARET W. FISHER, *University of California, Berkeley.*

The House of Lords in the Age of Reform, 1784–1837. BY A. S. TURBERVILLE. (London: Faber and Faber; Fair Lawn, N. J.: Essential Books. 1958. Pp. 519. $9.00.)

Professor Turberville's death in 1945 interrupted his work on a nineteenth-century sequel to his earlier standard histories of the House of Lords under William III and in the eighteenth century; what he had completed, however, has now been arranged by R. J. White to form a detailed study of the Lords from 1784 to 1837, with an epilogue sketching the trends of the period 1837 to 1867. The main thread is political narrative, with attention focussed on details of political strategy and the personalities, opinions, and roles of individual peers; the generally chronological treatment is broken at intervals by such topical chapters as "The House of Lords as a Court of Law" or "The Spiritual Peers and the Crisis of Reform." The climax of the story is, of course, the crisis of 1830–32, which is brilliantly handled; but treatment of the Lords' reactions to other issues is also expert and frequently illuminating. The Lords' conception of the British constitution and their role in it is sensitively portrayed and generously documented, as is the complex relationship of the peers to their own order and to the party system. Professor Turberville includes a good deal of significant material on appointment to the peerage, the wealth of the peers, their significance as landowners, and the shifting status of the House of Lords in public opinion; one could wish, however, for fuller and more conclusive studies on these points, as well as on a theme barely suggested here, the role of the peers as patrons of members of the House of Commons.

Professional Politicians: A Study of British Party Agents. BY GEORGE O. COMFORT. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1958. Pp. v, 69. $1.00.)

More properly, this book should be subtitled "A Study of Conservative Party Agents," for the activities of that party's constituency agents receive more than ten times the space devoted to those of either the Labour or the Liberal parties. This is in a way the point of the book: that Conservative Party agents cover more constituencies, organize more effectively, and develop a greater degree of professionalism than any of their rivals. What we are given is essentially a view of the agents as they see themselves. Thus this short book contains valuable descriptive material on structural topics such as organization, training, remuneration, and professional development; but it fails to convey any sense of who the party agents really are, how they operate, what problems they encounter, or how they figure in the power distribution within the parties. A few case studies of crises in local party associations would have added to the flavor, as would some attention to the thesis of Michels and the group theorists concerning the role of the professional organizer in making policy. This book sheds new light on the technical side of local party life in Britain. The essential mysteries remain, however.

Australian Government and Politics: An Introductory Survey. By J. D. B. Miller. (London: Gerald Duckworth and Company. 2nd ed. 1959. Pp. 239. 21s.)

It is always good to see excellence recognized and in this spirit to welcome the second edition of J. D. B. Miller's splendid introduction to Australian politics, which was first published in 1954. He has brought the book up to date and has demonstrated the virtue of scholarly exchange by replying to critics of the earlier edition and thus stating his own position more clearly. Particularly noteworthy is the combination of sound description and a substantial amount of theory. The material on local government is difficult to locate elsewhere.

The compactness of the material makes it particularly valuable for those who wish to refer briefly to Australian phenomena for comparative purposes. Australia may be regarded as sort of a half-way house between the United States and Great Britain where comparison is most helpful in highlighting the nature of the existing institutions in all there countries. The decline of the Australian Senate as a States' House goes a long way toward demonstrating the necessity for an underlying social basis for the maintenance of vigorous federal institutions. The radical differences between the civil service in Australia and Great Britain serve to demonstrate the relationship between environment and governmental practices. This is surely the best general survey of Australian politics.

Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy. By Klaus Epstein. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1959. Pp. xiii, 473. $10.00.)

This is a definitive biography of a still controversial figure, based on unpublished sources (primarily the *Erzberger papers*, now in the *Bundesarchiv*). Matthias Erzberger, an outstanding parliamentarian of Imperial Germany, became the leader of the left wing of the Catholic Center Party in the *Reichstag* in the decade before World War I. Though he was active in many areas, his main importance was in foreign policy. In 1914 he was an extreme annexationist who favored the incorporation of Belgium into Germany. However, unlike many of his contemporaries, he could learn from events and in the summer of 1917 sponsored the famous German peace resolution which rejected "forced territorial acquisitions and political, economic, and financial oppressions. . . . ," while actively supporting papal efforts at mediation of the conflict.

The nationalistic right never forgave him for his signing of the armistice, for his advocacy of ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, for his support of a policy of fulfillment, and for the progressive taxation policies which he instituted as finance minister of the Weimar Republic. He was assassinated on August 26, 1921, by two reactionary conspirators, to become one of the first martyrs of the young democratic republic.

Socialism in One Country, 1924–1926: Volume I. By Edward Hallet Carr. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1958. Pp. x, 557. $7.50.)

This is the fifth volume in the author's formidable enterprise, a detailed history "of the political, social and economic order which emerged from the Bolshevik Revolution. As he tells us now his first four volumes should be regarded as an introduction to his main task. The present book is the first of three dealing with the period from 1924 to 1926, which "gave to the revolutionary regime . . . its decisive direction." Apparently the author felt that in order to bring the whole Soviet evolution into broader relief it would be necessary to change his method somewhat and to look at Russia outside of Marxist doctrine and thought. Therefore, we are confronted in this volume with four chapters of "Background" which include the writer's philosophy of history as applied to the Russian revolution; an interpretation of post-revolutionary moral and intellectual change; an analysis of the motive forces in the new society; and short but brilliant portraits of the leading actors: Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and Stalin. These first four chapters will be of eminent interest to the political scientist, more so than the bulk of the book which discusses the economic situation. The author promises to investigate in the next volumes political developments and international relations of the period which entrenched "Socialism in one Country." Only, when these two volumes have been published will it be possible to review this significant work in accordance with its full merit.

RSFSR. Edited By Thomas Fitzsimmons. (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files. 1957. 2 vols. Pp. xii, vi, 681. $9.75.)

The fifth study in this Country Survey Series continues "to describe the dominant sociological, political, and economic aspects of a functioning society . . . and to identify the patterns of behavior characteristic of its members." Two volumes comprise a large variety of material, all relevant though naturally of varying importance for the political scientist. There is little in the way of original interpretation but a great deal of interesting factual information. Many of the tables and statistics have never been collected before in one place, but as, unfortunately, often happens in teamwork, discrepancies of facts cited at different points in the study and also some inaccuracies, due probably to editorial pruning, occur. While some chapters throw much light on relatively neglected aspects of Soviet life, others read like not particularly inspired summaries of well known monographs. The bibliography is especially helpful for the non-specialist or for students hitherto pre-occupied with the more narrowly defined political aspect. There can be only one major criticism of the survey: there is no good reason—and of this the authors seem to be not unaware—why the R.S.F.S.R. should be taken out of the U.S.S.R. and surveyed as an entity. Social and ethnic mobility as well as economic and political integration in war and peace have changed the picture radically since Tsarist days, and even then it would have been inaccurate to assert that "Russian society" was geographically confined to the territory occupied today by the R.S.F.S.R.

The Soviet Cultural Scene, 1956–1957. Edited by Walter Z. Laqueur and George Lichtheim. (London: Atlantic Book Publishing Company; New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1958. Pp. viii, 300. $3.75.)

This relatively slim volume brings together much highly interesting material, all of which originally appeared in the London review, *Soviet Survey.* The period in question is that of the "thaw" just before the Hungarian and Polish uprisings. There is reason to believe that no other period in the history of the Soviet Union has provided such an excellent focus for the understanding of the ideological superstructure. The book is divided into four parts: literature and the arts; history and philosophy (including an essay on Soviet attitudes to religion); social science and education (including a discussion of "conflict between the generations"); and problems in the satellite countries and in Asia. It is in the nature of such a collection that not all pieces are of equally high or lasting value. It should be particularly useful for students of totalitarian government who do not read Russian or have no access to Soviet periodicals.

Economic Analysis and Policy in Underdeveloped Countries. By P. T. Bauer. (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press. 1957. Pp. xiii, 145. $3.00.)

These lectures, delivered at Duke University's Commonwealth-Studies Center, discuss the role of "positive," or non-normative, economics in studying underdeveloped countries, a "few aspects" of the economies of these lands, and Professor Bauer's "value judgments" on policy. The author argues that basic methods and conclusions of Western economics—particularly the generalization that individuals tend to engage in activities yielding "the highest net advantage" within available opportunities—apply to underdeveloped lands. The substantial existing economic growth based on the real desires of individuals is, however, hampered by governmental restrictions. These restrictions are particularly inapt because the economies lack the advantageous background of a "comparatively long spell of unrestricted economic activity." Bauer assumes that the differences between opponents and proponents of compulsory saving, or "taxation for development," rest on a simple "value judgment": the former dislike "man's power over man"; the latter dislike a society offering a wide range of choice, often speak for urban interests, and embody the "inhumanity of the humanitarians." "Positive" economic study shows that raising the propensity to consume is advantageous—encouraging production, "suggesting new wants, new crops, and improved methods generally." The author is apparently not troubled by his recognition that attractive inessentials "are frequently precisely the incentive goods" inducing production for the market; creation of wants for inessentials he does not regard as compulsion of man by man.

Economic Development of Communist China: An Appraisal of the First Years of Industrialization. By Choh-ming Li. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1959. Pp. xvi, 284. $7.50.)

Professor Li's carefully constructed analysis of Chinese economic development during the period 1952–1957, corresponding generally to the period of the First Five-Year Plan, is a substantial contribution to the literature. The author works entirely with statistics released by the Peking regime, but these are brought under methodical scrutiny and such gaps and inconsistencies as occur because of changing statistical procedures and other factors are called to the reader's attention. Professor Li finds no evidence of "deliberate fabrication" on the part of Peking, although he discovers other statistical discrepancies and sources of error not unlike those found in the statistics of "almost all other underdeveloped countries today." The text of the work incorporates forty-eight statistical tables, most of them constructed by the author, and thirty-six more extensive tables in the statistical appendix add to the indispensable reference value of the volume. The eight substantive chapters cover the entire range of significant economic phenomena, by no means limited to industrial development.

Urbanization in Asia and the Far East: Proceedings of the Joint UN/Unesco Seminar, Bangkok, 8–18 August, 1956. Edited by Philip M. Hauser. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1957. Pp. 286. $1.20.)

Professor Hauser served as General Rapporteur for the Joint UN/Unesco Seminar held in Bangkok in August 1956, and the present work incorporates his summary report in that capacity (pp. 3–32) as well as the text of nine specialized seminar papers presented to the Seminar. The work is highly specific in character, and presents a variety of technical and statistical studies of the factors influencing (or being influenced by) the tendencies toward urbanization in the ECAFE area. The principal considerations are those of an economic, demographic, and sociological character, but political overtones are clearly apparent in the sixty-seven separate conclusions reached by the Seminar (pp. 33–49). While the reader is entitled to question whether the different conclusions can be applied politically in the planned manner contemplated by the Seminar, he must appreciate the substantial body of data presented in the volume before he can arrive at sound judgments concerning the broad problems of economic development, industrialization, and urbanization in the ECAFE countries.

New India's Rivers. By Henry C. Hart. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations; Bombay, Calcutta, Madras: Orient Longmans. 1956. Pp. xiv, 301.)

This volume describes India's efforts, mainly in the present but also in the recent and distant past, to harness its rivers for flood control, irrigation, and power. It describes the aims, progress, and problems of a number of specific projects, and it deals with such questions as the best type of organization for multi-purpose developments, the relative advantages in India of hand labor and machines, and methods of relocating submerged villages.

The author has had many years of experience with American river projects, including the T.V.A. He gathered material for this book while he was in India between 1952 and 1954.

Cabinet Government. By Sir Ivor Jennings. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 3rd ed. 1959. Pp. ix, 586. $8.50.)

The debt that students of British government owe to Sir Ivor Jennings mounts steadily. The second edition of his *Parliament* (1957) is now supplemented by this thoroughly reworked third edition of his justly famous *Cabinet Government*, previously revised in 1951. A substantial amount of new material, much of it drawn from recent memoirs, has been added. The structure of the book remains unchanged from that of the second edition. New illustrations and new evidence have been woven skillfully into the text rather than appended here and there along the way. Many points are more fully developed: for example, the role of the Monarch in the choice of the Prime Minister, Cabinet procedures, the Monarch's veto, the dissolution of the House; but the author's interpretations have, in general, been supported rather than changed by the new evidence.

Sir Ivor's preface to the present edition includes the welcome announcement that his third volume on the practice of the British Constitution, announced earlier as a volume on *Party Politics*, "is now in preparation."

A Bibliography of Parliamentary Debates of Great Britain. House of Commons Library Document No. 2. By the House of Commons Library. (London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1956. Pp. 62. 5s.)

To resolve some of the many complications in obtaining a full record of the debates or proceedings in the House of Lords and the House of Commons at specific times between 1066 and 1953 seems to have been the reason for the work. In good part it was prepared in 1953 by Dr. John A. Woods as a practical working tool in the House of Commons Library. There are three sections: I Debates; II Diaries; and III, Proceedings, including newsletters and periodicals. In each section, the arrangement is mainly chronological. For many of the titles some evaluation is given. Not infrequently, unusual and important bits of information are to be found scattered among the evaluations and notes. The work should well repay anyone having a serious interest in using British Parliamentary Debates.—J.B.C.

Organization of the Government of Canada: June 1958. Published by Authority of the Secretary of State of Canada. (Ottawa: Department of Public Printing and Stationery. 1958. Pp. 308. $2.00.)

For the first time there is brought together in systematic fashion an official compilation giving a statement of the authority and functions of the various agencies of the Government of Canada, together with the names of the principal officers. It is arranged in three sections: Parliament, Judiciary, and Executive. There are tables of the crown corporations. There are indexes to personal names and agencies as well as a useful list of abbreviations. A French edition of the work appeared simultaneously under the title: *L'Administration fédérale du Canada*.—J.B.C.

Patterns of Government: The Major Political Systems of Europe. By Samuel H. Beer, Adam Ulam, Harry H. Eckstein, Herbert J. Spiro, and Nicholas Wahl. (New York: Random House. 1958. Pp. xvi, 624. $6.75.)

This textbook is distinguished by the attempt to put the analysis of four systems of government into a general framework of theory. A blueprint of the theoretical structure is given by Beer in his opening statement on the significance of the political culture (political values and beliefs), of the pattern of power, of the pattern of interests, and of the pattern of policy. Beer's statement, though brief, is sound, unpretentious, and, unlike much current speculation on methodology, written in clear straightforward English. Although the four sections that follow—the British system by Eckstein, the French by Wahl, the German by Spiro, and the Russian by Ulam—are differently organized, the themes outlined by Beer reappear to give unity to the book.

The book is also distinguished by its admirable brevity, achieved not merely by restricting the coverage to four countries but also by a high degree of selectivity and by the authors' willingness to substitute interpretation plus illustrations for massive description. There are consequent omissions: for example, judicial administration and systems of law, local government, and dependencies.

A third distinction is that the whole book is interesting and readable. Using a minimum of tables and charts and no pictures, the authors depend upon the well-written word to hold the interests of students, whom they properly suppose to be literate.

The Soviet Crucible: Soviet Government in Theory and Practice. Edited by Samuel Hendel. (Princeton: D. van Nostrand Company. 1959. Pp. x, 594. $6.75.)

A skillfully compiled "reader" of documents, narratives, interpretations, and critiques should be particularly useful in this period when good up-to-date texts in Soviet governments are few and far between. The editor is an old hand at this sort of thing and has succeeded again in traveling widely over a large area while at the same time pointing sharply to certain crucial problems. Thus, for instance, while he assembles a good selection of the basic documents of Marxism-Leninism, he also contrasts the views of W. W. Rostow and R. N. Carew Hunt on the actual role that theory plays in Soviet society today. This substantial volume is highly up-to-date and includes selections not only from Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956, but also from Djilas, *The New Class*, and a summary of the new Seven-Year Plan. The editor's own introductions are short but to the point. Generally, he lets his authors argue it out among themselves.

German Federal Republic official publications, 1949–1957, with inclusion of preceding zonal official publications; a survey. By James B. Childs. (Washington, D. C.: Library of Congress. 1958. 2 vols. Pp. 887.)

For the first time, there is available a systematic, concise account of the official publications of the agencies of a German national government. The main arrangement is by ministry, and then by subordinate agency. For each agency there is a statement as to establishment and organization. Effort has been made to determine what are to be considered as agencies of the national government and what are to be considered as official publications of these agencies. While there is a Bundesdruckerei and a Deutscher Bundes-

Verlag, there is no overall central control of official printing and publishing. Many official publications are issued through the book trade without very clear indication as to their status, while many others are reproduced and distributed by the agencies themselves. Even as to the agencies, there are instances in which the status is not too clearly definable except by investigation, and many agencies have their ramifications in previously existing agencies of the Reich. The zonal agencies, 1945–1950, present a problem of considerable complexity. Owing to the difficulty of arriving at a definite and final determination of many intricate problems, the survey has been issued only as an operational document for very limited distribution, with copies probably otherwise available only on microfilm.

Die Aufrüstung in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands. By Helmut Bohn and others. (Bonn: Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen. 1958. Pp. 174.)

This statement about the formation of the *Ministerium für Nationale Verteidigung* and the *Nationale Volksarmee* in the German Democratic Republic contains many details as to government organization in these and related agencies that are not to be obtained in print elsewhere, even with great persistence. For the German Democratic Republic, the detailed national budget is prepared only for restricted official use, and the budget law is very brief, with no details as to government organization. Even the *Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1958*, while containing the results of the extensive changes made by the abolition of the industry ministries, has scarcely any information as to the agencies here treated in detail; it represents possibly the typical attitude of governments of the other so-called "peoples' democracies" in not making available the details of government organization except in the most general way.—J.B.C.

Russian Political Institutions. By Derek J. R. Scott. (New York: Rinehart and Company. 1958. Pp. 265. $4.00.)

The first of the Minerva Series of Student's Handbooks is a concise, scholarly, but rather dull short text. In method it follows on the whole the road of Towster's *Political Power in the U.S.S.R.* As a "handbook" it has value but as an introduction to Soviet government it could be misleading by, for instance, discussing in detail the constitutional set-up and what the writer calls "conventional state machinery" (a rather dubious nomenclature) *before* the role and structure of the Communist Party.

Monographies sur les systèmes de gouvernement local: 1. Le gouvernement local en Suède. By Arne Wåhlstrand. 2. *Les collectivités locales en Tunisie.* By Mohamed Suoussi. 3. *Le gouvernement local en Thaïlande.* By Malai Huvanandana et John W. Ryan. 4. *Le gouvernement local en Brésil.* By Diego Lordello de Mello. (Paris: UNESCO. 1958.)

Under a resolution adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its eighth session, an agreement was made with the Union Internationale des Villes et Pouvoirs Locaux to organize in each of its member-states studies of local autonomy. From about thirty-five of these national studies, four have been selected for issue as showing different types. The Union is planning to issue an overall study.—J.B.C.

Las constituciones de los Estados Unaaos del Brasil. Edited by T. Brandaao. (Madrid: Instituto de estudios políticos. 1958. Pp. xlix, 780.)

Las constituciones de Nicaragua: Exposición, crítica y textos. Edited by Emilio Alvárez Lejarza. (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica. 1958. Pp. xiii, 1004. 245 ptas.)

The series of Latin American constitutions is edited by Manuel Fraga Iribarne and published under the joint sponsorship of the *Instituto de Estudios Políticos* and the *Instituto de Cultura Hispánica.* The volume for Nicaragua was edited by a senator and former university professor, and includes the texts of forty-two documents having constitutional reference through 1955. The volume for Brazil was edited by a well-known jurist and university professor and includes the texts in Spanish of the Brazilian constitutions of 1824, 1891, 1934, and 1946, the last being also given in Portuguese.—J.B.C.

Political Handbook of the World: Parliaments, Parties, and Press as of January 1, 1959. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1959. Pp. 226. $3.95.)

Comment on this familiar publication is unnecessary. One can only say tritely that it has become an indispensable reference book for all students of comparative government.

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HIRAM M. STOUT
Washington, D. C.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

Le droit international de la mer, Tome I. By Olivier de Ferron. (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz; Paris: Librairie Minard. 1958. Pp. 240. Fr. s. 16.—.)

Dr. Ferron's treatise on the international law of the sea is one of a series of *Etudes d'histoire, économique, politique, et sociale* published under the direction of M. Jacques Freymond, Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, and M. Jacques l'Huillier. It is a very welcome contribution to the literature of a very important subject, which has suffered a good deal of neglect in recent years, although a neglect now being remedied in part by conferences in Geneva and renewed attention from scholars and writers.

There would not be much point, or enough room, to recite in detail the varied contents of this volume. Briefly, they cover coastal waters and the high seas in time of peace—all divided into eight chapters dealing among other matters with territorial waters, freedom of navigation and fishing, exercise of control on the high seas, and conventions and unilateral declarations relating to the sea. The reviewer has ascertained that the second volume will deal with fisheries and their regulation, resources of the sea, and the continental shelf. No war and neutrality? Perhaps there will be a third volume.

It would be impossible to comment here upon many of the pages of this very full volume, but some observations may be made on certain passages. Thus in both Section 29 and Section 30 there seems to appear some confusion of fact and theory, although it must be admitted that the subject treated—the Contiguous Zone—is just about the most difficult of all maritime problems. Sections 40 and 48 deal briefly with two highly controversial problems (access to the sea of land-locked states and "cheap flags"). Section 57 seems rather short in view of the magnitude of the problem (basis and limitations of state power over or on the high seas). Indeed, many sections of the book seem surprisingly brief for the topics treated. On the other hand, the right of pursuit, or hot pursuit, as it is sometimes called, is given a very interesting treatment in Part IV of Chapter VI. Neither here nor elsewhere does this reviewer find occasion to quarrel greatly with the author's conclusions. Chapter VIII is devoted to Unilateral Limitations on the Freedom of the Seas and on the Principle of Non-Interference; this demands a most delicately balanced attitude and this, on the whole, the author maintains (Section 92). Two proclamations of President Truman—on fisheries and the continental shelf—are treated in Sections 104 and 105 though no reference seems to be made to them in other Sections where these questions are treated (17 and 23); as already indicated, this subject is to be treated further in Tome II. The author's final conclusion (Section 109) is that economic fact takes precedence over juridical fact; without disagreeing with this position, one may observe that it does constitute an anti-climax to a treatise on law if not more than that.

The last fifty-three pages of the book are filled with documents, statistics, and lists of various kinds which constitute a valuable supplement to the text; curiously they are not included in the *Table des Matières*. There is a rather full bibliography. There is no index in this volume.

On the whole, a very scholarly and very welcome book, which should be useful to students, teachers, and even statesmen everywhere.—PITMAN B. POTTER, *The American University*.

Self Defense in International Law. By D. W. Bowett. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1958. Pp. xv, 294. $7.50.)

This is a very valuable scholarly treatise, if that is not too forbidding a term, full of keenest analysis and crammed with references to documents and the writings of other scholars and also abounding in factual data. At the same time the text is eminently readable or as readable as any technical treatise can be.

The author discusses his difficult subject under two headings: the substantive rights for which "self-defence is a permissable means of protection" and "the antithesis of the right of self-defence and the right of war." Under the former are grouped territorial integrity, political independence, security on the high seas, protection of nationals, and economic interests. Under the second heading fall war, neutrality, the U. N. Charter, collective, self-defence, and aggression. It is obvious that the topics treated in Part II do not all correspond to the title given to that section; indeed, it is a little difficult to say that any do.

Incidentally, before going further, why is "Defense" spelled with an "s" on the jacket and the title-page but with a "c" absolutely everywhere else in the book? A triviality—.

This reviewer, who has written on the central theme of this volume and on intervention, which bulks so large in one section thereof, cannot agree with all the detailed comments and conclusions of the writer, particularly in Part II; but that could hardly be expected. The chapter on neutrality (Chapter VIII) seems to be sprinkled with interpretations at least debatable to or by a realistic student of international relations. Indeed, if there is any criticism to be made of the book in general, it is that too little reference is made to general and current internaitonal politics. Nowhere in the book is there a reference to the Indian brand of neutrality or neutralism. The treatment of intervention, or non-intervention as the author prefers to regard it, at various points, seems to be unduly severe or restrictive; there is still no international police force and in its absence states must themselves enforce their own rights, small state and Latin American opposition to the contrary notwithstanding.

On the other hand, this reviewer would find difficulty in disagreeing with the author's four main conclusions (p. 269). Throughout this concluding chapter occur a number of very radical suggestions which, however, are constructive and desirable if utterly unattainable at present. On the whole, the book is a delight and a reassurance as to the continued existence and possible—just possible—revived authority of international law.—PITMAN B. POTTER, *The American University.*

International Law. Vol. I: As Applied by International Courts and Tribunals. BY GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER. (London: Stevens and Sons. 3rd ed. 1957. Pp. xlviii, 808. £3.3s.)

The third edition of this important work has been planned in two volumes. The second volume will cover the law of war and neutrality along with the law of international institutions. The present volume comprises: The Function of International Law, International Personality, State Jurisdiction, Objects of International Law, and International Transactions. The division into two volumes has been made necessary by the most welcome adoption of a larger type, the growth of judicial materials, and a change in emphasis from systematic exposition to critical evaluation of this material. The volume also contains a valuable bibliography, which alone accounts for ninety-four pages, and a thirty-page index.

The basic position of the author remains unchanged. The inductive method is followed strictly as the only means to guard against confusion between the *lex lata* and the *lex ferenda.* All law must flow from one of the three law-creating agencies (treaties, custom, general principles of law recognized by civilized States), with treaties occupying the first rank. Of the three law-determining agencies (subjects of international law, tribunals, doctrine), the work of international tribunals is constantly in the focus in this volume because they express international law "in its truest and most objective form." Natural law and equity are considered as law-formative agencies. The harsh dividing line between law as it is and law as it ought to be, between objectivity and subjectivity in the exposition and application of international law, is mitigated by the constant resort to what the author calls *jus aequm:* that is, considerations of common sense, reasonableness, good faith, and all relevant equitable considerations. The judicial process is thus presented as a balancing process between rights and duties of the parties established by conventional or customary international law. The outcome is determined by the choice tribunals are bound to make between competing rules of law and between competing rules of interpretation. The soundness of a judicial decision is measured by its conformity with the seven fundamental principles of international law (sovereignty, recognition, consent, good faith, self-defense, international resposnibility, and the freedom of the seas) and by its intrinsic persuasiveness. The author urges, rightly it is believed, that international judges make explicit their starting points and all considerations that enter into the making of a decision.

This volume will continue to be one of the most useful tools for the practitioner and one of the significant expositions of international law for the more advanced student.—LEO GROSS, *Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.*

The International Protection of Trade Union Freedom. BY C. WILFRED JENKS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1957. Pp. xl, 592. $15.00.)

This is a pioneering study, by the former Legal Adviser and present Assistant Director General of the International Labor Office, on the international protection of trade union freedom. Although primarily a problem of domestic law, it has become a matter of international concern since the establishment of the ILO and increasingly so since the adoption in 1948 by the International Labor Conference of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention and in 1949 of the Complementary Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention. Both Conventions are now in force, the former having been ratified by twenty-six and the latter by twenty-nine member states. In this volume Mr. Jenks attempts to give "a comprehensive account of these developments, to analyse the international conventions on the subject now in force and the rapidly growing body of relevant international case law, and to draw upon the wealth of comparative material concerning the national law and practice of some seventy countries recently made available by successive ILO inquiries." It is not possible within the compass of a brief note to do more than to indicate divisions of the book, which are: Guarantees and Standards, Protection of Freedom of Association, Freedom of Association in Practice, and Evaluation. Probably the most interesting and original part of the book is the very careful review and evaluation of 158 cases on Freedom of Association which have been handled by the Committee of the Governing Body. The procedure established by the Governing Body for the review of complaints with respect to violations or infringements of the freedom of association shows the flexibility and adaptability of the ILO. It is not always necessary, it seems, to have a solid legal foundation for doing what needs to be done. One may disagree here and there with the evaluation of the effectiveness of this procedure. But there cannot be any doubt that Mr. Jenks has opened up a large new field for further research.

Quite apart from its intrinsic merit, students will find this book particularly useful because of the numerous tables and bibliographical notes which it contains. For an outsider it would be extremely difficult to find all the cases involving credentials of deleagates to the International Labor Conference or the cases on Freedom of Association which have come to the `governing body. Mr. Jenks presents complete lists of all the pertinent cases with appropriate reference and also a table of laws and regulations on the subject enacted in some fifty-six states.—Leo Gross, *Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.*

Summit Diplomacy: Personal Diplomacy of the President of the United States. By Elmer Plischke. (College Park: University of Maryland Bureau of Governmental Research. 1958. Pp. viii, 125. $2.50.)

In this timely study, the author intended to collect and to compare the more important instances and techniques of personal diplomacy, as exercised by Presidents of the United States. It is subdivided into chapters on policy formulation and enunciation, personal communications, sending of personal diplomatic representatives, state visits, and participations in summit conferences. In the last-mentioned chapter, the author finds that the President of the United States has been present at some thirty-three summit meetings during the last forty years, F. D. Roosevelt emerging as the chief figure of more than half of these conferences. According to Professor Plischke, "as an instrument of diplomacy it would appear that the summit conference achieves its greatest stature and is most productive if it results in serious accommodation embodied in agreed instruments." Although the well known objections to personal diplomacy are quoted and discussed, it is found that summit meetings are inevitable in modern international politics and, when "judiciously planned" and "sparsely employed," may actually "bear significant fruit." On the other hand, conventional diplomacy while "quantitatively on the increase is qualitatively in decline." In conclusion, the author summarizes the benefits of summit meetings. They may enhance mutual understanding between countries; lead to speedier agreements; result in broad agreements in principle followed by definitive settlements on a lower level; resolve an *impasse* reached at the traditional diplomatic level; and attract world wide attention. The disadvantages consist in: lowering the morale of diplomatic representatives, particularly if the President is disposed to become his own Secretary of State; too much speed, resulting in unwise decisions; committing the President to unflexible positions; becoming too risky if the President is a "rank amateur"; having the President act on the basis of inadequate or unassimilated information; producing diplomacy in the "fish bowl," which when it fails, shakes public confidence in the Preident; placing the President in an unequal position *vis- à-vis* his opposite numbers because of his insufficient control over Congress and even over public opinion; and raising hopes falsely and prematurely.

Plischke's short study, it is hoped, is only the first of more detailed analyses of personal diplomacy, which, as the author rightly believes, will be with us for some time and may even increase in both frequency and importance.

International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control. By L. John Martin. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1958. Pp. vii, 284. $5.75.)

This is an inquiry into the nature and controls of propaganda in international relations. It starts by tracing the historical background and by searching for a workable definition of the concept of propaganda. It goes on in search of guidance on the place of propaganda in international law, which apparently cannot be found in the teachings of the publicists. Yet international agreements and particularly attempts to arrive at agreements to regulate the propaganda war among nations in peace time exist and are increasing in number, particularly under the sponsorship of various U. N. organs. On the other hand, bilateral treaties to outlaw harmful international propaganda are no longer in fashion. But efforts to forbid foreign propaganda by municipal law are multifarious and partly effective, often thus clashing with the U. N. concept of "freedom of information." Propaganda as an accepted weapon in power politics is also playing an increasing part in diplomatic negotiation and barganing. The conclusion of this well documented study is that in an age of democracy and mass participation in foreign policy propaganda has become too intangible for international legal control. No state today would submit to international restraints of its freedom to let its views be universally known. On the other hand, states have increasingly resorted to various means to keep harmful incoming propaganda from reaching their own residents. Thus control of propaganda remains in effect a subject matter of municipal law and has become and increasingly important attribute of the external sovereignty of a state. The author of this useful study, a former University teacher and foreign correspondent, is now on the editorial staff of the *Detroit Free Press.*

The War Against Japan. Volume II: India's Most Dangerous Hour. By Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby et al. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office; New York: British Information Service. 1958. Pp. xvii, 541. $10.22.)

This volume is the second of five in a study of the United Kingdom's war against Japan. The study is from an inter-service point of view, and the standpoint from which the campaigns are viewed is that of the theater commander. The first volume, which was noted in this Review, covered backgrounds and the first three months of the war (except for the Burma campaigns).

This second volume opens with a detailed account of the loss of Burma. It then goes on to discuss the fifteen months that followed, down to the summer of 1943. These were, in the main, months of defense, consolidation, and planning; fighting on land and in the air was on a relatively small scale. Some of the specific subjects discussed include Japanese naval raids on Ceylon, the defense of India and its development as a base, fighting in the Arakan, the first Chindit operation, and the Trident Conference. To provide perspective, American operations in the Pacific are covered. The volume closes with a chapter on "Allied and Japanese Plans for the Dry Weather 1943–44."

The Use of Force in International Relations. By A. Appadorai. (Bombay, Calcutta, New Delhi, Madras: Asia Publishing House. 1958. Pp. 124. Rs. 5.75.)

This small volume reproduces Professor Appadorai's thoughtful Tara Prasad Khaitan Lectures, as delivered at the University of Calcutta in September 1957. The author addresses himself to the dilemma of collective security, in a world in which "the application of the principle [of collective security] in a nuclear age may lead to the very negation of the principle by leading to collective destruction" (p. 34). After referring to the teachings of William James and Mahatma Gandhi, Professor Appadorai emphasizes the necessity for "tolerance and goodwill on the part of the parties concerned" in the cold war, which he hopes will be dissipated by a spirit of coexistence, defined as "active peaceful cooperation between the communist and non-communist States" (p. 70). The volume, written in an objective and scholarly spirit, actually provides a moral, legal, and political explanation of many of the policy positions adopted by the Indian Government.

Human Rights and World Order: The Struggle for Human Rights in the United Nations. By Moses Moskowitz. (New York: Oceana Publications. 1958. Pp. xii, 239. $3.95.)

Mr. Moskowitz offers a strong polemic argument in support of more effective United Nations action in the field of human rights. He believes that the United Nations "cannot escape responsibility for intervening in cases involving issues of human rights" (p. 35), although he candidly admits that the patterns of such intervention are not predictable or reliable under present conditions. He would like to see established, within the United Nations framework, the office of an Attorney-General for Human Rights charged with definite responsibility for action; he also contemplates the possibility of comparable agencies within existing regional organizations. The volume is a brief one dominated by a note of optimistic humanitarianism, in which the author draws on many lines of legal, political, and moral argument to support his conclusions.

International Civil Service: Principles and Problems. By Tien Cheng Young. (Brussels: International Institute of Administrative Sciences. 1958. Pp. 268. $5.00.)

Against the background of his own experiences in the United Nations and UNESCO, Dr. Young addresses himself to the problems involved in the creation of a truly internationalized civil service. He deals with the themes of national *versus* international loyalty, independence of external pressures, appropriate salary scales, guarantees of status and other subjects close to the interest of those employed by international agencies. Dr. Young tends to see strong affirmative virtues in an independent international civil service, and what he has to say will meet with warm response on the part of persons employed in international organizations. In a concluding thought on the subject, however, Dr. Young touches the heart of the matter: if there is to be an international civil service, it can "never be expected to rise above the political quality of the international community" (p. 228). The tenor of the argument does not generally correspond to this premise.

The Yearbook of World Affairs, 1958 (London: Stevens and Sons. 1958. Pp. viii, 471. £2.2s.)

The pattern of this Yearbook has not changed; book reviews grouped according to a rather artifical bibliographical system fill somewhat less than half of it, while the longer part contains twelve articles of varying quality, more or less topical. The first of these quite appropriately throws a by now fashionable *Rückblèck* at the multitude of largely American "scientific studies of international relations" during the last ten years. Harold Lasswell accomplishes this task with finesse by classifying the most important works according to their methods and approaches. Richard Lowenthal's essay discusses how ideological polycentrism in world communism had by the fall of 1956 superceded Stalinist infallibility and omnipotence, while Khrushchev's efforts during 1957 to reassert the primacy of Moscow proved to be successful only on the surface. Susan Strange attacks rather than analyzes strategic embargoes, which she regards as an "error in democratic judgment" and would like to see "quietly removed" from the arsenal of cold war. Sir John Troutbeck presents a knowledgeable, but altogether conventional, analysis of the Middle Eastern kaleidoscope. Werner Levi sheds light on the limitations of "non-alignment" in recent Indian foreign policy, while C. H. Alexandrowicz's summary of the federal system is blind to the possible international implications of regionalism in India. The articles on Pakistan and Canada take in the whole post-war period without offering any new insights or interpretations. Although much has been written on this topic by now, G. D. N. Worswick's summary of the arguments surrounding Britain's offer of a Free Trade Area is a useful piece, as is E. Grebenik's article on population increases in underdeveloped countries. H. E. Archdale's brief historical review of claim to Antarctica seems to have little to do with the purposes of a Yearbook. The outstanding contribution is A. G. Dickson's brilliant criticism of the oversimplified financial approach to the problems of underdeveloped countries, which deserves wide reading.

Australia's Outlook on Asia. By Werner Levi. (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press. 1958. Pp. 200. $5.00.)

This is a good small book which sets out to cover a limited area and does so thoroughly. The author's purpose is to trace "Australian attitudes and policies toward the peoples of East, South-east, and South Asia." He is handicapped by the disinclination of the Department of External Affairs to publish official documents, and he is aware of "the great difficulty in measuring or even knowing the existence, distribution, weight and influence of individual or group attitudes and opinions" (Preface). Yet since he does not intend to give a complete account but merely to cover the most essential aspects of this topic, the sources he utilizes—newspapers, parliamentary debates, and the few specialized studies that exist—are adequate.

Australia's Outlook on Asia is largely a commentary on the absence of serious Australian interest in Asia. What little thought there has been about Asia has reflected fear of the "yellow peril" and frightening pictures of dark-skinned hordes swamping the continent's white inhabitants. This feeling has been so strong that the White Australia policy has commanded virtually unanimous support among all sectors of the population. Even today the only serious discussion of this policy concerns the desirability of finding a more euphemistic term to describe exclusion on racial grounds. Not until Japanese troops made their presence painfully evident was there general recognition of the need to develop a conscious Australian foreign policy toward its Asian neighbors. The book's findings will have to be taken into account by anyone who attempts to interpet the character of the Australian people and their special brand of insularity.

Peace without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the British Liberals. By Laurence W. Martin. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1958. Pp. xiv, 230. $4.50.)

This scholarly monograph discusses the influence of British radical opinion upon Woodrow Wilson s formulation of his peace policy. Based partly on unpublished sources, such as the House, Wiseman, and Polk Collections at Yale and Wilson's own papers in the Library of Congress, it shows how close Wilson's links with the British radicals were and how much they encouraged him to appeal over the heads of Governments to the liberal minded public opinion of the world. Even though many of Wilson's often vague liberal principles affected the peace settlement and the Covenant of the League of Nations, such diluted and indirect influences fell far short of the expectations of liberal opinion in Britain and elsewhere. No wonder that the "radicals would be his earliest and most damaging denunciators." The story of planning is well told in Professor Martin's excellent study; the Peace Treaty and its consequences are summarized briefly in an epilogue. A useful bibliographical essay has one important omission: the author apparently was unaware of Mrs. Crosby's *Disarmament and Peace in British Politics, 1914–1919* (Harvard Univerity Press, 1957), which partly goes over the same ground but from another point of view.

The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery. By Field Marshal Montegomery. (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Company. 1958. Pp. 508. $6.00.)

Much has been said about these controversial memoirs. Many commentators have taken issue with some of its author's iconoclastic or "iffy" statements, but none denies that this is one of the best written and most important contributions to the history of the Second World War. What is its value for the political scientist? It contains, first of all, much material and many a stimulating remark regarding civil-military relations, particularly in the period after the War when Montgomery as Chief of the Imperial General Staff made himself (in his own words) a "nuisance in Whitehall." There is a great deal of interesting material on the organization and politics of NATO. There is some new light on military government. For the student of diplomacy, there is not only the story of post-war relations with the Russians in occupied Germany, but also much to learn about the military factors in the planning and execution of foreign policy. Finally, the problem of leadership, military and political, appears repeatedly and is examined unsystematically and subjectively, yet with the vigor of a mind that has been preoccupied with the mysteries of promotion and command for more than fifty years, during which he himself advanced from the status of an undistinguished and even obstreperous Sandhurst cadet to all the dignities the British Army could offer. Like all good memoirs, this one should be read, for full profit, with caution and in comparison with other memoirs as well as with the works of official and unofficial historians and military-diplomatic critics.

Select Documents on Asian Affairs: East Asia—China, Korea, Japan—1947–50. Edited by Vidya Prakash Dutt. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1958. Pp. vii, 747. $7.95.)

With this volume, the Indian Council of World Affairs inaugurates a new series of documentary publications dealing with the domestic and external affairs of the countries and regions of Asia. The present volume, however, may not hold the same interest for American readers as other volumes to be published in due course. Many of the documents bearing on Chinese affairs in the Kuomintang period, including some Communist documentation, are taken from the American China *White Paper;* most of the documents bearing on Korean affairs are taken from Department of State and United Nations publications that have enjoyed wide circulation in this country; and a substantial number of the documents relating to Japan are taken from SCAP publications and from *Contemporary Japan.* The 134 documents are well selected from a much larger mass of material, and as a rule are printed in their entirety; in nearly every case, an English-language translation has been supplied to the compilers, who do not appear to have checked the translations against Chinese, Korean, or Japanese originals.

The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem. By Robert C. Bone, Jr. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Interim Reports Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University. 1958. Pp. xii, 170. $1.50.)

Professor Bone approaches the problem of Western New Guinea in an apparent spirit of independence and objectivity. He therefore supplies argument and documentation which support both the Indonesian and Dutch views of the problem and, by the same token, opens himself to criticism by both parties for his failure to align himself squarely with either camp. The theme of "embittered stalemate" dominates the treatment, and on this point at least both antagonists may agree. The work is carefully documented from Indonesian and Dutch sources, and is replete with extended quotations from official policy statements. The problem is examined from the point of view of the separate national positions, the pattern of indonesian-Dutch negotiations, and the discussions of the West Irian question in the United Nations framework.

A Psychological Warfare Casebook. By William E. Daugherty in collaboration with Morris Janowitz. (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press. 1958. Pp. xxiii, 880. $12.50.)

Designed by the Operations Research Office as a training guide and reference source chiefly for military personnel assigned to psychological warfare planning and operations, this case book will be of limited usefulness to students of the political process. This is primarily because the original pieces and excerpts from established sources are so brief and fragmentary that it is difficult to do much with them, even as cases. There are just under 150 separate pieces covered in less than 900 pages, ranging over general areas such as psychological warfare doctrine, organization and personnel, policy planning, operational objectives, mass media, and the assessment of effectiveness. Materials are drawn parimarily from American, British, Nazi Germany, and Soviet Russian experience. The book is useful as a reference, but impossible as a text.

A processualística dos atos internacionais. By João Hermes Pereira de Araujo. (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Seção de Publicações. 1958. Pp. 353.)

This specialized treatise on the procedural side of international agreements seems to be based upon a rather careful acquaintance with the literature and upon the experience of the author in the pertinent section of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations. It seems particularly important for its statement of the Brazilian practices and seems to be quite well carried up to date.—J.B.C.

International Institutions. By Paul Reuter. Translated by J. M. Chapman. (New York: Rinehart and Company. 1958. Pp. 316. $5.00.)

Professor Reuter sets out "to define the elements of international society in terms of the accepted principles of group psychology" (p. 7), and the Introduction to the work (pp. 17–32) draws heavily on social psychology. In short order, however, he establishes that the study of institutions is more than a matter for sociology, history, and politics, and that "the study of international institutions is firmly based on a foundation of law" (*ibid.*). The legal approach dominates the work, but not to the exclusion of social, historical, and political factors. The result is a book capable of being used by a legalistically-minded instructor in a course in international organization, or by a socially-minded instructor in an introductory course in international law.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

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POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

The Evolution of Political Thought. By C. Northcote Parkinson. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1958. Pp. 327. $5.00.)

With a sharp wit, a sharp tongue, and a grand disdain for the dull tools of the scholar, Mr. Parkinson conducts the reader through the ruins of political philosophy. The trip has a certain dream-like quality, but it is a brisk, bracing, purposeful dream. If, at the end, the reader is not at all sure that the ruins he saw ever really existed or that the purpose justified all the bustling about, he must remember that such uncertainty in the aftermath of sure and secure assurance is the very essence of such dreams. Mr. Parkinson is a firm believer in "science." He classifies "political thought" according to the forms of government presumably advocated by its various practitioners (monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, dictatorship) and discovers that the very attempt to advocate any one form of government by universal arguments is inherently "unscientific." Undeterred by the fact that most political philosophers have agreed with this conclusion and by the fact that his system of classification does violence to the real concerns of most political philosophers, he then proceeds to lord it over these unscientific barbarians—although not without a certain *noblesse oblige* toward their underprivileged and unenlightened condition. The book is entertaining and, at times, even stimulating (I wonder whether some men who dream that they have devised the formula that solves everything don't produce something useful—if less comprehensive—when they wake up). It would be highly irresponsible for any teacher to use this as a textbook.—David Kettler, *The Ohio State University*

Consensus and Continuity, 1776–1787. By Benjamin Fletcher Wright. (Boston: Boston University Press. 1958. Pp. 60. $3.00.)

This slim but interesting volume contains Benjamin Wright's three Bacon Lectures delivered at Boston University in 1956–57. It is significant as an addition to the now considerable accumulation of scholarly evidence and interpretation, published by Wright himself, by Cecelia Kenyon, by Louis Hartz, by Robert E. Brown, and others, that has thoroughly revised the simple interpretation by Merriam, J. A. Smith, Beard, and Parrington of the making of the American Constitution and of the theory of the makers and their opponents.

Wright stresses the continuity of the theory of 1787 with that of 1776 and the dependence of both upon the English political tradition and upon colonial experience in self-government. Reviewing the debates at Philadelphia, he emphasizes the basic consensus on matters of political principle and points out that conflict on economic matters reflected sectional rather than class divergences of interest.

He reviews briefly the methods that have been followed in seeking an answer to the question, "Was the Constitution reactionary?" He points to the faulty scholarship involved in some of the methods and properly maintains that "an analysis of the Constitution, and of the principles involved in it, in relation to the ideas and institutions which had been adopted or generally accepted in America during the preceding eleven years" is the only safe route to follow in search of an answer. He concludes that the sharp conflict that some writers of the Progressive period discovered between the theory of the authors of the Declaration and that of the authors and defenders of the Constitution was founded "not so much in the history of that time as in the history of a century or more later." This conclusion will not surprise those who are acquainted with Wright's earlier writings. The book should be a tonic for those who may still be addicted to the simple Progressive thesis about the Constitution.

Sources of Indian Tradition. COMPILED BY WM. THEODORE DE BARY, STEPHEN HAY, ROYAL WEILER, AND ANDREW YARROW. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1958. Pp. xxvii, 961. $7.50.)

This volume of source readings was produced in connection with the general education program in oriental studies at Columbia College. The readings illustrate Indian thought from the beginnings down to the present. Parts One through Five, which make up about three-fifths of the volume, are on "Brahmanism," "Jainism and Buddhism," "Hinduism," "Islam in Medieval India." and "Sikhism." The remainder of the book (Part Six) is on "Modern India and Pakistan," and consists mainly of selections from nineteenth and twentieth century writers, including Rammohun Roy, Debendranath Tagore, Ramakrishna, Vivekananda, Dadabhai Naoroji, G. K. Gokhale, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Aurobindo Ghose, Syed Ahmad Khan, Rabindranath Tagore, Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru, and Vinoba Bhave.

Although the emphasis is on religion and philosophy, the compilers have not neglected political, economic, and social thought. A number of selections appear in English for the first time. The compilers have written numerour essays and commentaries, which knit the readings together and provide historical background.

This volume will be welcomed by instructors of courses on India and the history of religions. It should make a substantial contribution to the fulfilment of the aim of its compilers, which was "to provide the general reader with an understanding of the intellectual and spiritual traditions which remain alive in India and Pakistan today."

Studies in Rebellion. BY E. LAMPERT. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1957. Pp. xi, 295. $6.00.)

This penetrating study of the three most significant Russian revolutionary intellects of the nineteenth century, Belinsky, Bakunin, and Herzen, is designed "as the first part of a trilogy devoted to the study of the history of revolutionary thought in nineteenth-century Russia. . . . " The Russian-born author's profound knowledge of Russian intellectual history has been proved by his previous publications. In the present study he is particularly interested in the "ethos" of revolutionary movements, which he tries to characterize by examining the lives and thoughts of these remarkable persons. The book provides many fascinating facts and much stimulation, not only for the student of Russian intellectual history but also for those who are interested in the anatomy of revolutions and revolutionary movements in general.

Altgeld's America: The Lincoln Ideal Versus Changing Realities. BY RAY GINGER. (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company. 1958. Pp. 376. $4.95.)

Written in popular style, this work is an interesting, if often superficial and disorganized, treatment of the outrageous social and political scene in Chicago between 1885 and 1905. That era of the Haymarket bomb, Pullman strike, sweatshops, and blatant Columbian Exposition was, along with its reigning powers—the millionaire potentates and the Chicago ward bosses—confronted by the generation of "Chicago humanists": Altgeld and Jane Addams, Debs and Darrow, Veblen and Dewey, Dreiser, Wright and Sullivan, Theodore Thomas and Henry Lloyd. The description of Altgeld's struggle with his own political ambition before pardoning the Haymarket "rioters" in 1893 establishes Ginger's area of concern. For him, the "humanists," despite ambitions and inner conflicts, "ultimately faced up to the question: What is right? because they were moved by the vision of "individual responsibility for the welfare of mankind." He believes that "it is the vitality of this past generation," springing "from intensity and exaltation" of purpose, that "contrasts so strongly with our own confusions and lethargy."

Amerika im Spiegel des Deutschen Politischen Denkens: Äusserungen deutscher Staatsmänner und Staatsdenker über Staat und Gesellschaft in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. Selected and with an introduction by Dr. Ernst Fraenkel. (Cologne and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 1959. Pp. 333. DM. 20.)

This book, a collection of short excerpts about America by German writers provides some preliminary material for a much needed history of the image of America in Germany. It does not, even with Fraenkel's perceptive introduction, provide it. Judgments expressed range from an optimistic assessment of America as a fountainhead of freedom, as an example to be imitated by Europe, to stringent criticisms of America as "civilization," as a materialistic mass democracy. "Essentials . . . in this land . . . are impossible. Impossible is an American culture, impossible American intellectual leadership, impossible an American philosophy, science, art, or religion, impossible even an American history. Only business, technology, and politics are possible" (Walther Rathenau). Perceptive analyses of American institutions, such as Max Webers', may be found but do not predominate. "I was impressed," the renowned psychiatrist Carl J. Jung writes, "with the great [psychological] influence of the Negro. . . . The swinging of hips, which one can so often observe on American women, stems from the Negro. . . . North Americans have . . . kept the European heritage but could not prevent the souls of their Indian enemies from becoming their own." No undiscovered Tocqueville will be found in this work.

Lenin on the Question of Nationality. By Alfred D. Low. (New York: Bookman Associates. 1958. Pp. 193. $4.00.)

This is a brief scholarly discussion of a topic of abiding importance. The author rightly attributes to Lenin the lion's share in the development of Bolshevist thinking and early policy on nationality, thereby relegating Stalin to his original place. The analysis concludes that Lenin's theory was opposed both to later Stalinist practice, which gave preeminence to the Great Russians throughout the communist world and to Titoist claims for genuine equality among sovereign socialist national states. The study itself could have gone somewhat further; at times one feels that the analysis stops short of really penetrating conclusions. Some of the most interesting discussion and material can be found in the Notes at the end.

The Academic Mind: Social Scientists in a Time of Crisis. By Paul F. Lazarfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1958. Pp. xiii, 460. $7.50.)

This is a detailed, lengthy, and, at times, tedious analysis of questionnaires administered to more than two thousand social scientists concerning the impact of "McCarthyism" on the campus. The authors conclude that many social scientists did feel themselves under pressure, and they correlate such feelings (or their absence) with such factors as size and quality of institution, productivity, age, political orientation, etc. Like most studies of this type, the present work gives rise to three questions: concerning the adequacy of the analysis, the objectivity of the interviews, and the value of applying quantitative methods to social phenomena. The first question will be long debated by specialists. The book faces the second with remarkable frankness, appending a critique of the interviews by David Riesman. On the basis of extensive follow-up interviews, he concludes in a convincing manner that whatever bias and inaccuracy may have crept in did not affect the general validity of the study. As for the third question, no one who fears that the analytical dissection and quantification of man's thoughts and activities will kill the human spirit and its truths will be dissuaded by *The Academic Mind.* In any case, although the book fails to live up to the promise of its ambitious title, it is an important memorial of our time.

Some Applications of Behavioral Research. Edited by Rensis Likert and Samuel P. Hayes, Jr. (New York: UNESCO Publications. 1957. Pp. 333. $3.25.)

Sponsored by UNESCO as part of its *Science and Society* series, this collection of research essays has two basic purposes: to explain and encourage the scientific study of human behavior and to demonstrate by the use of case studies some applications of behavioral approaches to selected contemporary problems. To quote the senior author, "The cost of solving world problems by bungling, trial-and-error methods, the time and other hazards of using inefficient methods are so great that there is an urgent need to resort to the scientific process." Samples applications are drawn chiefly from the fields of leadership training, industrial management, and organizational behavior. The UNESCO sponsorship does not denote an international cast of contributors, for all seven authors are connected with American institutions and have carried on their research primarily in American industry.

Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism. By Lewis Samuel Feuer. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1958. Pp. x, 323. $7.50.)

As the title suggests, Mr. Feuer's essay in philosophical biography (or biographical philosophy) advances the thesis that a historical approach to Spinoza's thought illuminates the genesis and problems of modern "liberalism." The author seeks to support this thesis through a blending of Freudian biographical techniques, quasi-Marxist historical analysis, and liberal political interpretation of the texts. At times—as when Spinoza's "realism" is explained by an alleged masochism—the light filtered through these lenses obscures more than it reveals, but the general dramatic effect is interesting. If read with caution, this is a book which will be read with profit by students of modern political philosophy.

Political Ideas of the American Revolution. By Randolph G. Adams. (New York: Barnes and Noble. 3rd ed. 1958. Pp. vii, 216. $3.75. Paper ed., $1.50.)

The third edition of Adams's study of American interpretation of the British Empire in the period 1765 to 1775 brings back into circulation an important book, which has been out of print for some time. The present edition includes a note by Merrill Jensen on the significance of the study and a commentary by Jensen which seeks to put Adams's work into a more general background of pre-Revolutionary theory and which refers to some of the recent literature.

Social Darwinism in American Thought. By Richard Hofstadter. (New York: George Braziller. Rev. ed. 1959. Pp. 248. $4.00.)

This is the second edition of a significant book first published in 1944. Some rewriting has produced a terser and more readable style without changing the substance of the book. The footnotes have unfortunately migrated to the end of the volume.

Modern Political Ideologies. By Alan P. Grimes and Robert H. Horwitz (New York: Oxford University Press 1959. Pp. xiv, 535.)

This is an anthology of selections grouped under the headings of democracy, capitalism, socialism, communism, elitism, and nationalism, with each topic introduced by a short, competent essay. Besides the usual traditionally anthologized warhorses (*On Liberty*, *Of Civil Government*, *Social Contract*, *Communist Manifesto*, etc.), Grimes and Horwitz have also included writers such as Hayek, Carlo Schmid, Nehru, Djilas, and Nasser. Liberalism is represented in the sections on democracy and capitalism; Burke and other conservative writers are ignored. Bernstein is not included, nor any pre-Marxist socialist. Nietzsche bears the main guilt for political elitism, with three selections, while one looks in vain for Mosca, Pareto, or Sorel.

Foundations of Modern Jurisprudence. By William Seal Carpenter. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1958. Pp. vii, 430. $3.25.)

This is a short historical introduction for use in undergraduate courses in jurisprudence. It contains a section on "Theories and Systems of Law," two chapters on "Forms and Methods of Trial," and three chapters on "Law in the Modern World." The allocation of space in such a short volume seems arbitrary. One wonders, for example, why eighteen pages should be given to compurgation and wager of battle when only thirteen are given to the growth of English law and ten to "Some Recent Trends of Jurisprudence."

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SCHOEPS, HANS-JOACHIM. *Konservative Erneuerung: Ideen zur deutschen Politik*. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag. 1958. Pp. 152. DM 6.80.

SHUBIK, MARTIN. *Strategy and Market Structure: Competition, Oligopoly, and the Theory of Games*. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 1959. Pp. xviii, 387. $8.00.

SIH, PAUL K. T. *Decision for China: Communism or Christianity*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1959. Pp. xxiv, 262. $4.50.

SNYDER, PHIL L. (ED.). *Detachment and the Writing of History: Essays and Letters of Carl L. Becker*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univerity Press. 1958. Pp. xvi, 240.

SPICER, GEORGE W. *The Supreme Court and Fundamental Freedoms*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1959. Pp. x, 182. $1.50.

Struggle for Independence, 1857–1947: A Pictorial Record of the Pakistan Movement. Karachi: Pakistan Publication. 1958. Pp. 49 Rs. 5/–.

TAYLOR, HENRY. *The Statesman*. New York: Mentor Books. 1958. Pp. 159. $0.50.

TINKER, HUGH. *The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2nd ed. 1959. Pp. xiv, 424. $6.75.

TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. *Hellenism: The History of a Civilization*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 272. $4.50.

VADAKIN, JAMES C. *Family Allowances: An Analysis of Their Development and Implications*. Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press. 1959. Pp. xiii, 185. $4.95.

VAN LANGENHOVE, FERNAND. *La crise du système de sécurité collective des Nations Unies, 1946–1957*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; Brussels: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales. 1958. Pp. 272.

VILLARD, HENRY H. *Economic Development*. New York: Rinehart and Company. 1959. Pp. xi, 229. $2.50.

WADE, RICHARD D. *The Urban Frontier: The Rise of Western Cities, 1790–1830*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1959. Pp. 360. $6.00.

WELTER, RUSH. *Problems of Scholarly Publication in the Humanities and Social Sciences*.

New York: American Council of Learned Societies. 1959. Pp. xii, 81.

WILLIAMS, JACK KENNY. *Vogues in Villainy: Crime and Retribution in Ante-Bellum South Carolina.* Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press. 1959. Pp. vii, 191. $5.00.

WOLFE, HAROLD. *Herbert Hoover: Public Servant and Leader of the Loyal Opposition.* New York: Exposition Press. 1956. Pp. 507. $5.00.

WYNN, WILTON. *Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity.* Cambridge, Mass.: Arlington Books. 1959. Pp. x, 213. $3.95.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES*

COMPILED BY WILLIAM C. SEYLER

Deputy Secretary, Department of Internal Affairs, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

I. DISSERTATIONS IN PREPARATION

ADDITIONS, CHANGES, AND DELETIONS SINCE THE 1958 LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Additions

Milton C. Abrams, The Political Philosophy of Christopher Saint German. *Utah.*

John L. Auble, Abraham Lincoln and the American Liberal Tradition. *Northwestern.*

Donald G. Baker, Politics and Politicians in American Best-Selling Fiction, 1919–1959. *Syracuse.*

William C. Baum, The Conspiracy Theory of Politics of the Radical Right in the United States. *Iowa.*

Rulon L. Bradley, The Use of Mass Media and Minor Electioneering Methods in Western Politics. *Utah.*

Albert C. Brouse, Socialism and the Problem of the Democratic State in Italy. *Stanford.*

Harrison R. Bryan, Jr., The Implications for Politics of the Psychology of Alfred Adler. *Utah.*

William A. Carroll, The Natural Law in American Jurisprudence since 1930. *Georgetown.*

Items which appeared in the September, 1958, list and which are still in preparation *without change* are *not* repeated in this listing. The present listing contains only additions, changes and deletions. Additions are those items which were reported in preparation for the first time; changes are those items which have had a change in name, title, or classification; and deletions are those items which are no longer in preparation.

In cases where classification of an item has been suggested by the institution concerned, the suggestion has been followed. Each item is listed under one classification only.

The lists printed in the REVIEW are based on information from departments giving graduate instruction in political science. Often dissertations are in progress in departments of economics, history, sociology, etc., which overlap or supplement dissertations in preparation in political science. Attention is called especially to the following lists: "Current Research Projects in Public Administration" (reported to Public Administration Service), the most recent edition of which appeared in 1951; "Doctoral Dissertations in Political Economy in Progress in American Colleges and Universities," in the *American Economic Review;* "List of Doctoral Dissertations in History Now in Progress," published annually by the Division of Historical Research of the Carnegie Institution through 1938, and since then by the American Historical Association, as supplements to the *American Historical Review* (1940 and 1941), as Vol. III of its Annual Report (1941), and as separate publications (1947, 1949 and 1952); and "Doctoral Dissertations in Sociology," in the *American Journal of Sociology*. Consult also the "External Research List," published by the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State. These are in addition to the "List of American Doctoral Dissertations Printed in 1938," the most recent of an annual series published by the Library of Congress; and Arnold H. Trotier and Marian Harman, "Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by American Universities, 1952–53," the twentieth of a series beginning in 1933–34, compiled for the Association of Research Libraries. Consult, for other lists, T. R. Palfrey and H. E. Coleman, Jr., "Guide to Bibliographies of Theses, United States and Canada" (Chicago, American LibraryAssociation, 2nd ed., 1940).

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* Similar lists have been printed in the REVIEW annually since 1911, except for 1915–19, 1921 and 1923–24; full citations are given in the 1955 list, XLIX, 792.

Abstracts of some of the theses listed as completed may be found in "Dissertations Abstracts," published bi-monthly by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

For a chart which lists, by subject category, the number of dissertations completed and in progress, 1951 through 1957, see this REVIEW, LII, p. 916.

Ronald Cease, Sovereignty and Social Solidarity in the Political Thought of Leon Duguit. *Claremont.*

Helaine M. Colton, John Locke: A Science of Ethics. *Columbia.*

Irving D. Fisher, A Study of the Social and Political Theories of American Urban Planners. *Columbia.*

Maurice M. Goldsmith, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: The Rationale of the Sovereign State. *Columbia.*

Francis X. Kane, Principles of Military Planning: The Influence of Science and Philosophy. *Georgetown.*

Edward N. MacConomy, The Political Thought of William Temple, Archbishop of York (1922–1942) and Canterbury (1942–1944). *Michigan.*

Manuel Maldonado-Denis, The Problem of Freedom and Equality in the Social and Political Thought of Jose Ortega y Gasset. *Chicago.*

Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Statesmanship and Party Government. *Harvard.*

Rosemary O'Hara, Urban-Rural Influences on Political Attitudes. *Minnesota.*

Rev. Richard J. Roberts, S.J., The Emergence of a Civil Right; Anti-Discrimination Legislation in Private Housing in the United States. *St. Louis.*

Robert L. Rothweiler, Politics and the Novel: The Perspectives of Four Major Radical American Novelists. *Washington* (St. Louis).

Wilfrid E. Rumble, Jr., Anglo-American Interpretations of Liberalism: 1920 to the Present. *Johns Hopkins.*

Richard C. Spillane, S.J., Political Theories and Methods of Robert A. Taft: Study of Basic Political Ideas and Operational Techniques. *Georgetown.*

Otto C. E. Stoetzer, The Influnce of European Political Thought in Latin America (1789–1954). *Georgetown.*

John E. Tashjean, The Social and Political Ideas of Franz Borkenau. *Georgetown.*

William L. Thorkelson, War Planning and Army Programming. *Syracuse.*

William J. Trainor, Jr., The Concept of Public Opinion in Political Theory. *Harvard.*

William Troutman, Respecting the Establishment of Religion in Colonial America. *Duke.*

John S. Vanderoef, The Political Thought of James Madison. *Princeton.*

Michael L. Walzer, On the Ideas, Organization, Activity of English Puritanism: A Study in Political Sociology. *Harvard.*

Edward Wright, Christian Socialist Thought in Twentieth Century England. *Duke.*

Victor Zitta, Georg-Lukacs: Between Marxism and Communism. *Michigan*

Changes

James J. Finlay, S.J., Montalembert and the Theory of Liberal Catholicism. *Duke.*

Milton Hobbs, The Logic of Political Science. *Northwestern.*

Richard Lindblad, The Liberal Philosophy and the Scientific Outlook: The Political Ideas of Charles E. Merriam. *Minnesota.*

John Logue, The Political Philosophy of Edward Hallett Carr. *Chicago.*

Sister M. Christoper Querin, F.C.S.P., The Right of Privacy, A Political Concept. *St. Louis.*

Philip Secor, Richard Hooker and the Christian Commonwealth. *Duke.*

Kenneth Smith, The "Right to Work": An Analysis in Labor-Management Theories of Decision Making. *California* (Los Angeles).

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Additions

William M. Alexander, American Scientists Considered as A Political Interest Group: Their Impact on National Policies. *Oregon.*

Robert Alperin, Organization in the Communist Party, U.S.A., 1931–1938. *Northwestern.*

Lee F. Anderson, The Midwest in Congress: A Quantitative Study. *Illinois.*

Lillian Banahan, Enforcement of Price Controls 1942–1953. *Georgetown.*

Douglas L. Bailey, The Constitution, Federalism and American Foreign Policy. *Fletcher School.*

Robert F. Barlow, United States Exports and Imports of Cotton Textiles: A Study of the Bases of Trade. *Fletcher School.*

Rene R. Beauchesne, The French Canadian in American Politics: A Study in Electoral Behavior. *Syracuse.*

Donald R. Brown, Problems in Valuations and Description: Method in the Study of Politics. *Harvard.*

Todd H. Bullard, Political Parties and the West Virginia Legislature, 1949–1959. *Pittsburgh.*

Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. *Columbia.*

Joseph G. Chall, Federal Aid to Education in the 84th Congress: A Study of the Legislative Process in the House of Representatives. *Columbia.*

Alan Clem, A Congressman Runs for Re-election: Analysis of the 1958 Campaign in Nebraska's Third Congressional District. *American.*

Richard L. Conaway, Congress and the Problems of Providing Manpower for National Security, 1946–1958. *Pittsburgh.*

Bernard Cosman, Republicanism in the Metropolitan South, 1952–58. *Alabama.*

Duward L. Crow, The Defense Budget and the National Economy. *American.*

Roland H. Ebel, The Role of the Professional Staff in American Party Politics. *Michigan State.*

Steven Ebbin, A Qualitative Analysis of the Political Motivations of a Sample Group of Practicing Politicians. *Syracuse.*

Eugene N. Feingold, Pressure Politics and the Internal Revenue Act of 1954. *Princeton.*

Mark Ferber, Federal Aid to Education: A Study in Legislative Compromise. *California* (Los Angeles).

Julian Foster, Congressional Primaries. *California* (Los Angeles).

Robert G. Gilpin, Jr., The Politics of American Science. *California* (Berkeley).

Charles T. Goodsell, Congressional Access to Executive Papers: A Problem of Legislative-Executive Relations in American National Government. *Harvard.*

Marko Haggard, The Political Role of Organized Labor: Empirical Research and Descriptive Inquiry of the Political Participation of Organized Labor in One Oregon Industrial Community, 1954. *Oregon.*

Abimael Hernandez, Commonwealth Government Responsibility in Public Emergency Strikes on the Docks of the Island of Puerto Rico: Labor and Management Rights versus the Public Interest. *Chicago.*

Charles E. Jacob, The Political Ideas of Elihu Root. *Cornell.*

Charles O. Jones, The Theory and Practice of Representation: A Case Study of the Members of the House Agriculture Committee, U. S. Congress. *Wisconsin.*

Frank J. Kendrick, McCarthy and the Senate. *Chicago.*

Edgar Litt, Ethnic Identification and Perspectives: A Study of Political Attitudes Among Jews in an Urban Community. *Yale.*

Robert E. Matteson, Case Study in Decision Making: Development of United States Disarmament Policy during Stassen Period. *Harvard.*

William C. Mitchell, The Elective Public Official in America: A Study in Role Analysis. *Harvard.*

Richter H. Moore, Jr., United States Treaty Obligations and Civil Rights Enforcement. *Kentucky.*

Russell T. Newman, The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: 1941–1952. *American.*

Michael J. Parenti, Ethnic and Political Attitudes: A Depth Study of Italian-Americans. *Yale.*

Carl F. Poke, Congress and Outer Space. *Pittsburgh.*

James Pratt, Congress and the Creation of an Armed Alliance: A Study of the Executive-Legislative Policy Process in Foreign Affairs, 1948–1951. *Columbia.*

Fauneil J. Rinn, The Presidential Press Conference. *Chicago.*

William L. Rivers, The Washington Correspondents: Significance for Government. *American.*

Harold W. Rood, A Study of American Military Policy between 1919 and 1940. *California* (Berkeley).

Baljit Singh, United States Interests in Liberia. *Maryland.*

Archibald W. Singham, Political Leadership—A Study in Democratic Theory and Practice. *Michigan.*

Charles L. Robertson, The American Secretary of State: A Study of the Office under Henry L. Stimson and Cordell Hull. *Princeton.*

Alan Rosenthal, Control of Public Education. *Princeton.*

Diane Solares Rothberg, The Politics of Farm Support: A Study of Group Action in Congress. *Harvard* (Radcliffe).

Bonifacio Salamanca, The Beginnings of Philippine-American Affinity 1901–1907. *Yale.*

Walter S. Schoenberger, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and its Political and Moral Consequences. *Fletcher School.*

William Standing, Decision-Making in the Civil Aeronautics Board. *Northwestern.*

Nathaniel P. Tillman, Jr., Walter Francis White: A Study in Interest Group Leadership. *Wisconsin.*

Catherine D. Williston, The Development of Propaganda as an Instrument of American Foreign Policy 1945–1957. *Harvard.*

Raymond E. Wolfinger, Elements of a Theory of Politics. *Yale.*

Luther H. Zeigler, Jr., Small Business in American Politics. *Illinois.*

Changes

Fred I. Greenstein, Children's Political Perspectives: A Study of the Development of Political Awareness and Preference among Pre-Adolescents. *Yale.*

James B. Harrison, The Legislative History of Alaska Statehood—A Study in the Legislative Process. *Washington* (Seattle).

Laurin Henry, Presidential Transition. *Chicago*

Robert N. Johnson, Defeated Presidential Candidates and the Party System. *Johns Hopkins.*

George C. Roberts, Functions of a Political Party in Three Indiana Counties. *Indiana.*

Deletions

William D. Hatley, The Dixiecrat Movement. *Missouri.*

Edmund C. Mester, The Mayor in Maryland. *Maryland.*

Paul J. Scheips, The Chiriqui Improvement Company. *American.*

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Additions

Frederick Bertolet, The Bill of Rights under Military Law: An Appraisal of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. *Pennsylvania.*

David J. Danelski, The Chief Justice of the United States, 1921–1946. *Chicago.*

Alan Engel, Eugenic Sterilization: A Study in the Relationship between Law and Social Control. *Northwestern.*

Robert H. Gordon, Relationships between the Attorney-General and Agency Counsels in New York State. *Syracuse.*

Klaus H. Heberle, Federalism and the Supreme Court: A Study in Modern Judicial Theories of Federalism. *Chicago.*

Larry D. Johnston, The Impact of Congressional Organization on the Constitution. *California* (Berkeley).

John J. Mahoney, O.P., Development of Philosophy of the Supreme Court toward Monopoly and Monopoly Power. *Georgetown.*

Stephen R. Mitchell, Mr. Justice Horace Gray. *Wisconsin.*

Joseph R. Morice, Justice Stephen J. Field. *Pittsburgh.*

Stuart Nagel, Backgrounds of Judges and Litigants as Determinants of Judicial Decision-Making. *Northwestern.*

Alexander A. Palamiotis, Citizens and Aliens in American Constitutional Law. *Utah.*

Hobert P. Sturm, The Legal Theory of Associate Justice David J. Brewer. *Utah.*

Simon Tucker, An Analytical Study of the Legal Reasoning and Legal Methodology of the Warren Court in Reaching Decisions in Public Law Cases. *American.*

Theodore M. Vestal, The Legal Status of Labor Unions, Political Parties, and Religious Groups in the United States. *Stanford.*

Changes

Richard J. Bloss, The Right of Silence and the National Security: A Study of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Immunity Legislation with Particular Emphasis on the Immunity Act of 1954. *Pennsylvania.*

Ruth L. Byrd, Justice Rufus Wheeler Peckham and the Growth of Capitalism in the United States. *American.*

Stanley E. Lank, The Constitutional Opinions of Henry Billings Brown. *Virginia.*

Gerald Rigby, The Political Implications of Legal Decisions: The Little Rock Case. *California* (Los Angeles).

Sami Saliba, Watkins V. United States—An Analysis and Critique. *Kansas.*

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

Thomas J. Anton, The Politics of State Taxation: A Study of the 1959 Tax Revision Legislation (to be) Passed by the New Jersey Legislature. *Princeton.*

James D. Barber, The Legislator's First Session. *Yale.*

Harriet F. Berger, The Labor Relations of Local Government in the United States. *Pennsylvania.*

Laurence J. Burton, A Study of the Planning Functions of the Various States. *Utah.*

Carl W. Chilson, The Council-Manager Plan in Watertown, New York. *Michigan.*

Charles A. Cochener, Models of Leadership

Implicit in Executive Development Programs. *Pennsylvania.*

John F. Clough, The Politics of Pennsylvania: The Development into a Two-Party State. *Pennsylvania.*

Wilder W. Crane, Jr., The Legislative Process in Wisconsin. *Wisconsin.*

Howard E. Davis, Case Studies in Policy Making: The Establishment of State Alcoholism Programs in New England. *Yale.*

Walter De Vries, The Michigan Lobbyist: Socio-Economic Background, Legislative and Organization Policy Roles, and Perceptions of Effectiveness. *Michigan State.*

Essien U. Essien-Udom, Black "Nationalism" in Chicago. *Chicago.*

Daniel E. Farlow, The Politics of Selected Metropolitan Counties in Texas. *Texas.*

Edward Ferguson, The Present Status of State Bills of Rights. *Illinois.*

Harold C. Fishman, The Politics of Education in California. *California* (Los Angeles).

Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Some Social Determinants of Democracy in the 50 United States. *Northwestern.*

Edward M. Goldberg, The Concept of Development Rights as a Governmental Tool for the Preservation of Open Space. *Pennsylvania.*

Harold Gorvine, Massachusetts Politics During the New Deal, November, 1932–November, 1940. *Harvard.*

Samuel B. Hamlett, The Approach to the Metropolitan Problem in Tarrant County, Texas. *Texas.*

Gerald E. Hansen, State Party Platforms in Missouri. *Missouri.*

William Hathaway, Interest in Political Affairs as Measured by Readership of a Daily Newspaper, 1952–59. *Minnesota.*

Forbes B. Hays, The Regional Plan Association of New York: A Study of Metropolitan Community Leadership. *Columbia.*

Richard F. Heiges, The Ohio Administrative Procedure Act, 1943 to 1959: An Analysis and Evaluation. *Ohio State.*

Harold Herman, New York State Governmental Practices and Their Influence upon Metropolitan Integration. *Syracuse.*

James F. Herndon, The Relationship between Partisanship and the Decisions of State Supreme Courts. *Michigan.*

Donald S. Hiller, The Commission Form of City Government in Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania.*

Bernard Klein, Political Partisanship in Four State Legislatures. *Michigan State.*

Donald P. Kommers, Court Reorganization in Wisconsin. *Wisconsin.*

Robert N. Larson, The Governor's Council in New England. *Boston University.*

Willard H. Leavel, The Development of the Direct Primary in Four Western States with Special Note of the Role of the Western Progressive. *Washington* (Seattle).

E. Lester Levine, The Impact of Federal Grant-in-Aid Programs on Intergovernmental Relations in Minnesota. *Chicago.*

Charles S. Liebman, The Political Impact of Population Changes in Suburban Metropolitan Communities. *Illinois.*

Roger H. Mars, Suburbanization, Public Opinion, and Voting Behavior: The Case of Livonia. *Michigan State.*

John L. Perentesis, The Selection of a Rapid Transit for the Detroit Area. *Michigan.*

Myles M. Platt, The Detroit Metropolitan Airport: A Case Study in Bureaucratic Power, Leadership, and Frustration. *Michigan.*

Nelson W. Polsby, Theories and Findings in the Study of Power in American Communities. *Yale.*

Basil Scott, The Administration of Third Structure Motor Vechicle Taxes in New York State. *Syracuse.*

William M. Shear, The New York State Water Power and Control Commission. *Syracuse.*

Bert A. Smith, The Office of Speaker of the Missouri House of Representatives. *Missouri.*

Edward Sofen, The Miami Metropolitan Manger: A Case Study. *Columbia.*

Clyde Wingfield, Industrial Location in the Syracuse Metropolitan Area. *Syracuse.*

Changes

Alice Woodward Karl, Politics of the Boston School Committee, 1895–1914. *Harvard.*

James G. Kehew, Legislative Apportionment in Pennsylvania, 1874–1959. *Pittsburgh.*

Theodore J. Lowi, Study of the Appointment Process in New York Politics, 1898–1958. *Yale.*

Hyrum Plass, The Administration of County Roads in Utah. *Utah.*

Warren Weston, Comparison of the Method of Filling Vacancies in Congress by Appointment and by Special Election. *Minnesota.*

Deletions

Mark Ferber, The Politics of Education: An Analysis of Interest Groups and State Politics. *California* (Los Angeles).

Robert H. Simmons, A Comparative Study of State and Federal Land Management Practice in New Mexico. *Washington* (Seattle).

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Additions

Martin D. Dubin, The Development of the Concept of Collective Security in the American Peace Movement, 1899–1917. *Indiana.*

David L. Glickman, The Port of New York, Foreign Trade during the Post-War Period. *New School.*

Herman A. Jones, Jr., Training and Utilization of Auxiliary Nursing Personnel in Hospitals. *American.*

David Phillips, The Relationship of the Atomic Energy Commission to State and Local Governments. *Syracuse.*

Henry R. Mason, Evaluation of the Problem of Providing Hospital Care for Marginal Indigent Families in Syracuse, N.Y. *Syracuse.*

Boulton B. Miller, The Evaluation of Administration with Emphasis on Methodology and Specific Reference to the Department of Defense. *American.*

Maurice F. Ronayne, Central Government Organization and Automatic Data Processing. *American.*

Robert W. Schafer, Organization of the Army High Command, 1941–1950. *Syracuse.*

Edward V. Schten, A Study of the Administration of the Federal Milk Market in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. *Wisconsin.*

Harold Silverstein, A Top Management Analysis of Automatic Data Processing Systems with Specific Reference to the Department of the Army. *American.*

Norman C. Thomas, The Judicial Impact on Administrative Regulation: A Study of Public Utility Regulation in New Jersey. *Princeton.*

John T. Thompson, The Administration of Water Resource Development Programs in Texas. *Texas.*

Robert Warren, The Anarchy of Municipal Incorporation. *California* (Los Angeles).

Changes

Thomas Drake, Governmental Problems in Air Pollution. *Duke.*

James F. Guyot, Bureaucrats and Businessmen: A Comparison of Personality Characteristics of Government and Business Middle Managers. *Yale.*

Dennis E. Mulvihill, The Department of Army Management Improvement Program: A Case Study. *Pittsburgh.*

Robert L. Peabody, Toward Clarification of the Concept of Authority in Administrative Organization Theory. *Stanford.*

Theodore W. Taylor, Regional Organization of The Bureau of Indian Affairs. *Harvard.*

Joseph Willard, Public Relations Policies of Federal Departments and Agencies. *Indiana.*

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

Manzooruddin Ahmed, The Concept of Divine Sovereignty in Pakistan. *Columbia.*

Peter Alevra, Sir Winston Churchill and the British Constitution. *Texas.*

Evalyn C. Aligwekwe, British Political Parties and Mediterranean Colonial Policy with Special Reference to Cyprus and Malta *Bryn Mawr.*

Vladimir V. Almendinger, Rural District Government in the USSR. *Harvard.*

Charles W. Anderson, Central American Political Leadership and the Goals of Technological and Social Development. *Wisconsin.*

Stephen S. Anderson, A Problem in the Impact of German-Soviet Relations upon Political Development in Yugoslavia in the Interwar Period. *Harvard.*

Tatsuo Arima, Political Role of the Japanese Intellectuals in the 1930's *Harvard.*

Col. Dewitt C. Armstrong, III, British valuation of Strategic Deployment. *Princeton.*

John Batatu, History of the Socialist and Communist Movement in Iraq, 1917–1958. *Harvard.*

David A. Booth, Political Parties in Denmark. *Princeton.*

Henry Christopher, Relationship between Transportation Patterns and Regionalism in Latin America. *Northwestern.*

Fedor I. Cicak, The Structure and Development of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia between 1919–1941. *Indiana.*

Alfred B. Clubok, Political Party Organization and Activities in Rural Japan. *Michigan.*

Frank C. Darling, American Influence on the Evaluation of Constitutional Government in Thailand. *American.*

William F. Dorrill, The Growth of the Communist Movement in North China, 1937–1945. *Harvard.*

Tarik El-Erris, The Emergence of Saudi

Arabia as a Power in the Middle East, 1932–1957. *American.*

Trowbridge H. Ford, Gladstone's First Ministry: The Beginnings of the Modern Constitution, 1868–1874. *Columbia.*

Gregorio A. Francisco, Jr., A Study of the Career Patterns of Higher Civil Servants in the Philippines. *Minnesota.*

Robert C. Fried, The Italian Prefects: A Study in Field Administration. *Yale.*

Franklin E. Gill, Jr., Privately Owned Houses in the USSR. *Columbia.*

Leon Gourè, Administering and Investigation of Popular Behaviour of Leningrad during World War Two. *Georgetown.*

Sven O. Groennings, Post-War Behavior in the Norwegian Storting: A Study of Parliamentary Party Cohesion in a Multi-Party System. *Stanford.*

Alexander J. Groth, The Parliament of Poland, 1926–1939. *Columbia.*

Dagmar Gunther-Stirn, East Germany's *Volkspolizei. Columbia.*

Bertil L. Hanson, Stockholm Municipal Politics. *Chicago.*

A. Spencer Hill, The Politics of British Education. *Wisconsin.*

Wilbur W. Hitchcock, Some Aspects of Southeast Asian Politics. *Pennsylvania.*

Norman E. Holly, The Nordic Council. *Harvard.*

James E. Holton, Parliament, The Minister, and the Nationalized Industries: A Quest for the Public Interest. *Chicago.*

Jiri Horak, The Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, 1938–1948. *Columbia.*

Jerry F. Hough, The Role of the Party in the Administration of Soviet Industry. *Harvard.*

Yusuf K. H. Ibish, The Kurdish Problem. *Harvard.*

Herbert Jacob, German Field Administration: A History and Analysis. *Yale.*

Walter D. Jacobs, Mikhail Vasil'evich Frunze: His Place in the Soviet Military and Political Picture. *Columbia.*

Robert D. Judy, The Administration of the Canadian Northwest Territories. *California* (Berkeley).

Josef Kalvoda, The Institutional Aspects of Khrushchev's Agricultural Reform in the Collective Farms and Its Reflection in Czechoslovakia. *Columbia.*

Walter Klein, Relationship between Political Attitudes and Economic Development in Latin America. *Northwestern.*

Emery S. Kobor, The Third Force in Italian Politics—Parties and Policies of the Middle Way, 1944–1958. *Columbia.*

Stanley Kochanek, The Relationship of the Working Committee of the Congress Party with the Congress Party in Parliament (India). *Pennsylvania.*

Victor T. LeVine, The Cameroon: From Mandate to Independence. *California* (Los Angeles).

John W. Lewis, Organizational and Leadership Techniques in the Chinese Communist Party. *California* (Los Angeles).

Avelino Lim, The Setting of Philippine Fiscal Administration. *Syracuse.*

Leon N. Lindberg, The Group Theory and the European Common Market. *California* (Berkeley).

Gerald R. McDaniel, The Danish Unicameral Parliament. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert W. Miller, The Landerrat in the German Federal Republic. *Michigan.*

Edwin B. Morrell, Party Control of Local Administration in the USSR. *Harvard.*

David Mozingo, Sino-Indonesian Relationships *California* (Los Angeles).

Richard B. Myer, Raion Government in the Soviet Union: Its Structure and Function. *Columbia.*

Joan M. Nelson, The Role of Long-term Economic Advisory Groups: Burma, Iran, Pakistan. *Harvard* (Radcliffe).

Stanley S. Newman, The Status of the Imam in Republican Turkey. *Columbia.*

Elechukwu Njakar, IGBO Political Institutions in Transition. *California* (Los Angeles)

Phyllis J. Peterson, The Role of Personalism in the Brazilian Party System. *Michigan.*

Richard H. Pfaff, Economic Development and Governmental Planning in the Countries of the Middle East: A Political Evaluation. *California* (Berkeley).

David Price, Administrative Inspection in Egypt. *Syracuse.*

Peter Regenstreif, The Liberal Party of Canada (1896–1957). *Cornell.*

Nita Rous, Juvenile Delinquency in the Soviet Union, as a Major Current Problem of Soviet Government. *Columbia.*

I. Milton Sacks, Communism and Nationalism in Vietnam. *Yale.*

Manfred H. Schmidt, The East German Landsmannschaften in the Federal Republic of Germany—Their Organization and Influence. *Michigan.*

Sayre Stevens, Science as an Element of Soviet Society. *Washington* (Seattle).

Howard R. Swearer, Local Government in the USSR: Popular Participation in a Totalitarian Society. *Harvard.*

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Robert E. Beerstecher; A.B., Texas, 1949; Ph.D. Georgetown, 1959. Revolutionary Antimilitarism in Communist Theory and Practice. *Georgetown.*

Martin Birnbach; B.A., New York University, 1950; M.Sc. (Econ.), London School of Economics and Political Science, 1955; Ph.D., Rutgers, 1959. Neo-Freudian Materials for a Political Philosophy. *Rutgers.*

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Enid Campbell; LL. B., University of Tasmania, 1955; B.Ec., *ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., Duke 1959. John Austin and Jurisprudence in Nineteenth Century England. *Duke.*

Vincent C. Chrypinski; M. Law, Catholic University of Lublin, Poland, 1939; A.M., Wayne, 1953; Ph.D., Michigan, 1958. The Movement of "Progressive Catholics" in Poland. *Michigan.*

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James R. Flynn; A.B., Chicago, 1952; A.M., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. Modern Thomism and Democracy. *Chicago.*

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Nelson P. Guild; A.B., New Hampshire, 1953; M.A., Pennsylvania State, 1955; Ph.D, *ibid.*, 1958. The New Conservatism in America versus Traditional American Conservatism. *Pennsylvania State.*

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Hugh L. LeBlanc; A.B., Louisiana State, 1948; A.M., Tennessee, 1950; Ph.D., Chicago, 1958. The Governmental Process of the District of Columbia. *Chicago.*

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Daisy Parker; B.A., Florida State, 1937; M.A., Virginia, 1940; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. An Examination of the Florida Executive. *Virgina.*

Samuel C. Patterson; B.A., South Dakota, 1953; M.S., Wisconsin, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Toward a Theory of Legislative Behavior: The Wisconsin State Assemblymen as Actors in a Legislative System. *Wisconsin.*

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Bert E. Swanson; B.A., George Washington, 1951; M.A., Oregon, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Power and Politics: A Community Formulates Resource Policy. *Oregon.*

James D. Thomas; B.S., Alabama Polytechnic, 1946; M.S., *ibid.*, 1947; M.A., Alabama, 1948; Ph.D., Ohio State, 1958. County Government and Administration in Alabama. *Ohio State.*

Yadollah Toossi; B.A., University of Teheran, 1950; Ph.D., Texas, 1958. Headquarters-Field Relations in Selected State Agencies. *Texas.*

Richard A. Watson; B.A., Bucknell, 1948; LL.B., Michigan, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Law Enforcement in the Cleveland Metropolitan Area: A Study in Intergovernmental Relations. *Michigan.*

John E. Westburg; A. B., South Carolina,1941; A.M., *ibid.*, 1951; M.F.S., Southern California, 1954; A.M., *ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. Constitutional Reform for Effective Government in Nevada. *Southern California.*

Joseph S. Wodka; B.S. (Ed.), Ball State Teachers College, 1948; A.M., Michigan, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Some Correlates of Political Stability in a Polish-Language Voting Precinct in the Detroit Metropolitan Area. *Michigan.*

George D. Young; B.S., Missorui, 1950; M.S., Cornell, 1951; Ph.D., Missouri, 1958. The Role of Political Parties in the Missouri House of Representatives. *Missouri.*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

James H. Bahti; B.S., Michigan College of Mining & Technology, 1948; M.P.A., Michigan, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Personnel Integration in the Foreign Service. *Michigan.*

Roderick K. DeCamp; A.M., Chicago, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. The Chicago Transit Authority: A Study in Responsibility. *Chicago.*

Eugene T. Ferraro; M.S.S., New School, 1941; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. Military Air Supremacy Race: Political, Administrative, and Financial Consequences. *New School.*

Charles W. Fotis; A.B., Tufts, 1937; M.Ed., *ibid.*, 1939; Ph.D., American, 1959. Organization and Methods for Evaluating U. S. Federal Research and Development Programs. *American.*

Reverdy T. Gliddon; B.A., Texas, 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. Administrative Regulation of Commercial Air Transport. *Texas.*

Robert T. Golembiewski; B.A., Princeton, 1954; M.A., Yale, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. The Small Group, Organization, and Public Administration: An Analysis of Small Group Research Concepts and Operations. *Yale.*

W. Astor Kirk; B.A., Howard, 1946; M.A., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., Texas, 1958. Television Allocation Policy: An Administrative Search for the Public Interest. *Texas.*

Walter Kurylo; B.S., American, 1949; LL.B., Washington College of Law, 1938; Ph.D., American, 1959. A Study of the Federal Aid Highway Program with Special Emphasis on Its Budgetary and Planning Aspects. *American.*

Max Landau; B.S., New York University, 1942; A.M., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. American Enterprise in Mexico: A Case Study of Discriminations in an Underdeveloped Country during a Revolutionary Period. *New York University.*

Dean E. Mann; A.B., California (Berkeley), 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1954; Ph. D., *ibid.*, 1958. The Administration of Water Resources in the State of Arizona. *California* (Berkeley).

Sam Rothman; B.S., Long Island, 1943; M.A., American, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. The Scientist and Engineer in Government: A Study to Determine How Their Effectiveness Can Be Increased. *American.*

Edmund R. Smith; A.B., Washington, 1953; A.M., *ibid.*, 1954; Ph.D., Harvard, 1957. Public Administration and Bureaucracy. *Harvard.*

Peter Woll; A.B., Haverford, 1954; Ph.D., Cornell, 1958. Informal Administrative Adjudication and Its Significance in Terms of Administrative Responsibility. *Cornell.*

Lawrence G. Woodward; B.A., George Washton, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., American, 1959. Effects of Automatic Data Processing on Jobs in the Federal Government. *American.*

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Jose V. Abueva; A.B., Philippines, 1951; M.P.A., Michigan, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Formulation of the Philippine Community Development Program. *Michigan.*

Henry S. Albinski; B.A., California (Los Angeles), 1953; M.A., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1959. Australia's Search for Regional Security in Southeast Asia. *Minnesota*

Bahman Amini; B.A., Southwestern College, 1951; M.A., Fletcher School, 1954; Ph.D., Maryland, 1959. Indian Foreign Policy, With Particular Reference to Asia and Africa. *Maryland.*

J. Bruce Amstutz; A.B., DePauw, 1949; A.M., Fletcher School, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. The Indonesian Youth Movement, 1908–1955. *Fletcher School.*

Nan Louise Grindle Amstutz; A.B., Connecticut, 1944; A.M., Fletcher School, 1946; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. Development of Indigenous Importers in Indonesia, 1950–1955. *Fletcher School.*

William G. Andrews; A.B., Colorado A. & M., 1952; Certificates, University of Bordeaux, 1955; Ph.D., Cornell, 1959. Pierre Mendès-France: A Study of Political Ideas in Action. *Cornell.*

James H. Buck; A.B., Washington, 1948; M.A., Stanford, 1953; Ph.D., American, 1959. The Military and Political Aspects of the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. *American.*

Robert F. Curtis; B.A., Bates, 1942; M.A., Licencie es Sciences Politiques, Geneva, 1948; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1959. The Popular Republican Movement: Its Origins and Early Years. *Georgetown.*

Joseph J. R. Dobrich; B.A., New School, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. The European Defense Treaty in France and Germany. *New School.*

Carr L. Donald; A.B., Iowa, 1951; M.A., Columbia, 1955; Ph.D., Texas, 1959. The Brazilian Municipio: The Myth of Local Self-Government. *Texas.*

Marion E. Doro; B.A., Florida, 1951; M.A., Cornell, 1952; Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1959. Kenya: A Study of the Development of Western Political Institutions in a Plural Society. *Pennsylvania.*

James Dow; B.A., Minnesota, 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Benelux: An Experiment in the Compatibility of Sovereignty with International Organization. *Minnesota.*

Jack D. Dowell; A.B., California (Berkeley), 1949; A.M., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., Stanford, 1958. Legislative Process in West German Bundestag. *Stanford.*

Tarig El-Mutwalli; Lic. Law, Law College, Iraq; Ph.D., American, 1958. The Tax System in Iraq: A Study of Taxation in a Developing County. *American.*

Joan Gillespie; A.B., Mount Holyoke, 1953; A.M., Fletcher School. 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution. *Fletcher School.*

Maung Maung Gyi; B.A., Rangoon, 1946; M.A., *ibid.*, 1951; M.A., Yale, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. An Analysis of the Social and Political Foundations of the Burmese Executive, 1948–1956. *Yale.*

Daniel N. Jacobs; A.B., Harvard, 1948; A.M., Yale, 1951; Ph.D., Columbia, 1958. The May and October Slogans of the Central Committee: 1918–1954, as Seen through the Pages of Pravda. *Columbia.*

Choop Karnjanaprakorn; LL.B., Thammasat, 1954; M.A., Indiana, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Municipal Government in Thailand as an Institution and Process of Self-Government. *Indiana.*

Robert Kelson; B.S., Boston University, 1948; M.A., *ibids.*, 1949; Ph.D., Duke, 1959. The Private Member of Parliament and the Formation of Public Policy: A New Zealand Case Study. *Duke.*

Jerome B. King; A.B., Dartmouth, 1949; A.M., Stanford, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. Executive Organization and Administrative Practice in the Fourth Republic of France. *Stanford.*

Ehwer Koury; A.B., George Washington; Ph.D., American, 1958. Political, Social, and Economic Development in Iraq. *American.*

Thomas J. Leonard; A.B., Chicago, 1939; A.M., Columbia, 1946; Ph.D., Southern California, 1959. Some Administrative Relations of the Indian States and Union, 1950–1956. *Southern California.*

Peter Merkl; A.B., Munich, 1952; M.A., Minnesota, 1953; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1959. The Emergent Federal System of Western Germany. *California* (Berkeley).

Stanley Millet; B.S.S., College of the City of New York, 1946; Ph.D., New School, 1958. Majority Rule and the Control of International Conflict, A Study of the Voting Procedures of the Security Council. *New School.*

Marshall Ohashi; A.B., California, 1951; A.M., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., New York University, 1959. Ideology of Japan's Southward Movement as Seen through Japanese Eyes. *New York University.*

H. Carroll Parish; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. The Development of Democratic Institutions in Thailand. *California* (Los Angeles).

Suki Pasuknirunt; L.L.B., Thammasat, 1951; M.A., Indiana, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Analysis Between the Thai Labor Law and United States Labor Legislation. *Indiana.*

Marvin C. Rintala; A.B., Chicago, 1954; A.M., Fletcher School, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. The Development of the Extreme Right Wing in Finnish Politics, 1919–1939. *Fletcher School.*

Indira N. Rothermund; B.A., Wilson College (India), 1939; M.A., University of Bombay, 1941; M.A., Columbia, 1953; Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1959. Ghandi's Impact on India's International Relations. *Pennsylvania.*

Donald H. Scott; A.B., California (Berkeley), 1935; A.M., *ibid.*, 1937; Ph.D., Southern California, 1959. The Cultural Institute in Mexico City as an Example of United States Policy in Cultural Relations. *Southern California.*

R. Daniel Sloan, Jr.; A.B., Washington State College, 1952; A.M., Chicago, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. The Politics of Civil Defense: Great Britain and the United States. *Chicago*

John W. Ryan; B.A., Utah, 1952; M.A., Indiana, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. The Government and Administration of Bangkok: Appearance and Reality. *Indiana.*

Elaine D. Smith; B.A., Grinnell, 1946; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1947; Ph.D., American, 1959. Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the Grand National Assembly (1919–1922). *American.*

James W. Spain; A.M., Chicago, 1949; Ph.D., Columbia, 1959. Pakistan's North-West Frontier: Political Problems of a Borderland. *Columbia.*

Robert S. Sullivant; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., Chicago, 1958. Soviet Politics in the Ukraine 1917–1957. *Chicago.*

Ernest Harold Swayze; B.A., Reed College 1952; A.M., Harvard, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Soviet Literary Politics. *Harvard.*

Hugh G. Thornburn; A.B., Toronto, 1949; A.M., Columbia, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958.

The Politics of New Brunswick. *Columbia.*

Babatunde A. Williams; B.A., Northland College, 1953; M.A., Illinois, 1954; Ph.D., 1959. Nationalism and Federalism in Nigeria. *Illinois.*

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, POLITICS AND LAW

Abid Al-Marayati; A.B., Bradley, 1952; A.M., *ibid.*, 1954; Ph.D., New York University, 1959. Iraq's Preparations for Participation in the United Nations. *New York University.*

Charles D. Ameringer; A.B., Wisconsin, 1949; A.M., Fletcher School, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. Philippe Bunau-Varilla and the Panama Canal. *Fletcher School.*

Henry Austin; B.A., University of Travancore; M.A., American; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. India in Asia: 1947–1954. *American.*

Helen Bonnell; M.A., American; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Foreign Economic Relations in the Development of Iran. *American.*

Edward J. Brennan; Ph.D., Chicago, 1959. The Spanish Conscience and the Conquest of the Indians, 1511–1555. *Chicago.*

Vijay Sen Budbraj; B.A., University of Panjah; M.A., *ibid.;* Ph.D., American, 1958. The Soviet Image of India. *American.*

Sudershan Chawla; B.Sc., University of Delhi, 1943; M.A., Ohio State, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. India and the Communist Bloc. *Ohio State.*

Chieh Yue Jesse Chiang; B.A., St. John's University (China), 1944; M.A., Washington, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. British Colonial Policy in Tanganyika: A Study of Its Development in Relation to Changing Concepts and Needs, to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, and to the United Nations Trusteeship Council. *Washington* (Seattle).

Genevieve V. De Chellis; B.A., Aurora, 1942; M.A., *ibid.*, 1943; Ph.D., Georgetown. 1959. Highlights of the International Situation Presented to the Soviet People by the Soviet Press in 1955. *Georgetown.*

Brownlee S. Corrin; A.B., Stanford, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. League of Nations and United Nations Membership: A Study of Admission Concepts in Plan and Practice. *Stanford.*

Walter Damm; A.M., Chicago, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. National and International Factors Influencing Cartel Legislation in Post-War Germany. *Chicago.*

Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic; A.M., Chicago, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Propaganda Methods of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. *Chicago.*

Edwin H. Fedder; B.A., Maryland; M.A., American; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. The Privileges and Immunities Granted by the United States to the United Nations and to the Specialized Agencies. *American.*

Robert Ferring; B.A., Loras College, 1946; M.A., Notre Dame, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. The Accomplished Ambassador by Christopher Varsevicius and Its Relation to 16th Century Political Writing—With a Translation of the Treatise from the Latin. *Notre Dame.*

Henry W. Forbes; B.A., Southern California, 1949; Ph. D., Georgetown, 1959. Methods of Disarmament: A Critical Study of Disarmament Techniques Proposed in the Twentieth Century and the Impact of Nuclear Weapons on These Techniques. *Georgetown.*

Evan Fotos; B.A., Amherst; M.A., Johns Hopkins; Ph.D., American, 1957. Land Tenure and Rural Organization in Turkey since 1923. *American.*

Ellen Frey-Wouters; A.B., Concord, 1953; A.M., Columbia, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. The United Nations Children's Fund. *Columbia.*

Frederick Gareau; B.A., Toledo; Ph. D., American, 1957. A Critical Examination of United States Policy toward German Industrial Disarmament. *American.*

William P. Gerberding; A.B., Macalester College, 1951; A.M., Chicago, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Franklin D. Roosevelt's Conception of the Soviet Union in World Politics. *Chicago.*

Brijen K. Gupta; A.M., Yale, 1954; Ph. D., Chicago, 1958. Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–1757. *Chicago.*

Maurice Harari; A.B., Columbia, 1949; A.M., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. The Turco-Persian Boundary Question: A Case Study in the Politics of Boundary-Making in the Near and Middle East. *Columbia.*

Robert W. Harper; B.S., New York University; M.A., *ibid.;* Ph. D., American, 1957. An Analysis of the Development of the International Relations of Indonesia. *American.*

Charles W. Harris; B.A., Morehouse, 1949; M.S., Pennsylvania, 1950; Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1959. International Legal and Political Factors in the United States' Disposition of Alien Enemy Assets Seized during World War II: A Case Study on German Assets. *Wisconsin.*

Abraham M. Hirsch; B.SS., City College, 1949;

M.I.A., Columbia, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. International Rivers in the Middle East: A Legal and Political Analysis. *Columbia.*

Robert J. Horgan; A.B., North Dakota, 1949; M.A., Notre Dame, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. American Opinion Concerning the USSR between 1933 and 1939. *Notre Dame.*

Chun-tu Hsueh; LL.B., Caao Yang College, 1947; A.M., Columbia, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. Huang Hsing and the Cinese Revolution. *Columbia.*

John P. Hummon; A.B., Albion, 1953; A.M., Michigan, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. Protestants and Point Four: The Churches' Response to U. S. Programs of Aid to the Underdeveloped Countries. *Michigan.*

Vernon R. Iredell; A.B., Pomona, 1951; Ph.D., Chicago, 1958. Procedures for Maintaining the Peace According to the United Nations Charter, 1945–1955. *Chicago.*

Stephen H. Johnsson; B.A., Washington and Lee, 1954; M.A., Georgetown 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Special Interests and American Far Eastern Relations from Versailles to Yalta. *Georgetown.*

William B. Kelley, Jr., S.B., Louisville, 1949; A.M., Fletcher School, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. The 1927 Convention on the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions and its Significance in United States Commercial Policy. *Fletcher School.*

Cyrus H. Khabiri; B.A., George Pepperdine, 1949; M.A., American, 1951; Ph. D.,*ibid.*, 1959. Position of Iran in Contemporary World Affairs. *American.*

Shiwaram Kshirsager; B.A., Bombay; M.A., *ibid.;* Ph.D., American, 1957. Development of Relations between India and the United States, 1941–1952. *American.*

Melvin Marcus; A.B., Michigan, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Voting Procedures and Practices in the Security Council of the United Nations. *Michigan.*

Benjamin M. May., Jr.; B.A., Yale, 1943; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. Themes of Soviet War Propaganda, 1941–1945. *Yale.*

Charles B. McLane; A.B., Dartmouth, 1941; A.M., Columbia, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. Soviet Policy toward the Chinese Communists, 1935–1949. *Columbia.*

Jorge Morales-Yordan; B.A., University of Puerto Rico, 1948; LL.B., George Washington, 1952; M.A., American, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. The United States and the Non-Self-Governing Areas: A Study of the Relationships of the United States and the United Nations under Chapter XI of the Charter. *American.*

Harry Mullaly; A.B., New York University, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. The Refugee Act, 1953: A Study in the Development of a United States Foreign Policy for Refugees. *New York University.*

Khalil A. Nasir; B.A., University of Punjah; M.A., Boston University; Ph.D., American, 1957. The Foreign Relations of Pakistan: First Ten Years. *American.*

Dorothy L. Noble; A.B., Hood, 1930; A.M., Columbia, 1934; Ph.d., *ibid.*, 1958. Life of Francis Nicholson. *Columbia.*

Leon Novar; A.M., Chicago, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. The Great Powers and Iran, 1914–1921. *Chicago.*

Donald E. Nuechterlein; A.B., Michigan, 1948; A.M., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. The Icelandic Defence Problem, 1940–1956: A Study of the Influence of Domestic Political Factors on the Formulation of Iceland's Foreign Defence Policy. *Michigan.*

Stewart M. Patterson; B.B.A., Boston University; M.Ed., *ibid.,;* Ph. D., American, 1957. The Use of International Executive Agreements in the Foreign Assistance and Mutual Security Programs. *American.*

Belinda K. Pearson; A.B., Wellesley, 1952; A.M., Fletcher School, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. Commodity Reserve Currency with Special Reference to Monetary Aspects. *Fletcher School.*

Nemesio E. Prudente; B.S., U. S. Merchant Marine Academy, 1950; M.A., San Francisco State College, 1955; Ph. D., Southern California, 1959. The Admission to Membership in the United Nations as an Instrument of Diplomacy. *Southern California.*

Dorothy Robins; A.B., College of Wooster, 1942; A.M., Columbia, 1944; Ph.D., New York University, 1960. U. S. Non-Governmental Organizations and the Educational Campaign from Dumbarton Oaks, 1944 through the San Francisco Conference, 1945. *New York University.*

George K. Romoser; A.B., Rutgers, 1951; A.M., Chicago, 1954; Ph., *ibid.*, 1958. The Crisis of Political Direction in the German Resistance to Nazism—Its Nature, Origins, and Effects. *Chicago.*

Walter Rundell, Jr., B.S., Texas; M.A., American; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. European Activities of the U. S. Army Finance Department in World War II. *American.*

Andrew J. Schwartz; A B., Linfield, 1950; A.M., Fletcher School, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. American Foreign Policy and the

Russo-Finnish War, 1939–1944. *Fletcher School.*

Ali Sheikholislam; A.B., Teheran University; A.M., New York University, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. Open Diplomacy Registration of Treaties. *New York University.*

Mirza Shikoh; A.B., University of Delhi, 1940; A.M., Missouri, 1951; Ph.D., New York University, 1959. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Its Historical Determinants, Constitutional Antecedents, Evolution, and Major Problems. *New York University.*

Peter Stercho; Ph.D. in Economics, Munich, Dipl. Ing. of Economics, 1948; M.A., Notre Dame, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. The Carpatho-Ukraine in International Affairs, 1938–1939. *Notre Dame.*

Frank Tachau; Ph.B., Chicago, 1949; A.M., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. The Ideas of Turkish Nationalism. *Chicago.*

Edgar R. Terry; B.S., U.S.N.A., 1954; M.A., Maryland, 1955; Ph.D., American, 1959. A Critical Survey of the Geopolitical Schools of Thought Concerned with the Power Inventory of States and National Strategy and Their Interrelationship in the Context of International Politics. *American.*

Loren E. Tesdell; A.B., Iowa, 1941; A.M., New York University, 1949; Ph.D., Stanford, 1958. The Administration of Technical Assistance in Iraq and Jordan. *Stanford.*

Paul Weaver; B.S., U.S.M.A.; M.A., Georgetown; Ph.D., American, 1958. Soviet Interference in the Government of Iran, 1941–1951. *American.*

Richard J. Winters; B.S., Fordham School of Education, 1951; M.A., Fordham, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. United States Foreign Policy toward Japan from the Washington Conference to the Manchurian Incident. *Fordham.*

Minta Wang; B.A., Yenching, 1937; A.M., Columbia, 1953; Ph.D., 1959. The Development of I.L.O. Procedures for Making and Implementing International Labor Conventions between 1945 and 1957. *Columbia.*

William W. Whitson; S.B., U.S.M.A., 1948; A.M., Fletcher School, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1958. Army War College Preparation for National Security Policy Formulation. *Fletcher School.*

Klaus Wolff; A.B., Wabash College, 1950; Ph.D., Chicago, 1959. Pioneer Entrepreneurs in the German Linen and Cotton Industry, 1750–1860. *Chicago.*

Young K. Yoon; B.A., Chosan Christian, 1953; M.A., Hardin-Simmons, 1955; Ph.D., American, 1959. United Nations Participating in Korean Affairs, 1945–1954. *American.*

Isidoro Zanotti; LL.B., National School of Law, Brazil; Ph.D., American, 1958. Judicial Settlement of Inter-American Disputes. *American.*

NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The 1959 annual meeting of the New England Political Science Association was held on May 2 and 3 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. President Taylor Cole delivered greetings from the American Political Science Association. The Saturday evening meeting also featured an address on "A Scientist Looks at International Politics," by Dr. Jerome Wiesner, Director of Research at the M.I.T. Electronics Laboratory and member of the United States Delegation to the Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack in 1958.

The Saturday afternoon panel on "France: The Beginnings of the Fifth Republic" was chaired by Samuel H. Beer of Harvard and included as participants Luther Allen of the University of Massachusetts, Stanley Hoffman of Harvard, Daniel Lerner of M.I.T. and Nicholas Wahl of Harvard.

Robert Dishman of the University of New Hampshire was chairman of the Sunday morning panel on "The Political Ecology of New England." Papers were delivered by Robert Dahl of Yale, Duane Lockard of Connecticut College, and James Burns of Williams. Serving as discussants were V. O. Key of Harvard, Robert Babcock of the University of Vermont (currently serving as Lieutenant Governor of Vermont), and Father William L. Lucey of Holy Cross.

Gwendolen Carter of Smith College was elected president for the coming year, James Burns of Williams will serve as vice president, and Vernon Ferwerda of Trinity will continue as secretary-treasurer. Norman Padelford of M.I.T., Laurence Radway of Dartmouth, and Walter Bogart of Middlebury were elected to the executive committee.

The Midwest Conference of Political Scientists held its seventeenth annual meeting April 30 to May 2 at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. Featured speakers were Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee; Dr. Kevin McCann, consultant to President Eisenhower; and President Taylor Cole of the American Political Science Association, who analyzed "The West German Federal Constitutional Court."

The program was organized in terms of the local, state, national, comparative, international and professional "scenes." Papers on the following subjects were read and discussed: "Newspaper Leadership and/or Control of Local Politics," "The Politics of Local Government Reform and Reorganization," "Reevaluation of State Reorganization Trends," "The Politics of State Constitutional Revision," "Constancy in Voting Behavior," "What Should Public Law Contribute in Teaching and Research?" "Constituent and Representative," "Comparative Politics and Field Research in Interest Group Theory," "The Taxonomic Approach to Comparative Politics," "The German Problem: a Reassessment," "Colonialism in Africa," and "The Role of the Political Scientist in Public Affairs."

President Jasper Shannon chaired the business meeting of the Conference, which elected the following new officers: Amry Vandenbosch, Kentucky, president; E. Allen Helms, Ohio State, vice-president; and as members of the executive council, Clara Penniman, Wisconsin and William Riker, Lawrence. Vernon Van Dyke, Iowa State, was named to succeed David Fellman as Editor of the *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, and Harry R. Davis, Beloit, to succeed A. Leroy Bennett as secretary-treasurer.

The Northern California Political Science Association held its eleventh annual meeting at the University of San Francisco on May 2. Discussions were held on: "Press and Politics in California", "Professors and Politics" and "Creeping Partisanship in California." The first Presidential Award Citation for teaching, service to the profession, community service, and research was given to John M. Selig, City College of San Francisco. Officers elected for 1959–1960 were: president, Peter H. Odegard, University of California; vice president, Alexander Smetana, University of San Francisco; secretary-treasurer, John M. Selig, City College of San Francisco. The following were elected to the council: Gilbert Abcarian, Humboldt State College; Charles W. Black, Modesto Junior College; Karl Buckman, Fresno State College; Benjamin C. Franklin, Chico State College; Bernard Kronic, University of Santa Clara; Hubert N. Marshall, Stanford University; Paul Murray, Sacramento State College.

The Iowa Conference of Political Scientists devoted its annual meeting at Drake University, March 14, to discussions of state government reorganization, the governor's budgetary policy, and strengthening political party organization in Iowa. Officers elected for 1960 include: president, John Cotton Brown, Cornell College; secretary-treasurer, Donald E. Boles, Iowa State College; members of the council—John C. Norton, St. Ambrose; Harold Fletcher, Grinnell College; Ross B. Talbot, Iowa State College; Richard W. Taylor, Coe College; Elsworth P. Woods, Drake; Russell G. Whitesel, State University of Iowa; John R. Kapp, Iowa Wesleyan College; Jeffrey Mao, Central College.

The following were selected as officers of the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association for 1959–60. President—Hugh A. Bone, University of Washington; vice president—Boyd A. Martin, University of Idaho; Secretary-treasurer—Donald Balmer, Lewis and Clark College; executive council 1959–62—Brock Dixon, Portland State College, and Paul Castleberry, Washington State College.

The 1960 meeting of the association will be held on the campus of the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B. C.

A regional meeting of the American Society of International Law was held on April 16–17, 1959, at Tulane University, New Orleans. The general topic of the meeting was "International Law Developments and Latin America."

The meeting began on Thursday afternoon with an address by the President of the Society, Myres S. McDougal, of the Yale Law School, entitled "International Law and Contending Systems of World Order." Following the President's talk, papers were delivered by Brendan F. Brown, School of Law, Loyola University, entitled "Application of the International War Crimes Concept," and by Alan Karabus, School of Law, Tulane University, on "Modalities of Economic Aggression." Commentators for the session were: Clay Shaw, managing director, International Trade Mart, New Orleans; Carlos A. Mendoza, Tulane University School of Law; and Philip Taylor, Jr., department of political science, Tulane University.

At the Friday afternoon session, three papers were delivered by Thomas M. Rodgers, attorney and oil and gas consultant, New Orleans, on "Changing International Attitudes toward Oil Production Problems"; by Bernard K. Oppenheim, attorney, New Orleans, on "Some Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Latin America"; and by Brunswick G. Deutsch attorney, New Orleans, on "Developments in the Law of the Sea." Commentators at this session were Robert W. French, director of the Port, New Orleans, Frank L. Keller, department of economics, Tulane University, and Professor William J. Griffith, department of history, Tulane University.

The formal sessions noted above were open to the public. In addition to these, members of the Society and participants in the program were guests of the University at luncheons on Thursday and Friday. On Friday morning, Professor McDougal conducted an informal seninar for undergraduate, law and graduate students, at which contemporary problems of international law were discussed.

Members of the Local Committee for the meeting were: Eberhard P. Deutsch, New Orleans attorney; Max M. Schaumburger, New Orleans attorney; Professor Brendan F. Brown, Loyola University Law School; F. F. Stone, Tulane University Law School; and David R. Deener, department of political science, Tulane University.

The Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs of the University of Virginia presented the Taraknath Das Memorial Conference on "India: Conditions and Prospects," May 8 and 9, 1959. The annual Rabindranath Tagore Memorial Lecture was delivered at one of the conference sessions. The subjects discussed were: Social and Cultural Factors Conditioning Policy; Economic Development and Planning; India and the United States; Administrative and Political Factors; Foreign Policy and the United Nations. The participants were: Onkar P. Bhatnagar, visiting professor, Allahabad University; Paul C. Sherbert, Asia Society; Carl C. Taylor, formerly of the Ford Foundation; Eugene Staley, Stanford Research Institute; C. S. Jha, ambassador and head, Indian Mission to the United Nations; George V. Allen, director, U. S. Information Agency; Shiram B. Bapat, United Nations; Ralph Purcell, Wake Forest College; Phillips Talbot, American Universities Field Staff; Quincy Wright, foreign affairs department of the University of Virginia and Paul Appleby.

Three hundred students from twenty-three colleges and universities from five mid-western states attended a conference on "The Prospects for Democracy in the Underdeveloped Areas," April 30–May 2 at Wayne State University. Guest speakers at the conference were: Ambassador B. K. Nehru of India, "The View from India"; Governor G. Mennen Williams of Michigan, "America's Responsibility"; Francis Wilcox, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, Department of State, "The United States Program of Assistance to Underdeveloped Areas"; George Blanksten, Northwestern University, "The Prospects for Democratic Leadership"; Martin Bronfenbrenner, University of Minnesota, "The Role of Government in Economic Improvement"; George Cressey, Syracuse University, "The Strategic Significance of the Middle East"; Melville Herskovits, Northwestern University "Acculturation and the Democratic Process." Discussants in political science were Edward Heubel and Max Mark, Wayne State University.

The conference was under the organization and direction of Maurice Waters, political science department, Wayne State University.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The University of Texas, in cooperation with the County Auditors' Association of Texas, acted as sponsor to a County Auditors' Institute on May 21–22, 1959. The institute was planned as an intensive training course for the purpose of assisting the professional development of county auditors, clerks, and other county officials. Local arrangements were under the management of the Institute of Public Affairs, together with other divisions of the University. It is intended that this first effort will lead to an annual program built on these lines.

Harvard University announced the receipt of a grant of $285,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation for the support of a research and training program in science and public policy, to be carried out by the graduate school of public administration.

The program will study the broad range of problems involved in the financing and administration of scientific research and in the application of science to the formulation and determination of public policy. It will also undertake to train a number of scientists and administrators who are actively concerned with these problems.

The University of Idaho has recently established a bureau of public affairs research primarily concerned with the functions and problems of state and local governmental officials. It is attached to the department of social sciences and headed by Robert J. Huckshorn, assistant professor of political science.

An institute for political education has been established at Morgan State College, Baltimore, Md., and will be opened this year, (September, 1959). The project, made possible by a grant of $103,000 from the Ford Foundation, is designed to encourage participation in practical politics among Morgan State students and alumni, as well as to train citizen politicians.

The director of the Institute is G. James Fleming, professor of political science at the college. Dwynal B. Pettengill, formerly on the faculty of Goucher College, is assistant director of the Morgan project, with the rank of assistant professor. A group of leading Maryland citizens, from the ranks of business, labor and education is serving as advisory committee.

The faculties of the department of political science and the school of public administration at Florida State University have joined forces in the newly organized department of government in the College of Arts and Sciences. Dr. Marian D. Irish has been appointed head of the department. The Government faculty now includes: professors: R. R. Oglesby, Malcolm B. Parsons, James W. Prothro, Elston E. Roady, Vincent V. Thursby, Odell Waldby; associate Professors: Juanita Gibson, Daisy Parker, Paul Piccard; assistant Professors: Richard B. Gray, John S. Vanderoef.

The ACLS is exploring the possibility of expanding the present agreement on cultural, technical, and educational exchanges between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics so that it will provide additional opportunities for mature scholars in the humanities and social sciences of both countries to conduct research for periods of three months to a year. ACLS expects to prepare a statement for consideration in the renegotiation of the exchange agreement, and in this connection would be glad to hear from scholars in any of the disciplines included in the constituency of the ACLS who would be interested in carrying on research in the Soviet Union, with as much detail as possible concerning the projected research, including the length of stay desired and the location and description of materials to which access will be needed.

Henry J. Abraham, associate professor in political science, University of Pennsylvania, will spend the academic year 1959–60 at the University of Aarhus in Denmark, where he will be Fulbright lecturer on American political science and constitutional law.

Gordon E. Baker is on sabbatical leave from the University of California at Santa Barbara during 1958–59 in order to continue his research on legislative representation in the West Coast states. He is also a participant in the State Constitutional Studies Project sponsored by the National Municipal League.

Samuel H. Barnes, instructor in political science at the University of Michigan, received a grant-in-aid from the Social Science Research Council to enable him to visit Brussels last summer in connection with a research project concerning Christian trade unions.

Gerard Braunthal of the University of Massachusetts has been awarded a Fulbright grant for 1959–60 and will teach at the University of Frankfurt, Germany. He will also engage in research in the field of German politics.

Harold R. Bruce, professor emeritus at Dartmouth, has been reappointed a visiting professor at Pomona College.

William Buchanan, associate professor of political science at the University of Southern California, has been appointed as visiting research professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley for 1959–60.

Franklin L. Burdette of the University of Maryland was awarded an honorary LL.D. by Marshall College on May 31.

Ardath W. Burks, Rutgers University, has been serving as Fulbright research professor in Kyoto University during the academic year 1958–1959. He will resume his duties at Rutgers with the rank of professor in September, 1959.

Edward McN. Burns, Rutgers University, has been appointed Fulbright professor in the Free University of Berlin for the academic year 1959–1960. His place as chairman of the department at Rutgers will be occupied for the year by Benjamin Baker.

Gwendolen Carter of Smith College served during the spring semester, as a part-time member of the staff of the department of government at the University of Massachusetts, presenting an interdepartmental social science course on Africa, South of the Sahara.

Frederic N. Cleaveland, professor of political science, University of North Carolina, has been appointed as visiting professor at the University of California, Berkeley, to replace Albert Lepawsky, who will be on leave.

William Cornelius of Agnes Scott College was visiting professor for the summer session at Emory University.

L. Gray Cowan of Columbia will be spending his sabbatical leave in Africa.

Michael Curtis served as visiting assistant professor of government at Connecticut College during 1958–59.

Gottfried Dietze of the Johns Hopkins University returned to Heidelberg to teach during the summer semester of 1959. He was elected to the Academy of Human Rights in Geneva, and will be a participant at the meeting of the Montpelerin Society in Oxford.

Marjorie Dilley was on leave from Connecticut College during 1958–59 to accept a grant under the Smith-Mundt Act. She served as visiting lecturer at Makerere College in Kampala, Uganda.

Milorad Drachkovitch has been reappointed for 1959–60 as visiting assistant professor at the University of California, Berkeley.

Lewis J. Edinger, Michigan State University, has been awarded an advanced research award under the Fulbright program and a faculty research grant from the Social Science Research Council to collect material on post-totalitarian leadership in the German Federal Republic. He will be affiliated with the Free University of Berlin, for the academic year 1959–60.

Heinz Eulau, professor of political science, Stanford University, has received a grant from the Social Science Research Council for research on "Power, Tension and Conflict in the Legislative System."

Luther Evans, former Librarian of Congress and Director-General of UNESCO, has spent the spring semester at the University of Texas serving as consultant on international affairs programs. The University now offers either graduate or undergraduate programs in Latin-American Studies, East European Studies, and International Studies, and is contemplating the establishment of similar programs in other areas. Mr. Evans's function has been to advise staff members and the University administration on the establishment and coordination of such programs and to advise on the needs of the University Library in connection with them.

Herman Finer of the University of Chicago, received a Fulbright award to teach at the University of Leyden and the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague, Holland, during the period September 1 to December 31, 1959. Mr. Finer gave the two opening lectures at the Institute of World Affairs, University of Louisville, on June 16.

Michael J. Flack, associate professor, graduate school of public and international affairs, University of Pittsburgh, has received an Educational Exchange Award to make a study of Attitudes toward Foreign Aid in Mexico.

Ludwig Freund returned to Roosevelt University in September, 1958, from a year's leave of absence. He was appointed acting chairman of the department of political science at Roosevelt University. He had spent the year lecturing and writing in the Federal German Republic on a grant received from the German Federal Government. He returned to Germany in June, 1959.

William Goodman, of the University of Tennessee, has been appointed visiting professor of political science at the University of Michigan for the academic year 1959–1960.

W. Brooke Graves, specialist in American government and public administration, senior specialists division in the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, has been granted leave of absence from September 1959 through January 1960, during which time he will serve as Carnegie visiting professor of political science at the University of Alaska, College, Alaska. He will give one course in American State Government, give some lectures at the University and at other places in the State, particularly at the community colleges at Ketchikan, Juneau and Anchorage. He will also serve as consultant to the state legislative council and to several officials in the executive branch of the state government.

H. R. G. Greaves of the London School of Economics will spend the winter term at Columbia as visiting professor of government.

Mr. James Guyot has been appointed an instructor in political science at Swarthmore College for the year 1959–60, substituting for Charles E. Gilbert, who will be on leave of absence as a Fellow of the Social Science Research Council.

Thomas T. Hammond, associate professor, departments of history and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia, will be on leave 1959–60. He will be on the faculty of the history department as visiting associate professor at the University of Wisconsin.

Ferrel Heady, professor of political science at the University of Michigan was in Israel in late June and July on a summer fellowship for travel and study. He also received a travel grant from the Social Science Research Council to attend the Conference of the International Institutions of Administrative Sciences in Wiesbaden, Germany, August 29–September 3. He prepared the United States National Report on the Conference's Agenda subject "Devolution of Powers to Autonomous Institutions Including Professional Bodies and Universities."

Samuel Hendel of CCNY will serve for a second year as visiting professor of government at Columbia. He has been elected chairman of the National Academic Freedom Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union.

Roger Hilsman will go on six months leave from his position as deputy director for research of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, in the Fall of 1959 to do research on the making of U. S. Foreign Policy. Financed by a special grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, the project is sponsored by the Washington center of foreign policy research, the Johns Hopkins University, of which Hilsman is a research associate.

Louise Holborn served as acting chairman of the government department at Connecticut College during 1958–59.

Ronald F. Howell of Emory University has been awarded a fellowship to attend the Claremont Men's College Summer conference on political economy in early June.

Frederick C. Irion of the University of New Mexico will serve as visiting professor of government at the University of Texas during the fall semester of 1959–60.

Harold K. Jacobson, assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan has received a leave of absence for the academic year 1959–60, to enable him to accept the World Affairs Center Fellowship. He has received grants from the Social Science Research Council and the Horace H. Rackham fund to enable him to travel to Geneva during the summer of 1959 in connection with a study of Soviet policy concerning the United Nations economic and social activities.

Samuel Krislov, University of Oklahoma, will spend 1959–60 as visiting assistant professor at Michigan State Universitv.

Ivan J. Kubanis, formerly of the University of Minnesota has been appointed visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of Southern California for the academic year 1959–60.

Robert L. Johnston served as lecturer in political science during the spring semester 1959 at the University of California, Berkeley.

Morton A. Kaplan, chairman, committee on international relations, University of Chicago, is spending the year 1959–60 traveling around the world under terms of a grant from the Carnegie Corporation.

George A. Lanyi will serve as chairman of the department of government at Oberlin College for the year 1959–60.

Gertrude Leighton, associate professor at Bryn Mawr College, has been appointed lecturer in law and behavioral sciences at the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania for 1959–60.

Albert Lepawsky, professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, will serve as director of the United Nations Technical Assistance Training and Recruiting Center at Vancouver, Canada, during 1959–60.

Werner Levi, who is spending the academic year 1958–59 as associate professor at the graduate institute of international studies in Geneva, has given a large number of talks on American foreign policy in Paris, major cities and universities of Germany, and over the German radio.

John D. Lewis will be on leave from Oberlin for the year 1959–60 to serve as Fulbright lecturer in American political theory at Oxford University.

Benjamin E. Lippincott of the University of Minnesota attended during the summer the Staff and School Command at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, and a seminar on Strategy conducted by the National War College, Washington, D C.

Leslie Lipson, professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, will be on sabbatical leave during the fall semester, 1959.

William S. Livingston of The University of Texas has been awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship for 1959–60 for studies in the decision-making process in British politics.

George A. Malley has been appointed an instructor in political science at Swarthmore College for the year 1959–60. He will carry the work of Kenneth N. Waltz, who is on leave as a research fellow of Columbia University in political theory and international relations.

Hubert Marshall of the department of political science at Stanford University spent the spring and summer quarters of 1959 teaching at Stanford-in-Germany, Stanford's undergraduate study center near Stuttgart.

Henry L. Mason of Tulane taught at Columbia during the 1958 summer session and was Fulbright professor at the University of Innsbruck during the 1958–59 academic year.

Herbert McClosky, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, has received an additional grant from the Social Science Research Council, to continue for three more years the analysis and publication of his research inquiring into the sources of political affiliation and belief among leaders and followers of the American political parties. He will be on leave from the University during

1959–60 under a Rockefeller Fellowship, for the purpose of bringing to completion and publication a set of field studies relating to political affiliation and belief.

Grant McConnell will be visiting professor of political science at Makerere College, University College of East Africa, at Kampala, Uganda, under a Smith-Mundt grant during the academic year of 1959–60.

Charles N. R. McCoy, chairman of the department of political science at Catholic University, will be visiting professor of political science at Stanford University during the academic year 1959–60.

Robert L. Morlan of the University of Redlands will serve during the current academic year as visiting professor of political science at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium.

Cecil J. Olmstead of the New York University School of Law will give an international law course at Columbia during the fall term.

Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed chairman of the international relations group committee at the University of Pennsylvania (an interdepartmental graduate program in international relations). He has also accepted an assignment with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to make a survey of the potentialities of a training program for young diplomats from non-Western countries. In order to make this survey he will be on leave of absence for the fall term of the academic year 1959–60. From early September to late December he will make an extensive trip to Europe, Africa, and Asia.

Jewell Cass Phillips, University of Pennsylvania, has been reelected a director of the Philadelphia Regional Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration for two years, 1959–61.

Lester H. Phillips, professor of government and director of social science, University of Redlands, is on sabbatical leave for the fall semester.

Elmer Plischke, head of the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland, is on sabbatical leave of absence during the fall semester of 1959. He will remain in the Washington, D.C. area, and will be engaged in several research projects.

J. E. Reeves of the department of political science, University of Kentucky, is spending the spring semester and summer in England studying local government and elections.

In 1959–60, Peter Remec will hold a Rockefeller Foundation grant and a Fordham University Faculty Fellowship for residence at The Hague and Zurich. Dr. Remec will study the sociological approach to international law as developed by Max Huber and Dietrich Schindler. During the summer of 1959, Dr. Remec was visiting professor at the New School, lecturing on Western European Integration and American Foreign Policy.

Stanley Rothman of Smith College taught at the University of Massachusetts during the summer session, 1959.

Glendon A. Schubert, Michigan State University, will lecture at the University of Oslo, Norway under a Fulbright award for the academic year 1959–60.

Robert E. Scott, associate professor of political science at the University of Illinois, spent the summer in Peru completing field research for a study of the Peruvian political progress begun in 1958 as part of the world wide project on political groups sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the S.S.R.C.

Mulford Sibley, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, has received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to further his research and writing in the field of political philosophy. He will be on sabbatical leave for the 1959–60 academic year.

David Spitz of Ohio State University will be on leave during 1959–60 to carry on research in political theory under a combined grant from the University and the Rockefeller Foundation.

Leo Stein of Western Michigan University served as visiting professor of political science at the University of Michigan during the summer of 1959.

Carl B. Swisher will be on leave from the Johns Hopkins University during the academic year 1959–60, while doing research and writing on a volume of Supreme Court history for the Taney period. Professor Thomas I. Cook will be acting chairman of the department of political science for that year.

Eduard Taborsky has been awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship for 1959–60 for a study of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia.

Robert W. Tucker of the Johns Hopkins University has received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation for the year 1959–60.

John M. Vorys, former member of Congress from the 12th district of Ohio, and long time member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has been appointed a visiting lecturer, part-time, at the Ohio State University.

Wilfred D. Webb of the University of Texas will serve as visiting professor of political science at Duke University during the fall semester of 1959–60.

Edward W. Weidner, professor of political science at Michigan State University, has been invited by the International Association of Universities to participate in the meeting in August in Paris of the International Association of Universities' Committee on the Evaluation of Programs of Cooperation between University Institutions. He will report on the findings of the Institute of Research on Overseas Programs which for the last two and a half years has studied the impact of American university programs abroad and the impact of these programs on universities in this country and in connection with which he and eight others spent most of 1958 abroad.

Leo Weinstein of Smith College was visiting assistant professor at the University of Chicago during the summer quarter.

Guenter Weissberg will serve as lecturer in international law at Columbia during the fall term.

Norman Wengert, who was on leave during the spring semester and served on the Ford Foundation Team to study and report on the agricultural production of India, has returned to the University of Maryland to resume his duties. During the absence of Elmer Plischke, who is on sabbatical leave during the fall semester, Professor Wengert is serving as acting head of the department.

Richard S. Wheeler has been appointed as lecturer in political science at the University of California, Berkeley for 1959–60.

Allen S. Whiting has been invited to spend the spring term, 1960, as a visiting associate professor of government at Columbia.

Arthur M. Wilson of Dartmouth has been awarded the Herbert Baxter Adams Prize of the American Historical Association for 1958 for his *Diderot: The Testing Years, 1713–1759.*

Postdoctoral awards for study in statistics by persons whose primary field is not statistics but one of the physical, biological, or social sciences to which statistics can be applied are offered by the Department of Statistics of the University of Chicago. The awards range from $3,600 to $5,000 on a nine months' basis or $4,400 to $6,000 on an eleven months' basis. The closing date for application for the academic year 1960–61 is February 15, 1960. Further information may be obtained from the Department of Statistics, Eckhart Hall, University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Illinois.

The World Affairs Center is offering its third annual Fellowship for the Study of International Organization under a four-year grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. The program is designed to strengthen the teaching of world affairs in this country by helping American college and university teachers gain firsthand knowledge of the functioning and problems of international organizations. The award is given to one person each year, and enables him to pursue a project of his own choosing in New York City relating to the role of international institutions in world affairs.

The Fellowship is open to faculty members who hold the Ph.D. degree or its equivalent, are not over 40 years of age, and who are planning to continue to teach in the United States. The World Affairs Center is a private nonprofit organization founded in 1957 by the Foreign Policy Association in cooperation with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Inquiries about the Fellowship program should be directed to: Fellowship Program, World Affairs Center for the United States, United Nations Plaza at 47th St., New York 17, N.Y.

Social Science Research Council's fellowship and grant programs for the coming year embody some departures from previous policies and procedures. Prospective applicants are urged to consult the detailed announcement, which will be furnished on request after September 1, 1959, in order to avoid missing deadlines, some of which will be earlier than in past years. Closing dates for applications for some types of grants will be as early as November first. Preliminary inquiries should be addressed to 230 Park Avenue, New York 17, New York at least three weeks in advance of the deadline.

Predoctoral and postdoctoral research training fellowships will again be offered without restriction as to disciplinary specialty within the field of the social sciences. These fellowships may be held only after fulfillment of all requirements except the thesis for the doctorate; under certain conditions they may be held while engaged in writing doctoral dissertations.

Grants-in-aid of research and faculty research fellowships will be offered to mature research scholars of all ages; they are not available to candidates for academic degrees. The terms of faculty research fellowships have been radically changed; awards will be made directly to individuals, for periods not exceeding two years; part-time appointments for three year periods will not be offered.

Several categories of specialized awards will also be offered. As a rule applicants eligible to apply for one of these may not be considered as candidates for support for the same purpose under the unspecialized programs mentioned above. With the exception of the first item, all of the following awards are restricted to mature research scholars of postdoctoral status. The special categories include: predoctoral and postdoctoral fellowships in political theory and legal philosophy; senior research awards in American governmental affairs; grants for research on American governmental and legal processes; grants for research on national security policy; grants for research on the Near and Middle East; travel grants for participants in certain international conferences; grants for research on Latin America and on Slavic and East European areas (administered by Social Science Research Council with co-sponsorship of American Council of Learned Societies); and grants for research on East and South Asia (administered by American Council of Learned Societies, 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, New York, with co-sponsorship of Social Science Research Council).

APPOINTMENT AND STAFF CHANGES

Samir N. Anabtawi, of Yale University, has been appointed an instructor at Dartmouth College.

James E. Anderson, formerly of The University of Texas, has accepted a position as instructor in political science at Wake Forest College.

Paul Ashby has been appointed chairman of the department of government at San Francisco State College effective September 1, 1959.

Douglas E. Ashford, formerly visiting lecturer at Princeton has accepted an appointment as assistant professor, department of government, Indiana University.

Stephen K. Bailey has resigned his chair in public affairs at Princeton University to accept a post as professor of political science in the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

Richard Bald of the University of Michigan has been appointed instructor in political science at Ohio University.

Arthur C. Banks, Jr., visiting professor and acting chairman of the department of political science at Atlanta University will become professor of political science and co-ordinator of the social sciences at Morehouse College next year. Samuel DuBois Cook, on leave to do writing and research under a Rockefeller Foundation Grant, will resume his duties at Atlanta University next year.

David Elliott Bell, who has had a distinguished career in government service, in economic development programs abroad, and in academic administration and teaching, has been appointed to succeed Arthur Maass as secretary of the graduate school of public administration at Harvard on July 1.

In his government service, Mr. Bell spent four years with the U. S. Bureau of the Budget, and then five years iu the White House as Special Assistant and Administrative Assistant to the President.

Hugh A. Bone, professor of political science at the University of Washington has been named head of the department succeeding Dell G. Hitchner.

Joseph B. Board, lecturer in government at Indiana University, has been appointed assistant professor in the political science department at Elmira College, Elmira, New York.

Richard M. Bray has been promoted to professor in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Cecil Brett, instructor in government at Indiana University, has been promoted to assistant professor of government. He has also been appointed visiting professor with the Indiana University–Thammasat Public Administration Project in Bangkok, Thailand.

J. Cudd Brown, formerly on the staff of the Hoover Institution at Stanford and the San Francisco State College, has been appointed associate professor on the Chevalier Program in Diplomacy and World Affairs at Occidental College.

R. Jean Brownlee, University of Pennsylvania, has been promoted to an assistant professor in political science.

Eugene L. Burdick has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at the University of California, Berkeley.

Frederick S. Burin of the Department of State has been appointed professorial lecturer in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Cecil J. Burnett, University of Pennsylvania has been promoted to an associate professor in political science.

Byrum E. Carter, associate professor of government at Indiana University, has been appointed assistant dean of faculties.

Fedor Cicak, graduate student in the department of government at Indiana University has been appointed resident lecturer in government at the Calumet Center of the University.

Robert E. Clute, formerly of Tulane, has been appointed assistant professor of history and political science at the University of Nevada.

James G. Coke, University of Pennsylvania, has been promoted to an associate professor in political science.

John Crampton is an acting instructor in political science at the University of California at Santa Barbara for the 1958–59 academic year.

Joseph F. Cunningham, assistant to the director of Statistical Services, Department of the Air Force, has been promoted to professorial lecturer in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Charles D. Curran is now executive secretary for the U. S. Study Commission, Texas—a new agency for Neches, Trinity, Colorado, San Jacinto, Brazos, San Antonio, Guadalupe and Nueces Rivers and intervening areas.

Michael Curtis has accepted an appointment to an assistant professorship at Oberlin College for the year 1959–1960.

Harry R. Davis has been promoted to professor of government and appointed chairman of the department at Beloit College. Professor Davis was elected to the Beloit, Wisconsin city council in April.

Jack D. Dowell, who received the Ph.D. degree from Stanford University in October, 1958, has accepted an instructorship at the United States Army Intelligence Military Police and Special Weapons School, Oberammergau, Germany.

Charles A. Drekmeier has been appointed assistant professor of political science and sociology at Stanford University.

Daniel J. Elazar, University of Chicago, has been appointed research assistant professor in the institute of government and public affairs of the University of Illinois, effective September, 1959.

Alona E. Evans, professor of political science, has been elected chairman of the department at Wellesley College.

Daniel E. Farlow, formerly of The University of Texas, has accepted a position as instructor in government at Southwest Texas State College at San Marcos.

John Fenton of Michigan State University has accepted an appointment as professor of government at the University of Massachusetts.

J. Eldon Fields has been promoted to full professor at the University of Kansas.

Ossip K. Flechtheim, formerly of Colby

College and the Deutsche Hochschule fuer Politik, Berlin, has been appointed professor of theory and history of political parties and interest groups at the Free University of West Berlin. His is the first chair of this type established in Germany.

Floyd Flom has resigned his position as assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota to accept the position of Community Relations Representative for the General Electric Company in Philadelphia.

Herbert Garfinkel has resigned his position as assistant professor at Dartmouth to accept an associate professorship at Michigan State University. During the year 1958–1959 Professor Garfinkel has been at the center for advanced study in the behavioral sciences.

Frank K. Gibson, assistant professor of political science, has rejoined the faculty of the University of Georgia as associate professor.

Jack Gourman has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at Immaculate Heart College, Los Angeles, California.

Ernst B. Haas has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at the University of California, Berkeley.

Myron Q. Hale, formerly of Monmouth College, has been appointed visiting lecturer in the department of political science at the Ohio State University.

Royce Hanson has been promoted to assistant professor in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

J. Eugene Harley, professor of political science at the University of Southern California, and a member of the department since 1921, retired from the faculty in June 1959 after a distinguished career of forty years of service in the profession. Professor Harley has been appointed emeritus professor.

Christina Harris, formerly professor in the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, has been appointed professor of political science at Stanford.

Frederick H. Harris, Jr., has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at Georgia State College in Atlanta.

John J. Hebal of the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland has been appointed to the University's European overseas program.

Victor Heyman, a graduate of Washington University, currently located at Selfridge Air Base, Michigan has been employed as assistant professor at Marshall College.

Charles R. Hicks, professor and former chairman of the department of history and political science at the University of Nevada retired in June after thirty-five years of service.

Fred J. Horrigan, lecturer in government at Indiana University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the Louisiana State University at New Orleans.

Thomas E. Hovet has been promoted to associate professor of government at New York University.

Terry Hoy has been appointed to the Atlantic overseas program at the University of Maryland.

Chün-tu Hsüeh, formerly visiting professor at the University of Hartford and lecturer at Rutgers University, has been appointed as research associate in the department of political science at Stanford University.

Paul S. Jacobsen, chairman of the department of political science at Colgate University has been appointed to the European overseas program of the University of Maryland.

Harry V. Jaffa has been promoted to professor of political science at the Ohio State University.

Malcolm E. Jewell has been promoted from instructor to assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Kentucky.

Larry Johnston has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at Wellesley College.

Charles Joiner has received a joint appointment as instructor in the political science department and the institute of community development at Michigan State.

Charles Jones has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at Wellesley College.

Kazuo Kawai has been promoted to professor of political science at the Ohio State University.

David S. Keen, Princeton, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Union College.

Martin Kriesberg of the Agricultural Marketing Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, has been promoted to adjunct professor in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Don Larson, formerly of the University of Miami, and presently consultant to the Fairfax County (Va.) Board of Supervisors has been appointed professorial lecturer in the school of government and public administration, American University.

Carl Leiden, associate professor at Marshall College has resigned to accept a position at The American University, Cairo, Egypt.

Shao Chuan Leng has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia.

Charles O. Lerche has resigned at Emory University and accepted a position in The American University, Washington, D. C.

Duane Lockard has been promoted to associate professor of government at Connecticut College.

Clarence C. Ludwig, who has been at the University of Minnesota since 1935 as professor of political science, director of the Municipal Reference Bureau, and executive secretary of the League of Minnesota Municipalities, is retiring at the end of the 1959 summer session. He plans to make his home in San Jose, California.

Arthur Maass, who concludes a five year appointment as secretary of the graduate school of public administration at Harvard has been promoted recently to professor of government. He plans in the future to devote half of his teaching and a good part of his research to programs associated with the graduate school of public administration.

Gerald S. Maryanov, teaching associate in the department of government at Indiana University, has been appointed visiting assistant professor at the University of Illinois.

John W. Masland, professor of government, has been appointed provost of Dartmouth College, succeeding the late Donald H. Morrison, also professor of government as well as provost.

Charles B. McLane, professor of Russian civilization at Dartmouth has been appointed concurrently as professor of government.

Peter Merkl has joined the faculty of the University of California at Santa Barbara as instructor in political science.

Charles A. Micaud has been promoted to the rank of professor in the department of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia.

Ernest G. Miller has resigned his position as instructor at Dartmouth to accept an asistant professorship at University of California, Davis campus.

Stephen R. Mitchell has become an instructor in political science at the State College of Washington.

James William Morley, who has been promoted to associate professor of government at Columbia, will be on leave during 1959–60. He has received a Guggenheim Fellowship to study in Japan.

Herbert J. Muller, professor of English and government at Indiana University, has been named distinguished service professor.

Martin C. Needler, of Harvard University, has been appointed instructor at Dartmouth.

James Karge Olsen was promoted to a full professorship in political science at Kent State University.

John R. Owens of the University of Michigan has accepted a position as assistant professor of political science at the University of California (Davis).

Harvey S. Perloff, Resources for the Future, has been appointed professorial lecturer in the school of government and public administration of The American University.

Charles A. Phillips, director, Data Systems Research Staff, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) has been promoted to adjunct professor in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Robert J. Pitchell, resident director of the Indiana Commission on State Tax and Financing Policy, has been appointed associate professor of government and associate director of the bureau of government research at Indiana University.

Laurence I. Radway has been appointed chairman of the department at Dartmouth, succeeding John W. Masland in this position.

Merton L. Reichler, formerly of Wellesley College has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Southern California.

James S. Roberts has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Nevada.

William H. Roberts, The Catholic University of America, has been appointed coordinator of a new inter-departmental research and training program in international law and relations.

Lindsay Rogers, Burgess Professor of Public Law at Columbia, retired in June, 1959.

Arnold A. Rogow has been appointed associate professor of political science at Stanford University.

George F. Rohrlich, formerly Chief, Division of Actuarial and Financial Services and, temporarily, Chief, Division of Program and Legislation, Bureau of Employment Security, U.S. Department of Labor, has been appointed as a Principal Member of the Social Security Division, International Labor Office, Geneva, Switzerland.

Carl Rosberg, Jr., after a year's appointment as visiting assistant professor, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein, University of Pennsylvania, has been promoted to assistant professor in political science.

Dankwart A. Rustow has been appointed as associate professor of international social forces in the school of international affairs at Columbia.

Paul Seabury has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at the University of California, Berkeley.

Archibald Singham who is completing his Ph.D. at Michigan has been appointed instructor in the department at Michigan State.

H. Gordon Skilling of Dartmouth has resigned as professor to accept appointment as professor of political economy at The University of Toronto. He will give work in Soviet and East European studies and will participate in the development of a graduate program in Slavic Studies.

Franklin Smallwood, formerly with The Atomic Energy Commission, has been appointed lecturer at Dartmouth.

Julius Smultstys, teaching associate in the Department of Government at Indiana University, has been appointed resident lecturer at the Fort Wayne Center of the University.

Reed Smith has been promoted to assistant professor at Baldwin-Wallace College. He has been granted a senior fellowship at the Fels institute of local and state government at the University of Pennsylvania.

Richard F. Staar, chairman of the political science department of Arkansas State College, has been appointed an associate professor in the department at Emory University.

Richard W. Sterling has been advanced to the rank of associate professor at Dartmouth. He has been granted a leave of absence for the year 1959–1960 to accept an appointment as research associate at the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research.

Ralph A. Straetz has been promoted to full professor at New York University. He remains chairman of the department at the University College of Arts and Science.

E. Harold Swayze, who received his Ph.D. from Harvard University and who spent the academic year 1958–59 at Moscow University, has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Michigan.

Victor C. Swearinger of the staff of the Interstate Commerce Commission has been appointed professorial lecturer in the school of government and public administration of The American University.

George G. Thielman has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at Georgia State College in Atlanta.

John T. Thompson, who is completing a doctoral degree at the University of Texas, has been appointed research associate in the institute of public affairs at that institution.

E. G. Trimble has been made head of the department at University of Kentucky succeeding Amry Vandenbosch who has become director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, established by the University of Kentucky to open in September, 1959.

Tang Tsou, research associate in the center for the study of American foreign and military policy at the University of Chicago, has been appointed as assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Chicago.

Toshio G. Tsukahira of the Department of State has been appointed professorial lecturer in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Donald Urquidi has been appointed a member of the department of political science at Michigan State.

S. Walter Washington, acting professor in the department of foreign affairs of the University of Virginia has joined the Henry Clay Foundation in New York. For the next year and a half he will continue his research on Latin American problems which will involve several trips to Latin America.

David Welborn, formerly of The University of Texas, has accepted a position as instructor in government at Indiana University.

Alan F. Westin, formerly assistant professor of Government at Cornell University, has been appointed associate professor of public law and government at Columbia University. During the academic year 1959–60 he will be on leave under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Meyer Research Institute of Law, to complete a biography of the first Justice John Marshall Harlan.

Lewis J. Williams, formerly with the Department of Defense, has been appointed a Research Associate with the Ohio State Research Foundation. Mr. Williams is located at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Air Materiel Command, Dayton, Ohio. The Foundation, in cooperation with the Air University, is developing the new School of Logistics.

James Q. Wilson, who recently completed his Ph.D. degree at the University of Chicago, has been appointed an instructor in the department of political science at the University of Chicago.

Robert W. Wilson has been appointed instructor in the school of government and public administration at The American University to serve as academic director for Unit I of the Washington Semester Program.

Sheldon S. Wolin has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at the University of California, Berkeley.

Ronald Yalem, formerly of the University of Missouri, has accepted an appointment as associate professor of government at the College of William and Mary in Norfolk.

IN MEMORIAM

Donald Harvard Morrison died suddenly on March 17, 1959, peacefully in his sleep while he was a visitor at the home of his close friend and old teacher, John F. Sly, in Princeton, New Jersey. Although he had suffered a series of severe illnesses dating back to childhood days, he had been in good health in recent years and in his position as Provost of Dartmouth College he was an indefatigable worker.

He was born in Morgantown, West Virginia, on October 10, 1914, graduated from West Virginia University in 1936, and received his Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1940. He joined the Department of Government at Dartmouth College in 1945 after brief periods of service as a member of the faculty of Louisiana State University and as an administrative analyst in the U. S. Bureau of the Budget. Two years later, at the extraordinarily early age of 32, he was named Dean of the Faculty at Dartmouth. In 1955 he was appointed to the newly-created post of Provost.

Donald Morrison always took great pride in being a political scientist. He was co-author of a Budget Bureau publication, *The United States at War*, and also of a widely used text on American Government. From time to time he contributed articles and book reviews to political science journals. In the end, however, his great contribution to higher education was made as an administrator. His fellow political scientists may justly applaud this contribution. Most college professors believe that the academic profession should be a very important source of appointees to administrative posts in higher education, even though able men are thereby lost to teaching and research. Donald Morrison would undoubtedly have been an outstanding teacher and scholar; he chose instead to become an administrator. His record as Dean and Provost at Dartmouth College more than justifies his choice. The quality of that record is suggested by the following passage from a memorial resolution adopted by the faculty of Dartmouth College:

"Donald Morrison dedicated himself to the task of making the educational program of Dartmouth uncompromisingly first-rate. Every effort to raise the intellectual sights of the College could depend on his energetic and unremitting support. His vision and practical idealism made itself felt in almost every aspect of our work. His abiding concern was always with the educational experience of our students. Because he believed that the quality of the faculty was crucial in determining the quality of the College, he was unsparing in his efforts to encourage imaginative and ambitious faculty recruitment and correspondingly impatient with easy-going toleration of the second-rate. In the quality of men he attracted to Dartmouth, his influence on Dartmouth men will continue for decades."

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
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